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This thesis is a study of the cultural politics of environmentalism in an era of climate change and the 
public curriculum that it generates. Scientists and the policy elite alone are unlikely to solve the 
‘wicked problem’ of climate change, even in the unlikely scenario that consensus was reached and 
concerted international action was forthcoming. Increasingly, it is recognised that institutional 
learning through technocratic refinements of the status quo are inadequate. Although there is 
widespread belief that anthropogenic global warming is an urgent problem, political action has not 
followed scientific knowledge, because we have been slow to recognise the problem’s cultural 
implications. A range of voices within the environmental movement (broadly conceived) have 
increasingly challenged technocratic policy framing, with new ways of thinking. By widening the 
debate these critical voices increase the possibility of learning to react in new ways, which increase 
the capacity for collective agency. Based on this assessment, the aim of this thesis is to explore the 
ways in which the cultural politics of particular activist milieus generate public curriculum, through 
catalyzing the relationship between the cultural politics of civil society and the political culture of the 
state. From the 1960s onwards, the environmental movement has undergone a process of 
differentiation and specialisation, such that distinct cultural formations – oriented around direct action, 
relocalisation, and professional campaigning – emerged. Different ideal typical modes of “climate 
change communication” – agonistic pluralism, public participation, and social marketing (Carvalho & 
Peterson, 2012) – can be mapped onto the public pedagogies of these activist cultures. Political 
theorist Chantal Mouffe (2005, p. 20) uses the term agonistic pluralism to describe a situation where 
the “adversary” is understood in a productive sense to be “a crucial category for democratic politics”: 
where this is denied, we/they relations are understood to be “antagonistic” in the sense that conflicting 
parties do not recognise the legitimacy of one another. This view recognises the power play and 
affective commitments that determine modes of political association. On the other hand, “public 
participation” views politics as constituted through non-partisan rational deliberation in legitimate 
public fora. Finally, “social marketing” approaches discard the notion of people as rational decision 
makers, but also discard the principle of public participation in favour of the notion that political 
communication can be improved through expert evidence-based interventions. Cultures of direct 
climate action tend towards agonistic communicative styles, characterised by contestatory moments 
and a public pedagogy of “defining the enemy” (Newman, 1994). On the other hand, this approach 
has been perceived as problematic by movement intellectuals in relocalisation movements, who have 
argued that the non-politicised experimental practices of local communities, which engage 
optimistically with a sense of the possible, may in the long run, be more productive of the kind of 
mass cultural value shift required in order to tackle climate change. More recently, reflecting their 
own situated organisational structures and actor-networks, knowledge workers in the professional 
campaigning sector have increasingly applied insights from social psychology, behavioural 
economics, and cognitive science in order to find ways that engage tacit cultural values and norms in 
their public pedagogical efforts. In seeking to ascertain the ideal conditions for communication, the 
ENGO sector aligns most closely with a ‘social marketing approach’ to public pedagogy. Working 
with the ‘agonistic’ discourse theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, I believe that all cultures 
of activism necessarily engage in a contingent politics of articulation, at the heart of which lies 
antagonism and hegemonic struggle. In this thesis, I construct an intertextual research model, capable 
of exploring the contingent processes of articulation within cultures of climate change activism, 
between them, and between the movement at large, and the wider public, as they engage (implicitly or 
explicitly) in hegemonic struggles that provide moments of educative potential to activists, bystanders 
and politicians.  I argue that the public pedagogies of these cultures of activism cohere around the 
articulation of what Laclau (2005) would call “empty signifiers”, which link particular claims, 
interests, and identities through creating a frontier separating them from an outside, which partially 
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Introduction: climate change, education and the 




[C]limate change is too urgent and important to suffer ‘death by formal 
curriculum’ (Kagawa & Selby, 2010, p. 242). 
 
This thesis is a study of the curriculum generated through the cultural politics of 
climate change activism in the UK. As an educational researcher, I aim to answer 
two broad questions through studying the knowledge products of particular cultures 
of activism: (1) what is it about climate change that poses a challenge to 
communicative and educative efforts; (2) what is the role of social movements in 
addressing these challenges? To address the first question, three broad areas of 
challenge can be identified: (1) there are challenges derived from the complex 
epistemological nature of the problem as a scientific construct; (2) this scientific 
complexity does not stand in isolation from other aspects of our lives, but  “overlaps 
with socio-political complexity”; (3) these co-implicated complexities pose unique 
challenges to our cognitive and psychosocial processes (Gonzalez-Guadiano & 
Meira-Cartea, 2010, pp. 18-27). In this opening chapter, I would like to explicate 
these three areas of concern, before moving on to outline in broad terms the role that 





Scientists and the policy elite alone are unlikely to solve the ‘wicked problem’ of 
climate change, even in the unlikely scenario that consensus was reached and 
concerted international action was forthcoming. Increasingly, it is recognised that 
institutional learning through technocratic refinements of the status quo are 
inadequate. Although there is widespread belief that anthropogenic global warming 
is an urgent problem, political action has not followed scientific knowledge, because 
we have been slow to recognise the problem’s cultural implications. 
 
 A range of voices within the environmental movement (broadly conceived) have 
increasingly challenged technocratic policy framing with new ways of thinking. By 
widening the debate, these critical voices increase the possibility of learning to react 
in new ways, which increase the capacity for collective agency. Therefore, the aim of 
this thesis is to explore the ways in which the cultural politics of particular activist 
milieux generate public curriculum, through catalyzing the dialectical relationship 
between the cultural politics of civil society and the political culture of the state. 
From the 1960s onwards, the environmental movement has undergone a process of 
differentiation and specialisation, such that distinct cultural formations – oriented 
around direct action, relocalisation, and professional campaigning – with their own 
‘cognitive praxis’ have emerged (Jamison, 2001).  
 
Based on these distinctions, the aim of the thesis is to examine the curriculum 
generated through three activist cultures. For direct action, I study the cultural 
politics of the Camp for Climate Action (CCA hereafter); for community-based 
action, I study the Transition movement; finally, for professional activism, I study 
the work of environmental non-governmental organisation (ENGO hereafter) 
coalition Common Cause. Each of these activist milieux were chosen because they 
are arguably the most successful and visible examples in the UK of their respective 
types. They have been researched through applying concepts from discourse theory 
(Howarth, 2000) to the examination of a diverse and large corpus of movement 




releases, pamphlets, as well as books, newspaper articles, and so on. I will now move 
on to explore why the epistemic complexity of climate change as a scientific and a 
socio-political phenomenon, poses cognitive challenges to educative approaches. 
Having set out the problem and outlined the rationale, I will distil these into research 
questions. Finally, I will outline how the rest of the thesis is organised.  
 
The epistemic complexity of climate change 
 
Right now there is no path leading from my changing the lightbulbs in 
my home straight to the Earth’s destiny: such a stair has no step; such a 
ladder has no rung. I would have to jump, and this would be quite a salto 
mortale! All assemblages need intermediaries: satellites, sensors, 
mathematical formulae, and climate models, to be sure, but also nation 
states, NGOs, consciousness, morality and responsibility. Can this lesson 
of assembly be followed? (Latour, 2011, p. 7). 
 
Climate change is arguably the most formidable manifestation of what sociologists 
like to call the structure/agency problematic. The gap between individual agency and 
the autonomous functioning of this complex system at times seems insurmountable. 
What we call climate change is, in fact, a “hybrid theme essentially founded on 
uncertainty” deriving from “the impossibility of controlling – or even identifying – 
all of the relevant variables”, and understanding how they are linked (Gonzalez-
Guadiano & Meira-Cartea, 2010, p. 13). Thus, I find it useful to differentiate 
between the small ‘p’ politics of climate change (the politics of its construction as a 
scientific phenomenon) and the large ‘P’ politics of its causes, solutions and thus, 
attributions of responsibility.  
 
From science to policy? 
How, then, do we follow the ‘lesson of assembly’, and what role do movements 




whereupon the hermetically sealed bubble of scientific knowledge travels 
‘downstream’ to inform policy responses (Demeritt, 2001, p. 309; Jamison, 2001). 
The science of climate change has influenced its politics, but (often tacit) political 
expectations of policy relevance have shaped scientific practice (Demeritt, 2001, p. 
308). Drawing on the work of Donna Haraway, and Latour’s actor-network theory 
(ANT), Demeritt (p. 312) understands that “nature and other things in the world are 
disclosed to us through practical engagements that configure them in ways that are 
recognizable for us and transforming of us”. The important point about Demeritt’s 
argument is that the aggregation of empirical knowledge under a phenomenon called 
‘climate change’ has significant consequences for what scientific practices become 
dominant in informing policy. First, the ‘climate’ is a statistical abstraction, gleaned 
from the aggregation of measurements of surface variables (most often temperature, 
precipitation and wind) defined as “the average weather conditions of a region over a 
period” conventionally 30 years (IPCC, 2007, p. 78). Consequently, ‘climate change’ 
is defined by the IPCC (ibid.) in the following way:  
 
Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or 
the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, 
typically decades or longer.  
 
These definitions, Demeritt (2001, p. 312) would argue, are the “artefacts” of “social 
practices and conventions” that make them possible. These artefacts have produced a 
global scale that has been critiqued by many for ignoring the “uneven political 
economy of greenhouse gas emissions” (p. 313). Three-dimensional climate 
modelling based on mathematical algorithms has become one of the most important 
technical tools at our disposal as a species, in that it renders a more messy reality 
analytically manageable. Nevertheless, the epistemic community of climate 
modelling is based on such technically esoteric knowledge that not only non-
scientists, but also scientists using different methods are located – with a fragmented 





Indeed, even amongst the climate modelling “epistemic community”, because 
models are produced by multiple actors across multiple sites and because research 
often involves “modifying a subset of variables produced elsewhere”, the distinction 
between producer and user is problematic (Lahsen, 2007, p. 903). Lahsen argues that 
distributed co-production, psycho-social investment in one’s own work, and reliance 
on marginalised empirical scientists to compare real world data with models, are the 
main factors contributing to uncertainty within the scientific community. 
 
General Circulation Models (GCMs) have emerged as “the primary means by which 
global warming is understood” (Demeritt, 2001, p. 315). GCMs “simulate the 
behaviour of the climate system by dividing the earth into a three dimensional grid 
and using supercomputers to solve mathematical equations representing exchanges of 
energy between the grid points” (p. 315).  On the one hand, the increasing 
sophistication of models fostered interdisciplinarity by acting as a hub – a Lingua 
Franca – into which scientists with diverse approaches had to translate their 
knowledges. On the other hand, climate scientists have to “travel” further to translate 
their understandings into the common language (Demeritt, 2001).   
 
The absence of dialogical spaces 
A lively debate within the climate science community developed, as the modelling 
community gradually became hegemonic. Much like the World Systems approach 
used to produce the environmentalist landmark “Limits to Growth” (LtG hereafter), 
the value of climate models lies more in their public pedagogical power as heuristics, 
yet they are often misrepresented as infallible and wrongly endowed with predictive 
capacity. For some within this epistemic community, the problem with esoteric 
climate science is seen as educational, characterised by the lack of dialogical spaces 
for brokerage and translation between lay, political, and scientific knowledge (e.g. 




predictive, identity of models has not always been transparent. Yet, there are those 
who believe that the media should take more responsibility for representing 
consensus knowledge, and that tackling climate change is not best served by 
emphasising uncertainty (Edwards, 1996, p. 556).  
 
These concerns can be located in a more general critique of deficit models of public 
understanding of science. Wynne (2006, p. 212) argues that across scientific 
disciplines (including environmental science, but also including many other 
contentious fields such as genomics) there is often a lack of institutional reflection on 
relations with the public, coupled with exaggerated truth claims. Consequently, a 
“public mistrust of science” fallacy is continually reproduced in which “incompetent 
publics, irresponsible and misinforming media, and non-governmental organisations” 
become convenient scapegoats (p. 212). Wynne, at the time of writing, reflects upon 
the six years since the UK House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology recommended a cultural shift towards mutual education between 
scientists and publics, and judges that such a shift has not occurred. He argues that 
institutions continue to construct the “public mistrust” fallacy by inventing a public 
who demand zero risk; have misguided views on the degree of certainty that any 
scientific endeavour can claim; are ignorant of the (presumed) benefits of their 
applied findings; and who are incapable of epistemic nuance and ambivalence (p. 
216).  
 
In the context of both public understandings of, and attitudes towards, climate 
change, this takes on particular importance. Environmentalists have lamented the 
role they have been forced to play in defending climate science in the public arena, 
despite being unqualified to do so (Bird, et al., 2009, p. 55). Thus, one reason why 
learning the ‘lesson of assembly’ is an important educational task is because climate 
sceptics thrive on, and are incensed by, the fact that there is no single empirical data 
point or observation that reveals the unmediated reality of climate change: it is the 




observations must be translated through computer modelling processes (Demeritt, 
2001; Edwards, 2010; Gonzalez-Guadiano & Meira-Cartea, 2010; Latour, 2011). The 
solution, in this context, is the creation of public fora through which trust in the 
social process of such endeavour is made transparent.  
 
Thus, to return to the parallels between LtG and climate modelling, there are two 
sides to the debate, which highlight more general issues with approaches to educating 
the public around complex ecological problems. On the one hand, in the same way 
that LtG was successful as a public pedagogical tool in communicating that 
unchecked exponential growth is impossible, and that the world should be viewed 
holistically as a set of interlocking systems, climate models have been successful in 
providing the shared background assumptions for a hybrid science/policy epistemic 
community, and educating the public about the global scale of the human 
contribution to climate change since industrialisation  (Edwards, 1996; Eastin, et al., 
2011; Mearns, 2012). Like the LtG models then, the value of GCMs lies in their 
heuristic ability to construct a global-scale vision of what some geologists call the 
“anthropocene” – that is, a world finally divorced from a reified ‘nature’ or 
‘environment’, whose trajectory is affected by human activity on a grand scale. 
 
 On the other hand, both approaches share a technocratic orientation underpinned by 
a faith in a top-down, consensual, managerialist approach that favours technological 
solutions to the detriment of socio-political implications (Edwards, 1996, p. 154; 
Eastin, et al., 2011, p. 17). The primary issue with this is that in both cases a public 
pedagogy of alarmism, combined with the lack of any clear political road map or 
mechanisms for public dialogue, deprives the vast majority of people of any sense of 
collective agency.  
 
Uncertainty and the lack of dialogical space combine with pernicious consequences. 
As a solution to this structure/agency problem, Latour has argued that we need more 




that is climate science – not merely scientific (the pre-‘translated’ local practices that 
constitute this ‘global’ issue), but artistic, cultural, emotional, social, and so on. On 
this, Latour seems to be suggesting not only that an understanding of the complexity 
of the ‘upstream’ assembly of climate science will politicise us: he is also suggesting 
– if I have interpreted his recent Gifford lectures correctly (Latour, 2013) – that the 
idea of creating a fecund network of sensitising loops is about what climate change 
communications scholar George Marshall calls breaking the issue down “into smaller 
components that play to our strengths, that are more immediate, that are more 
personal” (Marshall, 2007, p. 11). This being said, I remain circumspect about the 
potential to link the ‘small p’ politics of the study of local actor-networks in this 
respect to the ‘large P’ Politics of social movements (Jamison, 2006, p. 46).  
 
Over the last decade, we have witnessed a significant growth industry of climate 
change communications from ENGOs, think tanks and various dedicated research 
institutions such as the highly regarded Climate Outreach Information Network 
(COIN) in the UK. So, it would appear as though progress is being made in this area.  
Strategies relate to the creation of dialogical and deliberative fora (Vandenabeele, et 
al., 2011), linguistic communication strategies (Segnit & Ereaut, 2006; Segnit & 
Ereaut, 2007; Futerra, 2009), and, in some cases, how to directly counter sceptic 
claims (Bird, et al., 2009, pp. 54-56). In many cases, as Monbiot (2006) points out, 
citizen journalists and the blogs of climate scientists now regularly deconstruct the 
claims of ‘sceptic’ pseudo-science. Yet, what set of circumstances gives sceptics’ 
claims populist appeal?  
 
Jamison (2004) on this issue is instructive: he argues that the (in)famous Bjorn 
Lomborg was only able to gain such political traction and public acceptance because 
of populist backlash to a technocratic greening of society by the Danish Social 
Democratic Party. He warns that a situation where the state funds the majority of 
environmental research, is ideologically committed to a green programme, but 




party was subsequently voted in, Lomborg found a willing home in a party intent on 
state rollback and looking for epistemic legitimation of an ideological predilection to 
public spending cutbacks. Jamison suggests that stronger connections between 
experts and the general public must be fostered in order to avoid the fomenting of a 
populist backlash against unaccountable technocracies. This involves dissolving the 
binary created between lay/expert in addressing “matters of fact”, by treating climate 
change instead as a shared “matter of concern”.  
 
Having looked in a reasonable amount of depth at the epistemic and political 
heterogeneity of the climate science epistemic community, and the scalar production 
of the phenomenon of ‘global’ climate change, I now move on to look at how all of 
this is intertwined with socio-political complexity, and the consequences of this for 
educational efforts.  
 
Socio-political complexity 
As an environmental-ecological issue, arguments made about climate change “are 
complex refractions of struggles being waged in other realms” – including 
institutional arrangements, labour processes, social relations, technological and 
organisational forms – which play out in our situated experience of everyday life 
(Harvey, 1996; 2010). Important consequences follow from this, in asking what role 
education has to play in climate change, and what role social movements have to 
play in such education. Firstly, anthropogenic climate change is intertwined with 
another complex autonomously functioning system of production: exchange and 
consumption based on capital accumulation.  
 
The two are, of course, related: technological advance and profit seeking made 
possible the extraction of fossil fuels, which ‘turbo charged’ our species 
development. Our learned ability over the past 150 years, to extract and convert the 




to obtain this energy “short circuits, so to speak, the long loop of the carbon cycle, 
which passes through the lithosphere and spreads over hundreds of millions of 
years,…so it accumulates” (Tanuro, 2010, p. 92). This has been referred to by 
ecosocialists as the ultimate contradiction of captial accumulation, as the irrational 
management of the social metabolism of humanity and nature destroys the conditions 
that make accumulation possible (O'Connor, 1998). Can there, as proponents of  
Ecological Modernization (EM) suggest, be a rapprochement between our relation to 
nature and the logic of captial accumulation, and what might this mean politically? 
Below, I explore this question through discussing the epistemic construction of the 
carbon economy as a form of public pedagogy. 
 
The carbon economy: calculation as discourse  
As Paterson and Stripple (2007, p. 149) put it, “the spatiality of climate politics 
is…sung into existence”. The production of space, and in particular its scalar 
construction, is partially socially constructed and enacted, related to questions of who 
has the power to make a geographical space a meaningful place of political action 
(Lefebvre, 2000[1974]; Soja, 1996; Harvey, 1996; Kurtz, 2003; Smith, 2001). 
Moreover, questions of space, materiality and meaning can be considered mutually 
constituting, to the extent that we can speak of something like a socio-spatial 
dialectic (Massey, 2005). What is at stake is how power is enacted to produce space 
and through what technologies? 
 
Santos (2008, p. 156) argues that in cognitive capitalism, techno-science becomes the 
primary tool in subordinating the material to the informational. This interpretation 
takes on particular significance in relation to the measurement, regulation and trade 
of greenhouse gas emissions, through assigning economic value to the world’s 
carbon sinks.  A recent technical article entitled, “Can the uncertainty of full carbon 
accounting of forest ecosystems be made acceptable to policy makers?” concludes 




indeed, it is uncertain whether the statistical methods employed to measure this 
uncertainty are even fit for purpose (Shividenko, et al., 2010, pp. 154-155). 
 
Nothing less than the struggle to bring in material processes and all their 
geographical, social and cultural contingencies into a calculable space of equivalence 
is what is at stake. As the hegemonic policy response to-date, carbon markets ride 
roughshod over sociomaterial and geographical contingencies, through the desire of 
expert epistemic networks, who – in a process akin to self-fulfilling prophecy – are 
forced to make questionable equivalences between very different places and 
practices in order to ‘hem in’ carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), so as to give it a 
calculable exchange-value (Lohmann, 2008; Bumpus, 2011; Lansing, 2011). Yet, 
this was not inevitable. Other choices have been framed out of the discussion. For 
example, cap and convergence, fee and dividends, and carbon taxes (Eastin, et al., 
2011). In the case of offsets, certain ‘additionality’ calculations are part of discursive 
formations intended to express the use-value of particular local spaces in the 
language of potential CO2e savings, rather than meeting any other number of local 
agricultural, industrial or social needs (Lansing, 2011).  
 
In other words, a particular change in the metabolic relationship between human and 
land through the application of labour power may result in less CO2e than otherwise 
would have been the case without this change, but the value in a global-scale regime 
of carbon cycle management (Kyoto) is not realised in actual CO2e: it is 
demonstrated as a commodity, only through speculative calculation, so that the non-
owner of the commodity can be assured of its use-value! (Lansing, 2011, pp. 747-
748). The calculation is not a mere abstraction, but is constitutive of the salto 
mortale necessary to throw the carbon sequestering ability of one particular place 
into relation with the emitting ability of another, thousands of miles away (Marx, 
1867 [1976], p. 200). Of course, once brought into relation with one another as 
commodities, the key is that no ethical distinction is made between “survival 





The carbon economy must be understood as the product of government policy: it was 
the most politically expedient solution to emerge from dialogues resulting in the 
Kyoto protocol (Boyd, et al., 2011). The carbon economy is composed of emissions 
trading schemes, the largest of which is the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), and offsetting schemes, controlled mainly through the UN-
controlled Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), but also through voluntary 
markets. Bailey et al. (2011, p. 690) make a key distinction between the CDM and 
the EU ETS: while the CDM takes social and environmental goals into account, the 
EU ETS aims chiefly to reduce emissions from energy producers and energy 
intensive industries, and is therefore judged in more instrumental terms than the 
CDM.  
 
Descheneau and Paterson’s (2011) compelling account of the social construction of 
carbon describes it as a dual discursive process, of mobilising the desire of those 
involved, and routinizing their own practices by borrowing from the discursive 
formations of pre-existing financial accounting practices. The “former animates the 
markets while the latter enables the markets to become normalized for financiers” (p. 
662).  
 
Firstly, as Descheneau and Paterson (p. 668) identify, for private individuals at least, 
the construction of demand for the offset market relies upon the construction of a 
guilty subject motivated to “’do good’ by investing in offset projects”, and directing 
guilt in particular ways such as “going on a low carbon diet”, which is motivated by 
“the relationship between desire, denial, the treat” and so on (p. 662). Indeed, Nerlich 
and Koteyko (2009) have argued that the application of moralistic frames in UK 
journalism uses exactly this vocabulary in order to lend such concepts resonance 





However, the majority of voluntary demand (80%) is corporate, not individual 
(Schmidt, 2009). Descheneau and Paterson (p. 669) argued that industry internal 
marketing schemes invoked the “normativity of climate change” as an urgent issue. 
Such intra-market advertising uses particular lexical and visual tropes to reinforce the 
notion that carbon markets are “reliable” and “secure” in the face of such a “wicked 
threat”.  
 
If the legitimacy of markets is discursively established by invoking reliability and 
security, then the authors argue that subjects are “motivated” by discursive strategies 
that invoke the need for developing “speedy” solutions for the sake of people and 
planet (p. 671). The perceived temporality of the issue emerges as a key stake, where 
it is argued that the speed and efficiency of market processes is advantageous in 
making the problem tractable. This is nothing less than a discursive attempt to bring 
the temporality of climate change outside the slow temporality of democratic 
politics, and into the space/times of late capitalism.  
 
Secondly, borrowing from the pre-existing tools of financial markets normalises and 
routinizes the trade in carbon. One example that the authors give is the establishment 
of a Carbon Rating Agency (CRA) that borrows directly from the structure of credit 
ratings (AAA down to D), so that potential traders can quickly assess the riskiness of 
particular CDM or Joint Implementation (JI) projects (p. 672). Financial derivative 
instruments such as “options, futures and swaps” are directly borrowed from 
financial markets (p. 673). In this sense, the epistemic community of those directly 
involved in the carbon trade is said to be constructed between desire and routine. 
Nevertheless, direct borrowing of the discourses and practices of financial markets 
generated discursive opportunities for critical analyses from social movements: the 
ENGOs invoked the trope of “sub-prime carbon” (Friends of the Earth US, 2009) as 





Lovell and MacKenzie (2011) argue that since the tools of the accountancy 
profession are key to making carbon fungible, they must be brought into the light of 
scrutiny. From 2005, the accountancy profession has sought to discursively position 
itself as well-placed to take the lead on the governance of climate change because of 
the debate occurring over “how best to integrate EU ETS carbon credits within 
financial accounts” (p. 714). The authors’ empirical findings that this technical 
debate occurred “behind closed doors”, with little integration of wider debates over 
“the principle of valuing the environment and accounting for environmental assets 
and liabilities” (p. 715), reinforces the difference between literal accountability and 
ethical accountability. 
 
They note that, despite a slow start, we now see the emergence of international 
epistemic communities “connected through their accounting expertise and shared 
professional culture and values” such as: 
 
The Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB), formed in 2007, 
whose Technical Working Group comprises accountants and 
representatives from the major international accountancy professional 
bodies…The CDSB has the objective of developing a global framework 
for corporate reporting on climate change, and is pressing for climate 
change to be integrated into mainstream financial reports (Lovell & 
MacKenzie, 2011, pp. 723-724).  
 
Such practices are integral to ensuring the spatial flexibility of capital (as compared 
with state mechanisms), which has been the key driver behind the ascendency of 
carbon markets.  The construction of markets overcame tensions inherent in the 
scalar politics involved in implementing pollution taxes, as nation states were 
“reluctant to cede tax raising powers to the EU” (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 687). 
Although the UK (and Germany) voiced concerns about the extent to which the EU 
ETS could be reconciled with the commitments of national legislation, it was seen as 
ultimately more flexible, and no doubt more politically viable, than a national to 




the implementation of the EU ETS saw it politically reframed, from it being viewed 
sceptically as an ineffectual tactical device to avoid real change, to a “practical 
device for realising the ambitions of EM” (p. 691). Thus, at the heart of difficulties in 
implementing the EU ETS are tensions between the technocratic logic of EM and the 
social consequences of uneven geographical development.   
 
There are tensions between those traders who rely on the environmental integrity of 
the market and those seeking to exploit it for quick gain but, on an even more 
systemic level, the market logic of wanting maximum reductions with minimum cost 
leads to some perverse outcomes: targeting the removal of hydrofluorocarbons and 
giving waste sites payment for capturing and burning methane – which are inevitably 
positioned where the poor live – are easier ‘wins’ than investing in renewables 
development (Lohmann, 2005; Bailey, et al., 2011). 
 
In terms of the materiality of the offset market and the projects developed, two 
different kinds of carbon sink can be distinguished: those sequestering projects “built 
from land, forests, soils, water, even parts of the oceans. Fast growing eucalyptus 
monocultures, for example, may be established on cheap land in the South and the 
carbon they ‘sequester’ then sold” (Lohmann, 2005, pp. 208-209).  
 
The second type is more complex: it involves Northern emitters buying into projects 
in a Southern country which still emit greenhouse gases, albeit less than would 
“‘otherwise’ be the case” so Northern emitters can buy-in to schemes that can show 
that, despite emitting greenhouse gases, they emit less than if they operated in a less-
environmentally friendly manner, so to speak (p. 209). For example, if a power plant 
in Africa burns methane, this can act as a recipient of offset funds because it is 
ostensibly less harmful in terms of CO2e emissions than if it was a coal fired power 





And, of course, this all says nothing of the difficulty of outsourced emissions from 
the production of goods and export of goods that the inhabitants of particular 
producing territories will not enjoy, or embedded carbon in transportation chains 
which emit across territories. There is indeed a “dialectical tension between the 
production of space in international carbon markets and local socio-natural relations” 
(Bumpus, 2011, p. 614), which is highlighted through activist practice and codified 
as activist knowledge, as an alternative curriculum of space.  
 
And so, in identifying agents who have reduced carbon emissions, “[n]egotiators and 
their technical advisors have had to supress the candidacy of actors who happen to be 
resistant to quantification”, such as movement activists working on both the supply 
and demand side of carbon reduction, with deleterious consequences, since “policy 
change and political movements are powerful factors in systemic change” (Lohmann, 
2005, p. 214). And thus, the disentanglement, or black boxing, of such processes can 
be read as an “attempt to repress knowledge of the plurality of alternative futures” 
and an “attempt to repress popular participation in the taking of alternative 
decisions.” (p. 222). In short, the carbon economy, when articulated into political 
discourse, is communicated as a kind of public pedagogy, which ‘befuddles’ the 
“concerned middle-class public” into thinking something is being done, and equates 
agency with technocratic expertise. 
 
The challenge for the cultural politics of climate 
change 
All of this signals an important point in the argument: the challenges of climate 
change education are centrally to do with “the total disconnect between the range, 
nature, and scale of the phenomena [that together constitute climate change] and the 
set of emotions, habits of thoughts, and feelings that would be necessary to handle 
those crises—not even to act in response to them, but simply to give them more than 





Belief in the importance of tackling climate change is widespread, but frighteningly 
superficial: the best attitudinal evidence we have of this can be seen in national 
surveys where its relative importance compared to other issues is assessed. For 
example, in Scotland, 18% of respondents perceived climate change as the most 
pressing issue facing the world, with only the economy (19%) and the ‘war on terror’ 
(20%) being perceived as more important. However, when the same question is 
asked, but for issues facing Scotland rather than the world, only 4% of respondents 
identified the issue as being most important (Davidson, et al., 2008). Action on 
climate change is much more likely to be supported in the global abstract than in the 
local particular.   
 
As climate change communicator George Marshall (2005, p. 7) has argued, the result 
is a bystander effect, whereby – when we consider that 80% of people in the UK 
believe climate change to be a major threat – there is “a crowd of 40 million people 
in Britain alone waiting for someone to take responsibility”. Consequently, the 
principal task of the cultural politics of any nascent social movements concerned to 
tackle climate change - that is, the task of catalysing the dialectic between political 
culture of the state and the cultural politics of everyday life - would, on the face of it, 
appear to be the great salto mortale that still eludes us. The pertinent point is that this 
disconnect is exacerbated by a top-down technocratic hegemony. 
 
In this context, it is my view that Nancy Fraser’s (2005) argument for reframing 
justice in a globalising world helps us to understand the need to question the decision 
rules about whose voices are heard in decision making fora. When questions of 
justice, crowded out by market norms and technocratic procedures, are brought to the 
fore, new foci emerge. Fraser’s (2005, p. 72) argument is useful because she reminds 
us that, “it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame which is in dispute” 
(2005, p. 72), such that struggles over material redistribution and political and 




represented in the political space. The three dimensions of justice are, therefore, to 
do with distribution, recognition, and representation. Representation can itself be 
bifurcated into two kinds of question: the first is, “do the boundaries of the political 
community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation?” (p. 
75). The second is, “do the community’s decision rules accord equal voice in public 
deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members?” (p. 
75). Whilst the former is concerned with boundary work, the latter is concerned with 
who is involved in setting the boundaries.  
 
In distributive justice terms, richer nations have, over the course of their material 
development, used more than their fair share of atmospheric space as a part of the 
global commons. This is perhaps the most intuitive concept of ‘justice’ thinking in 
relation to climate change – the historical ‘ecological debt’ frame. However, 
distribution not only covers climate finance and the right to pollute in order to 
develop, but the distribution of technology and knowledge needed for adaptation and 
mitigation, and the attendant issue of intellectual property rights. It also speaks to the 
colonial ‘land grabbing’ practices of energy companies for fossil fuel extraction, and 
the extraction of profit through land rents. 
 
As regards recognition, the concept of climate justice finds its genealogical roots in 
environmental justice struggles (Hill, 2003, p. 28), as campaigners and communities 
of resistance assert that the consequences of climate change are visited 
disproportionately on particular intersectional identities. Finally, representation – the 
framing of political space – is possibly the most troublesome concept, because the 
abstract nature of the threat creates ruptures between cause/effect, perpetrator/victim, 
and depending on how we see the “butterfly effect” of causality, chains of 
responsibility can seem too complex to be adduced in any practical sense. As 
Majority World negotiators argue, emissions resulting from the production and 
transport of commodities produced in developing nations, but consumed by 




obfuscate these complexities. The representational dimension in fact reframes 
climate justice, as an issue of what Santos et al (2007, p. xxix) call ‘cognitive 
justice’; meaning that the hegemonic epistemic community should be challenged by 
“knowledges and criteria of rigour that operate credibly in other social practices 
regarded as subaltern”. This may take place through “invented spaces” of 
participation, , as opposed to merely “invited spaces” of participation(Miraftab, 
2004). This distinction captures the difference between those participatory spaces 
that are claimed, subverted and informal (invented) and those that are presented to 
groups and officially sanctioned (invited).  
 
This socio-political complexity that emerges when questions of distribution, 
recognition, and representation are brought to the fore, requires not only situated 
learning engagements, related to both demand reduction through community action, 
and lifestyle change but “sophisticated deliberation and reflexive engagement with 
climate change justice questions that span the local/global and present/future time-
space configurations” (Lotz-Sisitka, 2010, p. 82). However, an important issue to 
confront is that abstract justice claims do not necessarily motivate change. “Learning 
the lesson of assembly” in relation to climate change knowledge, and conceptualising 
climate justice as an issue of cognitive justice involving a complicated reframing of 
political space/time, and cause and effect, implies a radical democratisation of 
knowledge, and optimism of the will. Below I address the cognitive and psychosocial 
barriers to implementation of such democratic ideals, and ask whether or not they are 
even realistic given the time frame? 
 
Cognitive challenges 
As an educational researcher concerned with how to change mental perceptions, I am 
particularly interested in the cognitive challenges posed by climate change. As I have 
argued above, these must not be considered in isolation from other moments in the 




climate change have been well addressed by a growing literature on climate change 
communication. This section will be brief, because the rest of the thesis is dedicated 
to considering such issues. Firstly, on the difference between acute and chronic 
problems: as a chronic problem, in the realm of everyday life, climate change is 
“very low in the hierarchy of needs” (Gonzalez-Guadiano & Meira-Cartea, 2010, p. 
28). It is in this sense of climate change as an epistemological construct (not a 
material reality) , that it is considered a post-material and middle class cultural 
concern
i
. Inglehart’s (1990) post-materialist thesis, based loosely on Maslow’s needs 
hierarchy, states that increasing material prosperity creates more cognitive space to 
consider ‘quality of life’ issues including ecological, or environmental concerns. 
 
However, this connection between cultural values and material wealth is not so 
simple:  comparative work undertaken by sociologist Hanno Sandvik found as 
national wealth increases, concern for the climate decreases (Norgaard, 2011, p. 
402). By using data on GDP and rates of annual growth as independent variables, 
and treating concern about climate change – drawing on data from a global online 
survey indicating degree of concern about climate change – as a dependent variable, 
Sandvik (2008, p. 339) found evidence to support his hypothesis that “the cognition 
of our species is biased in a way that enables us to supress ‘uncomfortable truths’” 
(Sandvik, 2008, p. 339). In other words, there are significant psychological gains to 
be made in denying the issue’s salience, when one’s material wealth depends on 
emitting highly. .  
 
The broader point here is that “people learn to think through socialization into 
different ‘thought communities’” (Norgaard, 2011, p. 408), and so the trouble with 
connecting an abstract acceptance of climate change with everyday life is the process 
of cognitive dissonance occurring when the implications of acting clash with cultural 





Fundamentally, this problem is compounded by what has been understood – through 
insights from psychology and behavioural economics – as our species-level, 
evolutionarily evolved cognitive short-comings: these are our tendency to favour 
short-term over long-term gains,  our intuitive reasoning impinging on our abilities to 
think probabilistically, our bias towards problem solving in situations where causes 
and effects can be analysed in terms of middle-sized objects that can be visually 
perceived (Marshall, 2007; Jamieson, 2011; McGeevor, in Pykett, et al., 2011). In 
other words, climate change’s “causes and effects are temporally and physically 
unbounded”, and many of its effects will be relatively invisible since they will 
involve ‘statistical’ rather than ‘identifiable’ lives (Jamieson, 2011, p. 49).  
 
Finally, we must add to this mix the controversy over alarmist rhetoric. It has long 
since been argued by myriad climate change communicators and movement 
intellectuals (Segnit & Ereaut, 2006; Hopkins, 2008a) that saturating people with so-
called ‘depressing’ information through alarmist rhetoric further strengthens the 
process of cultural denial, in order to overcome feelings of low self-efficacy and 
cognitive dissonance. As I go on to argue, the discursive space for the cultures of 
activism I study opened from 2005 onwards, whereupon popular discourse became 
saturated with public pedagogies of disaster in relation to climate change, 
promulgated by the popular press, by politicians, and in films such as “An 
Inconvenient Truth” and “The Day After Tomorrow”. Such public pedagogies were 
frequently ‘alarmist’ in tone.  
 
For example, at the G8 meeting in 2005, then Prime Minister Tony Blair proclaimed 
that “we have a window of only 10-15 years to take the steps we need to avoid 
crossing a catastrophic tipping point” (Risbey, 2007, p. 27). One problem, as 
identified by many commentators  including climate scientists (see for example 
Hulme, 2006), was a seeming disjunction between objective assessment of urgency, 
as espoused by the climate science epistemic community, and more alarmist public 




recognise the pernicious effects of alarmist rhetoric, the language used by scientists 
is more accurately described as reflecting an alarming situation, rather than being 
alarmist. Having outlined the three inter-related dimensions of educational challenge 
(epistemological, socio-political and cognitive) in the context of climate change, the 
next section explores how social movements might contribute to addressing these 
challenges.  
 
Social movement learning in context 
Social movement learning (SML) “refers to: (a) learning by persons who are part of 
any social movement; and (b) learning by persons outside of a social movement as a 
result of the actions taken or simply by the existence of social movements” (Clover 
& Hall, 2010, p. 164).  As Foucault (in Rochon, 1998, p.239) recognised, social 
movements from the 1960s have changed “the attitudes and mentality of other 
people, people who do not belong to these movements”, yet this is seldom 
acknowledged (Clover & Hall, 2010, p. 164).  
 
Clover and Hall (2010, p.165) go so far as to contend that, “[a]ll of us, no matter 
whether we are formally informed of the intricacies of climate change or not, have 
been learning about climate change because of the nearly thirty years of work done 
by activists and movements”. Activists “learn in” social movements, and bystander 
publics, politicians and even antagonists “learn from” social movements (Hall, et al., 
2011) as they produce knowledge and affect cultural values and norms over time 
(Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Rochon, 1998; Earl, 
2004; Williams, 2004). In the context of climate activism, Plows (2008, p. 101) 
writes:   
 
Publics can become directly engaged in protest activity or in other ways 
encounter the resources and discourses developed by countercultural 




community level…,or through encountering movement frames 
‘mediated’ through the media”. 
 
For reasons detailed above, climate change education must necessarily engage with 
issues of political economy, issues of cultural change, and the intersection between 
them. In other words, diverse activist practices recognise the need to move beyond 
information dumping and lobbying, to re-catalysing the dialectic between the cultural 
politics of civil society and the political culture of the state. The cultural politics of 
social movements is educational, and education is a form of cultural politics. In fact, 
we can relate cultural politics to three different levels of the systematisation of 
‘knowing’ within such activist practices. 
 
SML can be informal or non-formal. Non-formal learning refers to any space created 
by social movement actors with a purposively pedagogical dimension. Informal 
learning is often self-directed learning, but can also be collective; it is often 
incidental, and accidental; it is situated, embodied and therefore often tacit and 
messy (Schugurensky & Myers, 2003; Conway, 2006; Haluza-DeLay, 2008; Clover 
& Hall, 2010; Crowther, et al., 2012).  
 
Janet Conway (2006) makes an argument for three distinct forms of knowing in 
social movements, which increase in their respective levels of systematisation: “tacit 
and practical knowledge” produced through the situated and unacknowledged 
‘learning through doing’ of everyday practice (as ‘communities of practice’); praxis, 
in which  “reflections on political practice in engagement with other theories and 
concepts inform further practice”, or “the dialectical unity of theory and practice”, as 
Holst (2002, p. 79) neatly puts it; and knowledge production, meaning “active, 
intentional knowledge production processes in which the intellectual development of 
self and others is a central dimension of capacity building for political struggle” 
(Conway, 2006, pp. 21-22). Cultural politics is enacted in and through these different 




contesting hegemonic representations and interpretations of issues, and through non-
formal but explicitly popular educational activities (Conway, 2006, pp. 12-13). 
 
At this point, however, it is pertinent to note that different activist cultures (direct 
action, community-based, and professional), with their own distinct actor-networks, 
enact different kinds of cultural politics (Jamison, 2001). As a result, different ideal 
typical ‘modes’ of climate change communication can be mapped onto the public 
pedagogy of various activist cultures. Cultures of direct climate action tend towards a 
public pedagogy of ‘agonistic pluralism’; cultures of relocalisation tend towards a 
public pedagogy of ‘consensus’, based on more ostensibly open, non-politicised 
kinds of public participation; the ENGO sector, reflecting its own situated 
organisational structures and actor-networks, aligns most closely with a ‘social 
marketing approach’ to public pedagogy, in seeking to ascertain the ideal conditions 
for communication. Political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2005, p. 20) uses the term 
agonistic pluralism to describe a situation where the “adversary” is understood in a 
productive sense to be “a crucial category for democratic politics”: where this is 
denied, we/they relations are understood to be “antagonistic”, in the sense that 
conflicting parties do not recognise the legitimacy of one another. This view 
recognises the power play and affective commitments that determine modes of 
political association. On the other hand, “public participation” views politics as 
constituted through non-partisan rational deliberation in legitimate public fora. 
Finally, “social marketing” approaches discard the notion of people as rational 
decision makers, but also discard the principle of participation in favour of the notion 
that political communication can be improved through expert evidence-based 
interventions. 
 
These divergent approaches reflect processes of differentiation and specialisation that 
have occurred over the years as the environmental movement has produced different 
‘cognitive regimes’ of ‘green knowledge’ (Jamison, 2001). This process, dubbed 




useful theory of social movements in the context of this thesis. To understand social 
movements as cognitive praxis is to understand them as ‘cognitive territories’, ‘new 
conceptual spaces’, which are productive of social learning through tensions and 
dynamic interactions between different individuals and groups acting in that space 
(p. 55). Social movement intellectuals coalesce to form ‘critical communities’ 
(Rochon, 1998), from which ‘cosmological’ knowledge (worldviews), 
‘organisational’ knowledge, and ‘technological’ knowledge emerge (Eyerman & 
Jamison, 1991). These knowledge interests are the attempts of the authors to 
appropriate Habermas’s transcendental knowledge constitutive interests, and 
‘operationalise’ them as heuristic empirical indicators: distinct types of knowledge 
that can be observed, and emerge from the interactions within and between particular 
situated actor-networks.  
 
Activists collectively ‘learn through doing’, as they draw upon the knowledge 
resources of previous social movements (p.57). Such knowledge exists in a 
dialectical relationship between resistance to the knowledge structures of the status 
quo and incorporation into them.  In other words, as representations produced by 
movements are incorporated into the discourse of institutionalised actors, the 
‘cognitive’ space for the existence of the movement is reduced. Thus, the 
professional campaigning groups and networks are said to represent incorporation 
into dominant cultural forms, whilst more ‘militant’ forms of direct action and 
alternative community experiments represent ‘residual cultural formations’ (Jamison, 
2001). The (cosmological, organisational and technological) knowledge generated by 
these cultural formations is mapped in this thesis as a kind of public curriculum, 
generating processes of social learning within activist cultures over time, and from 
activist cultures amongst the wider public.  
 
It is important to emphasise that culture in the theory of cognitive praxis is 
conceptualised after Raymond Williams, in its situated material and spatial context, 




linguistic sense). Therefore, in this thesis, I also argue, taking a materialist view of 
culture, that the insurgent discourses of all of these activist practices are also 
intrinsically bound to the production of space.  As Paulo Freire (1972, p. 90) puts it:  
 
People, as beings “in a situation”, find themselves rooted in temporal-
spatial conditions which mark them and which they also mark. They will 
tend to reflect on their own “situationality” to the extent that they are 
challenged by it to act upon it. 
 
Through the spatial interventions of direct action protest, through translocal 
prefigurative cultural practices, through the framing efforts of activists, and through 
the grey literature of ‘civil society’ research, the analyses of these critical 
communities form a powerful, but often ignored, curriculum for wider society. In 
adopting cognitive praxis as an orienting concept, I investigate how its very premises 
have come to be reflexively challenged by climate activist-intellectuals. Furthermore, 
through engaging with discourse theory, I critically explore such challenges and their 
wider implications for political praxis. Based on what I have explored in this opening 
chapter, I present the following research questions, guiding this thesis:  
 
Research Questions 
This thesis addresses the following research questions: 
 
 What are the cultural politics of direct action in relation to climate change? 
What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics? 
 
 What are the cultural politics of community action in relation to climate 
change? What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics? 
 
 What are the cultural politics of professional activism in relation to climate 





 What dialogue can be observed across these activist cultures and, where it 
exists, has it been generative of praxis, and thus social movement learning? 
 
 What can be learned about the cognitive praxis of climate change activism? 
 




Structure of the thesis  
The following chapter, entitled “The conceptual value and limitations of public 
pedagogy as a framing concept”, situates this cultural work in the wider context of 
public pedagogy, and explores the conceptual value and limitations of public 
pedagogy as a framing concept. The term ‘public pedagogy’ has come to represent a 
diverse body of scholarship, connected through an interest in species of pedagogical 
power operating ‘outside’ of formal educational institutions.  Despite debates over 
the term itself (to do with the very nature of the ‘public’ and the ‘pedagogical’), this 
move allows me usefully to locate my work in a wider body of scholarship 
concerned with the pedagogical and curricular potential of popular culture, everyday 
life, struggles over public space, hegemonic discourse, and public intellectualism and 
social activism (Sandlin, et al., 2011).  I argue that climate activism can usefully be 
conceptualised as producing public curriculum, positioned against the public 
pedagogy of neoliberalism, and ‘in and against’ the pedagogical state. ‘Social 
movement learning’ in civil society is generative of pedagogical counter-power, the 
consequences of which are ambivalent and uncertain. The value of this chapter, then, 
is in explicating Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) maxim that all hegemonic relationships 
are intrinsically educational. The substantive focus of this chapter is in explaining 




context, so that we understand better how climate activism might be positioned both 
in and against such public pedagogies.  
 
This leads into chapter three, which explores the contours of social movement 
learning itself, in the context of climate change. This chapter, entitled “Social 
movement theory in context”, begins with the (seemingly obvious) rationale that a 
coherent theory of social movement learning requires both a coherent theory of 
social movements and a coherent theory of learning. Yet, this is important because 
different theoretical understandings of social movements, which reflect different 
assumptions about human rationality and agency, inflect differently on how any 
learning generated through their activity is understood. In this context, I explore 
three different cultural theories of social movements: new social movement theory, 
framing theory and discourse theory. This exploration serves two purposes: (1) the 
tensions between each of these perspectives reflect, in theoretical terms, practical 
tensions both within and between the cultures of activism that I study in this thesis; 
(2) I make the case that the discourse theory, supplemented by a focus on theories of 
space, is particularly valuable in bringing fresh insights to bear on the cultural 
politics of climate activism.  
 
Having set out the problem motivating the thesis, explained its rationale and aims, 
and explored relevant literatures, chapter four, entitled “Research methods: 
deploying discourse theory”, gives an account of my operationalisation of discourse 
theory, and outlines my approach to data collection and analysis. Discourse theorists 
“are concerned with how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses 
are constructed, contested and change” (Howarth, 2000, p. 131). I am essentially 
interested in answering these kinds of questions in order to gain insight into how a 
dislocatory moment has produced the conditions for antagonisms, from which 
overlapping but distinct articulations of cultural political projects in relation to 




learn about the implications of these projects for the cognitive and political praxis of 
climate change activism.  
 
Deploying post-structuralist discourse theory does not imply a kind of 
‘methodological anarchism’ where ‘anything goes’, but neither does it necessitate a 
mechanical application of particular procedural logics (Howarth, 2000, p. 134). What 
discourse theory does provide is a distinctive theoretical logic, which can be applied 
to particular empirical contexts without stripping them of their historical singularity 
and contingency. Situated partly in a hermeneutic tradition of empirical research – 
but importantly, departing from it in the sense that it does not aim simply to 
distinguish true meanings from ‘surface’ obfuscations – the veracity of my 
interpretation of empirical material will be determined in large by scholarly 
judgement of my application of a distinctive set of theoretical logics to the subject at 
hand. Yet, although there is no one algorithmic replicable procedure, I have found 
the work of Lene Hansen (2006) particularly useful as a heuristic guide of how to 
operationalise key concepts from discourse theory. I draw upon her work in order to 
construct an intertextual research model premised upon the investigation of three 
ethically, spatially and temporally constituted ‘basic discourses’ or ‘Selves’, as she 
puts it, derived from Jamison’s (2001) analysis of three cultures of activism, which 
developed over a number of decades through the cognitive praxis of ‘green 
knowledge’. 
 
Having outlined the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of my research, chapters five, six and seven, 
constitute the substantive interpretive analyses of these three cultures of activism. 
Chapter five, entitled “Direct climate action as public pedagogy: the cultural politics 
of the Camp for Climate Action”, explores how the cultural politics of this culture of 
activism was generative of public pedagogy, using discourse theory to explore the 
pedagogical and political problems and possibilities which emerged from such a 
cultural politics. As the equivalential chain articulating the meaning of radical 




and contradiction represented by institutional responses to climate change, the 
movement gained a significant window of discursive opportunity to educate the 
wider public, but fissures within its nascent identity posed questions of its efficacy as 
a public pedagogical force. The valorisation of direct action and ephemeral spatial 
interventions, as well as an analysis of the fetishisation of carbon, was produced 
through these resulting tensions.  
 
In dialogue with, and in contrast to, chapter five and the cultural politics of DA, 
chapter six uses discourse theory to explore how the Transition movement enacts a 
different public pedagogy through differentiating itself from the cultural politics of 
direct action. Rather than becoming mired in critique, and sensitive to the dangers of 
alienating the broader public through creating yet more activist ‘lifestyle ghettos’, 
activist-intellectuals in the Transition movement began the construction of a nascent 
identity based on ‘engaged optimism’, and the creation of ‘post-political’ place-based 
narratives, based on the ‘theory of anyway’ (Astyk, 2007). This means that the 
movement based its cultural strategy on the notion that the things we need to do to 
collectively tackle climate change (and peak oil) must seem like the things we would 
be likely to be doing anyway, even if it were no longer a problem. This, in turn, so 
the argument goes, means creating cultural narratives, based on a sense of universal 
morality and virtue, that both appeal broadly and transcend traditional political 
boundaries. Although the cultural politics of Transition makes a strategically 
intelligent discursive move in order to mobilise people around the empty signifier of 
Transition, its own denial of its contingency on a constitutive outside can be read as a 
hegemonic manoeuvre replete with its own ambivalences. I therefore explore these 
ambivalences as a result of the cleavage of the political from the cultural. By refusing 
to engage in agonistic politics, I show how particular concepts central to Transition 
culture can so easily become floating signifiers incorporated into alternative chains 





One potentially problematic aspect of Transition culture’s denial of agonistic politics 
that I identify is its readiness to invoke a politics of ‘bottom up’ change, of 
‘community’ and of the ‘grassroots’, without confronting power. This is a problem 
because by ignoring the political economy of the formation of movement 
intellectuals, and invoking exaggerated claims of grassrootism and horizontal 
associationalism, the structural barriers to participation, as well as more insidious and 
distributed forms of power, are obfuscated. In reality, Transition culture stems from 
the application of psychological insights developed through collaboration with 
intellectuals and knowledge workers from academia and professional campaigning 
networks In fact, intertextual links between Transition culture and the cultural 
politics of professional campaigning network Common Cause show strong links 
between the cognitive praxis of both cultures of activism.  
 
The final substantive chapter, entitled “Professional activism: the cultural politics of 
Common Cause”, explores how the cultural politics of professional ENGOs have 
looked to expand the intellectual terrain, and have also influenced the cultural 
politics of relocalisation. Although there are significant tensions and differences 
between the cultural politics of Common Cause and the Transition movement, they 
are united by a belief in universal values and a questioning of the Enlightenment 
subject. In this chapter, I examine how these cultures of activism can be understood 
as undergoing a process of meta-learning through which they are actually 
questioning the very premise of the ‘cognitive’ in the cognitive praxis. Yet, I argue in 
this chapter that there is a fundamental tension at play: much is made of questioning 
the myth of Homo economicus and the Enlightenment subject, without any reflection 
on the irony of interventions grounded in an evidence-based approach to culture 
change, which rely on the epistemic validity of the academy to promulgate woolly 
notions of the Common Good. Thus, in this chapter, I use discourse theory to 
examine the potential of such approaches in the context of climate change, and the 
problems that arise when culture change is co-opted into an ideology of scientism; 




communities of culture change experts who then devise interventions and tools to 
implement them, in the governance of an irrational public.  Although claims to 
epistemic legitimacy through evidence-based policy are seductive, their 
popularisation amongst the wider environmental movement and influence upon the 
wider public do not always make clear that such work is part of a far-reaching 
process of territorial expansion by psychology, cognitive science and behavioural  
economics. In fact, such an approach does not at all challenge, but re-enforces the 
humanist ideal that there is indeed space for a theory of ‘transformative learning’ 
(Mezirow, 1995) in relation to climate change.  
 
In the concluding chapter, I offer reflections on the thesis, reflexively considering 
themes emerging from the research in the context of the research questions 
articulated in this chapter, and considering areas for future research. I ask what the 
consequences of my investigation reveal about the cognitive and political praxis of 
climate activism. In doing so, I reflect on the problematic of the three competing 
temporalities that we face: the temporality of capital accumulation; the temporality of 
anthropogenic climate change and the temporality of democratic politics, and 
consider the structure/agency problematic in this context. I acknowledge the 












Beyond climate change: The conceptual value 
of public pedagogy as a framing concept 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I defined the research problem, framed broadly by two 
overarching questions: what are the educational challenges related to addressing 
climate change?; and what role might social movements play in addressing these 
challenges? In identifying the challenges, I analysed the complexities of knowledge 
production in the science/policy nexus, and then went on to outline the co-implicated 
cognitive and psychosocial challenges that result. I finished by outlining a set of 
specific research questions guiding the thesis.  
 
The dominant discourses of climate change emanating from the science/policy nexus 
are characterised by a particularly toxic combination: a public pedagogy of fear, 
combined with technocratic pedagogies, which educate the wider public that the 
problem can be made tractable through the bird’s eye view interventions of experts, 
in lieu of significant civil society participation. To put it simply we could say that 
this thesis addresses the tensions between  two aspects of public pedagogy: the 
‘official’ one that derives from the hybrid ‘science/policy’ epistemic community, and 
the one that emerges from critical communities, composed of activist-intellectuals.  
 
I argued in the introduction that climate change poses particular and profound 
challenges to the cultural politics of social movements for a multitude of reasons, 
which are all connected to “the total disconnect between the range, nature, and scale 




habits of thoughts, and feelings that would be necessary to handle those crises—not 
even to act in response to them, but simply to give them more than a passing ear” 
(Latour, 2011, p. 2). This, in my view has to do with what cultural theorist Slavoj 
Žižek (2009, p. 154)  calls waiting for the ‘Big Other’. We all hope to be guided by a 
‘subject supposed to know’, when no such subject exists! This to me would suggest 
the final abandonment of the kinds of teleological reasoning driving both laissez-
faire liberalism through to the kind of Marxism that the Second International flirted 
with. On the one hand, the current trajectory of humanity is unsustainable, yet on the 
other, science tells us that we do not have time for the glacial pace of old notions of 
‘historical necessity’. Ultimately, the challenge of climate change dislocates the 
underlying humanist narratives of adult education, and forces us to reflect on whether 
or not there is space for a theory of ‘transformative learning’ (Mezirow, 1995) in 
relation to climate change.  
 
Nevertheless, I would contend that the problem cannot be construed as one of 
‘human nature’ holding back political action. Firstly, I do not believe in teleological 
or totalising accounts of ‘human nature’. Secondly, climate change is not a post-
political problem. It is a problem of overuse – of carbon sinks, of fossil fuels – driven 
by a hegemonic economic system which aspires to an ideal of 3% annual compound 
growth in order to function and reproduce itself (Harvey, 2010). As a result, our 
dominant, and often tacit, cultural values and norms reinforce “a worldview which 
embraces [conspicuous] consumption as a fair reward for a lifetime’s dedication to 
the growth economy” (Marshall, 2007, p. 4). The problem becomes a double bind. 
To the extent that climate change movements are embroiled in a battle for hearts and 
minds, their pedagogical dimensions are about much more than the promulgation of 






The public pedagogy triad: market, state, civil 
society 
It is in this context that it is useful to situate a theoretical exploration of social 
movement learning and education, and its so-called ‘sister activity’ (Hall, 2009, p. 
46), knowledge production, in the broader frame of ‘public pedagogy’. Broadly 
speaking, public pedagogy is a term that has come to represent scholarship interested 
in the process of learning and education occurring outside formal institutional 
contexts. In the only comprehensive review (covering 420 publications) of the public 
pedagogy literature, Sandlin et al (2011, p. 338) identify five primary categories, four 
of which are relevant in the context of climate activism:   “popular culture and 
everyday life; informal institutions and public spaces; dominant cultural discourses; 
and public intellectualism and social activism”. The grouping pertaining to the 
relationship between formal schooling and citizenship that Sandlin et al identify is 
beyond the scope of my study. This being said, given the significant role of social 
movements in shaping knowledge on climate change (Jamison, 2010), it would be 
sociologically valuable to investigate the extent to which such knowledge has 
breached the formal curriculum. As social movement scholar Zald (2000a) points 
out, this is one of the more neglected cultural consequences of social movements. As 
such, investigating the relationship between formal schooling and social movements 
in the context of learning and knowledge production, would certainly be a fruitful 
avenue of future research.  
 
That idea that popular culture and, more broadly, everyday life is a learning project 
through which cultural identities are reproduced and contested owes a debt to 
feminist scholarship (Luke, 1996). As I have already argued, the primary challenges 
for the cultural politics of climate activism are about how the abstract carries into the 
‘thematic universe’ of the everyday (Freire, 1972). As regards the strand of literature 
focusing on the educative potential of public spaces, climate activism is principally 




takes the shape of a cultural re-engagement with ‘place’ through community 
building, or the spatial interventions of direct action (‘invented’ rather than ‘invited’ 
spaces of public participation), the ‘recommonsing’ of our discourse only makes 
sense in the context of concrete spatial interventions. Finally, as I have argued, 
tackling climate change is primarily about challenging dominant cultural discourses, 
and it is the role of public intellectualism and social activism in rising to this 
challenge that I am concerned with here.  
 
Public pedagogy is a term that captures the confluence of cultural politics and 
education, and has been championed over the years by Henry Giroux, who in turn, 
has been influenced by scholarship from the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies 
(established in 1964). As a signifier, the term public pedagogy has its uses, and its 
limits. In what follows I would like to make both clear. In the widest general terms, 
public pedagogy is concerned with forms of education and learning occurring outside 
formal educational institutions: it is used to circumscribe an imbroglio of scholarship 
undertaken by those who “position informal spaces of learning such as popular 
culture, the Internet, public spaces such as museums and parks, and other civic and 
commercial spaces, including both old and new social movements, as sites of 
pedagogy containing possibilities for both reproduction and resistance”  (Sandlin, et 
al., 2010, p. 2, my italics). 
 
The primary utility of this concept, in relation to climate activism, lies in this final 
sentence. The term ‘public pedagogy’ finds its value in taking seriously “[what] 
many cultural studies theorists failed to take seriously, [namely] Antonio Gramsci’s 
insight that “[e]very relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational 
relationship”— with its implication that education as a cultural pedagogical practice 
takes place across multiple sites as it signals how, within diverse contexts, education 
makes us both subjects of and subject to relations of power” (Giroux, 2010, p. 492). 
To discuss a nascent climate change movement as public pedagogy then is, after 




read it in the widest sense as “the struggle between insurgent and dominant 
discourses”.  
 
For the sake of clarity of thought, I invite the reader to conceptualise public 
pedagogy within the conceptual triumvirate of state-market-civil society (no 
particular order). The very point being that each of these categories is, of course, a 
chaotic abstraction, which cannot be cleaved from its counterparts. To reify any of 
these categories is to ignore that they are relationally constituted events and 
processes.  
 
Thus, at any given time, the major function of public pedagogical practices may be to 
patrol the boundaries between these categories or, conversely, to clarify the actual 
processes by which such categories are constructed, boundaries naturalised, and 
connections between them obfuscated. Many ‘Left’ scholars, who diverge in 
fundamental ways, nevertheless agree that state, market, and civil society as 
sociomaterial ‘entanglements’ are of course irreducible, but that the discursive 
practices that serve to ‘black box’ their boundaries and shape our mental conceptions 
of what we believe to be true, are nevertheless real enough in their consequences 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, pp. 176-193; Harvey, 2010; Hall, 2011, p. 716).  
 
Thus, dialectical materialists would speak of fetishisation, through which reified 
categories gain dominion over our mental conceptions to the extent that we become 
ignorant of the sociomaterial practices that constitute them. Post-Marxist discourse 
theorists speak of over-determination in much the same way, whilst rejecting a priori 
totalities, and the ‘new materialists’ (also whilst rejecting a priori totalities) and 
those who utilise the language of science and technology studies (STS), speak of the 
black boxing “of specific practices and assemblages of the human and non-human” 
through representational practices (Edwards, 2010, p. 19). Theoretical differences 
aside, the common point is that the  public pedagogy of climate activism in 




categories, is a form of  ‘border pedagogy’ (Giroux 1991, p.51), underpinned by a 
concern to render visible the shifting borders that “undermine and reterritorialize 
different configurations of culture, power and knowledge”. 
 
Scholars of public pedagogy have made powerful arguments that the possibilities for 
democratic politics have been severely undermined by sites, modes, mechanisms, 
spaces of neoliberal and corporate public pedagogy (e.g. Giroux, 2010; Graham & 
Luke, 2011; Luke, 1996). Yet, these so-called public pedagogies are not monolithic. 
It is in this sense that I find the term public pedagogy most useful: it speaks to the 
contested practices through which dominant worldviews “root themselves in the 
contradictory elements of common sense, popular life and consciousness” (Hall, 
2011, p. 713), and through which social movements contest the status quo through 
hegemonic struggle to articulate diverse struggles and demands under populist 
identities (Gramsci, 1971, p. 350; Laclau, 2005; Giroux, 2000, p. 354; Melucci, 
1996, p. 75; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987).As I go on to argue, social movement milieus 
as agents of public pedagogy in relation to climate change are positioned in and 
against the public pedagogies of “neoliberal corporate culture” (Giroux, 2010) and 
various manifestations of the “pedagogical state” (Newman, 2010). In making this 
claim, it is necessary for me to unpack these respective terms and address their 
critiques. 
 
Neoliberal public pedagogy  
Giroux (2010, p. 487) argued, borrowing a turn of phrase from Raymond Williams, 
that neoliberalism functions as a mode of ‘permanent education’, through which the 
“possibility for democratic politics” is undermined. Thus, the insurgent discourses of 
climate activists seek to increase “the capacity to conceptualize a meaningful sense 
of the public itself” (Sandlin, et al., 2011, p. 353). It seems to me that there is general 
academic sense in education studies in which it has become unfashionable or 




thinkers such as Bruno Latour and the thought styles of Actor Network Theory 
(ANT), ask questions such as “[W]here has it been compiled? Where is it? Where 
can I find it?” (Fenwick, 2010, p. 182).    
 
To unpack neoliberalism as public pedagogy is to understand that the term itself is 
what Karl Marx would have called a ‘chaotic abstraction’ – that is, a first 
approximation, to which we “then need to add further determinations to reproduce 
the concrete in thought” (Hall, 2011, p. 706). As Stuart Hall (2011, p. 708) 
understands it, neoliberalism is a contingent ensemble of ideas, policies, and 
strategies held to together through sheer ideology.  
 
From the 1970s onwards, neoliberalism emerged as a moral project underpinned by a 
faith in “the superiority of individualized, market-based competition over other 
modes of organisation” (Mudge, 2008, pp. 706-707). Its “intellectual face is 
distinguished by (a) its Anglo-American-anchored transnationality; (b) its historical 
gestation within the institutions of welfare capitalism and the Cold War divide and 
(c) an unadulterated emphasis on the (disembedded) market as the source and arbiter 
of human freedoms” (Mudge, 2008, p. 704). This is not the place for a genealogy of 
neoliberalism
ii
; rather it is my stated intention to adumbrate something of its so-
called pedagogical character.  
 
Giroux (2010, pp. 490-491) argues that “culture plays a central role in producing 
narratives, metaphors, images, and desiring maps that exercise a powerful 
pedagogical force over how people think about themselves and their relationship to 
others”. His concern is that given the “enormous concentration of ownership and 
power among a limited number of corporations that now control diverse media 
technologies and markets”, “the translating and pedagogical possibilities of culture 
are under assault, particularly as the forces of neoliberalism dissolve public issues 





Considering reasons for healthy scepticism over the utility of this concept, 
sociologist James Scott’s (1990) “weapons of the weak” thesis immediately springs 
to my mind: in his influential critique of hegemony, Scott argued that people are not 
simply interpellated by – do not ‘internalise’ – ideology, but develop ‘backstage’ 
what he called “hidden transcripts”, by which he meant dissenting discourses, whilst 
the appearance of hegemonic consent was performed, or enacted ‘front stage’ as a 
matter of necessity. Scott argued that “orthopraxy” – behaving as if one subscribes to 
a set of beliefs and ideas under coercive power – may be the starting point of all 
ideological processes. Therefore, in explicating the uses and limits of the term 
‘neoliberal public pedagogy’, it is useful to keep this in mind. 
 
Nevertheless, it is surely undeniable that today there is a genuine sense in which 
“[t]he historical rise of the price system as the primary political reality in which 
corporate profits signify general economic wellbeing reflects nothing less than the 
infusion of corporate consciousness throughout whole societies” (Graham & Luke, 
2011, p. 117). Whether ‘internalised’ or not, public discourse subjugates social 
relations to market metaphors and, conversely, the market is nominalised and imbued 
with human emotion;  “it ‘thinks’ this, ‘does’ that, ‘feels’ the other, ‘gets panicky’, 
‘loses confidence’, ‘believes’” (Hall, 2011, p. 722). 
 
From the 1990s onwards, neoliberal public pedagogy has become so in a very literal 
sense, as the insidious erosion of the private and public sectors has gathered steam 
(particularly during the ascendency of New Labour), through public-private 
partnerships, ushering in a kind of corporate ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1998), throughout 
public services euphemistically referred to in business-speak as ‘culture change’ 
(Hall, 2011, p. 715). Following from this, accountability, that is the “literal duty of 
care in the administration and expenditure of budgeted monies” (Graham & Luke, 
2011, p. 110), has become increasingly cleaved from any sense of embodied ethical 





At its most fundamental level, as I have argued, the cultural politics of such public 
pedagogy involves discursive work designed to ‘black box’ the esoteric workings of 
new corporatism and neoliberalism, such that disjunctions between ownership and 
responsibility, between accountability in a moral and financial sense, and between 
actual human industry and business are kept in place and naturalised. Secondly, the 
inner workings of the state-finance nexus, considered as the central nervous system 
of capitalism, must be obfuscated, to the extent that it is natural to speak of only the 
market: 
 
The prevailing market discourse is, of course, a matter of ideological 
representation… [Markets] require the external power of state and law to 
establish and regulate them…This does not mean that markets are simply 
manufactured fictions. Indeed, they are only too real! They are ‘false’ 
because they offer partial explanations as an account of whole processes 
(Hall, 2011, p. 716) . 
 
The cultural politics of such ideology functions through suturing together 
contradictory lines of argument and emotional investments which are discursively 
effective even if they are not logically coherent (Hall, 2011, p. 713). The 
construction of what Laclau (2005) calls “populist identity” is central to such a 
public pedagogy. Laclau understands populism to be a political logic, understood not 
as mere rhetoric or a set of characteristics of a species of political action, but as a 
reflection of a non-essentialist ontology based on relations of exteriority
iii
. This 
requires a particular understanding of hegemony as the process by which an 
ideological discourse seeks to become so, through denial of its dependency on a 
‘constitutive outside’, and refusal of its own contingent status (Howarth, 2000, p. 
123).  
 
In the case of neoliberalism, different discursive formations have been sutured 




In the UK, Thatcherism articulated links between “Englishness, the family, tradition 
and patriotism, on the one hand and classical liberal ideas about the free market and 
Homo economicus on the other” (Howarth, 2000, p. 9). These seemingly 
incommensurate elements were connected only by that which they stood in 
opposition against which, in this historical moment, was a moribund and crisis 
ridden social democracy.  
 
Critiques of the concept of neoliberal public 
pedagogy 
Yet to the extent that such processes of hegemonic articulation are contingent, 
emergent, and historically specific, cultural theorist and popular educator Glenn 
Savage (2010) argues that such nuances are not clear, particularly in Giroux’s work. 
Savage charges much of the public pedagogy literature with a cynicism which fails to 
recognise the quotidian possibilities for resistance. It should be said that Savage’s 
argument in this sense fails to attend adequately to feminist articulations of public 
pedagogy (Sandlin, et al., 2011, p. 346). Nevertheless, his arguments are clear in 
setting out the potential limits of public pedagogy. 
 
Savage is concerned that the accounts of neoliberal public pedagogy are far too close 
in proximity to discredited notions of false consciousness, inculcated through 
“capitalist brainwashing” via mass media socialisation and the culture industries 
(Savage, 2010, p. 108). Although I share Savage’s concern with unhelpful caricatures 
of ‘descending’ power, I would argue that Giroux himself never expresses such facile 
understandings. Giroux’s writing is of course polemical, sometimes seemingly 
written as a wake-up call. On this, I feel it is simply a matter of taste for his tone. 
Indeed, the charge that Giroux’s concept of neoliberal public pedagogy represents a 





Inherent in the attempt by dominant groups to transform rather than 
displace the ideological and cultural terrain of subordinated groups, 
dominant ideology itself is compromised and exist in a far from pure, 
uncontaminated state. Needless to say, the culture of subordinated groups 
never confronts the dominant culture in either a completely supine or 
totally resistant fashion (Giroux, 1992, p. `187) 
To emphasise the extent of the success of neoliberalism as an ideological project, the 
London riots provides a good example. After the London riots in the summer of 
2011, outrage at another incidence of perceived institutional racism where police 
shot dead  Mark Duggan, found its expression through acts of consumerism. David 
Harvey (2011), responding to political and media branding of rioters as ‘feral’, 
described this as merely one more manifestation of the “animal spirit” of feral 
capitalism: “Thatcherism unchained the feral instincts of capitalism (the “animal 
spirits” of the entrepreneur they coyly named it) and nothing has transpired to curb 
them since” (Harvey, 2011).  
 
Since talk about poverty and inequality is virtually taboo, politicians 
address the young as ‘aspirational’. But everything depends on how, and 
into what ‘culture’ aspirations are channelled….[The marginalised] 
resentful that society wants to control but will not invest in them; 
despairing at being unable to imagine a future for themselves; and 
lacking a politics capable of articulating any of this (Hall, 2011, pp. 722-
723). 
 
Across the board, attitudes towards the poor and marginalised are hardening. A 
recent study by the Rowntree Foundation, using data from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey, has even shown that the attitudes of Labour voters towards the 
poor have shifted since the late ‘80s, towards a belief in personal agency and 
individual responsibility: apparently, “47% of Labour supporters surveyed in 2011 
said if benefits were not as generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet, 
up from 17% in 1987” (Ramesh, 2013, n-p). Whether the sense that the ‘ordinary 
person’ is getting a raw deal is channelled into support for movements like UK 




happening in the UK currently with UKIP), is a contingent upon discursive 
articulation. Certainly, it is ominous that it is perceived by many that there is no 
credible Left political party prepared to stand with nascent movements and articulate 
a coherent stance amenable to the mainstream. 
 
Yet, again, I would like to reemphasise my disagreement with totalising ‘false 
consciousness’ explanations on two counts: firstly, citizens have ‘learned’ publically, 
at least since the unprecedented scale of the anti-war mobilizations in 2003, that 
when consent fails, coercive power can do what it wants anyway. People have 
‘learned’ the hard way that Charles Tilly’s (2004) social movement criteria of 
displays of “worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment”, through “politics by other 
means” are no guarantors of being listened to by our elected representatives.  
 
As people have publically learned the limits of MP letter writing and marching, 
despondency seems a natural consequence. In this case, ‘weapons on the weak’ 
might increasingly be reduced to hedonic escape tinged with a dark irony; what 
Gamson (1992, p. 21) calls “cynical chic”, to denote the response to powerlessness 
whereby people overemphasise their cynicism to demonstrate that “they have not 
been fooled into wasting their time on something they cannot influence”.  
 
This issue of wasting time brings me neatly to what I regard as a criminally neglected 
argument in the structure/agency debates of the public pedagogy literature. Culture 
as a pedagogical resource is increasingly stymied by the network time of late 
capitalism, which many commentators (Hartman & Darab, 2012) have argued is 
insidiously creeping into all aspects of our lives, exerting what could be argued to be 
an embodied cognitive mode of disciplining biopower. ‘Fast-time’, what Erikson 
(2001) has called the ‘tyranny of the moment’,  is partly to do with the way that 
technological advances changed the way we work, play and differentiate between the 
two. This, so the argument goes, marks a differentiation from a so-called ‘Fordist’ 




understand that such changes are related to the need for capital accumulation to 
overcome geographical boundaries.  Hassan (2009, p. 335) argues that, until the 
1970s, new cultural forms had the time to evolve dialectically in relation to the 
dynamics of capital, “or organically as new independent forms”. Yet, he argues that 
we are now at a point where digital network time has locked in cultural production to 
a “recursive mode” of recycling at worst, and bricolage at best.  
 
Network time, and the overabundance of information that we deal with at work, at 
home, whilst socialising and so on, is said to squeeze out the slow-time required for 
reflective thought, meditative thought, and ultimately non-instrumentalised creative 
and critical thought. For example, sociologist Gemma Edwards’s (2008, p. 305)  
empirical study of work intensification in the education sector found that around 
85% of rank and file members of the National Union of Teachers never attended 
union general meetings and around 4 out of 10 surveyed cited ‘too many work 
commitments’, or ‘care commitments’ as the reasons for non-attendance (p. 307). 
Ultimately work intensification contributed to “a lack of time at work to reflect, 
discuss issues, collectivize them and make them their priority for action” (p. 307). In 
the information rich but culturally stagnant network time of daily life, cognitive 
attention becomes a key commodity, as individuals struggle to allocate it across the 
overabundance of information sources that demand it (Hassan, 2009, p. 352; 
Bouchard, 2011, p. 292). 
 
In this context, the embodied political economy of attention should be of more 
importance to public pedagogy scholars: it augments Savage’s critique of public 
pedagogy as neoliberal brainwashing, by suggesting that the individual is not 
brainwashed, but is washed out, to the point where their physiological-cognitive 
reserves for critical political thought, and addressing wicked problems such as 
structural economic issues and climate change, are low priority. The crux of this 
argument is that our own subjectivities are subject to the requirement of capital to 





[C]ultural studies seeks understanding through specific forms of 
“reading” to identify cracks of “resistance” (Hall 1973; Fiske and Hartley 
1978) in the controlling edifice of the culture industries (especially 
television), where again no edifice really exists – only capitalism dealing 
chaotically and opportunistically with its deepest contradiction through 
constant fixes in time and space (Hassan, 2009, p. 354). 
 
Thinking about space/time as a product of political economy, and therefore 
something political, enriches Savage’s critique of public pedagogy. A good example, 
in the context of the rise of the populist Right, is given below (James, 2013): 
We live in time. If a worker lacks a good understanding of capitalism, if 
she votes for a right wing populist party (such as has just happened in the 
UK with UKIP making considerable gains in recent council elections) 
then this is not because she is stupid and not because the plutocratic class 
has manipulated her mind by inserting an ideological (i.e.: epistemic) veil 
between the real world and some delusional one. If a worker spends 8 
hours of her day at work, operating in two temporalities via her body and 
her immersion in a disembodying digital temporality, and must suffer the 
chronic overstimulation of her evolved attentional capacities, thereby 
generating a near permanent level of chronic anxiety…then it is no 
wonder that she doesn’t have a good understanding of the political and 
economic condition of her age. There is no time for it! Chronic 
overstimulation and under nutrition mean her brain is burned out, 
exhausted, and she must get to bed rather than crack open a copy of 
Capital or Hatred of Democracy. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the ‘tyranny of the moment’ is not strictly 
something new to the advent of ‘network time’; Paulo Freire (1972) argued that 
people living in poverty know all about the tyranny of the moment: dealing with 
perpetual crises, and working long hours for unfair wages, robs one of time as a 
resource. This condition is simply amplified in an era of cognitive capitalism. The 
consequence for the public pedagogy debates, and thus for my study is quite clear: an 
interest in the pedagogical potential of public space or lack thereof, should not be 





The second strand of the public pedagogy critique is centred round the idea that the 
use of ‘public’ to describe the commodification of our cultural lives is an obvious 
misnomer. With this I agree although I’m not sure whether this gripe goes any deeper 
than invective over semantics: Savage argues that the socio-spatial polarisation 
resulting from uneven geographical development renders the very term ‘public’ 
problematic, because the resulting uneven distribution of social capital means that it 
makes more sense to speak of a plurality of publics (Savage, 2010, p. 104).  
 
Furthermore, Savage (2010, p. 105) asks,  “with the exception of exclusively state-
owned libraries, museums, gardens and other such spaces, which citizens might not 
necessarily access, to what extent can we feasibly suggest that “public space” has 
ever existed, since the first line was drawn in the sand?”. Ultimately, he argues that 
“ideologies of corporatisation” might be preferable to the “oxymoronic” term 
“neoliberal public pedagogy” (2010, p. 106). Of course, many of our public spaces 
are more correctly quasi-public in their ownership and degree of openness with the 
consequence that the public/private dichotomy is often unhelpful. Indeed, the central 
thesis of Castells’s recent most work “Networks of outrage and hope” (2012) is that 
current social movements exist in ‘hybrid spaces’, combining the space of place and 
in the space of flows, which are simultaneously local and global, private and public. 
Thus, I do not have much of a rejoinder to this other than to say that the phrase 
public pedagogy emphasises that the public and the pedagogical are two intertwined 
stakes of political struggle, as the public sphere, and paternalistic state power is 
eroded by the market. Since obscuring the irreducibility of the state and the market 
has been shown to be a necessary part of the cultural politics of neoliberalism more 
generally, I move on below to make the argument that pedagogical power has 
emerged as a form of soft power, supplementing, and in some cases ostensibly 
supplanting more so-called ‘paternalistic’ forms of governance. Yet, I also argue that 
harder, more coercive forms of power are re-enforced through ‘raced’ post-911 





In and against the pedagogical state? 
In the UK, the death and resurrection of neoliberal discourse under New Labour’s 
Third Way project heralded in the era of what has been referred to as the pedagogical 
state. This is used in different contexts to describe a situation in which pedagogical 
power replaces state coercion and ‘harder’ techniques of governance. This 
understanding takes on particular significance and multiple inflections in the context 
of environmental activism. 
 
Newman (2010) and Pykett (2010) both helpfully question the notion of a coherent 
turn towards a “governmentality of the self” under neoliberalism; the former 
identifying four policy strands relating to a ‘pedagogical state’, which can be 
discerned from an historically complex assemblage of practices, actors and projects: 
these can be summarised as training for education and flexible capitalism; capacity-
building for self-provision and self-management; moral regulation; and public 
participation and deliberative democracy.  
 
The point that I would like to begin with is that the pedagogical state as a concept 
can easily slip into caricature if one is not careful with its various inflections. Its 
‘Moral regulation’, or ‘remoralisation’ component can be read as a particularly 
Anglo-American phenomenon: a response to the “crisis of cultural security” (Green, 
2007, p. 565) faced by the state in a globalised risk society, and one in which 
signifiers such as ‘community’, ‘social capital’ and ‘resilience’ are prescribed with 
classed, raced, and gendered implications. In other words, remoralisation can be read 
as an ideological response to social issues arising as a result of a ‘performative’ 
competition state losing its grasp on paternalistic authority in a “postmodern” polity. 
 
Thus, whilst some argue that the pedagogical state is primarily about performativity 
(roughly speaking, a term catachrestically applied from the regulation of ‘inputs’ and 




through pedagogical interventions – there is a quest for alternative ethical and moral 
frames, in the face of the “abstracted abnormalities and anomic potential” (Green, 
2007, p. 559) of the neoliberal polity, which has seen a revival of neoconservative 
values promulgated in a variety of public pedagogical spaces. 
 
This is compounded by the ‘post-9/11’ context, where moral regulation is linked to 
‘disaster pedagogies’ (Preston, et al., 2011). Preston (2012) argues that public 
disaster education, in a post-9/11 context, is embedded into the fabric of everyday 
lives through security alerts, routines of securitisation, and media promulgation. Why 
might this be relevant to climate activism? My answer is that as climate change 
moves into the realm of the political, it is necessarily imbricated in a wider politics of 
economy, development, immigration and energy. The state’s preparedness to apply 
tropes such as ‘domestic extremism’ to the uptake of direct action tactics can be 
interpreted as a public pedagogical device, designed to justify the systematic 
surveillance and repression of political activism. Social movement scholar Alexandra 
Plows (2008, p. 94) has rightly argued that “given the hard times for UK civil 
liberties in a post ‘9-11’ climate, the continuing impact and uptake of 
[environmental] protest tactics deserves recognition”. Post-structuralist philosopher 
and sociologist Baudrillard (Paillard, 2011, p. 343) has posited that the ‘War on 
Terror’ has become a kind of symbolic virus of the imagination, through which 
“Western powers have imposed a kind of security terror on themselves”. As I will go 
on to argue, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, particularly their radical 
reworking of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and Mouffe’s theory of agonistic 
democracy, are invaluable in understanding what is at stake in this respect. The 
natural consequnce of the post-partisan myth is that when antagonisms arise, they are 
denied channels of legitimate ‘agonistic expression’, the result being the emergence 
of populist identities, both secular and sectarian, Right and Left. As I will show over 
the course of the thesis, the cultural politics of environmentalism in an era of climate 
change increasingly tends towards consensus oriented approaches, which seek to 




The relevance does not end with direct action. Preston et al. (2011), are the first 
academics that have identified parallels between the discourse of ‘post 9-11’ disaster 
pedagogies and the discourse of community learning, with interesting implications 
for the public pedagogy of community activism against climate change. It appears 
that ‘community resilience’ is a quintessential ‘floating signifier’ – meaning, a 
signifier whose meaning is ambiguous enough to be appropriated by various interests 
into various chains of equivalence (explained more fully in the following chapter)– 
used in the context of national security and ‘preparedness for emergencies’, as well 
as responding to climate change and austerity. Preston, et al., in interviews with 
policy makers and community practitioners, found the ‘absent presence’ of race was 
a key feature of such discourse: 
 
Community Resilience is associated with ‘Dunkirk Spirit’ and 
‘Britishness’. In interviews with policy makers and practitioners, 
community resilience invoked themes of “localism and romanticised 
communities as sharing a collective (British) spirit of survival and 
counterpoised the metropolitan as anonymized and unsafe. “Race is 
therefore ‘absent’ in not being directly made, but always ‘present’ in 
terms of the racial associations which fetishized Britishness and 
stereotypically white, rural/suburban forms of social capital.” (Preston, et 
al., 2011, p. 759) 
 
Thus, as I argue in the forthcoming chapters, the post-partisan preoccupation with 
consensus, mixed with insights from psychology, and heavy reliance on the 
invocation of ‘local community’ in the relocalisation movement is problematic 
because in marginalising an agonistic approach to cultural politics, the power play  
constituting any stable social formation is obfuscated. In the Transition Towns 
movement, a survivalist element to its cultural identity often lurks barely supressed 
beneath front stage discourses of engaged optimism. Transition Culture also invokes 
notions of ‘Dunkirk Spirit’, as a narrative that bridges the need to relocalise for 





More generally, the tropes of ‘community’, ‘resilience’, and ‘social capital’ – as well 
as being floating signifiers deployed with good intentions by relocalisation 
movements – are policy prescriptions for the marginalised – in lieu of any 
redistributive measures (Levitas, 2005; Worley, 2005; Robinson, 2007). As positive 
as such concepts can be, they may also be deployed in such a way that they reinforce 
the status quo. To be more specific, such tropes are ambivalent, and can be used to 
reproduce privileged class positions, and maintain divisions along raced and 
gendered lines. This is explored in more depth in chapters six and seven. 
 
Finally, a very different way in which the notion of the pedagogical state is relevant 
relates to a range of strategies, which can be considered soft interventions designed 
to shape the subjectivities and behaviours of citizens in relation to pro-environmental 
behaviours. In this context, the performative state perpetuates the so-called 
‘governance trap’ (where citizens and the state both attribute primary responsibility 
for acting to one another) through seeking to shape behaviour at an individual and 
household level in a way which obscures obvious tensions between neoliberal 
economics and sustainability (Webb, 2012). 
 
This relates more to the notion of policy interventions informed by “epistemological 
drivers” such as “behavioural economics, psychology and the neurosciences”, and  
“mechanisms” such  as “spatial design and (choice) architecture; temporal ordering; 
measures to rationalize the brain; and prompting social norms via culture change 
strategies, social motivation and segmentation, and the development of peer-to-peer 
pressure” (Jones, et al., 2010, p. 486). Such interventions can be considered 
pedagogical to the extent that they aim to ‘re-educate the habitus’ (Haluza-DeLay, 
2008) (our structurally constrained habitual practices) and exercise a kind of 
technocratic control over citizens’ social learning capacities, through drawing upon 
academic insights into the relationship between the cognitive, social and material 
worlds. This aspect of pedagogical power, deployed by ENGOs, community 




although often with very little critical scrutiny regarding its limits as well as 
possibilities in catalysing the relationship between the cultural politics of everyday 
life and political culture.  ENGOs are productively applying insights from such 
disciplines to move beyond the piecemeal and short-termist interventions of social 
marketing, and towards a more holistic reorientation of our cultural values. In 
particular, ENGOs increasingly recognise the need to contest values and market 
norms of neoliberal public pedagogy. Yet, they assume that the Common Good and a 
universal value base is something that can be unproblematically identified through 
empirical research, and that expert knowledge workers can be entrusted with the task 
of devising cultural and pedagogical strategies for transformation. Again, I argue that 
the essentialist and totalising view of culture, mixed with a post-political view of 
evidence-based policy, is ambivalent and questionable.   
 
In short, the portrayal of the state as a monolithic public pedagogical agent is 
misleading. In this thesis, I argue that discourse theory can be fruitfully deployed in 
order to analyse the ambivalences and productive tensions generated through the 
cultural politics of climate activism.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have positioned the cultural politics of climate activism in the wider 
context of public pedagogy. I have explored the rationale for this, and in doing so 
have looked at the limits and possibilities of such a positioning. I explained the 
various inflections of the term public pedagogy and argued that it can be 
disaggregated into the public pedagogy of the market, the state, and civil society. I 
explored the notion of neoliberal public pedagogy as set out by Henry Giroux with 
the intention of arguing that climate activists operating in civil society are positioned 
against such a public pedagogy. Nevertheless, I argued that these categories are 
reified generalities that barely reflect the multi-scalar interaction of persons, 




very operation of public pedagogical practices is often to patrol the boundaries of 
these categories. I argued that the notion of neoliberal public pedagogy cannot be 
fruitfully explained in terms of Marxian notions of false consciousness (as opposed 
to the true path of Grand Historical Time) and that reality is far more contingent, and 
emergent, even whilst it is saturated with power. I attempted to explain the notion of 
being both in and against the pedagogical state as well as its various connotations in 
the context of this study. In doing all of this, I have set up the idea that the public 
pedagogy of climate activism emerges through hegemonic struggle. In the following 
chapter, I develop this line of thought by arguing that the post-structuralist discourse 
theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1987) provides the most promising basis for 
understanding the cultural politics of climate activism in this way. I couch this 
argument in a wider discussion of the cultural turn in social movement theory, 
explaining the main tenets, strengths and weaknesses of new social movement theory 
and framing theory in relation to discourse theory. Such an in-depth exploration of 
social movement theory is necessary in order to understand how these different 
perspectives, and the tensions between them, are inflected in the practices of 


















Social movement theory in context: 




In the previous chapter, I situated the ideational work of climate change oriented 
social movements in the broader frame of public pedagogy. The primary reason for 
doing so was to emphasise that the knowledge making and educational capacity of 
social movements focused in one way or another on climate change is necessarily 
polemical; positioned ‘in and against’ the “pedagogies of everyday life” (Luke, 
1996), ‘neoliberal’ and ‘corporate public pedagogies’ (Giroux, 2005; Giroux, 2010), 
‘raced’ neoconservative ‘disaster pedagogies’ in a post-9/11 context (Preston, 2012), 
as well as the pro-environmental change strategies and community rhetoric of the  
‘pedagogical state’, more generally (Pykett, 2010; Newman, 2010). 
 
This point deserves close scrutiny, as it bears directly on how we might understand 
social movements themselves. Alain Touraine, for instance, argued that “[c]ultural 
innovation is not truly linked  to a social movement unless it is polemical, in which 
case it comes into  conflict with the mechanisms of cultural reproduction maintained 
by the dominant class” (Touraine, 1977, p. 330). If this is what I take to be the case, 
then I will have to either occlude various non-confrontational pedagogical practices 
that I would recognise as being part of a broader climate ‘movement’, or else allow 




Jasper (1999, p. 35) argue that  “[m]oral or “prefigurative” movements, that put 
unorthodox values or norms into practice – including religious movements, utopian 
communities and self-help movements  – challenge dominant cultural beliefs and 
ideologies without directly confronting, and in some cases intentionally avoiding, the 
state or polity members”. In the case of climate change, there are certainly utopian 
community practices and self-help practices, which align with such understandings. 
 
Moreover, there are a number of studies of “social movement learning”, which 
would stretch some of the more rigid definitions of social movements available in the 
sociological literature (Gouin, 2009; Parrish & Taylor, 2007; Sandlin & Walther, 
2009; Flowers & Swan, 2011; Jubas, 2011). These studies use the term social 
movement learning to address movements based on ethical consumption; faith; less 
valorised forms of community struggle in everyday life; the reclamation of time 
through ‘living simply’, and ‘slow food’, where simply ‘slowing down’ is considered 
to be counter-hegemonic. It sometimes seems as though the subjects of such studies 
are only nominally connected by an interest in ‘social movement learning’. 
 
This review chapter is partly based on the premise that any coherent theory of social 
movement learning in context must combine two co-implicated components: a theory 
of social movements and a theory of learning. I proposed in chapter one that three 
‘modes’ of climate change communication – social marketing, deliberative 
democracy, and agonistic pluralism (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012) – can be mapped 
onto the cognitive praxis, and thus, the public pedagogy of climate change 
movements. In this broad context, I will explore the extent to which, and in what 
ways, existing cultural theories of social movements help us to develop our 
understanding of climate activism and its educative potential. I ask the question, 
‘what is the right kind of cultural theory?’ Expanding on the previous chapter, which 
essentially framed public pedagogy as hegemonic struggle, I make the case for 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1987) discourse theory, which retains key insights from 




argument for discourse theory in a wider ‘cultural turn’ in social movement theory, 
which includes new social movement theory and framing theory. Crudely speaking, 
new social movement theory speaks to ‘deliberative democracy’ approaches, framing 
theory speaks to ‘social marketing’ approaches, and discourse theory speaks to 
‘agonistic pluralism’ approaches. It is vital to explore each of these approaches in 
some depth precisely because they reflect, in theoretical terms, important tensions 
occurring both within and between the concrete practices of each culture of activism 
studied. I explore new social movement theory and framing theory first, in order that 
I can place my argument for discourse theory in a context where it is clear to the 
reader how it differs from, and improves upon, these accounts of the cultural work of 
social movements. 
 
Over the course of this chapter, I make it clear that I think social movements can be 
defined in terms of relations of exteriority: that is to say, they are emergent, 
contingent and reliant upon an outside that partially constitutes their inside. 
Consequently, they create identities that strive for a necessary, yet impossible, 
fullness. This is one primary reason why I find discourse theory so useful.  I have no 
problem accepting that a social movement can encapsulate cultural practices that are 
implicitly anti-status quo, but are strategically non-confrontational. The more 
interesting question to me is the extent to which confrontation and power can be 
avoided, and the consequences of particular activist cultures’ disavowal of 




It is necessary to place my discussion of cultural theories of social movements in 
theoretical and historical context before I begin. In particular, a concise discussion of 
the rational turn in social movement theory is necessary because I think it helps to 




the empirical and the normative, as well as reason and affect. Pre-1960s social 
movement studies tended to characterize social movements in pathological terms: 
participants were looked upon as irrational, and protest leaders were depicted in 
Freudian terms as acting out unconscious psychological urges (Flacks, 2005, p. 6). 
Notable studies which characterise social movements in pathological terms are Eric 
Hoffer’s “The True Believer” (1951) and Theodore Adorno et al’s “The 
Authoritarian Personality” (1950). This “dispositional perspective” holds that 
“movement participants will differ importantly from non-participants in terms of 
various personal and cognitive traits or dispositions” (Snow & McAdam, 2000, p. 
43).  
 
The post ‘60s period was marked by a significant shift in perspective, as many 
academics participating in social action during the previous decade could not accept 
such explanations of change efforts that they were both involved in and sympathized 
with. Thus, by simply recasting social movements as “politics by other means”, 
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) emerged in the late ‘60s as an alternative to, 
and criticism of, dominant theories, which incorporated social movements to other 
forms of impulsive, and somewhat irrational, behaviour, by depicting them as 
rational responses to the cost and rewards of different lines of action regarding a 
specific conflict with authority in the context of institutionalised power relations  
(Jenkins, 1983, p. 528; della Porta & Diani, 1999, p. 139; Piven, 1995, p. 137). RMT 
argues that, since grievances are to be found consistently throughout society, to 
define movements in terms of grievances holds no analytical utility. Later, Political 
Opportunity Theory (POT) emerged as what were seen by its proponents as a 
refinement of RMT. In POT, it is posited that social movements emerge as a result of 
expanding political opportunities, such as the degree of institutional openness, 
stability, alliance formation, and capacity for repression (Kriesi, et al., 1995; della 





There is an extent to which such theories are useful for understanding climate change 
activism. Existing studies of direct climate action have used the ‘political 
opportunity’ model to explain activists as rational actors responding to institutional 
failure and policy contradiction (Pearse, et al., 2010, p. 79; Plows, 2008, pp. 95-99). 
As Schlembach (2011, p. 195) observes, one of the features distinguishing the 
climate movement in its various manifestations from established incarnations of the 
green movement is an “epistemological shift” to “legitimization of activism resulting 
partly from the close observance of official sources of climate science”.   
 
To put it simply, it is clear that the mainstream political acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change as a chronic threat, which emerged in the early millennium, provided 
political opportunities for activists to highlight the irrationality of trying to square the 
circle of long-term climate change policy and short-term goals of economic growth. 
This approach to theorising and justifying activism may seem all the more appealing 
precisely because of the historical pathologisation of collective protest. Existing 
scholarship has highlighted the fact that this identification of political opportunities 
then opens the space for various repertoires of climate action from direct action 
directed at the state and corporations (Pearse, et al., 2010; Plows, 2008), to collective 
action at the local level to reduce emissions (Nerlich & Koteyko, 2009). 
 
In terms of public pedagogy, we can say that climate activists learn to mobilise 
resources, and that the wider public learns from the mobilisation of such resources. 
However, climate activists do not learn to mobilise these resources tabula rasa: 
latent ‘capacity’ is ‘built’ through ‘cycles of protest’ (Tarrow, 1991): 
 
Previous generations of [environmental] activists have accrued tangible 
resources —knowledge about campaign issues, political institutions, 
repertoires of action, ‘ways of doing things’, social networks, specific 
resource centres…which provide resources for new generations of 





Moreover, it could be argued that these theories of social movements do not account 
for the cultural work taking place in the “submerged networks” of everyday life 
(Melucci, 1996). Arguably, affective ties, cultural values and norms and meanings 
are necessary, in order to explain participation in collective action which may be 
high stakes, or for which there is no obvious instrumental pay-off for individual 
participants (Jasper, 2010). Cultural theorists of social movements have argued that 
there is “no such thing as objective political opportunities,…they are all interpreted 
through cultural filters” (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, pp. 31-35). My suggestion is that 
culture provides a hinge between structure and agency, which more instrumental 
theories of social movements are ill equipped to account for. However, to what 
extent can culture be regarded as a resource to be rationally mobilised? Moving on, I 
explore how New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) addresses this question.  
 
New Social Movement Theory 
In this section, I focus on NSMT generally, albeit with a particular focus on the 
contributions of the critical theorist Jurgen Habermas. The reason that this is 
important in the wider context of the thesis is that Habermas’s NSMT is actually a 
theory of social learning, grounded in his distinctive discourse theory of deliberative 
democracy. The goal of this theory is to formulate context-free, universally 
applicable axioms, from which the validity and rationality of discourse in the public 
sphere can be judged. As such, it provides an ‘ideal type’ of public pedagogy, which 
is reflected in the organisational cognitive praxis of different cultures of climate 
activism.  
 
Generally, NSMT has “provided a shared perspective for such European theorists as 
Alain Touraine (France), Alberto Melucci (Italy), Jürgen Habermas (Germany), and 
Manuel Castells (Spain) who sought to construct a macro societal paradigm for 
explaining the rise of movements in society” (Waters, 2008, p. 63). The first 




theories that they inspired. NSMT is an unashamedly teleological and macro-
sociological body of theory, which emerged as an interpretation of European student 
movements, and subsequent waves of student protest in North America, in the 1960s 
and ‘70s, that ostensibly could not be accounted for by the Marxian and Parsonian 
modes of sociological explanation dominant in critical sociology of the time 
(Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, pp. 19-23; Waters, 2008).  
 
It is well-documented that the critical historical-geographical moment for the 
development of NSMT was May 1968, France. A student-led and instigated 
movement which articulated so-called ‘post-material’ demands, successfully forged 
alliances with the French working class and the trade unions, to the extent that, at the 
zenith of the protests, over eight million people went on strike and the legitimacy of 
the French Government was put under severe strain (Hannigan, 1985; Eyerman & 
Jamison, 1991; Welton, 1993; Waters, 2008).  The unfolding of the movement and 
its demands, were rooted in what radical educator Freire (1972) called “ontological 
vocation”,  that is, an intellectual questioning of the whole of human experience and 
purpose; this questioning, centred around demands for freedom, real participatory 
democracy and autonomy, provided the concrete historical circumstances required 
for critical Marxists, such as Henri Lefebvre and Touraine, to reconceptualise the 
critical site for contestation as alienation in everyday life, and culture, rather than the 
point of production (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Welton, 1993; Waters, 2008). 
 
Subsequently, seemingly heterogeneous protests spread throughout the ‘Global 
North’, related to issues of ecology, animal rights, women’s rights, LGBT, sexuality, 
personal and local autonomy, held together, on the face of it, by a common 
membership base that was young, white, and educated. A questioning of the 
promethean faith in our productive capacity, and even the seeds of what we would 
now call post-humanism, were brought into question by these movements, who saw 
evidence of nuclear militarization of nation states and ecological degradation as 




NSMs combined “four basic principles weaving through particular movements: 
ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy [and] non-violence”.  
 
NSMT was a theory which developed around the idea of the emergence of identity 
and ideological consciousness in response to situations where existing norms fail to 
provide guidance as to a course of action. In this sense, the theory itself was not so 
new in that it could be seen as a development of what was called “emergent norm 
theory” (Turner & Killian, 1957; Turner & Killian, 1972), which evolved from the 
work of the symbolic interactionists in which cultural innovators suggest courses of 
action, which may or may not be taken up more widely and become new norms 
(Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 13; Hannigan, 1985, p. 435; Hannigan, 2006, p. 139). 
However, emergent norm theory and symbolic interactionist approaches have been 
critiqued for failing to take account of the particularity of the socio-historical 
moment and, as such, can be regarded as the antithesis of structural functionalist 
approaches that “looked for the societal determinants of collective behaviour” 
(Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 13).  
 
This was addressed by NSMT, which situated the symbolic interaction of emergent 
norm theory in a macro-societal theory.  NSM theorists believed that social 
movements could only be understood within a wider analysis of the particular socio-
historical moment from which they emerge. NSM theorists believed that social 
conflicts took the shape of cultural confrontations because of a systemic shift 
towards ‘post-industrial’ capitalism, where technocratic control of culture and its 
commodification were epoch defining concerns (Touraine, 1977; Habermas, 1981; 
Melucci, 1996). Habermas understood and explained this through his thesis that the 
most important axis of conflict from which movements arose was not capital/labour, 
but was between what he called the logic of the “systemworld” and the “lifeworld” 
(Habermas, 1981, p. 202)
iv
. Roughly speaking, the systemworld is the state-market 
nexus, and is driven by the “functional rationality” of commodification and 




purposive ends in order to reproduce the system. On the other hand, the lifeworld 
consists of public (work, education, leisure) and private (e.g. family) spheres of 
everyday life, where reason becomes “communicative rationality”, driven by 
normative, ethical and aesthetic concerns (Habermas, 1981; Welton, 2001; Edwards, 
2008).  
 
Social movements emerge from “legitimacy crises”: roughly speaking, situations 
where the “resources” of the lifeworld are marshalled to reason against the 
irrationality of systemworld logics in particular contexts. These “lifeworld 
resources”, namely social networks, cultural formations and identities, are at once 
productive of, and produced though, a so-called “universal pragmatics” of 
communicative action (Edwards, 2008). The conditions for this “universal 
pragmatics”, rest upon three pillars of intersubjective communication, which 
Habermas calls “validity claims”: propositional truth, the sincerity of the speech act 
and the rightness of norms (Habermas, 1979). In other words, one asks of one’s 
interlocutor, ‘does s/he have reason to say this?’, ‘does s/he mean what s/he says?’, 
and (to me, the most problematic) ‘is this right according to intersubjectively 
established norms?’.  
 
It is because these claims can only be verified through rigorous intersubjective 
communication that there is a deeply participatory principle at work. I would like to 
suggest to the reader that it is a scholastic justification of the kind of consensus 
approaches to climate politics at work in different cultures of activism. In this way, 
NSMT provides a potential bridge between the rational and the cultural turn in social 
movement theory, as culture itself is a resource to be rationally mobilised (Edwards, 
2008, p. 302). In the words of Habermas himself, “the rationalization of action is 
deposited not only in the forces of production, but also – mediated through the 






It is clear that such a position requires one to take a very optimistic view of human 
reason and intentionality. As a post-structuralist, I find these conditions 
fundamentally questionable. It is not the ‘propositional truth’ condition that bothers 
me, so much as much as the other two. I would argue that norms and ideals are the 
result of the repetition of power-infused material practices, and not the result of some 
kind of transcendental intersubjective rationality. Following from this, the entire 
notion of the sincerity of a sovereign ‘Self’ is arguably problematic. Moreover, I 
would argue that people, despite tacitly recognising elements of insincerity in 
intersubjective encounters, often ‘validate’ claims because they believe that they 
should act in ‘good faith’. 
 
Generally, post-structuralist theorists of hegemony such as Chantal Mouffe are not 
convinced by his rule-based linguistification of democracy, or the “epistemic 
function ascribed to democratic will formation” whereby the legitimacy of the 
democratic procedure is derived from “the general accessibility of a deliberative 
process, whose structure grounds an expectation of rationally acceptable results” 
(Mouffe, 2005, p. 86). The fundamental disagreement between Habermasian 
discourse theory and the post-structuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
(1987), is between the political ‘moment’ properly conceived of as popular 
participation in power-free rational dialogue, and the establishment of political 
frontiers within which such encounters might be imagined to occur.  
 
At this juncture, I think that it is important to make an ontological point in relation to 
NSM theory: with these notions of epochal shifts towards ‘post-industrial’ conflicts 
and systemworld/lifeworld conflicts, NSMT simply replaces the capital/labour 
metanarrative with others. Because I take a post-structuralist position, I am sceptical 
of these totalising accounts. In my assessment, it is fair to say that NSMT vacillates 
between grand abstractions and the notion of micro-level ‘emergence theory’ in a 




understood social movements as “the conflict of agents of the social classes 
struggling for control of the system of historical action” (Touraine, 1977, p. 298).  
 
For example, although Touraine’s sociological intervention into actually existing 
NSMTs recognised their fragmented and sometimes overlapping nature, he believed 
them to be different from a true ‘Social Movement’; a monolithic antagonistic force 
set against the incumbent force, and locked into a battle for the direction of History. 
He argued that a true Social Movement involves a principle of Identity, of 
Opposition and of Totality and that “the conflict causes the adversary to appear, as it 
shapes the consciousness of the actors confronting one another” (Touraine, 1977, p. 
312). In this sense, it could be argued that  NSMT simply describes a teleological 
process of social learning, where social actors become more accomplished in solving 
social problems, through the application of reason within a liberal democracy. 
Hence, it is important to emphasise the word ‘evolutionary’ in Habermas’s humanist 
notion of “social evolutionary learning” (Habermas, 1979). 
 
 Implications for the public pedagogy of climate 
activism  
Where might climate movements fit into the meta-narrative of NSMT? Are they part 
of a broader movement to define the direction of historicity (Touraine, 1977)? What 
are they opposed to? Capitalism, globalism, neoliberalism? The ‘programmed 
society? the ‘systemworld’? Or they are they more pragmatic? Much climate change 
activism seems to favour a kind of micro-politics averse to such grand narratives and 
imposed meanings (Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010). This suspicion of what has been 
described as the ‘theoretical Leninism’ of NSMT’s grand ambitions is present in 
relocalisation movements, as well as the anarchistic and Zapatista-inspired roots of 
the alter-globalisation movement, from which DA climate activists draw inspiration. 
The most coherent identity to emerge from climate activism to date has been around 




collective identity at movement level that unites the heterogeneous practices, 
organisations, networks and subjectivities, which constitute climate activism 
(Jamison, 2010). 
 
This is an important issue, and one that I will expand upon in the chapters to come. 
Yet, for now, I will say that Alberto Melucci’s NSMT concept of ‘metamorphosis’ is 
potentially useful. Melucci argued that a feature of NSM activism was that personal 
passion and commitment for progressive social change in general, helped to maintain 
a general ‘activist identity’ over time, that allowed an individual to metamorphose in 
reaction to shifting realities, and juggle multiple identity commitments both within 
and outside activism (Melucci, 1995). In the context of climate change activism, the 
consequences of this are ambivalent. One the one hand, it recognises that individuals 
are reflexive and passionate creatures (King, 2004), and that a tendency towards 
climate change activism will often be related to a general passion for broader, more 
universal social justice concerns.  On the other hand, it recognises the identity 
processes supporting the maintenance of a kind of ‘activist’ disposition, whereby 
passionate career activists take on the role of social change experts at the expense of 
the ‘everyday’.  
 
Another test of the utility of NSMT for climate change activism lies in examining the 
principles of participatory democracy, which traditionally underpin green movement 
practice (Welton, 1993, pp. 162-163). The pertinent question for climate change 
politics to address is does, and indeed should, tackling climate change have any 
logical connection to these participatory theories of agency? In other words, can we 
separate means from ends? This is where the insights of NSMT are as valuable to 
climate activism as they have ever been to the environmental movement, more 
generally: whilst ‘Third Way’ environmentalists such as Anthony Giddens (2009, p. 
70) would argue that we can separate means from ends, through “ecological 
modernization” thinking – where there is an “overlap between low-carbon 




competitiveness” (Giddens, 2009, p. 70) –  NSMT’s  insights about discontent 
arising from control over information and culture in the ‘programmed society’ 
remain convincing. To the extent that climate governance is formulated within 
unaccountable technocratic networks, driven by instrumental logics of functionality, 
the cultural mandate required for action may not emerge.   
 
Thus, the implications of NSMT for understanding learning occurring in and from 
climate activism are considerable. Actors engaged in normatively oriented rational 
discourse, upon encountering lifeworld/systemworld tensions, are confronted with 
the blocked ‘learning capacity’ of society (Habermas, 1979; Eder, 1993). Social 
movements have been variously postulated as sites par excellence of this process of 
social learning. As entities containing the so-called “latent learning capacity” of 
society,  social movements are not merely reactive phenomena either. Partly, they are 
understood as prefigurative ‘cultural laboratories’; that is to say, they create 
microcosms of what could be, including worldviews, forms of social organisation 
and technologies for living (Melucci, 1996). In this sense, Melucci understood the 
activities of NSMs to be symbolic. Direct action ‘climate camps’ and community-
based relocalisation initiatives both exemplify this tendency. Transition initiatives, in 
particular, use the phrase “scalable microcosms of hope” to describe this. The 
Transition approach is to network these place-based cultural experiments in a larger 
ecosystem of Transition initiatives, thus creating a learning system of what Scott-
Cato and Hillier (2010) have called “social innovation”. In fact, Scott-Cato and 
Hillier liken these practices to Freirian pedagogy of creative praxis, whereupon 
people act creatively to read and write the world, and in doing so change themselves. 
If practices work, they spread. 
 
NSMT recognises that unless fragmented projects are able to unite to recognise their 
epochal role in capturing the zeitgeist, they are doomed to marginality. Thus, NSMs 
exist on the “periphery” of mainstream culture and find their way into public 




by “density of connection, complexity of organisation and spatial range” (Welton, 
2001, p. 30); (2) “episodic publics” of face-to-face interaction in everyday life; (3) 
“abstract publics” composed of the producers, consumers and channels of mass 
media (ibid.). Congruent, to an extent, with the “neoliberal public pedagogy” 
arguments of the previous chapter, NSMT argues that the ‘publicness’ of these 
publics is increasingly eroded by media power, by political power, and by corporate 
power all of which: (1) combine to render climate change a complex global problem, 
which can be made more tractable through market mechanisms combined with 
technocratic management; (2) render citizen agency in individualistic and 
consumerist language (e.g. the ‘do a little change a lot’ approach of many carbon 
reduction campaigns) (Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012).  
 
Thus, NSMT is capacious enough to encompass what has been called the “relational 
turn” in social movement theory, which locates their power in the social networks 
they create (c.f. Diani, 2000). Viewing social networks as a ‘lifeworld resource’, 
simply “places cultural and ideological factors…in a relational perspective” (Diani, 
2000, p.22). From this perspective, the network approach has been indispensable to 
social movement studies through theorising a dialectical link between social 
networks and culture through which “a linkage only exists to the extent that a shared 
discourse enables actors to recognise their interdependence (Diani, 2003, p. 5).  In 
this sense we can say that “networks are the media of cognitive praxis” (Carroll & 
Ratner, 1996, p. 604). Networks are important to learning in this context because 
they focus our attention on the fact that social innovation occurs at the interface of 
people’s structural position in social networks, and the knowledge resources and 
skills that people bring (Campbell, 2005, p. 65; von Bülow, 2011, p. 169). 
 
Network accounts not only of social movements, but of society, have been 
indispensable to the NSMT of Alberto Melucci (1996) and Manuel Castells (1996; 
2012) who attribute the networked organisational forms of contemporary social 




a tension here between the horizontal network as an actually existing state of affairs 
and as a normative principle, which is important to grasp. As spatial imaginaries, the 
language of the network is often part of a cultural logic, which works alongside other 
concepts such as ‘open space’, ‘horizontality’, and ‘rhizomatic’. It may therefore 
prove important to investigate the extent to which such imaginaries as employed by 
intellectuals involved with climate activism (e.g. Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010), differ 
from empirical reality and mask power relationships.   
 
Overall then, unlike theories of ecological modernization, through which  learning to 
tackle climate change results from the refinement of technological, institutional and 
economic arrangements, NSMT understands social learning at a societal scale to 
occur in the non-instrumental realm: 
 
Whereas Marx localized the learning processes important for evolution in 
the dimension of objectivating thought – of technical and organizational 
knowledge, of instrumental and strategic action, in short, of productive 
forces – there are good reasons meanwhile for assuming that learning 
processes also take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical 
knowledge, communicative action, and the consensual regulation of 
action conflicts – learning processes that are deposited in more mature 
forms of social integration, in new productive relations, and that in turn 
first make possible the introduction of new productive forces” 
(Habermas, 1979, p. 98). 
 
Through a bracketing of commitments, power and instrumental concerns, citizens 
come together with a desire to communicate rationally. This theory appeals to those 
who have not given up on the idea that the democratic governance of society can be 
grounded on completely rational grounds. Rationality and Enlightenment reason 
provide a basis for processes of open communication and participation in economic 
and administrative structures, through which universally acceptable cultural norms 
can be enacted. The use of peer-reviewed climate science to highlight irrational 
policy and justify activist interventions often creates the communicative space that 




public opinion; alter the parameters of organised will formation; and exert pressure 
on parliaments, courts and administrations in favour of specific policies” (Welton, 
2001, p.276). 
 
There are a number of issues with this approach: firstly, there are arguments about 
the limits of rational dialogue, deliberation, environmental ethics, the application of 
cognitive rules and a calculating appreciation of the facts. For example, Haluza-
DeLay (2008) argues that such theories ignore the fact that much of what we learn 
takes place through structured habitual practices. This learning is tacit in the sense 
that everyday skills and behaviours are learned, routinised, then forgotten by the 
conscious mind, but not the body (2008, p. 212). This ‘learning’ occurs in a 
structured field of possibilities, such that the notion of a sovereign individual who 
behaves rationally and freely is troublesome (Shove, 2010).  
 
As a ‘wicked problem’, climate change pushes the limits of our cognitive 
architecture, and our intuitive spatial and temporal perceptive abilities. As discussed 
in chapter one, this creates complex issues around the role of technical knowledge, 
organisational knowledge, and ethical knowledge. It creates issues around how we 
respond effectively, as well as how we adduce responsibility for action. Meanwhile, 
the climate science community tell us that the climate is changing ‘rapidly’ and that 
we have a limited window of opportunity for action (Risbey, 2007). Surveying the 
scientific literature, Risbey (2007, p. 28) argues that it is legitimate to use the term’ 
‘rapid’ if the “system changes more quickly than our ability to respond”, and finds 
that, in several critical contexts, “the term ‘rapid’ seems appropriate”. This view has 
only been reinforced by the recently published fifth assessment report of the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2013).  
 
What is pertinent here is that it is that deliberative democracy is a slow grind. There 
is a legitimate question here over whether or not our ‘social learning capacity’ is up 




questions to be asked about the consequences for democracy. In the last chapter, I 
argued that that ideology critique is of limited utility if there is a disjuncture between 
abstract recognition of injustice and the rhythms and habitual practices of daily life. 
But most importantly, I would suggest that we must interrogate the credibility of the  
notion that power can be bracketed in processes of communicative action aimed 
towards intersubjective consensus, where unencumbered individuals only come to 
the table with their desire to communicate. Habermas contends not only that 
technical rationality has subordinated normative and aesthetic values, but that to 
solve our social and ecological problems we must come to a consensus about what 
norms we want to have enacted”  (Brulle, 1995, p. 322). 
 
Overall, we have seen that NSMT embodies a rationalistic approach to cultural 
politics and to learning. It has much to commend it in the context of climate change – 
particularly its analysis of the insidious mission creep of the ‘systemworld’, how this 
provokes ‘legitimacy crises’, and its deeply participatory principles. However, social 
movement against climate change, given the urgency of the timescale discussed, 
should arguably offer something more than rational dialogue, since it is not a 
problem that we are responding rationally to. For example, empirical evidence 
suggests that across the Western world, increasing scientific certainty has not led to 
long-term increased public concern about climate change (Ratter, et al., 2012, p. 7).  
 
Looking at current empirical evidence, one might highlight research drawing on 
aggregate public opinion trends from the 27 EU countries (including the UK), as well 
as the US, which found that both concern and beliefs about climate change are most 
strongly determined by economic conditions. This research found that labour market 
conditions explain opinion trends better than weather extremes, media cycles and 
partisan politics: “a shift in the national unemployment rate from 5 to 9% in 
Europe…reduces the percentage of people reporting that global warming is a very 
serious problem by about 10 [percentage] points” (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 513). 




concern might be explained as a simple public goods dilemma in trying economic 
circumstances, a change in belief is harder to explain: the explanation offered was 
that because the perceived steps taken required to ameliorate climate change conflict 
with those perceived to be necessary to improving the economy, climate change 
beliefs are altered to overcome “cognitive dissonance” (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 
508).  
 
In a time-limited situation, what alternative ways of thinking exist? I will argue that 
framing theory and discourse theory provide alternatives. Part of the cultural strategy 
of the public pedagogical efforts of climate activism is to win over sympathetic 
onlookers through building bridges between the discourse and practices of movement 
milieus and the wider public. This is not merely a rational process but involves 
targeting pre-existing and often tacit values, norms, tastes, preferences and so on. In 
the literature on social movements this concept has been most thoroughly developed 
through framing theory. Framing theory exemplifies a more instrumental approach to 
communication, whilst emphasising its supposedly non-rational aspects. I move on to 
explore this below. 
 
Framing theory 
The concept of ‘frame’ in sociology is popularly attributed to the work of Erving 
Goffman (1974, p. 464), who deployed the term to describe hierarchical “cognitive 
schemas of interpretation that…function to organize experience and guide action”. 
More generally, between 1970 and 1980, the term gained currency and was 
developed in the fields of cognitive science, linguistics and artificial intelligence 
(Donati, 1992, p. 140; Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 188). In the social movement 
literature, there is significant conceptual entanglement within the ideational triad of 
discourse, ideology and frame (Johnston, 2002).This should not be surprising since 
each of these terms on its own is subject to multiple interpretations. However, for the 





Positivists and empiricists argue that discourses are best visualised as 
‘frames’ or ‘cognitive schemata’, by which they mean the conscious 
strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of 
the world and of themselves that legitimate or motivate collective action. 
 
Frames are hierarchical cognitive structures including roles, relations to roles, and 
relations to other frames, which are said to be physiologically realised in the brain’s 
neural circuitry and also linked to emotions (Lakoff, 2010, p. 71).  Frames are 
systems, which must be strengthened over time with repetition. In this light, the 
framing approach to social movement studies connects most with the ‘social 
marketing’ approach to climate change communication, through which discourse is 
treated as something which can be rationally manipulated with the desired cultural 
outcomes (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012). It is important to explore framing theory 
because it has been taken up and developed by sectors of the professional 
environmental movement in the context of climate change. As such, it embodies an 
approach quite distinct from the one above and from the agonistic approach I argue 
for below. In other words, this section reflects, in theoretical terms, concrete tensions 
occurring in the practices of actually existing cultures of climate activism. From the 
1980’s onwards, framing theory became of interest to political scientists and 
sociologists interested in social movements because it appeared to provide insight 
into how frames rendered particular events meaningful for different audiences, thus 
mobilising people and widening movement constituencies (Noakes & Johnston, 
2005, p. 3). To link with my account of NSMT above, frames were understood to be 
resources to be mobilised by activists (Williams, 2004, p. 92).  
 
Throughout the 1990s, as the framing perspective grew in popularity, a wide variety 
of framing mechanisms were posited, and numerous attempts were made to define 
various features of “collective action frames” (Benford & Snow, 2000). In this sense, 
framing theorists sought to do two things: firstly, they sought to introduce dynamism 




concepts that rendered ideological and cultural work more amenable to empirical 
investigation (Snow & Benford, 2002). Collective action frames perform certain 
tasks, chiefly providing a “diagnosis” (problem defining), a “prognosis” (what is to 
be done), and providing “motivation” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). Similarly, 
Gamson (1992) posits that collective action frames have an identity component, an 
agency component, and an injustice component. However, there has been debate 
over the role of the injustice component in social movement framing. This debate 
retains a prominent role in my analysis of climate activism. The cosmological 
(knowledge pertaining to the development of coherent worldviews), organisational 
and technological dimensions of cognitive praxis, have in fact been understood by 
some social movement scholars as an attempt to “relate the representations produced 
by specific movements with more general forms of symbolic production” (della Porta 
& Diani, 1999, p. 79). The key concern in framing theory is how to bridge and align 
the collective action frames of movement milieus in ways that capture the attention 
of, and speak to the often tacit cultural values and norms of the wider public.  
 
Implications for the public pedagogy of climate 
activism  
The literature on framing is of obvious relevance to climate activism and its cultural 
politics, since it seeks to identify the discursive mechanisms through which scientific 
genres can be connected to more concrete social justice struggles, and through which 
discourse can be aligned with the meaning systems, values and norms of popular 
culture and everyday life, so that they resonate with bystander publics, decision 
makers and potential adherents. Thus, framing has obvious relevance to the idea of 
public pedagogy. The notion of framing aligns most closely with the ‘social 
marketing’ approach to climate change communication,  which emphasises the 
instrumental dimensions of communication, and draws on cognitive science, 




“ascertain the optimal communication strategies for environmental matters” 
(Carvalho & Peterson, 2012, p. 9). 
 
As cognitive scientist George Lakoff (2010, p. 72) brought to the attention of 
environmental activists and communicators, the central import of framing from 
cognitive science was to challenge the “Trap of Enlightenment Reason”, where 
reason is thought to be “unemotional, logical, abstract, [and] universal”, Lakoff 
argued that “facts must make sense in terms of their system of frames, or they will be 
ignored”, with the implication that “social movements require the coherence 
provided by coherent framing”, and accordingly, provides a number of 
recommendations, which have, over the period of this study, strongly influenced the 
cultural strategies of the Environmental NGO sector and relocalisation movements 
(Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Crompton, 2010; Holmes, et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2011). 
 
One of Lakoff’s (2010, p. 74) recommendations has arguably done more than the 
others to push forward the framing agenda in the context of climate change in recent 
years: he argues that framing is not merely an issue of shallow linguistic 
manipulation (in this sense the ‘social marketing’ moniker may be a little 
misleading), but that frames are mostly unconscious cognitive structures used to 
interpret the world that are consolidated through being reinforced over time. Thus, 
framing climate change should not be understood as a short-term messaging issue, 
relying on catchy slogans. Thus, the dilemma for climate activists of whether to lead 
by example – through contentious politics, or prefigurative community initiatives – 
or to change the issue to make it more appealing through framing, is said to be a false 
choice. Lakoff (2010, p. 79) argues that framing is ubiquitous, that the political Right 
do it better than the Left, and that what climate activism needs is a pro-active 
framing strategy, focused on moral values of the Left, that doesn’t react to the 





For climate activism, and the environmental movement as a whole, the consequences 
are not only that cultural politics should be treated as a matter of strategic 
importance, but that such strategy can be rationally planned through applying 
insights from social psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science. Thus, Lakoff’s 
(2010, p. 79)  insistence that “there needs to be cognitive policy as well as material 
policy” can be interpreted as a form of “green governmentality” (Backstrand & 
Lovbrand, 2007; Paterson & Stripple, 2010; Luke, 2011). Two questions arise here: 
the first is to do with democratic implications addressed above in the section on 
NMST; the second with credibility. First, the very phrase “cognitive policy” might 
be interpreted as having obvious Orwellian overtones, that seem out of step with the 
ideals of direct democracy inscribed within the “civic environmentalist”  (Backstrand 
& Lovbrand, 2007) discourse of the green movement. Second, is such an 
instrumental approach to cultural politics credible? To speak with the previous 
section, can the ‘lifeworld’ be considered a ‘resource’ to be ‘mobilised’ by cognitive 
experts (Edwards, 2008), or are there fundamental problems with this view? Such 
questions are particularly pertinent given the urgency of the ‘wicked problem’ of 
climate change. I will address these questions in the section below, but first, I should 
say something about the content of frames. If climate activists’ efforts should fit 
within a wider, more holistic and universalist ‘progressive Left’ frame, what can the 
social movement literature tell us about the general properties of such frames?  
 
As I mentioned above, the social movement literature tells us that the components of 
any collective action frame perform certain tasks, chiefly providing a “diagnosis” 
(problem defining), a “prognosis” (what is to be done), and “motivation” (Benford & 
Snow, 2000, p. 615). These are particularly challenging tasks in the context of 
climate change. William Gamson (1992, p. 32) has argued that successful social 
movements must avoid the trap of framing chronic issues in ways that attribute 
responsibility to abstract impersonal forces, lest such frames lead to a wider social 
narrative of resignation. Thus, the public pedagogy of climate activism, through 




individual or collective). Nevertheless, as I touched upon in the above section where 
I explored the definition of social movement, Benford and Snow (2000) point to 
prefigurative and non-confrontational movements to argue that injustice frames are 
ubiquitous rather than being necessary. Again, this general issue in the framing 
literature is particularly salient when applied to the cultural politics of climate 
change: injustice frame, or no injustice frame? Precisely this question has been the 
topic of considerable debate amongst activist communities, with some advocating 
that ‘speaking truth to power’ be suppressed in order to bring the issue down to earth 
and mobilise the widest audience possible through a mixture of ‘everyday’ 
pragmatism and ‘engaged optimism’ (Hopkins, 2008a). Below, I move on to more 
explicitly examine the educational implications of these issues.  
 
In chapter one, I introduced the concept of “critical communities”. Critical 
communities are loose networks of intellectuals who produce new knowledge 
(Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Rochon, 1998). In order to convey the ideas of critical 
communities to a receptive public, frames are said to be ‘aligned’ by activists to 
‘resonate’ through various processes: “value conversion” is “the replacement of 
cultural values with new ideas on the same topic about what is important, equitable, 
or legitimate” (Rochon, 1998, p. 86); “value creation” describes “the development of 
new ideas, concepts, or categories of analysis that apply to situations that had not 
previously been the subject of explicit cultural values” (p.86); finally, “value 
connection refers to “the development of a conceptual link between phenomena 
previously thought either to be unconnected with each other or connected in a 
different way” (p. 86). Therefore, it is clear that framing work draws strategically 
from extant ideologies and ideas developed in various critical communities, as well 
as the wider cultural stock, and that collective action frames should not be confused 
with ideologies as has been the tendency in some scholarship (Oliver & Johnston, 





In reality, the cultural work of social movements blurs these neat analytical 
distinctions, but they are useful. Value conversion is, of course, the ultimate goal. In 
the context of climate change, ‘value connection’ (Rochon, 1998, p. 57), or ‘frame 
bridging’ (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 12), occurs routinely by establishing links 
between everyday behaviours such as flying, home energy use, diet and climate 
change. Also, bridging frames connect issues of political economy to climate change, 
as well as issues of gender, race, and poverty. Through doing so, new discourses and 
analyses (‘value creation’) emerge, such as those around a Just Transition from 
reliance on fossil fuels, and the ideals of Climate Justice. In a sense, the framing 
literature applies directly to the public pedagogy of challenging dominant discourses, 
and the public pedagogy of neoliberalism. Nevertheless, it should be remembered 
that sceptics and those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo create their 
own bridging frames through a recursive engagement with movements.   
 
Although frame theory posits mechanisms, which help us to understand how people 
learn from social movements; moves us beyond information deficit theories of 
behaviour change (theories that posit that people just need more or better factual 
information); and speaks to the notion of what strategies might help the abstract issue 
of climate change resonate with pre-existing cultural values and norms, there are 
concerns to be addressed. The main issue, when placed in dialogue with education 
literature is the unidirectionality of communication implicit in framing: “idea 
specialists in social movements are never thought to change their thinking—just the 
way they package their thinking to make it more appealing to someone else” (Oliver 
& Johnston, 2000, p. 195). Specifically in the context of climate change, critical 
theorist Brulle (2010, p. 89) has argued that “Lakoff…uses a top-down approach, 
mobilizing supporters as if they were isolated consumers of ideas rather than citizens. 
This form of message delivery inhibits the development of a collective community 
consciousness and mobilization”. 
 




and the credibility of such an account of cultural change. Regarding the former, 
Lakoff’s call for “cognitive policy”, was supposed to be a pragmatic wake-up call to 
environmentalists, and the Left, in general. Nevertheless, this approach, which aligns 
with modes of governance associated with libertarian paternalism – where policy 
experts draw upon psychology, cognitive science, linguistics and behavioural 
economics to “bypass the irrational nature of the human brain” (Pykett, 2012, p. 219) 
– is about communication experts “targeting emotional registers…and changing 
social norms via social marketing techniques”. 
 
Thus, the choice in this context could be framed as cultural efficacy, versus the 
idealism of ‘green’ theories of agency, emphasising rational forms of deliberative 
democracy. Yet, the workability of such approaches cannot be taken for granted. On 
the issue of credibility, Marc Steinberg (1999; 1998) argues that framing rests on 
contradictory epistemological assumptions, which vacillate between social 
constructionism and rational actor theory. Rather, discourse must be understood to be 
unstable, dialogical and recursive. Lakoff (2010, p. 72) even makes this point when 
he argues, for example, that “negating a frame just activates the frame, as when 
Nixon said,‘‘I am not a crook’’ and everyone thought of him as crook”. Lakoff’s 
(rather mechanical sounding) advice to climate change communicators is that “the 
new language must make sense in terms of the existing system of frames. It must 
work emotionally. And it must be introduced in a communication system that allows 
for sufficient spread over the population, sufficient repetition, and sufficient trust in 
the messengers” (p. 72). It can thus be argued that frame theory has little to say about 
how such change efforts involve “a long process of self-conscious discussion, debate, 
and political education”, which necessarily grapples with “the relation between 
people’s material conditions or material experiences” and their cultural worlds 
(Oliver & Johnston, 2000, pp. 196-200). It recognises the Enlightenment Reason 
fallacy yet, in my mind, unconvincingly assumes that cultural technocrats can 
address this. Thus, whilst NSMT and framing theory have useful things to say, I now 





Discourse theory – an accepted shorthand for what is alternately called the post-
structuralist, or post-Marxist discourse theory developed by Laclau and Mouffe 
(1987) – is based on the following premises:  anti-essentialism, the logic of 
contingency, and an understanding of ‘the political’ process as hegemonic struggle, 
combining the insights of Antonio Gramsci with post-structuralism. It conceives of 
the cultural politics of climate change in terms of “agonistic pluralism”, thus 
providing an alternative to the rational “public participation” model proposed by 
Habermas’s NSMT and the “social marketing” approach embodied in framing 
(Carvalho & Peterson, 2012). The reason why it is important to understand these 
tensions in theoretical terms is that they emerge from the concrete practices of 
different cultures of activism. Mouffe’s (2005) critique of the political process as 
consensus-oriented intersubjective communication is based on the development of a 
nuanced ontological position drawing on Gramsci and Derrida, amongst others. 
Mouffe proposes that the very condition for intersubjective communication within a 
stable social formation is contingency and antagonism, resolved through the exercise 
of power. This places Laclau and Mouffe alongside Foucault in being highly 
sceptical of the Habermas’s utopian “ideal speech situation”, since “all knowledge 
claims are conditioned by historical frames of understanding that have been partly 
constituted and affected by subliminal power relations” (Ingram, 2006, p. 262). For 
Habermas, the exercise of administrative power requires consensus-oriented 
communication for its legitimation, hence the scepticism of critical theorist Brulle to 
the governmental power of framing experts. Whilst for Habermas, this occurs though 
the bracketing of power, for discourse theorists, all governance involves the 
reciprocal and productive use of power amongst non-equals.  
 
Thus, Mouffe uses “agonism” to describe a situation in which “we/they” relations are 
not transcended but are configured in a different way (Mouffe, 2005, p. 20): “While 




any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting 
parties…recognise the legitimacy of their opponents”. Discourse theory has profound 
implications for our understanding of climate activism and its cultural politics, 
despite seldom being included in debates over social movement theory, social 
movement learning, or climate change more generally, for that matter. There are, 
however, some notable exceptions, with discourse theory being fruitfully applied to 
the study of anti-airport protest (Griggs & Howarth, 2002; Griggs & Howarth, 2004), 
the development of the Slow-Food Movement (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011), the 
challenges of learning through student activism (Zielinska, et al., 2011), and climate 
politics (Methmann, 2010; Carvalho & Peterson, 2012). Of all of these studies, the 
value of discourse theory in an educational context might be said to be that “the 
process of learning…can be understood as filling ‘empty signifiers’ with concrete 
meanings” (Zielinska, et al., 2011, p. 262) – a term which I will move on to explain 
in this section. 
 
Discourse theory is motivated by a commitment to “the radically contingent, non-
necessary and relational character of social and political identities” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 
14). Emerging in the 1980s from an intellectual context in which Marxist theory and 
socialist politics were perceived to be in crisis, and inspired by the actually existing 
‘new social movements’, discourse theory nevertheless diverged from the totalising 
accounts of NSMT. Critical realists have claimed that the post-structuralist 
foundations of discourse theory are idealist and have even claimed that it denies 
mind independent reality, yet this is a gross misreading: it is truer to say that 
discourse theory embraces the materiality of all phenomena, including language, yet 
they argue that the same linguistic contingency opened up by poststructuralist theory 
can be applied to social structures (Gilbert, 2009, p. 15). Discourse, after Foucault, 
refers to “historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of 
subjects and objects” (Howarth, 2000, p. 10). Discourse theory is committed to a 




obligatory’ rather than ‘logically necessary’ (DeLanda, 2006). This position requires 
some unpacking.  
 
In structuralist accounts of discourse, meaning is relational and differential; that is, 
meaning depends on the relations between different elements in a closed (linguistic) 
system. Linguistic signifiers correspond to signified concepts in an essentially 
arbitrary way, but are formalised within systems of relational meaning. Jorgensen 
and Philips (2002, p. 25) use the helpful metaphor of a fishing net in which “all 
linguistic signs can be thought of as knots in a net”. Founding figure of structuralist 
linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure, argued that language is “form not substance”, and 
that it consists of “differences without positive terms” (Howarth, 2000, p. 26). Thus, 
taking the analogy of chess, he argues that any particular piece, for instance a knight, 
only makes sense within the context of the relational rules constituting the game of 
chess (p.26). Yet, going further than this, Saussure believed that societies could be 
understood as consisting of deep symbolic structures, constituted through their 
relations between systems of elements (p. 28). Thus, structuralism, “rather than 
assuming society to be…the teleological development of the human spirit…focused 
on the changing signs and codes that make possible social practices” (p.26).The 
‘post’ in post-structuralism emerged from critiques of the perceived shortcomings of 
structuralist accounts of the social. First and foremost, the notion that the social is 
determined by the relations between closed symbolic systems “makes it difficult to 
provide an adequate account of the historicity of social systems” (Howarth, 2000, p. 
28).  
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory retains the insight that identity is relational, 
but extends this concept beyond the linguistic, and challenges the notion of stable 
wholes as a priori totalities, giving their components essence as parts of the whole.  
The ‘post’ critique draws on insights from the deconstructive philosophy, in order to 
challenge the closure and fixity of discursive systems: the relations between 




dependent on a ‘surplus of meaning’, which can never be fully exhausted (Howarth 
2000, p. 103). The post-structural critique is too complex to explain here in detail, 
and is outwith the scope of this chapter. However, some basic understanding is 
necessary, as the specific manner in which it has informed the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe has often been subjected to misinterpretation.  It is based on the notion that 
there is no necessary relationship between signs because of the logical impossibility 
of a private language: signs contain “minimal remainders of meaning” allowing them 
to be recognised when articulated in different chains of meaning and contexts. This 
move relies on a rejection of both essences and totalities. Both of these moves imply 
an ontology and epistemology based on relations of exteriority. This requires some 
explaining.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s position, and post-structuralist philosophy in general, contrary 
to popular misinterpretation, does not ignore the permanencies of human experience, 
whilst favouring constant flux and metonymic sliding of meaning (Howarth, 2000). 
Rather, they seek to understand the logic behind the underlying, but in their view, 
non-necessary and precarious stability of social and political orders. To do this, they 
must account for the synthesis of the properties of a whole, in a way which moves 
beyond the dichotomy between methodological individualism (‘there is no such thing 
as Society’) and what theorist DeLanda (2006) calls ‘organismic’ metaphors’, where 
the component parts of structural regularities are reduced to internal moments of 
closed totalities. Both Hegelian dialectics and Saussurean structuralist linguistics 
belong to this grouping. Although I have briefly sketched the idea of Saussurean 
linguistics above, I have not explained Hegelian dialectics. Therefore, a brief 
explanation is required particularly given the currency that Hegelian thinking 
continues to have in social and political thought.  
 
For Hegel, the sole purpose of reason was to overcome fixed oppositions such as 
mind/matter, subjectivity/objectivity, particularity/universality, individual 




synthesis (Cullen, 1979, p. 50). His dialectical thought was based on a distinction 
between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft): for Hegel, “understanding” 
was “only capable of drawing distinctions and grasping external relations between 
determinate atoms or monads”, whilst “reason” could “grasp the fundamental unity, 
the becoming, underlying all things” (p. 51). For this reason, Hegel viewed 
antagonisms as contraries or contradictions (thesis/antithesis) “sublated” (roughly 
speaking, assimilated) into greater organic totalities (synthesis).  
 
Dialectical relations in this sense, lead to a kind of circular approach to structure and 
agency, which remains very popular within the social sciences. For example, 
Anthony Giddens’s “structuration theory” is very Hegelian (and by implication I 
would argue, not particularly helpful in accounting for change): social structures 
(routines, procedures, resources, laws and so on) allow for agency, but are 
constructed through it (DeLanda, 2006, p. 10). Another example is Pierre Bourdieu’s 
notion of “the habitus” as the master process structuring dispositions, tastes, 
attitudes, cultural values, social norms and so on. The habitus is an idealist totality in 
the sense that it is both structured and structuring; it posits an internal dialectical 
relation between free will and structures, between objective differences in the social 
distribution of risk and resources and subjective cognitive states (DeLanda, 2006). 
Both structuration and the habitus are deployed within sociological theories of 
practice addressing climate change, and are offered as an alternative to the 
rationalistic tendencies of NSMT (Haluza-DeLay, 2008) and the positivistic 
aspirations of behaviour change technologies (Shove, 2010). Despite the popularity 
of these theories, they still strike me as rather nebulous and circular. If agency is 
internally related to structure how does real change occur? To account for 
progressive change, the idea of “synthesis” or “determinate negation” is employed.  






In accounts of wholes relying on ‘relations of interiority’, the component parts have 
no identity other than their relation as parts of the functioning totality. There is a way 
out: a view of (social, discursive, material) wholes as fully-emergent, based on 
relations of exteriority, through which abstract micro and macro reductionism is 
replaced by contingency, and an analysis of social and political formations consisting 
of a number of inter- and intra-acting units of analysis plugged into one another. In 
this view, capacities and the potential of what is not, are as real as the emergent 
properties of any particular historical, political or social ensemble. This, however, 
does not deny sedimented power. Simply put, relations of externality imply an 
ontology through which the component parts of any particular ensemble can be 
“detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions 
are different” (DeLanda, 2006, p. 10). Thus, we move from a logic of necessity, to a 
“logic of contingency” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). I should make clear that I am 
reading, somewhat idiosyncratically, but transversally, across a Deleuzian 
‘materialist’ understanding of relations of externality (DeLanda, 2006), and Laclau 
and Mouffe’s poststructuralist understanding. Laclau and Mouffe have been charged 
with reducing everything to language and even denying mind independent reality, yet 
this is a misreading: what Laclau and Mouffe do is to take a non-reductionist or 
transversal view of thought and materiality; of discursive and non-discursive 
practices:  
 
Laclau and Mouffe justify this move through a meticulous argument 
which draws primarily on Derrida’s early claim that in the absence of any 
final principle of meaning or identity outside of a field of contingent 
relations which can guarantee the consistency, order, finitude and finality 
of that field - in other words, in the absence of a ‘transcendental 
signified’ - the general field of relationality for which ‘discourse’ is one 
name cannot be easily delimited. This is a complex manoeuvre in both 
Derrida and Laclau and Mouffe, and in both cases it has generated a great 
deal of misunderstanding on the part of readers who have understood 
their statements to amount to an insistence that there is no other reality 
than language; in fact, they would be better understood as claims that 
there is no social practice that is not caught up in a network of 




much as the effect and significance of linguistic signs is always 
destabilised by their irreducible relationality (Gilbert, 2009, p. 14). 
 
The subtlety of this position can be seen in Laclau and Mouffe’s (1987, p. 107) 
foundational text where they argue the following:  
 
[I]f the so-called non-discursive complexes – institutions, techniques, 
productive organisation, and so on – are analysed, we will find only more 
or less complex forms of differential positions among objects, which do 
not arise from a necessity external to the system structuring them and 
which can therefore only be conceived as discursive articulations (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 1987) 
 
The point of contention here lies in whether or not Laclau & Mouffe “ontologise”, 
and thus overstretch, post-structural linguistics to explain reality as such (Barnett, 
2004), or whether they have creatively applied these ideas in order to arrive at a 
theory of  contingency capable  of explaining material processes, albeit through an 
idiosyncratic vocabulary (as hinted at by Gilbert, 2009). For example, behind the 
concept of “assemblage” so popular in contemporary materialist theories across the 
social science, humanities and geography, lies an ontologisation of the geological 
vocabulary of “double articulation”. This “double articulation” process is used as an 
alternative to the Hegelian understanding of part to whole relations. Raw materials 
are selected and pre-processed and then are consolidated over time into wholes with 
properties of their own (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 39). Another popular 
example would be Alain Badiou, who ontologises mathematical set theory (Badiou 
& Tho, 2007). For him, reality is reduced to multiplicities of mathematical sets, 
composed of elements not defined through their internal relations with one another, 
so that set {x,y,z}, for example,  is the same as {y, z, x}. Significant theoretical 
differences notwithstanding, my point is that all of these theorists are trying to find a 
vocabulary to describe the contingency of reality, with the political implication that 




debate (but well beyond the scope of this thesis), whether or not any of these 
vocabularies represents reality better than another.  
 
In discourse theory, insights from hermeneutical philosophy are incorporated to the 
extent that discourse theory is concerned with “the historically specific rules and 
conventions that structure the production of meaning in a specific social context” 
(Howarth, 2000, p. 11). However, discourse theory differs from the hermeneutic 
tradition in that its ultimate goal is not to “reconstitute the common meanings and 
practices of particular groups and communities”, but to instead analyse the way in 
which “political forces and social actors construct meanings within incomplete and 
undecidable social structures” (Howarth, 2000, p. 129). 
 
The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe draws on Gramscian Marxism in order to 
postulate a distinctive theory of hegemony. Gramsci rejected the “vulgar 
materialism” and “historical economism” underlying the base structure/super 
structure dualism, which to his mind was prevalent in common sense forms of 
Marxism.  Gramsci’s thought was dialectical – that is, he posited an organic internal 
relation between thought and being, man and nature, history and matter, subject and 
object (Gramsci, 2011 [1930-32], p. 190). For this reason, he argued that the 
superstructure of the “integral state” had a relative autonomy of its own. The integral 
state was composed of political society and civil society (roughly mapping on to 
Habermas’s systemworld/lifeworld distinction).  
 
Gramsci’s concept of building diverse alliances through intellectual work, known as 
the ‘war of position’, represented a step forward from the woolly notion of 
spontaneous economic struggle at the point of production. For Gramsci,  civil society 
was not somehow separate to the state (a la Habermas’s Kantian ideal of the 
‘lifeworld’) but was irreducible from it. The institutions of civil society represented 
the hegemonic aspect of consent, which balanced and reinforced the coercive power 




conceptualisation of ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ obscuring one’s actual role 
in material relations of production. For him, ideology was ‘organically’ related to the 
historical emergence of any social formation. That is, regardless of the propositional 
truth value or empirical credibility of particular systems of ideas, they have real 
‘material’ effects on political and economic life.  
 
However, for Gramsci, alliances ultimately served the instrumental purpose of 
securing the intellectual dimension of a class-based proletarian hegemony. Although 
he argued that the economistic base structure and the “integral state” as the 
superstructure existed as a unity of opposites in a “historic bloc”, he argued that such 
blocs were ultimately organised around the antagonisms between a dominant 
(capitalist) and subjugated (proletariat) social class and between dominant and 
communist modes of production (Howarth, 2000, p. 91). For Gramsci, the aim was 
nothing less than to transform the particular claims of the working class into a 
“’collective will’ that represents universal values or interests” (Howarth, 2000, p. 
109). Again, we can see the organismic metaphor at work in the conceptualisation of 
the whole. Laclau and Mouffe (1987, p.134) wished to retain the notion of the 
contingent ‘war of position’ but sought to eliminate the notion of a fundamental 
social class; what they called Gramsci’s “last remainder of essentialism”. Drawing 
on philosophical critiques of structuralism, they argued instead that it is only because 
all social relations are contingent that agency is possible at all (Howarth, 2000, p. 
110).  
 
Discourse theorist Ernesto Laclau (2005) demonstrates that one of the central 
difficulties Marx encountered was how to articulate ‘peoples without history’ into the 
teleological narrative of proletarian hegemony. As Laclau (2005, p. 143) points out, 
before Marx, the category ‘proletarian’ denoted the ‘passive spectacle’ of poverty 
and was used in France synonymously with the term ‘nomade’. In this way, the 
proletariat was a catchall term for “a poor outside any stable social inscription” (p. 




privileged agent within an a priori history of production, but in order to do that the 
‘proletariat’ had to be distinguished from the ‘lumpenproletariat’ – a kind of 
‘marginal mass’, outside the singular logic of capital accumulation (p. 143-148). This 
‘marginal mass’, Laclau argued, could never be fully explained by the notion of the 
‘industrial reserve army’; used to describe a kind of jobless population functional to 
the requirements of capital, who, through their maintenance of competition for work, 
help to maintain the rate of profit. Discourse theorist Laclau (2005, 148) is at pains to 
point out that, particularly in today’s globalised society, the ‘peoples without history’ 
have occupied centre stage to the point of shattering the very notion of a teleological 
historicity”. 
 
 The difference between a more classically Gramscian-Marxist interpretation and 
discourse theory is that in the latter, the ‘lumpen’ to speak with Marx, or the 
‘dispossessed’, ‘precariat’ or ‘informal sector’ to use today’s vocabulary (Holst, 
2011), are simply a heterogeneous grouping amenable to political articulation. 
However, the Marxist understanding is that such ‘peoples without history’ now form 
an “objectively revolutionary” force because their “simple demands for survival can 
no longer be met within prevailing capitalist relations” (Holst, 2011). As such the 
task of hegemonic struggle is to move from an ‘objectively revolutionary’ situation 
to one of subjective recognition. This is a good example of the idea of the ‘internality 
of relations’ as opposed to the ‘externality of relations’ at work:  
 
When we think…in terms of internal relations (Allman, 2001), one can 
see how the existence of oppressor classes and nations is incumbent upon 
the existence of oppressed classes and nations; one pole of the dialectic 
cannot exist without the other (Holst, 2011, p.123) 
 
On the other hand, discourse theory, understanding the world though the ‘externality 
of relations’ asserts that “antagonism presupposes heterogeneity because the 
resistance of the antagonized force cannot be logically derived from the form of the 




globalised capitalism. Rather it is to acknowledge that “globalised capitalism creates 
myriad points of rupture and antagonisms – ecological crises, imbalance between 
different sectors of the economy, massive unemployment, and so on” and that “it is 
impossible to determine a priori who the hegemonic actors in this struggle will be” 
(Laclau, 2005, p.150).  
 
Thus, the discourse theory understanding of hegemony is reconfigured from a 
question of instrumental alliance formation for the emergence of a unified, 
predestined historical subject, to the very nature of ‘the political’ itself: in other 
words, hegemony is understood in discourse theory as the process of attempting to 
create political projects and structures that refuse their own contingency on a 
‘constitutive outside’ (Howarth, 2000; Hansen, 2006), or the “non-recognition of the 
precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any final suture” 
(Laclau, 1983, p. 24).  Hegemonic projects seek to achieve the impossible task of 
stabilising meaning within a totality. Gramsci’s “‘war of position’, is, strictly 
speaking, a logic of displacement of political frontiers” (Laclau, 2005, p. 153). 
 
In order to understand how such frontiers become displaced, Laclau (1990) uses the 
concept of dislocation. Dislocatory moments are those which cannot be represented 
within existing orders of discourse. In other words, political frontiers are thrown into 
question when the logics of equivalence and difference – functioning in hegemonic 
projects, fail to adequately represent orders of events, subject positions and social 
structures (Howarth 2000, pp. 131-132). Dislocations are particular historical 
moments of crisis, whereupon indeterminacy and contingencies become plainly 
visible to people. The concept of dislocation is similar to the Habermasian concept of 
“legitimacy crisis”. The crucial difference is the emphasis given to antagonism rather 
than rational consensus in addressing and responding to such moments or crises.  
 
In discourse theory antagonisms “represent particular discursive responses to 




imaginaries”, known as subjectivities (p. 132). Social movements of all political 
orientations operate according to this logic where heterogeneous subjects make 
affective investments in forms of identification opposed to  crudely identified 
‘Others’. For example, in South Africa, the Soweto uprisings of 1976 marked the 
beginning of a dislocation, through which frontiers between “Afrikaan” volk (people) 
and those (black people, imperialists, English speaking capitalists) denying “the 
creation of an Afrikaner identity”, were reorganised along different axes to do with 
White/Black, apartheid and ‘the people’ (Norval, 1996). Thus, the diversity and 
particularity within the Black Consciousness movement the was smoothed over 
through a common opposition to ‘white racism’: In the 1980s the United Democratic 
Front linked a range of sites and interests including community organising, the 
student movement, trade unions and women’s groups (Howarth, 1997).  
 
As an “equivalential chain” joining the claims of particular collective actors through 
their opposition to a ‘constitutive outside’ grows, they become united under “empty 
signifiers”, so-called because particularistic claims , demands and interests are linked 
increasingly only in terms of that which they oppose on the other side of the 
“dichotomic frontier” (Laclau 2005, p.131). However, because antagonism and 
indeterminacy are intrinsic parts of social life, political frontiers are unstable and 
may shift. Laclau (2005, p. 130) introduces the term “floating signifiers” to denote 
those particularistic claims “whose meaning is suspended between two alternative 
equivalential frontiers”.   
 
The floating dimension becomes most visible during moments of  crisis “when the 
symbolic order needs to be radically recast” (Laclau, 2005, p. 132).  Hegemony is 
thus played out between the indeterminacy of the empty and the floating: whilst the 
empty “concerns the construction of a popular identity once the presence of a stable 
political frontier is taken for granted, the floating dimension  “tries conceptually to 
apprehend the logic of the displacements of that frontier” (p. 133). For Laclau and 




and structures are inherently unstable. As a consequence, discourse theory argues 
that (1) people, groups, organisations, networks and so on are fully emergent. There 
is no a priori totality to which they belong; (2) the practices/agency of these 
emergent wholes are not determined by their relation to any master process, but 
conversely, individual and collective subjects are not free agents, able to frame issues 
as they please. Discourse theory thus makes a valuable contribution of the 
structure/agency debate. 
 
Implications for the public pedagogy of climate 
activism  
One implication of applying these insights to climate activism, is that that it may not 
be defined as such prior to practical action, but emerges through it. Conversely, what 
might nominally begin as climate activism, may grow and develop to be about much 
more than merely climate change. One of the implications that follows from this, is 
that for actors to successfully respond to dislocatory moments, particular signifiers 
have to be credible and available to collective actors (Griggs & Howarth, 2004). 
Consequently climate activists may find themselves drawing upon elements from 
previous struggles for social and environmental justice; whether or not they 
implicitly or explicitly differentiate themselves from such struggles, or articulate 
them into chains of equivalence. As Melucci (1996, p. 207) recognised:  
 
In its formative stage, a ‘movement’ always adopts the language of 
previous struggles. Still unable to define itself in terms of an identity of 
its own, the new collective actor uses the symbols, the organizational 
experience, and the forms of action of the movements that preceded it. 
 
Not only this, but particular signifiers are struggled over through recursive processes 
of dialogue so that meanings may be appropriated, modified or even inverted by 




difference is in the judgement that this process might be rationally and 
technocratically managed. A good example is Griggs & Howarth’s (2004) study of 
Heathrow airport expansion protest: These discourse theorists show how anti-airport 
expansion protest went through several stages in its ‘war of position’: from a 
reformist middle-class NIMBY protest, to becoming part of a broader coalition 
against airport expansion, to making alliances with environmental organisations, 
rural protection groups, social justice campaigners, and the domestic tourism 
industry. The campaign also moved from environment versus economy framings to 
directly contesting the economic rationality of airport expansion with the aim of 
splitting the opposing side (the ‘freedom to fly’ coalition), thus realigning the 
political frontier (Griggs & Howarth, 2004). Thus, pragmatically, this campaign 
turned away from more universal but abstract arguments about the environment 
(which could have taken it in the direction of climate change) when it seemed that 
such framings would trouble the maintenance of the anti-expansion coalition.  
 
Thus, this small example shows how discourse theory has profound implications for 
how we understand the potential of climate activism, and perhaps more specifically 
on the viability of a cultural politics based on the idea of developing a coherent 
identity around the idea of tackling climate change.  The logic of discourse theory 
can play a part in explaining how expanding chains of equivalence can be 
constructed around the idea of tackling climate change (in the same manner as they 
are for the notions of being ‘green’ or ‘sustainable’) such that the very idea of what 
this means increasingly embodies tensions, as the “dislocatory effects of climate 
change for hegemonic structures” are dampened by articulating what the idea of 
climate protection means back into a “global governmentality of climate protection 
built on globalism, scientism, an ethics of growth and efficiency” (Methmann, 2010, 
p. 369). By globalism, Methmann is referring to the way in which climate change is 
rendered as a global issue requiring consensus (see chapter one). Thus, the political 
arena is constructed as a universe, rather than a pluriverse, to speak with Mouffe 




its solutions are constructed around the perceived need to link increasing scientific 
certainty with other forms of calculative rationality in order to establish a global 
techno-managerial regime (also see chapter 1). By an ethics of growth and 
efficiency, Methmann is referring to the unquestioned faith that technological 
innovations and economic growth are mutually constitutive and required, particularly 
if developing countries are to tackle climate change. 
 
Thus, for Methmann, such a discourse of ‘climate protection’ had become an empty 
signifier, which tempered the dislocatory effects of climate change on the idea of 
sustainable capitalism. By contesting such hegemonic notions of climate protection, 
climate activists once again re-emphasise the ‘floating’ dimension of ‘climate 
protection’, or ‘climate action’, as they disrupt its meaning by articulating it into 
other chains of equivalence encompassing social justice, localisation, anti-capitalism 
and so on.  
 
Unlike NSMT which, after Habermas, believes that it is possible in the public sphere 
to “achieve consensus on collective issues through rational argumentation”, an 
application of the fundamental insights of agonistic pluralism to climate politics 
holds that “rational decisions cannot be reached through communicative exchanges 
and that a fully inclusive consensus is not possible” (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012, p. 
12). The implication for social movement against climate change is that it is 
contingent upon mobilising alliances of interest and identity (Griggs & Howarth, 
2002), which cannot be assumed, but are radically contingent, constructed through 
practical action, and are reversible. Ultimately, this view holds that a liberal politics 
of climate change is a non-starter. Given the time-limited nature of climate change, 
its complex and uncertain epistemological nature and its complex justice 
implications, I am inclined to agree with Carvalho & Peterson (2012, p. 16) that 
“climate change policy is the antithesis of an issue likely to be resolved through 





Thus, the post-political golden mean of green as ‘beyond left and right’ is 
problematic in this light as the lack of an agonistic conception of the political 
constructs potential adversaries as enemies, or simply tries to deny the existence of 
the antagonistic moment, in which case it springs up in more extreme forms in other 
places. An analogy for this is the contraction and convergence of politics during the 
era of the Third Way, such that Right populist parties and movements are enjoying 
resurgence in the UK (e.g. UKIP), Europe (e.g. Golden Dawn) and the United States 
(e.g. the Tea Party). Thus, although climate change as an environmental phenomenon 
operates completely independently of our anthropic political relations (we are 
‘locked-in’ to a certain degree of climatic change which cannot be reversed already), 
the notion that its loaded political implications can be solved through the overcoming 
of antagonism as simply a failure of rational actors operating in the demarcated 
political space, is (particularly after the pantomime of Conference of Parties 15) 
entirely a proposition without credibility. Moreover, the shift towards evidence-based 
‘cognitive policy’ recommended for the green movement, as examined in the section 
above on framing, appears problematic in this light. Mainly this is because it is 
problematic that a conception of the common good can easily be assumed and 
worked towards through application of the rational strategies of culture change 
experts. As climate change moves into the realm of the political, it is necessarily 
imbricated in a wider politics of economy, development, immigration, energy 
security and so on. However, the development of a socially just activist identity 
suturing together commitments to social justice and climate change cannot be based 
on the myth of any logically necessary relations: they are contingent, fully-emergent 
and are forged through hegemonic struggle. 
 
The specific implications of discourse theory for social movement learning are 
reasonably straightforward to articulate, yet underdeveloped in the literature. As the 
dislocatory effects of climate change play out in particular real-life spatial contexts, 
the political meaning of particular struggles are constructed through it, not anterior to 




radical environmentalists, social justice campaigners, local communities, business 
interests, employees, employers, sectors of the legal and political establishments into 
periods of “radical learning” with one another, as stakes, purposes and identities are 
redefined, and  geographical, cultural, and epistemological borders challenged, 
disrupted and remapped. One direct implication of this contingency is that such 
public pedagogies are “messy” as Crowther, et al’s (Crowther, et al., 2012) study of 
adult learning through environmental campaigning and several other influential 
studies of social movement learning underscore (Foley, 1999; Conway, 2006). 
Although this is commonly recognised, a fundamental difference of perspective 
remains between the agonistic pluralists and those who think that such messiness can 
be systematised only through a Marxist political economy based on Hegelian 
dialectical thought (Holst, 2002, pp. 81-102). 
 
Thus, the basic insight of discourse theory in an educational context is that in 
emergent collective struggles, “learning…can be understood as filling ‘empty 
signifiers’ with concrete meanings” (Zielinska, et al., 2011, p. 262). As I argued 
above, this begins with taking seriously Gramsci’s insight that that hegemony is an 
educative process whilst significantly altering the meaning of hegemony so that it is 
understood as the process of seeking to overcode particular configurations of the 
material and discursive, such that their contingency is suppressed, as is their 
historical dependence upon a separation from an outside that once made them 
possible. In other words, an identity becomes hegemonic though the drive to realise 
the impossibility of pure or full representation. One response to this is that such a 
project has no anchor, and is doomed to collapse into moral relativism. How can a 
post-foundational perspective argue for radical democracy? One partial answer is 
that this perspective constitutes a kind of “enlightenment blackmail”, which implies 
that, if one does not accept wholesale the historically specific rationality of 
enlightenment humanism, then one has no grounds at all for engaging in political 
discourse (Foucault, 1984). An agonistic conception of the political holds that 




In the context of discourse theory, I see the public pedagogy of climate activism as a 
form of what critical education scholar Henry Giroux (1992) has called “border 
pedagogy”. The end of a teleological view of cultural politics does not preclude 
formative narratives, and in fact arises often from prefigurative practices, or 
‘structures of feeling’ to speak with Raymond Williams. Giroux (1992, p.31) argues 
that “[b]y ‘interrupting’ representational  practices that make a claim to objectivity, 
universality, and consensus, critical educators can develop pedagogical conditions in 
which students can read and write within and against existing cultural codes while 
simultaneously having the opportunity to create new spaces for producing new forms 
of knowledge, subjectivity, and identity” (Giroux, 1992, p. 31). Thus, his concept of 
border pedagogy in this context would be one which always begins with a 
questioning of how political and cultural spaces have been drawn, and by whom, 
with regards to issues of recognition and distribution in relation to the human effects 
of climate change. Giroux (1992, p. 30) explains the concept below: 
 
Border pedagogy decentres as it remaps. The terrain of learning becomes 
inextricably linked to the shifting parameters of place, identity, history 
and power. Border pedagogy shifts the emphasis on the mapping of 
knowledge/power relationship away from the limited emphasis on the 
mapping of domination toward the politically strategic issue of engaging 
the ways in which knowledge can be remapped, reterritorialized, and 
decentred in the wider interests of rewriting the borders and coordinates 
of an oppositional cultural politics.  
 
Thus, the  “epistemic awareness” of the provisional nature of knowledge; ethical 
awareness “insofar as the defence and assertion of values is grounded on 
argumentative movements”, and “political awareness”, insofar as “historical 
achievements appear as the product of hegemonic and contingent (and therefore 
reversible) articulations” (Giroux, 1992, pp. 51-2), leads us away from the view that 
barriers to learning are found in ‘distorted communication’: that is to say, social 
movements possess society’s latent learning capacity to overcome instrumental 




If, applying discourse theory to the public pedagogy of climate activism results in  
border pedagogies, which “undermine and reterritorialize different configurations of 
culture, power and knowledge” (1991, p. 51), then three defining features can be 
identified: it “signals forms of transgression in which existing borders forged in 
domination can be challenged and redefined”; “it speaks to the need to create 
pedagogical conditions in which [teachers] and students become border crossers in 
order to  understand otherness in its own terms”; consequently, the first step of 
border pedagogy is to “make visible the historically and socially constructed 
strengths and limitations of those places and borders we inherit and which frame our 
discourses and social relations” (Giroux, 1991, pp. 51-2). Thus, ultimately “[w]e 
should not forget that any political order can only exist because of a division between 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’” (Biesta, 2011, p. 151). I move on to finish the chapter by 
making the case that integrating themes of space into the position I have adopted thus 
far, strengthens it, and enables a sharper analysis of the public pedagogy of climate 
activism.  
 
A spatial supplement to discourse theory 
Although I have argued above for the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, there 
are elements of their writing and theoretical project, which require development. In 
particular, although they provide a theoretical framework which I think is superior to 
both NSMT and framing theory, the material-spatial implications of their work 
require to be unpacked since, in many instances, climate activism is emerges through 
material struggles over the production of space, which come to make sense as 
meaningful social practices. Henri Lefebvre (2000 [1974], p. 44), the French 
philosopher of space puts it well:  
 
What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space which it 
describes, whose vocabulary  and links it makes use of, and whose code 
it embodies…Ideology per se might well be said to consist primarily in a 




Broadly speaking, the spatial turn is concerned with a rapprochement of the social 
and the spatial. However, we can think of the spatial turn on a continuum bookended 
by strong and weak versions. In the weak version, the relational connection between 
space and social practice is examined through a conceptualisation of space as 
“simply the site or place wherein processes and practices take place” (Howarth, 
2006, p. 109). In the stronger version, space is “conceded ‘emergent properties’ and 
‘causal powers’”(p. 109). There are also those sceptical of what they see as a 
valorisation of space, which brings little added value to comprehending and 
explaining social processes. Dialogue between political/cultural geographers and 
discourse theorists has produced some interesting poststructuralist conceptions of 
space. Doreen Massey (1995, p. 284), in dialogue with Chantal Mouffe, reasoned 
that the concept of ‘place’ in geography is analogous to the notion of ‘identity’ in 
discourse theory, and since Mouffe’s position was to take a transversal view of the 
discursive and material from the outset, I find myself able to accept this argument 
without difficulty. Place, as space imbued with historically constituted and 
contingent identity, it is undecidable, multiple,  heterogeneous, and thus can never be 
fully realised (Howarth, 2006, p. 117). These thinkers would not dispute the 
dominant role of capitalism in processes of uneven geographical development, just 
that resistance to it can only be conceptualised through a kind of dialectical reversal 
of its internal logic. Thus, the making of a geographically bounded space into a place 
is seen as a hegemonic act.  
 
Where thinkers such as Doreen Massey and Laclau disagree is in the abstract 
formalism of space conceptualised in discourse theory: curiously enough for a theory 
owing in part to a Derridean scepticism of binaries, this assertion rests upon setting 
up a binary opposition between space and time (Laclau, 1990; Massey, 1995; 
Howarth, 2006). Spatialising an event entails “eliminating its temporality” according 
to Lalcau (1991, p. 41). Space is seen as absolute stasis, which conceived as a 
“Kantian regulative ideal”, can never be actualised (Howarth, 2006, p. 122). So, if 




associated with dynamism and dislocation. Space is therefore, “an (ideological) 
attempt at closure”, whilst “Grand Historical Time” is associated with dislocation, 
contingency, openness, undecidability, emancipation (Massey, 1992, pp.  26-27).  
 
This depoliticisation of space is what geographer and spatial philosopher Doreen 
Massey (1992; 1995) takes issue with. She is against the decoupling of space and 
time, and seeks to understand space politically. Massey argues for a transversal 
understanding of social and spatial relations. She argues that ‘material lived’ space 
and its contingencies shape social relations, whilst the ‘social’ acts back in complex 
ways upon the materiality of lived space. The spatial form of the material ‘real’ may 
be the result of meaningful social practices, but as Massey (1992, p. 81) argues, 
“although the location of each (or a set of) a number of phenomena may be directly 
caused…,the spatial positioning of one in relation to another may not be directly 
caused”. Consequently, “die happenstance juxtapositions”, in which the coherence of 
lived space is disrupted, by unexpected land uses or social relations emerging from 
unintentionally juxtaposed locations, point to a view where antagonisms arise from 
dislocated space. This is an important point, as the ‘thrown togetherness’ of 
configurations of people and material resources in geographical space means that 
material space forms part of the undecidability and contingency of the social.  
 
Recently, attempts have been made to theorise the spatialities of social movements 
through conceiving of them as assemblages (DeLanda, 2006; McFarlane, 2009; 
Davies, 2011), which I argue is the most ontologically adequate way of looking at 
the relationships between knowledge, power and space. Assemblages, after 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze (a colleague and compatriot of Henry Lefebvre) are 
“wholes categorised by relations of exteriority” (DeLanda 2006, p. 10). Assemblages 
are therefore made up of components contingently related through historical 
processes, rather than Hegelian wholes of ‘necessary’ relations of interiority. In 
terms of social science, an assemblage can be regarded as an emergent whole, which 




social movement network, to nation state, to regional institutions such as the EU and 
so on. Nevertheless, the concept of relations of exteriority ensures no “simple 
Russian doll relation” (p. 33) between scales, and certainly eschews any linear sense 
of causality. Assemblages are irreducible, and may form part of multiple 
assemblages simultaneously across spatial and temporal scales. To me, the focus on 
capacity rather than property, or to put it another way, a logic of contingency as 
opposed to a logic of necessity, highlights obvious similarities between discourse 
theory and assemblage theory, which are worth exploring. 
 
It is my view that assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) and discourse theory (Laclau, 
2005) say remarkably similar things despite drawing on different bodies of theory 
and embarking on different projects. The main difference, for example, between the 
projects of assemblage theorist DeLanda and discourse theorist Laclau are 
commitment to a ‘realist’ mind independent reality-based discursive/non-discursive 
split, and a transversal view of the discursive and non-discursive, respectively. Both 
assemblage theory and discourse theory, grounded in ontologies based on relations of 
exteriority, are both “motivated by a strikingly similar set of objectives” (Gilbert, 
2009, p. 16): “in both cases a language is sought…which can capture adequately the 
historically contingent, non-necessary and ultimately mutable nature of the precise 
configurations of relationships making up existing social entities”, and it is only “on 
the basis of such an understanding that effective strategies can be enacted for social 
change”. 
 
Whereas in discourse theory, the formation of emergent wholes is expressed in terms 
of the logics of equivalence and difference (Lalcau and Mouffe, 1987), in 
assemblage theory, the analogous concepts are territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation (DeLanda, 2006). The logic of territorialisation applies to any 
process which increases the internal homogeneity of an assemblage. This includes a 
literal interpretation of territorialisation, paying particular attention to the “spatial 




processes that operationalise heterogeneity; destabilising commonality and 
establishing difference, but also emphasising the literal deterritorialisation spatial 
boundaries at different scales. This understanding enriches the discourse theory idea 
of public pedagogy as “border pedagogy” (1992), with a more explicit focus on 
geographical space: 
 
[S]pace is open to be shaped by activists who produce relations with 
other activists ⁄ objects that alter over time, creating assemblages where 
spatially extensive relations maintain and territorialise organisations. 
Thus assemblage allows us to understand how activists engage with both 
a series of spatial structures that, while seemingly giving stability to an 
organisation, are also constantly being produced by these actors and thus 
open to change. Seemingly ‘local’ relations are constitutive of wider 
networks of connection, and these spatially extensive connections in turn 
help to territorialise the organisation  (Davies, 2011, p. 277). 
 
Thus, it can be argued that a re-politicisation of the spatial (Massey, 2005), and 
concomitant struggles over the right and capability to exercise control over the 
production of space (Lefebvre, 2000[1974]), lie at the heart of various cultures of 
climate activism. It is a struggle between the spatial imaginaries and strategies of 
activists (whether ENGO professionals, community activists, or DA activists) and 
hegemonic spatial practices. Doreen Massey’s question of who has the power to 
make a space a place is highly appropriate here, and can be asked and answered in 
different ways. From a Marxian perspective, the master narrative remains the tension 
between “creative destruction on the land” (Harvey, 2010, p. 184), or the “productive 
consumption of space” (Lefebvre, 2000[1974], p. 375) in the interests of creating 
surplus-value for the few, and the use-value of space as a Commons. We can apply 
this perspective in two ways: through analysing anthropogenic climate change 
understood as an effect of human activity, and through looking at the human activity 
itself that, to speak with activist communities, can be understood as the ‘root causes’. 
Climate change is a global spatial construction; its governance is about creating 
spaces of equivalence, where particular places in all their specificity and 




issue is about the overuse of atmospheric space in the context of uneven geographical 
development. As an issue, its specific human geographical consequences 
fundamentally challenge the arbitrary nature of the scaling of the Westphalian nation 
state. 
 
The Marxian understanding of the power over the production of space departs from 
the insight that market and state power are co-constitutive, but are governed by two 
contradictory logics: the logic of capital, and territorial logic, respectively (Harvey, 
2007, p. 107). The frictionless movement of capital envisioned by free-market 
ideologues requires the agglomeration of fixed embedded capital in concrete spatial 
form (Lefebvre, 2000[1974], p. 388; Harvey, 2010, pp. 184-214).  
 
Consequently, “pressure from below must…confront the state in its role as the 
organiser of space” so that “its ability to intervene in space can and must be turned 
back against it, by grassroots opposition” (Lefebvre, p. 383). Yet the production of a 
new space in any particular context through collective efforts involving various 
‘stakeholder’ interests, presupposes moments of antagonism: Lefebvre’s (p.380-1) 
point is that as soon as we move beyond the abstract, and in to the realm of specific 
conflicts over the production of space, unlikely alliances of interest and identity 
arise. Thus, as I have argued above, much climate change activism does not arrive 
ready-made as such.: this has been seen in anti-airport protest, anti-coal protest, and 
occasionally workers’ struggle, where the connection of particularistic interests must 
be articulated in chains of equivalence with actors concerned with climate change in 
populist alliances.  
 
The significance of climate politics as struggle over the right to the production of 
space has already been noted by the nascent literature on climate activism. For 
example, Pearse, et al (2010, p. 82) analyse Australian climate camps as “spatial 
interventions mounted as close as possible to the physical site of large-scale carbon 




(2009) analyse climate camps as heterotopic spaces of alternative social ordering, 
focusing also on the internal as well as external tensions marking such spatial 
interventions. From a discourse theory perspective, the important point to note for 
direct action is that all activist spaces of resistance are simultaneously spaces of 
domination (Anderson, 2004). 
 
In another context, a number of academic commentators and activist intellectuals 
have added nuance to the notion of local community activism through analysing the 
Transition Network as a multi-scalar translocal assemblage, which simultaneously 
seeks to re-engage people with a sense of place whilst spreading ‘rhizomically’ 
(Scott-Cato, 2008; Bailey, et al., 2010; Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; Aiken, 2012).  
 
One implication of all of this for learning is that although the scale of particular 
activist practices is materially enforced to an extent, it is itself a learning process 
because scale does not exist prior to its discursive articulation (Kurtz, 2003). In this 
sense, we can speak of the dialectical relationship between learning scale and scales 
of learning and the outcome between the two
v
. Pedagogically, this idea was 
expressed by Freire in the language of “generative themes”.  
 
Generative themes can be located in concentric circles, moving from the 
general to the particular. The broadest epochal unit, which includes a 
diversified range of units and sub-unitscontinental, regional, national, 
and so forthcontain themes of a universal character…Within the 
smaller circles, we find themes and limit situations characteristic of 
societies…Within yet smaller circles, thematic diversifications can be 
found within the same society, divided into areas and sub-areas. These 
constitute epochal sub-units (Freire, 1972, p. 90). 
 
Thus, the act of discursively shaping the scale of a collective struggle for the sake of 
claims-making can be read as a Freirian process of reading and writing ‘the world’ 
and ‘the word’.  Scale matters when local struggles ‘jump scale’ in order to gain 




apply them to particularistic struggles (Kinchy, 2010).  In this sense, the 
territorialisation and deterritorialisation of particular assemblages of cognitive and 
material resources can be considered to be constitutive of learning. In the same sense, 
place-making is inherently a collective learning act. All of this challenges the overly 
linguistic and cognitive conceptions of social learning in NSMT and framing theory.  
 
Conclusion  
The rational turn in social movement theory, as a reaction against the pathologisation 
of protest, sought to conceptualise social movements as simply politics by other 
means. However, rational actor theories are not able to adequately theorise agency 
without culture. In asking what kind of cultural theory might be most useful, I 
explored new social movement theory, framing theory and discourse theory as 
embodying different approaches to the cultural politics of climate activism: drawing 
upon Carvalho and Peterson (2012), I characterised these as public participation, 
social marketing and agonistic pluralism. I argued that these types reflect, in 
theoretical terms, important tensions occurring in the actual practices of social 
movements addressing climate change. Yet more than this, I made the case for 
discourse theory as the most useful perspective both analytically and normatively. In 
the previous chapter, I made the case for conceptualising climate activism as a 
process of public pedagogy. I argued that this allowed us to see that climate activism 
is engaged in wider hegemonic struggles, which may generate public learning. Here, 
I strengthened this argument by explaining and making the case for Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of hegemony. I argued that although NSMT is useful to the extent 
that it can explain climate activism as emerging from systemworld/lifeworld 
tensions, its teleological reasoning and overly rational and linguistic account of 
democracy detract from its usefulness. I argued that although framing theory 
addresses these concerns over rationality, its quasi-technocratic response is confused. 
I then argued that discourse theory provides a more compelling and convincing 




enhanced focus on the relationship between discourse theory and space, arguing that 
this is important because climate activism is about the right to the production of 
space. Therefore, I showed that the logic of discourse theory can be fruitfully applied 
in order to understand how public pedagogy emerges through spatial processes. In 
the following chapter, I move on to operationalise Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 




















Research methods: deploying discourse theory 
 
Introduction 
Heretofore, I have outlined the purpose and rationale of the thesis, I have detailed the 
reasons why climate change presents such an educational challenge, and I have 
attempted to indicate how social movements and their knowledges might widen the 
debate, and bring new analyses to bear. In chapter two, I framed the educational 
challenge in the context of a literature on public pedagogy, arguing that the educative 
challenges of climate activism are not simply about promulgating climate science, or 
even improving science-society interfaces, but are fundamentally issues of cultural 
politics. As such the cultural endeavours of climate activists are situated against 
‘neoliberal’ public pedagogy, and in and against the ‘pedagogical state’. I outlined 
the possibilities and limitations of public pedagogy as a framing concept. Ultimately, 
I argued, the virtue of this perspective is to see education and learning as a process of 
hegemonic struggle, through which “a ruling bloc can only engage in a political and 
pedagogical struggle if it prepared to take seriously and articulate some of the values 
and interests of [those it seeks to govern]” (Giroux, 1992, p. 186).  
 
In the previous chapter, I developed these ideas by exploring three different ways of 
understanding the cultural politics of climate activism as public pedagogy. I argued 
for a discourse theoretical perspective, which provides the theoretical grounding for 
my view that the public pedagogy of climate activism is articulated through 
hegemonic struggle. Finally, I supplemented my discourse theoretical perspective 
with a discussion of post-structuralist spatial theory, arguing that the cultural politics 




(Lefebvre, 2000[1974]). Having introduced the thesis, given an account of 
hegemonic epistemic communities in relation to climate change knowledge, 
adumbrated the contours of the wider terrain of the debate, and defined the problem 
as one of cultural politics and hegemonic struggle, this chapter moves on to detail the 
methodological approach that has defined the forthcoming substantive chapters. 
 
To ‘do’ cultural politics is, after Stuart Hall (Giroux, 2000, p. 342), to explore 
struggles over identity, meaning and power “produced and meditated within different 
social contexts, spatial relations and historical conjunctures”. This requires an 
understanding of the environmental movement as an historical and ongoing process 
of movement building and differentiation (identity), as a source of public pedagogy 
and cultural change (meaning), through which emergent cultural formations exist in 
shifting relations “between incorporation and resistance” (Jamison, 2001, p. 27) as 
they contest hegemonic representations (power) (Giroux, 2000, p. 342; Conway, 
2006, pp. 11-12). Eyerman and Jamison (1991) and Jamison (2001), have produced 
the most thoroughgoing account of this process to-date, which, as we know, they 
term “cognitive praxis”. My task, in this sense, is to extrapolate and explicate the 
theory of cognitive praxis in this historical moment, as new activist practices enact 
new cultural practices and ‘produce’ new knowledge that constitute curricular 
artefacts.  
 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, a focus on identity, meaning, and power 
suggests to me an engagement with the theoretical logic and methods of discourse 
theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; Howarth, 2000; Hansen, 2006). Also, given my 
desire to follow a broad comparative approach similar to Jamison’s (2001), tracking 
knowledge production over time, through which the cultural politics of climate 
activism is generative of public curriculum, an approach based on analysing 
publically available texts as curricular artefacts seems viable. Therefore, in what 





This chapter lays out the conceptual basis of my research design, drawing primarily 
on Hansen’s (2006) operationalisation of discourse theory, and her model of 
intertextuality. Section 2 justifies and explains my general research approach—a 
discourse approach. Following from this, I explain the concept of intertextuality and 
its significance. I explain that the notion of intertextuality is vital for three main 
reasons: firstly, it may help us to evidence mutual learning across the milieus under 
study; secondly, it allows for a design that conceptualises hegemony in the wider 
public discourse arena; thirdly, it allows for elements of a genealogical approach 
capable of interrogating some of the more exaggerated claims of ‘grassrootism’ made 
of movement knowledge.  
 
Intertextuality is an important orienting concept, but it is not the only one. Therefore, 
my next move is to introduce other factors feeding into the design of my study. 
These are the actors involved, events involved, and the temporal perspective. If these 
considerations, taken together, provide the building blocks of an analytical 
framework, then the next question to be asked is substantive: how do we identify 
‘discourses’, or ‘identities’ to begin with? Drawing on Hansen and the work of 
Eyerman and Jamison (1991), I describe the concept of basic discourses as 
distinctions of an ideal-type kind that situate the study. Another way of putting it is 
that these are the basic identities, or selves, under consideration in relation to a set of 
substantive political issues. As such, these identities are spatially, temporally and 
ethically constituted in relation to 'Others'. In identifying these basic discourses, I 
take as my starting point Jamison’s (2001) typology of community (place-based) 
environmentalism, professional (reformist) environmentalism, and direct action 
environmentalism to provide my ‘basic discourses’.  
 
Having outlined a broad conceptual framework for conducting my analysis, I move 
on to populate this framework with real collective actors: these are the direct action 
networks manifested in the actions of the Camps for Climate Action, the ‘place-




Having identified the ‘Selves’ of my study, I describe the study’s temporal 
perspective, including the question of number of events to be covered. I move on to 
describe my approach to data collection and analysis, situating my corpus in the 
context of Hansen’s models of intertextuality.  Having conceptualised and 
operationalised a discourse approach, I address its limitations in conceptualisation 
and execution. The penultimate section addresses ethical considerations before 
briefly concluding.  
 
Research approach  
There exist very few comparative studies which have compared and traced the 
development of green movement knowledge and identities in a macro-context, in an 
era of climate change (see Saunders, 2008 for an exception). Differing collective 
identities within the same movement industry can cause schisms and sectarian 
isolation, but they also provide opportunities for brokerage, adaptation and mutual 
learning (Saunders, 2008, p. 250). Documenting such productive tensions is one task 
of the research. However, one might legitimately ask whether post-structural 
discourse theory and a comparative research approach are compatible. The answer is 
yes, but that “the point of comparison is to further our understanding and explanation 
of different logics of identity formation and hegemonic practice in different historical 
conjunctures, and not to construct generally applicable laws of social and political 
behaviour” (Howarth, 2000, p. 139).  
 
My contention is that the period under examination is a politically salient moment (or 
a ‘dislocatory moment’ to speak with discourse theory), which has presented unique 
challenges for the effective promulgation of ‘green’ knowledge in public discourse, 
and has therefore generated what Tilly (2004) would call new “repertoires of 
contention”, power struggles, identities and therefore, public curriculum. As Stuart 
Hall (Giroux, 2000, p. 354) understood, “pedagogy is at work in all those public 




with how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses are constructed, 
contested and change” (Howarth, 2000, p. 131). I am essentially interested in 
answering these kinds of questions in order to gain insight into how a dislocatory 
moment in time has produced the conditions for antagonisms, from which 
overlapping but distinct articulations of cultural political projects in relation to 
climate change arose. Thus, I am interested in applying these questions in order to 
learn about the implications of these projects for the cognitive and political praxis of 
climate change activism. The curriculum generated through this process of 
hegemonic struggle can be ascertained by analysing the presence of movement 
knowledge in public discourse.  Therefore, whilst the process of cognitive praxis 
documents processes of linking and differentiation within the green movement over 
time, it also charts the hegemonic struggle through which the knowledge produced in 
particular movement milieus finds its way into arenas of public discourse. Plows 
(2008, p. 101), in assessing the ‘success of UK environmental protest’ relates that: 
 
Publics can become directly engaged in protest activity or in other ways 
encounter the resources and discourses developed by countercultural 
networks. Routes of transmission include interface at the local 
community level…, or through encountering movement frames 
‘mediated’ through the media. 
 
It has been claimed through empirical research that “the media are the main source of 
information and the main factor shaping people’s awareness and concern in relation 
to climate change” (Carvalho, 2010, p. 165)
vi
. It has also been written that bystander 
publics at large have been learning about climate change from social movements for 
over thirty years (Clover & Hall, 2010, p. 165). If so, then it makes clear sense to 
research the mediation of movement knowledge through the print media as one 
significant site of hegemonic contestation.  
 
The two axes of comparison to consider thus far in terms of discourse are between 




more polyphonic arenas of public discourse. However, the popular press represents 
one discursive arena for the uptake of movement knowledge. What others might we 
consider? ‘Official’ policy discourse clearly is another discursive arena, through 
which the cultural influence of movement milieus may be evidenced. Moreover, as is 
often the case with protest (whether transient direct action, or a more rooted place-
based initiative), the efficacy of movement discourse can be assessed through its 
success in defining its purpose in the legalistic discursive genre of the court room. 
Archived court transcripts and legal journals therefore represent another avenue of 
exploration. 
 
Lastly, as chapter two argued, movement milieus cannot be regarded as hermetically 
sealed spaces. A genealogical approach to discourse analysis seeks to identify the 
key academic disciplines, public intellectuals and epistemological commitments 
associated with the development of movement generated knowledge. This is 
important because it allows for a more nuanced exploration of the ambivalence of 
movement power/knowledge. A robust discourse analysis of the cultural politics of 
green movement milieus in an era of climate change must be cognizant of where 
movement knowledge comes from, how it travels between milieus, and the paths it 
takes into arenas of public discourse. A study such as this requires, first and 
foremost, a robust model of intertextuality.  
 
Operationalising intertextuality 
Intertextuality is a concept often ascribed to Russian cultural theorist Mikhail 
Bakhtin. The Bakhtinian legacy is a dialogical theory of discourse in which all 
utterances, all texts, are keyed to social, cultural and political histories (Steinberg, 
1999, p. 772; Fairclough, 2003, p. 61; Blomaert, 2005, p. 46). Texts therefore draw 
upon histories of use of contested meanings, whilst attempting to fashion them into 
new unique meanings and identities. As we know from the previous chapter, in the 




dialogicality. Hegemonic projects seek to achieve the impossible task of stabilising 
meaning within an impossible totality. 
 
Intertextual linkages are divided into those that are implicit and those that are explicit 
(Hansen, 2006, p. 57). Implicit intertextual links are when conceptual articulations 
rely upon “implicit references to a larger body of texts on the same subject” (p. 57).  
“Programmatic catchphrases”, or even whole bodies of work may be drawn upon 
without being explicitly referenced (p.57). Intertextual links can be established 
through direct reporting (an attributed quotation), or indirect narrative reporting (an 
attributed summary of another text, speech or event but not what was actually written 
or said) (Fairclough, 2003, p. 49). This study considered both forms to establish 
intertextual links in constructing the corpus.  
 
Hansen’s (2006) work on poststructuralist discourse analysis (PDA) provides a 
robust framework delineating four intertextual research models. These models are 
usefully summarized by Hansen in the table below. Each model allows the researcher 
of cultural politics to answer different questions: Hansen’s principle concern is with 
policy discourse, and so she begins with model 1, and progresses to model 3b 
concerned with marginal political discourses. In my case, my analytical focus begins 
with model 3b and progresses all the way to model 1, as I am interested in the 
journeys of green movement knowledge. The principle is the same, however. Model 
1 to 3b is a spectrum along which the multivocality of discourse on particular 
substantive political issues can be explored (p. 67). As we can see, model 2 
“broadens the analytical scope beyond official discourse and its intertextual links to 
consider the major actors and arenas within…policy debate”. In constituting the 
discursive arena more fully, model 2 includes influential voices in the media, 
corporate settings, as well as the voice of more influential NGOs, employer’s 
organisations and even trade unions (p. 62). The goal of model 2 is therefore to 
analyse processes of hegemony at work in public discourse. Model 3a includes wider 




literary analyses of Raymond Williams.  
 
Although Hansen precedes the discourse of social movements with discourse 
originating in popular culture, the aim is not to locate the autochthonous location of 
an idea; this is anathema to discourse theory. Public intellectuals who fabricate the 
discourse found in model 3b on particular topics, are often part of “critical 
communities” (Rochon, 1998, p. 30), from which new and innovative worldviews, 
technical and organisational knowledge emerges. These communities incubate new 
ideas, and it is often social movement actors who promulgate these ideas to the wider 
public, through strategic framing mechanisms (p. 95). Model 3b, in Hansen’s work 
includes emergent social movement organisations, less powerful NGOs, as well as 
academic analyses, and is the locus of counter-hegemonic discourse and is fruitful 
for those interested in analysing “where resistance and future rearticulations might 
occur” (Hansen, 2006, p. 63). 
 
Table 1 Intertextual research models. Reproduced from Hansen (Hansen, 2006, p. 63)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b 
Analytical focus Official 
discourse: 


























































































Resistance to the 
status quo 
Dissent in cases 





Of course, researchers need not adhere to one modelmany, such as myself, may be 
interested in the wider process of epistemic drift and therefore should aim to work 
across the whole spectrum. On this basis, I resolve to deploy a model that runs from 
‘3b’ through to ‘1’. One good example of an operationalisation of this kind of 
approach in social movement research is van Bommel and Spicer’s (2011) study of 
the Slow Food movement (SFM).  
They employ a model ‘3b’model ‘2’ approach in seeking to analyse how the SFM 
engaged in hegemonic struggle (p. 1718). The researchers first began with “the 
movement’s foundational texts, manifestos, speeches, histories and campaigning 
literature from websites”, and “examined secondary literature on the movement” (p. 
1723). Through analysing media accounts, the researchers were able to discern how 




empirically demonstrated how the movement linked itself to other actors over time 
by “broadening the range of floating signifiers they appeal to and by creating 
increasingly ambiguous nodal points able to appeal to a range of different 
constituents” (p. 1719).  
 
Using a similar approach, Nerlich and Koteyko (2009) studied how the cultural 
strategies and knowledge of community-based carbon reduction action groups, as 
evident in their self-produced (online) texts, translated into popular media accounts. 
They found that their practical activities around carbon reduction were articulated 
into chains of equivalence, which linked credible and available tropes to do with 
dieting (low-carbon dieting), finance (‘carbon accounting’), and individual pietistic 
morality (carbon sinning). Although I have read discourse theory into their more 
positivist approach, their study showed the contingency and intertextuality of 
discourse (that these climate activist strategies are contingent upon what signifiers 
are credible and available), where a nascent ethical identity around climate change 
can be co-opted back into dominant orders of discourse, which casts the issue in 
individualistic but familiar terms.  Although these examples give an impressionistic 
flavour of how one might investigate the cultural politics of contemporary 
movements, surprisingly few studies adopt such an approach.  
 
Actors, events and timeframes  
Having discussed how intertextuality can be operationalised, it should be 
acknowledged that there are other conceptual issues that must be brought to bear 
when designing my study. A discourse analysis is inevitably a simplification of a 
messy reality; an interpretative framing of events. As such, choices must be made, 






…whether one should examine the…discourse of one Self or of multiple 
Selves; whether one should select one particular moment or a longer 
historical development; whether one should study one event or issue or a 
multiplicity; and finally, which material should be selected as the 
foundation for and object of analysis (Hansen, 2006, p. `73).  
 
Selecting the corpus for any study then, depends on intertextuality, identities to be 
studied, the temporal perspective, and the event(s) to be covered. This is summarised 
below (figure 1):  
 
Figure 1. Operationalising discourse theory. Adapted from Hansen (2006, p. 81) 
 
 
Firstly, the study of the formation of selves, or identity, is the raison d’être of 
discourse theory, which considers that ontologically, there is no essential self. Yet, to 
avoid misunderstanding of my position I should re-emphasise that although signifiers 
do not have any intrinsic or stable relationship to anything in the ‘real world’ (the 
position of essentialism), neither is identity a free-floating social construction: this 
premise leads to what DeLanda (2006, pp. 45-6) calls a ‘social essentialism’. Rather, 
cultural identity should be considered to be transversal: it denies 
Study 
Selves: single; comparison 
around events or issues; 
discursive encounter 
Number of events: 
One 
Multiple – related by 
issue 








1. Official discourse 
2. Wider political debate 
3. Cultural representations 





discourseǀmateriality, cultureǀnature dualisms. Identities may congeal around 
particular more or less stable nodal points, but these in my view are the discursive 
components of assemblages undergoing ongoing processes of (de)territorialisation. 
Even one self will be internally heterogeneous, and is constructed in a Self-Other 
relationship, through discursive encounters. Furthermore, one identity may even 
construct itself by Othering its own previous historical incarnations. Delineating 
selves is therefore a situated analytical choice. The temporal perspective again is a 
matter of analytic unit of analysis. One may elect to compare carefully selected 
salient historical moments over a period of decades in order to analyse the evolution 
of discourse, or conduct a contemporary synchronic comparative analysis of different 
selves. Relatedly, an event may be macro-social – an on-going war, the negotiation 
of the Kyoto agreement – or micro-social, for example contemporary transient 
protest events within the same historical period. 
 
Once these decisions have been made, one can turn to the practical task of gathering 
the corpus. Model 1 texts are the least problematic to gather because they are official 
policy texts, freely available online as a matter of record. Model 2 texts involve the 
utilisation of media archives. I have personally opted to use Lexis Nexisa powerful 
digital archive of UK news, and other selected periodicals. Depending on the degree 
of thoroughness perceived to be necessary to make a study reliable, discourse 
analysts might combine digital sources with hard copy archives in order to 
triangulate for inconsistencies, but this was outwith my personal capacity. Model 3a 
texts, as popular culture texts, should be by definition easily accessible. However, 
with model 3b, “[w]hen speaking of social movements and illicit organisations it will 
often be a matter of selecting any material that might be available” (Hansen, 2006, p. 
87). Nevertheless, smaller NGOs, community organisations, and even direct action 
networks increasingly have web presences from which ephemera that have been 
archived for posterity can be obtained. Moreover, the range of alternative media 




Identifying Basic discourses 
The discussion heretofore, particularly intertextuality, has been concerned with the 
location of discourse in the context of justifying text selection. To remind the reader, 
this is necessary in order to present a model of research that can be put to work in 
order to chart processes of epistemic drift, mutual learning, as well as the historical 
sedimentation of particular movement identities. Analytically separate from this, 
Hansen (2006, p. 65) uses the term “basic discourses”, in order to delineate the initial 
research orientation towards the various “political and substantial positions” that one 
might be interested in. As such, basic discourses are “analytical distinctions of an 
ideal type kind” (p. 52).  These are the “different constructions of identity and 
policy…which separate the political landscape between them” (p. 52).  
 
Hansen provides three methodological points one should aim to apply in the 
identification of basic discourses. First, the discourses should be based upon reading 
a wide variety of sources, media and genres. In this sense, the starting point is based 
on an in-depth reading of academic accounts, popular accounts, and self-generated 
activist accounts that has occurred prior to beginning the analysis ‘proper’. Secondly, 
“basic discourses should be built on explicit articulations of identity”, whether these 
articulations are “geographical identities, historical analogies, striking metaphors, or 
political concepts”. Thirdly, the analyst should draw from conceptual histories and 
genealogies that trace the constitution of a basic discourse “back in history to 
understand when and how it was formed”, thereby equipping the analyst with the 
basic knowledge to see where “fault lines might be located in the present”. 
 
Basic discourses are primary orienting identities, and since identities are 
heterogeneous ensembles representing impossible totalities, their existence without 
exception depends on a constitutive outside—an ‘Other’. A caveat worth stating is 
that this process of differentiation may not be explicitly articulated in discourse. A 




Nevertheless, Hansen contends that universalising discourse on for example human 
rights or  justice is always mobilised in relation to a situated set of identities in a 
material reality where such concepts are never fully realised For example, claims to 
universal human rights are made in protest of violations of such rights.  Moreover, a 
non-oppositional identity may be cleaved from previous incarnations of itself in the 
past: thus the other is temporally constituted. 
 
In general, Hansen (p. 46) usefully describes identity as being spatially, temporally 
and ethically constituted. Temporal constructions of identity likewise can frame Self 
and Other in several ways: depending on the historical constitution of identity, 
particular events may be wilfully foregrounded or obfuscated. Of course, “[t]emporal 
themes such as development, transformation, continuity, change, repetition, or stasis 
are crucial for analysing the construction of identity” (p. 48).  Finally, the ethical 
dimension of identity straightforwardly speaks to discursive constructions of ethics, 
morality, and responsibility in relation to Self and Other (p. 50).  Each of these 
analytical distinctions is co-implicated—one cannot be privileged over the other.  
 
I see this spatio-temporal framing of collective identity as compatible with a view of 
social movement milieus as material-discursive assemblages. As DeLanda (2006, p. 
58) argues, drawing on social movement theorist Charles Tilly, the discursive 
components of social movements: 
 
…concentrate on unified space and time settings and on actors with clear 
motivations and fixed attributes, and therefore do not really capture the 
actual causal structure of a conflictive situation, particularly one that has 
lasted a long time. These narratives tend to leave out anything related to 
unintended consequences of intentional action, any concentration of 
resources that is too slow to be detected by direct experience, as well as 
any effects mediated by the social environment.  
 
The important point is that such spatio-temporal articulations of identity go on to 




effect on the ‘structure’ of a ‘conflictive situation’. Again, it is important to 









Given the above, Hansen’s framework seems robust enough to encompass the rich 
work on collective identity produced through what is referred to as the ‘cultural turn’ 
in social movement studies. In fact, whilst providing a satisfactory meta-level 
framework for situating the study, which encompasses themes of space in its 
conception of cultural politics, the nuances of collective identity theory in social 
movement studies allows the refinement of the concept of identity as laid out above. 
Firstly, aside from meaningful social practice framed in terms of spatio-temporally 
situated ethical worldviews, movement identities often coalesce around specific 
repertoires of action, tactics, and organisational styles (Fomiyana, 2010, p. 396). As 
Melucci (1996, p. 183) recognises, collective identity in contemporary social 
movements frequently coalesces not around primarily oppositional claims-making, 
but around organisational and technical innovation. Movement milieus may 
demonstrate through ‘doing’, that they are sites of social and technical innovation 
informed by particular worldviews. Thus, the collective identity of a social 
movement milieu can be expressed along Hansen’s axes of space, time and ethics, 













interests”: that is, movements produce and promulgate “technical knowledge”, and 
“organisational knowledge”, knowledge pertaining to how we communicate, 
organise and disseminate knowledge itself (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, pp. 68-69). It 
is, however, important to treat these categories as heuristic categories intended for 
empirical investigation, and not as the Habermasian transcendental ‘knowledge 
interests’ they were derived from, because such foundational thinking is anathema to 
discourse theory. 
 
In an effort to identify basic discourses from which new activist practices have 
emerged, I begin with Jamison’s (2001) typology (see table 2) of different kinds of 
environmental activism, “based on different forms of practice and, more specifically, 
on different forms of cognitive praxis” (Jamison, 2001, p. 149). These are 
community environmentalism, professional (or reformist environmentalism) and 
direct action environmentalism. 
 
 
Table 2 ‘Basic discourses’ of environmental movement cognitive praxis. Adapted and 
developed from Jamison (2001, p.149-170) 
Type of action Cognitive praxis Examples of knowledge 
produced and disseminated  
Community 
environmentalism 






Empirical knowledge about 
local environmental 
problems, and ‘know how’ 
based skills e.g. community 
carbon foot printing, waste 
distribution, local food 
production, recycling 
schemes, local currencies, 




Deliberative Techniques of 
communication, translation 
and synthesis of knowledge 
concerned with making local 
governance and democracy 
work. The use and 
promulgation of consensus-








Civil society research (CSR) 
on environmental matters 
combining the genres of 
scientific research, 
investigative journalism and 
policy. 
 
Activist expertise in 
education 
Popular educational 
materials such as training 
handbooks, manuals, 
pamphlets, on-line materials, 
CD-ROMs, DVDs for use in 





Innovative concepts and 
strategies devised by expert 
‘movement intellectuals’ 
Activist expertise in strategic 
communication  
PR, social marketing, 


















Ethics of personal agency: 
bio-power.   
 




Dramaturgical creativity to 
create spectacle mixed with 
ideological/ political critique 
and demands 
 
Personal responsibility to put 
one’s body on the line to 




Collective actors involved in cognitive praxis 
I have taken as my starting point, three basic ideal-typical forms of collective climate 
action, which form the starting point for comparison. These three basic types are: 
‘place-based’ community activism; targeted direct action; professional activism. For 
community activism, the Transition Towns movement will be the object of focus. 
For professional activism, the ENGO coalition Common Cause (CC) has been 
selected. Finally, the Camp for Climate Action (CCA) network has been selected as a 
proxy for high profile environmental DA aimed tackling climate change. I will 
briefly address each in turn. 
 
Camp for Climate Action (CCA)  
In order to study the cognitive praxis of direct climate action the CCA will provide 
the object of focus. Protest events since the first Climate Camp at Drax power station 




coverage in the mass media (Plows, 2008). The first CCA at Drax power station 
2006 drew from the capacity built by counter cultural networks at the anti-G8 protest 
in Stirling in 2005, where there was broad uptake of consensus tactics and the set-up 
of an ‘eco-village’ (Plows, 2008, p. 101). It has been associated with a young 
generation of “post-Seattle” activists from the global justice movement, rather than 
environmental issues, narrowly defined (ibid.). Thus, “its roots lie in grass-roots anti-
capitalist activism combining social justice and anarchist perspectives” (Schlembach, 
2011, p. 195). Yet, it is also true to say that the global justice movement drew 
capacity from previous protest cycles of environmental DA protest. What is 
interesting about the CCA is that first, climate change is thought to be an 
epiphenomenon of ‘root causes’, namely capitalism. Secondly, and importantly, there 
is “an epistemological shift that has arisen with the advent of climate change as the 
dominant frame of environmental protest, with legitimization of activism resulting 
partly from the close observance of official sources of climate science” (p. 195). 
This, of course, is an orienting principle for the epistemological shift occurring in 
environmental activism in the UK, more generally. Climate change science and 
climate change politics present unique challenges for public communication and its 
efficacy. 
 
Transition Towns (TT) 
Through its self-proclaimed ‘viral spread’ from a UK-based movement, the TT 
movement has become emblematic of place-based activism oriented around climate 
change and peak oil around the world since its inception in 2005. The Transition 
Towns movement is a multi-scalar network of initiatives based on grassroots 
community capacity building faced with the intertwined issues – the ‘hydrocarbon 
twins’ – of climate change and peak oil (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 8). The cosmological 
knowledge of Transition is not easily separable from the development of locally 
appropriate technical-practical skills (‘know how’ knowledge), and organizational 




all based on the premise of energy descent. Yet, Transition has arguably spread as a 
successful idea because of the ability of movement intellectuals to expand the range 
of floating signifiers that it appeals to. 
 
Permaculture is indeed the primary philosophical antecedent owing to the cosmology 
of the Transition movement, which transcends its locally contingent character 
(Connors & McDonald, 2010, p. 568; Aiken, 2012). Yet systems thinking, 
psychology, and ideas from business development have all been integral to the 
movement’s cognitive praxis (Hopkins, 2011, p. 21). In short, the emergence of 
Transition is fundamentally premised on an eclectic recombination of different 
bodies of knowledge, oriented towards experimentation and practical application, 
and learning through doing (Hopkins, 2011, p. 17).  Transition discourse 
simultaneously finds strength in place-based cultural narratives and connectivist 
‘learning network’ metaphors. The latter type of metaphor is used to describe the 
spread of the movement such that there were 134 ‘official’ Transition Town 
communities worldwide  in February 2009 (Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010); growing to 
159 in May 2009 (Connors & McDonald, 2010). The rhizome-like growth of the 
Transition movement and its ethos of experimentation and innovation beginning at 
the local level, mean that rather than the stasis implied in communitarian conceptions 
of community, local Transition initiatives are better conceived as local assemblages 
sharing resources and loosely connected by a shared philosophy and underpinning 
concepts, known as ‘Transition Culture’ (Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010; Aiken 2012, 
p. 96). 
 
Common Cause (CC) 
In order to study the cultural politics of professional climate activism, Common 
Cause (CC) will provide the object of focus. CC exists explicitly to address culture 
change, and encompasses the well-known public brands, who (especially throughout 




historically having “take[n] over the mantle of the movement, both in terms of media 
attention as well as in regard to general public interest” (Jamison, 2001, p. 158).   
 
CC consists of a working group of ENGOs, green independent think tank staff, as 
well as other civil society organizations (CSOs). It is of interest here as an influential 
coalescing network of intellectuals oriented towards explicating and promulgating 
theories of cultural change for campaigners tackling global ‘bigger than self’ 
problems. The work of CC has emerged from a collective perception amongst those 
involved that “current approaches to tackling global challenges are failing”, for 
example, “real UK [carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)] emissions have actually 
increased by 17% since 1990” (Crompton, 2010, p. 17). The coalition has produced 
what I regard as two key documents—“Common Cause: the Case for Working with 
Our Cultural Values”, and “the Common Cause Handbook” (Crompton, 2010; 
Holmes, et al., 2011). At the time of publishing the former document, the working 
group was convened by chief executives from the Climate Outreach and Information 
Network (COIN), Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), Friends of the Earth 
(FoE), Oxfam, and WWF. The working group itself consisted of senior campaign 
directors and heads of communication from each NGO. By the time the latter 
document was published, the coalition had expanded to include “Action for Children, 
Cambridge Carbon Footprint, the new economics foundation and Think Global” 
(Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 4). The latter document was also written in collaboration 
with independent think tank “The Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC), who 
produce CSR in collaboration with various NGOs: their primary interests are in 
strategic communications in climate change, energy, and economics.  
 
CC, rather than being the face of professional lobbying efforts around ENGO climate 
lobbying like Stop Climate Chaos for example, is interesting because it foregrounds 
cultural concepts – namely values and frames – as primary strategic concerns for 
ENGOs and their campaigning efforts. As CC gains popularity amongst 




interesting because its influence bleeds into the discourse of the TT movement, and 
its work has interesting parallels with government social research into behaviour 
change utilising behavioural economics, social psychology, and sociological theories 
of practice. As such, the cognitive praxis of CC is interesting because it shares some 
features of an epistemic community, in that it is arguably part of a wider terrain of 
territorial colonization of the ‘psychagogy’ disciplines, whilst its purpose is to 
directly contest the cultural values and norms, and hence the public pedagogy, of 
neoliberalism.  
 
Temporal Perspective  
In terms of circumscribing the corpora temporally, these milieus have all have risen 
to prominence during the same broad politically salient moment. The first press 
mention of Transition found by this researcher was 2005, and the first Climate Camp 
protest was nominally 2006, but arguably 2005 at the G8 protests. The work of CC 
has co-evolved alongside these milieus, but its first publication did not emerge until 
2010. Nevertheless, the work of CC is based on the praxis of the ENGO sector, from 
at least 2005 onwards when Friends of the Earth launched its ‘Big Ask’ campaign. 
The work of CC has evolved from the same dislocatory moment, recognising the 
weaknesses of technocratic approaches to climate change combined with the 
hegemony of market norms, and although the academic work underpinning CC had 
been developed throughout the 1990s, explicit collaboration with professional 
activists came later. It was, in fact, in 2008, when the germinal report “Weathercocks 
and Signposts” (Crompton, 2008) announced that the environmental movement is at 
a crossroads, with respect to efficacy in relation to climate change. Therefore all 
three milieus arose from the same political ‘moment’, and the analysis has a defined 
time period from 2005-present. Transition Towns and Climate Camp existed on the 
fringes of public perception from 2005/06 onwards, and have gained in profile and 
participation since (although the ‘submerged network’ organising as Camp for 





What I am proposing here, is that 2005 marks a wider “politically salient moment” 
(Hansen, 2006; Emejulu, 2011), where climate change re-emerged with gusto in the 
public discourse arena, over a decade after Kyoto, eventually producing a dislocatory 
experience. The cultural politics of each culture of activism reflect the development 
of their cognitive praxis over time, which in turn have gone on to inform the ways in 
which such cultures of activism have attempted to convert this dislocation into 
articulatory moments, constitutive of nascent identities. A “politically salient 
moment” is a clearly defined point in time “tied to particular events [that are] 
analytically driven by changes in important political structures and institutions” 
(Emejulu, 2011, p. 231). Arguably, the next “politically salient moment”, for these 
cultures of activism was the crisis of finance capital in 2008, which arguably reduced 
the salience of environmental issues, and thus climate change (see appendix 1).  
 
What can we point to in order to substantiate this? We can identify three such 
signposts which signalled the public salience of carbon mitigation: these were the 
release of Al Gore’s film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ in the summer of 2006, the Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change published in the autumn of 2006, and 
the IPCC’s fourth report in 2007 (Nerlich & Koteyko, 2009, p. 207; Eastin, et al., 
2011, p. 22). An empirical support of the change in public discourse is provided by 
Nerlich and Koteyko’s finding that in the eleven years from 1992-2003, there are ten 
mentions of the term “carbon footprint” in UK newspapers, whilst in the two years 
from 2004-2006 alone, the count becomes 918 (p. 207), almost a hundredfold 
increase. Boykoff’s (2008, pp. 553-4) study of UK newspaper coverage of climate 
change points to two moments post-2000 where coverage spiked: firstly, June/July 
2005 where Tony Blair highlighted the seriousness of the issue at the G8 summit, 
and when proposals over the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme were being 
debated; second, 2006 when Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ became a focus and 
the Stern Review was published. In addition, Grundmann and Krishnamurthy’s 




found an “exponential rise after 2005” in reporting on climate change in UK 
newspapers.   
 
Subsequent critical political moments within this overarching time period involve the 
passing of the Climate Change Act (2008) on the 26
th
 November 2008, committing 
the UK to 80% carbon emissions cut by 2050, and the passing of the Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009 on August 4
th
 2009, committing Scotland to an 80% reduction 
by 2050, and the very visible failure of the Conference of Parties 15 to agree a treaty 
in Copenhagen in December 2009. Of course, the ‘economic crisis’ from 2008 has 
intersected with the issue salience of climate change in complex ways (see appendix 
1).   
 
Plows (2008, p. 95) points to external issue triggers leading to the development of 
climate movement action: namely, contradiction between the increase of government 
discourse on the urgent necessity of tackling climate change and their move in the 
other direction in terms of energy and transport policy. In addition, the contradiction 
between apocalyptic media narratives and the promotion of individual and 
household-level actions (turning of lights, washing clothes at a lower temperature 
and so on), set up a dichotomy that to large swaths of the public, was particularly 
disempowering and emphasised a tragic disavowal of human agency (Segnit & 
Ereaut, 2006; Segnit & Ereaut, 2007; Foust & Murphy, 2009). These dislocatory 
moments provided the starting point and motivation for the innovative and 
competing approaches of the climate change communication literature proliferated 
by think tanks and ENGOs. It has also led to the rapid spread of ‘meso-level’ 
community responses (bridging the micro and the macro) as well as the ethic of 
personal responsibility mixed with collective solidarity seen in targeted direct action. 
 
 At a certain basic level, the green theories of value of various milieus could be 
argued to emerge from these same dislocatory experiences; they just have differing 




dominant response to climate change (and peak oil) at the meso-level where people 
felt able to exercise collective agency beyond small personal actions and without 
waiting on the state. The protest events of the CCA expressed agency in a different, 
more oppositional way, focusing on personal responsibility to engage in an agonistic 
politics with powerful institutional actors. Later on, CC built on academic expertise 
and campaigning nous in order to re-think how behaviour is related to cultural 
values. Therefore, conceptualised as one ‘moment’, the timeframe for this study 
stretches from 2005 through to 2011 (the end of the data collecting period).  
 
Another important point to make is that from 2006 onwards, the dislocatory effects 
of climate change in terms of challenging citizens’ relationship with the public 
pedagogy of neoliberalism could be taken for granted: from 2006 onwards, powerful  
organisations of global economic governance such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have seized on 
the ambiguity of ‘climate protection’ as a signifier, and have struggled to articulate it 
into chains of equivalence based on “globalism, scientism, [economic] growth and 
efficiency” (Methmann, 2010, p. 357). As I argued in chapter two, the success of 
suturing together these elements relies on suppressing their contradictory moments 
that are intrinsic to the tensions in the state-finance nexus: namely, the tensions 
between the technocratic global rationalism of ‘green governmentality’, and the 
‘ethical’ discourse of ecological modernization, which seeks to recast efficiency in a 
discourse of market values and norms (p. 357). Overall, the pertinent question in 
relation to the cultural politics of the environmental movement is how to identify the 
teachable moments in all of this.  
 
Thus, a plethora of events are circumscribed by one moment, charting the emergence 
and growth of three selves (place-based community activism; professional activism 
and targeted direct action). Furthermore, the intertextual model runs the entire 









In this section I explain my approach to data collection and analysis. In keeping with 
my proposed framework, the table below (table 3) illustrates my text selections in the 
context of Hansen’s (2006) intertextual models explained above.  Accordingly, I 







Study: The cultural politics 
of climate change activism in 
the UK as public pedagogy 
(2005-2011): direct action, 
relocalisation, and 
professional activism 
Three selves: Direct action (the Camp 
for Climate Action), relocalisation (the 
Transition movement) and professional 
activism (the Common Cause coalition) 
Number of events: 
Multiple protest and 
political events– related 











1. Official discourse (policy 
and legal discourse) 
 
2. Wider political debate (the 
popular press) 
 
3. Marginal political discourses 















































Key texts:  The Transition 
Handbook (Hopkins, 2008a); The 
Transition Timeline (Chamberlain, 
2009); The Transition Companion 
(Hopkins, 2011). 
 
Transition Culture Website: 
www.transitionculture.org 
  
Transition Network website:  
www.transitionnetwork.org 
 
Transition Scotland Website: 
www.transitionscotland .org 
 
Alternative press: Peace News; Red 
Pepper; Shift Magazine; 
Resurgence; Trapese Collective  
 
Transition Scotland monthly e-
newsletter emails. 
 
Key secondary academic analysis: 
(Scott-Cato, 2008; Bailey, et al., 
2010; Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; 
North, 2010; Aiken, 2012; North & 
Longhurst, 2013) 
  






educator 1 (28th May , 2010), 
Community activist/popular 
educator 2 (1st June, 2010), 
community activist/popular 
educator 3 (Tuesday 8th June, 
2010), Peak oil activist/educator 





















 CC publications: 
 
Key texts: “Weathercocks 
and signposts” (Crompton, 
2008); “Common Cause: 
The Case for Working with 
Our Cultural Values” 
(Crompton, 2010); 
“Common Cause 
Handbook: A Guide to  
Values and Frames” 
(Holmes, et al., 2011) 
 
Common Cause website:  
www.valuesandframes.org 
 
key secondary academic 
analysis: (Brulle, 2010; 
Lakoff, 2010; Corner & 
Randall, 2011; Jones, et al., 
2011) 
 
Participant observation notes: The 
Friends of the Earth 40th 
anniversary conference, 
9-11 September, 2011, Nottingham 
University 
 




with CC movement intellectual 
Tom Crompton at "Conference on 
Communication and Environment: 
Participation Revisited: Openings 
and Closures for Deliberations on 
the Commons" Held at Uppsala 






















Human Rights , 




on Lexis Nexis 
(N=593) 
 




a year in the life 















Graeber, D. (2004) 
“Fragments of an Anarchist 
Anthropology” 
 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 
(2006) “Multitude: War 




Pamphlets from the climate 
camp website:  
www.climatecamp.org.uk 
 









Activist research from the 







Press releases from the 




Discussion threads  
From www.inydmedia.org. 
 
‘Promotional’ materials  
from www.justdoit.org  
 
CCA mailing list. 
 
Alternative press:  
Principally Peace News;  
Red Pepper; Shift Magazine 
 
Selected activist blogs 
 
Key secondary academic analysis:  
(Plows, 2008; Saunders & Price, 
2009; Pearse, et al., 2010; 
Schlembach, 2011) 
 
Key informant interview: 
 
CCA and Plane Stupid 




The key point to note is that the table above is indicative of the wider research 
process, not exhaustive. It is difficult to give a closed list of texts because the 
distinction between text selection and analysis is not clear cut. This means that I 




so, considering how its language and ideas fit into a wider process of identity 
construction. It was not important that I collate and analyse every available text 
related to these cultures of activism in the UK (an impossible task). Just because a 
particular text is not listed above does not mean it was not used in the analysis. 
Moreover, just because particular texts were not included, does not mean they were 
irrelevant.  Rather, what was important was that I was confident enough in my 
evolving interpretation that I recognised it when I began to encounter redundancy 
and repetition with regards to the processes of linking and differentiation I was 
interested in. This indicated to me that I had reached a kind of ‘saturation point’ in 
my discursive analysis. The presentation strategy of selecting exemplars of particular 
discursive processes in particular contexts then becomes rather more a matter of craft 
in giving a convincing, but empirically grounded account of the discursive logics at 
work in climate activism.   
 
In each case the analysis began with foundational texts from each milieu, where they 
existed. These acted as nodal points around which a wider intertextual web of debate 
could be constructed. From here, key arguments from movement intellectuals and 
their diffuse critical communities, as well as key texts from the climate science 
epistemic community could be identified. Foundational texts for each culture of 
activism would be those that both give a clear articulation of identity and are widely 
read.  An example for the Transition movement is the “Transition Handbook” 
(Hopkins, 2008a), by the movement’s cofounder, permaculturist and most influential 
intellectual Rob Hopkins. An example from Common Cause is “Common Cause: 
The Case for Working with Our Cultural Values”, (Crompton, 2010),written by 
movement intellectual Tom Crompton, who became a prime mover of the work of 
Common Cause out of frustration at his own experiences of professional advocacy. 
An example from the climate camp is “Criticism without Critique: A Climate Camp 
Reader” (Shift Magazine/Dystophia, 2010). Although the movement itself has no 
defining movement intellectual, I considered David Graeber as one principle 




(2004) as a key text, shaping the identity of the movement (listed as key reading on 
the climate camp website). I also considered Hardt and Negri (2006) to be two 
movement intellectuals who have directly influenced the cognitive praxis of the 
Global Justice movement.  
 
In order to strengthen and help to inform my initial reading of foundational texts, I 
conducted a number of semi-structured pilot interviews (10 in all) in the summer of 
2010, with activists either involved in direct action, community activism and 
professional activism connected with climate change (see appendix 2). These 
activists were selected on account of their high-levels of general involvement, often 
with a range of activist commitments. The knowledge gleaned from these pilot 
interviews helped to strengthen my initial understanding of ‘basic discourses’, as 
well as the potential points of both overlap and antagonism between them.  
 
In addition to this, to further enhance my understanding of discourse in action, I draw 
upon participant observation field notes and reflections from a small selection of key 
activist events. Between 20
th
 May, 2010 and the 11
th
 September 2011, I elected to 
take participant observation notes at three events productive of dialogue between DA 
activists, local community activists, and professional campaigners from the UK and 
beyond. The first of these events was a pre-trial rally for DA activists who had been 
arrested for occupying Aberdeen airport taxiway in protest at airport expansion. It 
brought together community campaigners, professional campaigners, DA activists, 
sympathetic lawyers, and general supports.  
 
The second was on 18
th
 April 2011 was a ‘People’s AGM’ called “Royal Bank of 
Scotland: Back to Black”. The purpose of this event, coinciding with the Royal Bank 
of Scotland’s (RBS) own AGM was to educate attendees about, and contest the 
bank’s financing of oil sands extraction in the Alberta Canada. To give a picture of 
the diversity of such events, representatives of the Indigenous Environmental 




Lubicon Cree and the Yinka Dene alliance were directly represented. Furthermore, 
the UK Tar Sands Network, Scottish Education for Action and Development 
(SEAD), People and Planet, the World Development Network, and Platform were 
represented.  
 
Lastly, I participated as a delegate at the Friends of the Earth 40
th
 anniversary, held at 
Nottingham University between the 9
th
 to the 11
th
 September 2011. This event was 
full of educational workshops populated by people with involvement in many kinds 
of climate activism, such as “Power to the people – How is it changing?” in which a 
diverse array of campaigners in including DA activists explored different approaches 
to activism and definitions of success. Another example was the Common Cause 
workshops where delegates tried to negotiate their own local rationalities with such 
new strategies from the centre. Finally, I draw on my own personal experience such 
as informal conversations I have had with educators and activists, which have come 
about through my own (limited) personal involvement.  
 
Movement ephemera such as pamphlets, press releases, radical periodicals, 
educational resources, research reports and so on, were made easily available by 
being archived on respective websites. Although a discourse theoretical perspective 
denies any foundational separation between ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ facing 
documents, it can be a useful heuristic distinction to make. The more outward facing 
of these documents (climate camp press releases being a good example) provided 
insight into the movement’s intended curriculum for potential adherents. This speaks 
to the development of “sophisticated framing stakes and accompanying resources 
with a broad (UK) public uptake” (Plows, 2008, p. 103). On the other hand, 
movement internal debates (blogs, radical and special interest periodicals being good 
examples) allowed me to capture something of the internal activist praxis over time. 
Again, this speaks to “[a]ctivist network longevity and capacity building, protest 




gives insight into the recursive and dialogical nature of cultural politics (Steinberg, 
1999) involving activists, the wider public, industry and politicians.  
 
Despite various forms of independent media and publishing available to activist-
intellectuals nowadays, bystander publics’ exposure to social movement activity 
often remains mass mediated. Despite the fact that activists advance “some aspects of 
their collective actions frames into media discourse, power asymmetries and 
prevailing journalistic norms often make this difficult” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 
22). Thus, as a source of social movement public pedagogy, the popular print media 
is therefore particularly interesting as it continues to “constitute a principle site for 
the crafting of hegemony in modern societies” (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011, p. 
1718) 
 
Newspaper articles were accessed through systematic searches on the Lexis Nexis 
digital archive. They constituted part of the corpus for Transition and the CCA 
because Common Cause only exists to produce civil society research and educational 
materials for campaigners around the notion of cultural change. For the CCA, 
newspaper articles were found using the search terms ‘climate camp’ and ‘camp for 
climate action’. This retrieved a total of 593 relevant articles. For the Transition 
movement I first used the search terms ‘transition town’ and transition towns’. Then, 
I used the specific name of individual Transition initiatives, whose activities may 
have been reported upon, yet not expressly as a ‘Transition Town’. Because of the 
sheer number of Transition initiatives in the UK, I opted to include the names of 
Scottish initiatives only, in order to keep the study manageable. I identified the 
relevant groups by interviewing the co-ordinator of the Transition Scotland network 
and then obtained a list from the Transition Scotland website. In the end, this 
returned 207 relevant newspaper articles. All news articles dated later than 2011 
were excluded. There was a strong arbitrary element to this cut-off point, but to put it 





I included in my search UK titles across the ideological spectrum from ‘quality’ 
through to ‘tabloid’ titles. Significant CCA and Transition activity occurs in 
Scotland, but is under reported, in UK titles, so I also included specifically Scottish 
titles. Lastly, I did include local press, particularly with the rationale that the activity 
of community-based Transition groups would be more likely to be covered by local 
titles. Again, for manageability reasons, I looked at only Scottish local titles. Please 
see appendix 3 for an exhaustive list of newspaper sources consulted arranged by 
year and newspaper title. On the whole then, although the newspaper corpus covers 
the UK, it should be noted that there is a Scottish bias to the data. 
 
Using newspapers to study collective action has a rich history in social movement 
research, and is a widely used approach (Rucht & Ohlemacher, 1992; Earl, et al., 
2004).Newspapers are not only useful as sites of hegemonic struggle and for gaining 
insight into ‘front stage’ versus ‘backstage’ representations, but they have also 
provided me with an economical method of systematically gathering longitudinal 
data covering multiple places, events, and actors within the UK (Rucht & 
Ohlemacher, 1992, p. 91). Having outlined my approach to data collection, I move 
on below to address data analysis.  
 
Data analysis 
All texts were uploaded to qualitative research software ‘NVivo’. The overwhelming 
majority of texts were digital and for those few that were not, relevant portions could 
be scanned and then imported as PDF files. To begin with, texts were organised into 
basic folders and sub-folders in a consistent way. For each culture of activism, texts 
were catalogued according to whether they were primary academic texts 
(predominantly related to climate science, but any relevant sources drawn upon 
directly by activists); secondary academic analyses of particular cultures of activism 
(this distinction is not clear cut as in many instances the academics writing such 




texts (including activist periodicals and blogs); newspaper texts; political texts; and 
finally legal texts (also accessed using Lexis Nexis. Particularly concerning direct 
action).  
 
To address the strategy for data analysis, I must return to the fundamental concepts 
outlined above, which structured my coding categories. My aim is to understand how 
the cultural politics of climate activism is generative of public pedagogy. I have 
asserted that this occurs through hegemonic struggle. Hegemonic struggle plays out 
through articulatory practices and is productive of impossible totalities, or as Hansen 
says ‘Selfs’. These ‘Selfs’ are constructed through articulatory practices which 
require radical investment in the whole because they are only contingently 
obligatory, not logically necessary: they are simultaneously entered into other 
multiple relations, which destabilise the emergent ‘Self’. Hegemony is thus the 
attempted denial of the  ‘Other’, as the condition of the ‘Self’s’ existence. Popular 
collective identities, are sometimes referred to as ‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau, 2005) 
precisely because as the chain of equivalence  joining particular partial  claims, 
demands and interests expands, their precarious unity depends ever more on 
expressing their identity in negative terms: the anti-capitalist global justice 
movement being a quintessential example.  
 
Thus, the first thing I did was create ‘tree nodes’ for each culture of activism divided 
into ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. ‘Tree nodes’ are a hierarchical way of coding with NVivo. 
They create arborescent structures with a ‘parent’ node and ‘child’ nodes branching 
off from it. Each child node itself can act as a parent sub-dividing into further parent 
nodes, and so on. The logic of articulation (or the ‘War of Position’ if you like) is 
divided into two basic operations, the logic of equivalence (linking particular 
democratic demands under a common identity) and the logic of difference 
(differentiating the emerging ‘Self’ from various excluded interests and identities). 





I began by reading and re-reading texts looking for patterns in what particular claims, 
demands, and interests were linked together, and how. At the same time, I was 
looking for points of antagonism. Thus for both emerging movement identities 
(‘Selves’) and their adversaries (‘Others’), processes of linking and differentiation 
were documented.  As I have explained previously, the logic of hegemony is about 
the shifting of frontiers and thus the indeterminacy between the ‘empty’ (when 
political frontiers are well established), and the ‘floating’. Dislocatory moments 
create periods of indeterminacy and crisis where the meaning of particular signifiers 
may become suspended between two or more equivalential chains, creating the 
potential to shift the frontier between Self-Other. Thus, the next logical step was to 
create under each ‘linking’ node, two more nodes called ‘empty’ and ‘floating’.  A 
good example of a signifier whose ‘floating’ elements became obvious during 
moments of indeterminacy is ‘peak oil’ in Transition discourse: concern over peak 
oil can be linked into chains of equivalence connecting anti-immigration sentiment, 
energy and resource scarcity, and racial intolerance, as easily as they can be linked 
into chains of equivalence around sustainability, local diversity and so on.  
 
Returning to Hansen’s (2006) framework, the Self is also spatially, temporally and 
ethically constituted in relation to the Other. Thus, for each ‘Self’ node, I created 
nodes called ‘Space’, ‘Time’, ‘Ethics (worldview)’. The first pertains to how 
discourse structured spatial boundaries and logics and was structured by them; the 
second approached temporal orderings in the same way; the third was concerned 
with the development of ethical worldviews motivating collective action. Finally, I 
created nodes called ‘Organisational-’ and ‘Technological-knowledge’, in order that 
I was able to code texts according to the different kinds of knowledge involved in the 
process of cognitive praxis.  
 
In addition to this a priori approach to coding, I also used non-hierarchical (‘free’) 
nodes to make some basic categorisations regarding the content of my corpus in 




Rucht & Olemacher (1992, pp. 93-95), this more inductive  rough and ready coding 
did not pay too much attention to preconceived theories and hypotheses because, by 
going beyond the main research orientation and its more highly abstracted 
categorisations, I was allowing for new interests and therefore questions to emerge 
(p. 94). In particular contexts, simple content analysis techniques were used where I 
felt that they could be used heuristically help to illustrate a particular point. For 
example, quantifying the frequency of key words occurring in key texts, or 
quantifying the presence or absence of particular themes in particular newspaper 
articles. This thin empiricism was only intended to be illustrative, not to make any 
particular objective truth claims. I will leave it to the reader to decide if it is helpful.  
 
One of the chief advantages of NVivo seemed to be that one can code reflexively. 
One particular piece of text can be coded to multiple nodes. One can capture themes 
from the ground up, gradually collapsing these codes into larger more abstract 
concepts, or begin with a more top-down approach that begins with particular 
research themes and theoretical concepts and then branches off arborescently. 
Alternatively, one could work with a combination of both approaches. This is what I 
have chosen to do. On the whole, with the time period stretching from 2005-2011, I 
was able to analyse discursive changes occurring over time between events, within 
cultures of activism, and between cultures of activism. I was able to analyse how 
particular cultures of activism sought to expand their territory and include new actors 
by expanding the stock of floating signifiers available to them. Consequently, I was 
able to analyse tensions that developed as a result of such expansion, and 
opportunities for learning that developed from all of this.  
 
As a brief example, van Bommel and Spicer (2011, p. 1726) inspired me as to how 
such research, with a similar subject matter and similar theoretical approach, might 
look in practice. Their table, reproduced below (table 4) shows how a particular 
nodal point – incidentally that of gastronomy – has been identified as being a 




incorporate new actors. Coded under this nodal point, are a number of floating 
signifiers, which imbue the notion of gastronomy with meaning and are loose enough 
to be interpreted to the movement’s purposes. We are then given extracts of the 
actual text underpinning this coding as exemplifications. This is all to illustrate the 
kind of presentation strategy that is viable using NVivo as a coding and data 
management tool applied to discourse theory. Having outlined my approach to data 
analysis, I now turn to address the limitations of the approach I have taken.   
 
 
Table 4. Example of how to present NVivo coding from a social movement study 
underpinned by discourse theory: “Shifts in discourse in the Slow Food movement: pre-
2000”, reproduced from van Bommel and Spicer (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011, p. 1726). 
 
Period: pre 2000 
Nodal point Floating signifier Description  Example Source (if 
applicable) and 
date 
Gastronomy Taste Use of fresh, and 
authentic high-
quality products for 
meal creation 
‘It’s all about the 
right to consume a 
meal in beautiful 
surroundings – the 
opposite of fast 
food and the sworn 
enemy of boring, 
mediocre 
supermarket food’ 




Enjoying the art of 
cooking with other   
people to escape the 
business culture 
‘Take time              
and pleasure over 
preparing and 
eating our food, it 
puts a brake on our 
increasingly 
frenetic way of life’ 
(The Times, 06 Dec 
1997) 
 Artisanal Preference  for non-
industrialized and 
‘Real Italian               





food in order to 
keep the cultures 
and craft skills alive 
a hot drink but part 
of the Italian way of 
life. It was 
becoming 
increasingly urgent 
for Europeans to 
defend their local 
identity and “spirit 
of place” against 
the multinationals’ 
(The Times, 5 Apr 
2001) 




‘Then we had a big 
idea to rediscover 
the osterie – the 
classic, traditional 
places where you 
could eat regional 
food informally and 
get good value for 
money’ 
Giacomo Mojoli 
(Slow Food VP) 
(Daily Telegraph 




Limitations of the approach  
 
Product versus process and hidden transcripts  
The limitations of my methodological approach are, I think, best summed up by the 
tensions between social movement discourse as process (verb) and discourse as 
product (noun) (Melucci, 1996; Benford & Snow, 2000; Oliver & Johnston, 2000; 
Fomiyana, 2010). . Fomiyana (2010, p. 397) argues the collective identity as product 
and as process refer to two different things rather than two faces of the same thing. 






The ‘product’ definition refers more to a perception of shared attributes, 
goals and interests (something that can be felt by movement insiders but 
also by those outside the movement), whereas the ‘process’ definition is 
more concerned with shared meanings, experiences and reciprocal 
emotional ties as experienced by movement actors themselves through 
their interaction with each other. The ‘product’ understanding refers to a 
sort of ‘shorthand’ reference point for insiders and outsiders that 
encapsulates key movement frames, issues, tactics, identities, ideologies 
and orientations. Scholars emphasizing the ‘product’ aspect of collective 
identity understand it as a sort of public good produced by movements 
and available to everyone, a ‘public pronouncement of status’ which they 
see as an important aspect of recruitment or incentives that motivate 
participation. 
 
In this sense, despite my limited participant observation and pilot interviews, it is 
clear that my operationalisation belongs overwhelmingly to the ‘product’ definition 
of collective identity. On the other hand, the ‘process’ approach is usually researched 
through ethnographic methods (Mische, 2008; Plows, 2008), or the temporary speech 
situations of focus group research (Melucci, 1996; della Porta, 2005). I initially 
regarded focus group methodology as particularly promising given my interest in 
discourse theory because according to Melucci (1996, p. 393), such an approach 
seeks to:  
 
break the apparent unity of the discourse of movements and to observe 
the interactive construction of the unity though differences and conflicts. 
The particular methodology is intended to address not individual 
opinions, but the system of interactions in its making…The analysis 
reveals the tensions between various orientations that are present within 
the movement, but also within a single group, or portion of the 
movement.  
 
From this standpoint, the clear limit of reified text is that “the discourse of the 
leaders and their framing activities are taken, mostly implicitly, as representative of 
the movement as a whole: the actor is conceived therefore as a unified reality which 
is interpreted in a transparent way by the leaders and by the organisational discourse” 




refer to as the “hidden transcripts” (see previous chapter) in the internal power 
dynamics of social movements (Estevez, 2008, p. 1947), as opposed to their “public 
transcripts”.  
 
As Whelan (2002, p. 111) points out, the often incidental learning occurring in 
activist milieus can be devalued by movements and their key figures given their 
externally focused instrumental goals. In this regard, Cox (1999, p. 63) argues that 
researchers often risk “systematically misunderstanding” the cultural milieus they 
study, through overemphasising key activists’ more political and externally driven 
understandings of the meaning of collective action. The constant transformative 
learning – in the more personal sense of the term – occurring in the development of 
“reflexive rationalities” (p. 63) arguably also helps us to understand the cognitive 
development of movements, where such activists can be in a sense thought of as 
“legitimate peripheral participants” (Lave & Wenger, 1991) who bring new 
resources, knowledge, skills and values. As Tusting (2005, p. 39) argues, although 
meaning is produced within communities of practice through ongoing processes of 
participation and reification, such that “reifications reveal something of a practice 
that a community is involved in but never all of it”.  
 
In the initial conceptualisation of my research design, I considered arranging three 
focus groups consisting of participants within each culture of activism under 
investigation, whilst also arranging a focus group combining participants from each 
culture of activism. Logistical difficulties in coordinating such focus groups led me 
to abandon this element of the research. 
  
Network analysis 
Originally, it was my intention to gather data that would allow me to carry out formal 
network analysis in order to operationalise elements of a relational approach (see 




participation in ‘horizontal’ networks and ‘open spaces’ with reality, and would give 
me insight into the power dynamics of knowledge production and cultural politics. 
Inspired by the social movement research of Ann Mische (2008), I sought to 
understand how “location at the borders and interstices of several networks or 
organizational fields” fosters creative thinking, innovation and bricolage (Campbell, 
2005, p. 65). In January 2012, I constructed a Bristol Online Survey called “Mapping 
participation in Transition Scotland”. 
 
As well as asking a number of demographic questions, I asked questions about 
individual learning, questions about depth, breadth, length and type of involvement, 
and also asked about involvement in other groups. After discussion with the 
coordinator of the Transition Scotland network, my survey was advertised through 
the network’s monthly newsletter in January 2012, and a link was posted on the front 
page of the Transition Scotland network’s website. The survey was opened on 31
st
 
January 2012 and was kept live until the end of March 2012. Despite re-posting the 
link on the website, I only received thirteen responses. In terms of overlapping 
personal affiliations, those who responded were involved predominantly with other 
community organisations or networks, or with permaculture initiatives (table 5). As a 
result, I did not think that there was sufficient volume of responses, or diversity of 
affiliation with other cultures of activism to warrant pursuing this line of research. 
Moreover, I reasoned that if this was difficult with good access in relation to 
community activism, it would be very difficult with submerged direct action 
networks. Despite its promise, network analysis was abandoned for this research 
project. With hindsight, it might have been interesting to conduct in-depth interviews 
with respondents maintaining overlapping commitments, but in any case, those 
respondents willing to be contacted did not have the type of sufficiently different 






Table 5 Overlapping commitments in Transition Scotland network (listed alphabetically). 13 
respondents. 
Overlapping individual commitments in Transition Scotland 
Anti-Cuts campaign 
Clydesdale Development Trust 





Scottish Green Party 
Towards Transition Glasgow 
Urban Roots 
World Development Movement  
10:10 campaign 
 
Learning from social movements 
One final limitation of my research is that in arguing that a public curriculum is 
produced, I did not carry out any research into the reception of bystander publics. 
‘Learning from’ social movements as opposed to ‘in’ them is very under-researched. 
One reason for this is most likely the methodological difficulties of doing so. How do 
we move beyond the rhetorical claims about the educational effects of bystander 
publics on social movements, in order to investigate educational outcomes and 
bystander interpretation of intended curriculum empirically? In the framing 
literature, studies of ‘frame resonance’ provide potential as this engages the question 
of whether or not bystander publics understand issues in the same terms as social 
movements. However, the inference of resonance often borders on the tautological as 
“most studies [of frame resonance]…are after the fact reconstructions of a frame’s 
mobilizing potency that impute the influence of a resonant frame” (Noakes & 





Noakes and Johnston (2005) argue that the closest we have come to a direct study of 
frame resonance is Gamson’s (1992) study of how ordinary “working-class people” 
negotiate political meaning. Gamson conducted surveys to collect demographic data 
in a bounded working-class geographical region and went about the task of 
constructing balanced focus groups based on this. The focus groups explored several 
contentious political issues (nuclear power, affirmative action, Israel Palestine 
relations and the economy). Gamson’s research team explored the extent to which 
focus groups and individuals within them relied upon media discourse, which at so-
called critical discourse moments” included social movement framing, and relied 
upon experiential knowledge. One difficulty was that researchers could only say that 
participants were drawing upon public discourse, but could not specify from which 
exact source they learned about specifics (Gamson, 1992, p. 26).  
 
In general, Blee and Taylor cite the focus group as a powerful tool for investigating 
how bystander publics interpret and incorporate a movement’s “ideas, goals, 
practices and identities” (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 107).  Thus, as I have argued that 
the mass media continues to represent a major arena for the crafting of hegemony, 
focus groups could be used to “examine how readers and viewers interpret the traces 
or elements of collective action frames in news texts” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 
226). Focus groups consisting of non/peripheral participants might discuss specific 
events, episodes and types of movement activity, portrayed though specific media 
accounts, as well as through official movement representations. Again, despite 
considering such a research design, the methodological issues involved in 
constructing focus groups (i.e. self-selection, sampling of participants) and the 
logistics in conducting them seemed to me to be beyond my capability as a lone 







Ethical Considerations  
Given that my research is based on an analysis of publically available discourse, 
direct ethical concerns are not readily apparent. The three generic foci of ethical 
issues in social research are ‘informed consent’, the ‘right to privacy’ and ‘protection 
from harm’ (Fontana & Frey, 2008, p. 142). Accounts from participant observation 
and text from semi-structured interviews has been anonymised and informed consent 
was obtained from interview participants prior to interviews being carried out. In the 
main, what I am analysing is text already in the public domain, either digitally or in 
print. As such, safety concerns, anonymity concerns, and informed consent concerns 
do not seem to immediately apply. That, however, does not translate as a lack of 
ethical considerations altogether.  The particular ethical considerations arising from 
this project I believe are most strongly framed by considerations over the ownership 
of knowledge and the by now well-known debates over what constitutes “movement 
relevant research” (Bevington & Dixon, 2005).   
 
Firstly, what is clear from the movement relevant research literature is that 
movement relevant research is not and should not be a synonym for hagiography 
(Bevington & Dixon, 2005, p. 191; Frampton, et al., 2006, p. 254; Plows, 2008, p. 
1532). Nevertheless, Bevington and Dixon (2005, p. 194) provide an interesting 
perspective in this regard: they argue that detached scholarship has thrived during 
periods of movement abeyance, and that research on social movements should focus 
on a “dynamic engagement” with the issues that movement actors themselves are 
concerned with, such as mobilisation, organisation, internal conflict, motivation, 
commitment and activist burnout. Such research would require reflexivity on the part 
of the researcher, as a primary goal would be to work critically and cooperatively 
with movement participants in order to “help them to understand their situations 





Environmental activism in an era of climate change is no different, with activists and 
academics apparently continuing to speak past each other. Although researchers 
benefit from an “institutional space for reflection” (Meyer, 2005, p. 203) that social 
movement actors often lack, researchers must be aware of the dangers of becoming 
part of a technology of normalisation through the necessity of working within the 
boundaries of academic discourse (Yeatman, 1994, p. 37). Melucci (1992, p. 248) 
suggests that we should approach the relationship as a cognitive and ethical contract 
between actors, who possess “expertise and information relative to the action itself”, 
and researchers, who “control some cognitive resources” and have the institutional 
space, time and distance to develop coherent, challenging and novel analyses of 
action.  
 
Power/knowledge relations between movements and the academy are notoriously 
difficult to navigate. Movements are more than capable of assimilating and 
incorporating the insights of academic theory and research directly to their own 
‘organic’ theorising and change efforts, and collaborating directly with academics in 
order to create their own theory without relying directly on social movement theory. 
The movement researcher relationship has often been characterized by movement 
participants as an extractive one in which “academic researchers ‘milk’ their 
subjects”, but developing more collaborative practices is challenging (Edleman, 
2009, p. 260). Yet movements, often by their nature, are also assimilative (they 
strategically frame and they mobilise resources). Must a ‘dynamic engagement’ 
always translate as a kind of action research practice?  
 
Rootes (1990, p. 14) some time ago argued that “theory of social movements, even 
without being theory for social movements, may yet be useful to social movements”. 
Edleman (2009, p. 260) in asking “what can be done to realise the potential synergies 
between professional researchers and social movements”, suggests that mutual 




completely the researcher|activist distinction but, rather the first step is understanding 
commitment “along a continuum that has many dimensions”.  
 
No doubt, too much research is ‘extractive’, and disseminated only in arcane 
academic journals. However, propagating mutual misunderstandings and myths in 
my mind only serves to obscure the messy realities of how subjects are positioned ‘in 
and against’ the (network) space/times of neoliberal logic (Castells, 1996; Harvey, 
2006; Hassan, 2009). The perceived objective urgency of the need to organise 
against climate change (whether through reformist ENGOs, relocalising or taking 
direct action) exacerbates the need for ideas that find a place in immanent action if 
one is an activist. On the other hand, those researching social movements often seek 
to develop theory and gather empirical evidence in order to understand. Moreover, 
the performative university exerts its own pressures on those who would seek to 
develop socially useful knowledge, to disseminate according to impact 
measurements.  
 
As Plows (2008, p. 1532) convincingly argues, engaged research can mean different 
things in different circumstances: on the one hand, researchers might be involved in, 
and explicitly identify with, a particular activist milieu. However, from the various 
intellectual milieus of civil society, particular fields of action often emerge (e.g. 
nuclear power, renewables, stem cell research, or in this case, climate change), which 
are nuanced and contested. As a result, engaging with various publics and their 
cultural representations as they attempt to navigate power relationships and address 
their various enmities in order to see the bigger picture is important. Hence, my 
desire to take the approach I have. As argued in the previous section, however, my 
lack of attention to movement internal processes makes me overly reliant on 
‘official’ narratives.  
 
This limitation is, however, to a large extent borne of lack of capacity as an 




engaging in dialogue across various activist milieus has been an ambivalent one. 
After many false starts, I began to realize that being drawn into particular milieus as 
a committed or militant researcher would have me working at cross-purposes, in a 
piece-meal fashion. Whether it be finding out how to convert peripheral ENGO 
activists to paying, active members, organizing environmental justice bus tours, or 
starting my own Transition initiative, I realized I could not feasibly engage in-depth 
with any milieu without sacrificing breadth and losing my own way. Also, the lack of 
understanding between activists and academic communities as to what either party 
might gain is something I have experienced. However, as a novice researcher, I 
recognise that the balance of who gains what from the researcher/activist relationship 
is presumably disproportionately in my favour, competing for attention with other 
commitments, happenings, events, and so on. This means that even if something 
could be genuinely valuable, communicating why is often very difficult.  
 
To finish this section then, I can only conclude that insights generated from my 
research might be of use to people involved in environmental action in an era of 
climate change in a variety of contexts. Whether this proves to be the case I cannot 
say, but my approach at least does not demand the resources of overstretched 
activists, whilst being able to gain insight into activist discourse across a spectrum of 
engagement. It also poses no pressing ethical concerns.  
 
In this chapter, I have operationalized a discourse approach by combining Hansen’s 
(2006) work on discourse analysis with Jamison’s (2001) account of the evolution 
and differentiation of the environmental movement,  and then filling this framework 
with real actors, materials and a  timeframe. I went on to discuss the limitations of 
my study, and in this section I discussed what I see as some of the ethical 
implications.  Having outlined my methodology, the following chapter is the first of 
three chapters reporting the research findings. I begin with my analysis of the CCA, 
move on to the Transition movement, and finally cover Common Cause. The 




regarded the identity of Transition as being borne of a frustration with the limitations 
of confrontational activism. The work of Common Cause has taken some inspiration 
from the CCA, and from Transition, but its origins are more recent and it draws more 
on expert actor-networks. Throughout each of these chapters, I try to capture 



















Direct climate action as public pedagogy: the 
cultural politics of the Camp for Climate Action 
(2005-2011) 
 
For me one of the biggest successes you can have when campaigning on 
any issue is to educate people – be it information, ideas, attitudes or 
behaviour. Every single person that has ever campaigned, protested, 
taken action or stood up to be counted was inspired and educated at some 
point which set them off on that path; whether through reading 
something, seeing something, hearing something or talking to someone. 
So, just getting our message and our ways of living, working and being 
out there was, to me, actually our biggest success (Shift Magazine , 2007)  
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the cultural politics of direct climate action 
(DCA) in the UK, based predominantly on the public discourse of Camp for Climate 
Action (CCA) from its inception in 2005 to its ‘metamorphosis’ (CCA, 2011) in 
2011. More specifically, I interpret this cultural politics as a form of ‘public 
pedagogy’; a contested term used by scholars who focus on learning and education 
occurring outside formal institutional contexts (Sandlin, et al., 2010; Giroux, 2000).  
 
In what follows, I intend to explicate what might be considered the public curriculum 
generated by the CCA. The public curriculum produced by social movements is 
forged through hegemonic struggle to articulate diverse struggles and demands under 
a populist identity (Gramsci, 1971, p. 350; Laclau, 2005; Giroux, 2000, p. 354; 
Melucci, 1996, p. 75; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). Such a curriculum is both explicitly 





The CCA has, from its inception, explicitly sought to balance action with creating an 
open space for public pedagogy (CCA, 2010, p. 21; Shift/ Dystophia, 2010, p. 5). 
Moreover, it is important to be aware that the explicit articulations of the CCA’s 
educational dimensions do pragmatic work: examining a corpus of the CCA’s 
‘outward facing’ material
1
 in order to examine how strongly its educational 
dimensions are emphasised in its public communications, I found that around a 
quarter of texts sought to describe the camp in explicitly educational terms. The 
excerpt below, taken from an open letter to local residents near the site of the 2009 
Blackheath, London camp, shows the emphasis placed on praxis (politics/fun; 
theory/practice; education/action). Portraying the camp as an open, non-sectarian 
space in which to learn and have fun (italicised below), is arguably an important 
element of the CCA’s impression management strategy. 
For the last 3 years we’ve organised a week-long event in the summer to 
educate each other, demonstrate sustainable living and learn about 
different ways we can stop and reverse climate change…The camps are 
family friendly and open to all. There’s no entrance fee, everyone works 
on it as volunteers. It’s a very do-it-yourself kind of event and we hope 
we manage to combine things that are too often kept apart: politics and 
fun, practice and theory, education and action…Please do come along 
and see for yourself, you are very welcome. (Camp for Climate Action, 
2009a) 
 
The framing of the CCA as a convivial, ‘family-friendly’ educational space is often 
strategically invoked in order to mobilise people, by emphasising social diversity and 
distancing the camp from activist stereotypes and sectarian activist isolationism: 
 
The people participating in the Camp for Climate Action are all 
volunteers, lots of us learning how to do it as we go along. We’re a pretty 
diverse bunch – teachers, nurses, students, couriers, plumbers, graphic 
designers, doctors, youth workers, lawyers, carpenters, campaigners, 
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 For this corpus (N=52), archived press releases, two self-produced ‘newspapers’ and an open-letter 




artists, carers and many, many more (Camp for Climate Action, 2010a, p. 
21). 
 
These explicit representations are contextually important because the focus on 
diverse educational workshops coupled with a festival-like atmosphere, has been 
used pejoratively – to question the camp’s efficacy and tactics. In fact, the camp’s 
intentional blending of DA and education seemed to create a catch-22 for the CCA’s 
relation to popular media: when conservative media portrayed the CCA as dangerous 
anarchists, the liberal media was often keen to emphasise the respectability of the 
camp. This set up a narrative in later camps of ‘fluffy’ and ‘spiky’ protesters, or good 
and bad protesters, which was increasingly perceived as  problematic in fora for 
activist praxis. 
 
Because the CCA’s public curriculum is forged through collective struggle, it is 
dialogical, recursive and contested. Therefore, significant elements of its public 
curriculum may be considered incidental or even accidental to its stated purpose. 
Moreover, the CCA is but one collective agent of public pedagogy in relation to 
climate change, positioned in and against various manifestations of the “pedagogical 
state” (Newman, 2010), and against the public pedagogies of “neoliberal corporate 
culture” (Giroux, 2010). 
 
The educative consequences of DCA amongst participants and bystander publics are 
consistently invoked as metrics of success by activists and academic analysts alike 
(Plows, 2008). SML scholars have often bifurcated learning into its movement’s 
internal (learning in social movements) and external (learning from social 
movements) dimensions (Hall, et al., 2011, p. 114). Although this simplifies messy 
empirical realities in which such clear boundaries cannot be drawn, it remains useful 
as an analytical distinction because it draws attention to the argument that  bystander 
publics at large have been learning about climate change   “because of the nearly 




165). In one of the few existing academic analyses of DCA in the UK, Plows (2008, 
p. 93), in her analysis of what might be considered success in the DCA movement, 
implicitly utilises this dichotomy:  
 
 “Activist network longevity and capacity building, protest counterculture as a 
social resource” (learning in social movements) 
 
 “Developing sophisticated framing stakes and accompanying resources with a 
broad (UK) public uptake” (learning from social movements) 
 
The explicit educational dimensions of the CCA discussed above, belong to the 
former. On the latter point, the DCA movement, of course, promulgates its own 
curriculum through self-produced digital and print-based artefacts, yet the mass 
media remains another important route of transmission. The DCA movement is 
perceived by activists to have been successful through influencing public discourse, 
merely by connecting issues – for example, climate change and aviation – usually 
discussed separately.  
 
Yet, by and large, these claims and interpretations of success remain largely 
speculative. No study exists that that has actually examined the UK DCA 
movement’s intended issue frames in its ‘outward facing’ discourse, their mass 
mediation, all in dialogue with movement praxis in various activist fora, over time, in 
a systematic way. To speak with the last sentence from the opening quotation, this 
chapter asks, what is ‘our message’, and in what ways can ‘getting it out there’ be 
considered a success? 
 
The chapter is organised in the following way: firstly, I explore the discursive origins 
and evolution of the CCA. This section serves a dual purpose in that it provides the 




curriculum, through which activists and the broader public learn to link 
contemporary struggles by locating them in a broader historical context. I move on to 
outline the substantive dimensions of the movement’s public pedagogy, organised 
around various knowledge interests as the nascent movement struggled to articulate a 
“populist identity” (Laclau, 2005) in opposition to the “root causes” of climate 
change.  I remind the reader of the ‘knowledge interests’ developed in Eyerman and 
Jamison’s (1991) cultural/cognitive theory of social movements, arguing that the 
curriculum of the CCA, as promulgated  through articulation of a populist identity, 
can be split into three analytical categories: cosmology, organisational, and 
technical-practical knowledge. 
 
Accordingly, the rest of the chapter examines the movement’s public pedagogy along 
these axes. In doing so, I also maintain Rochon’s (1998) distinction between critical 
communities (loose groupings of movement intellectuals who generate codified 
knowledge) and movement constituents who promulgate such knowledge to a 
broader public. Importantly, I make the case that what is most educationally 
generative in the CCA are the productive tensions at the intersections of these 
knowledge interests: specifically, the relationship between political worldviews and 
organisational form (cosmology and organisational knowledge), and the relationship 










Understanding the origins and evolution of 
direct climate action 
 
Dislocation and the formation of new 
subjectivities 
 
To understand the origins of the CCA, we must understand the discursive logic of 
which it is a manifestation, as well as its genealogy. Literatures in behavioural 
economics and psychology highlighting the species-level psychological challenges of 
climate change related to its epistemic and spatio-temporal complexity, have in turn 
produced an important growth industry in climate change communications (Pykett, et 
al., 2011, p. 306). Such literature has argued that alarmist narratives coupled to 
political inertia and hypocrisy can lead to a counsel of despair. However, it also 
provides the point of dislocation from hegemonic discourse from which new 
identities and ideational resources arise (Brulle, 2010, p. 92). These dislocations arise 
at “politically salient moments” keyed to significant events occurring in political 
structures and institutions, which were delineated in chapter six on methodology 
(Hansen, 2006). 
 
The contradictions between government policy and rhetoric, and between 
apocalyptic public narratives and exhortations to ‘change light bulbs’ have, since 
2005, provided the conditions for such dislocations, as exemplified below in this 
climate activist dialogue between those engaged in relocalisation efforts and 
advocates of contentious politics: 
 
Over the past few years there has been an unprecedented level of media 
coverage and initiatives around climate change. Arguments that 
environmentalists have been making largely ignored for decades have 




top the G8 agenda in 2005. Since then the scale of the problem, media 
attention and the striking evidence of the rate of change have left many 
scared and anxious. People desperately want ideas for positive action 
(Chatterton & Cutler, 2008, p. 3). 
 
Since 2005, nascent relocalisation movements and direct action movements (of 
which the Transition Towns movement and the CCA are emblematic, respectively) 
have both articulated this dislocation in terms of the need for grassroots cultural 
change, whilst offering conflicting understandings of how this might best be 
achieved. Both cultures of activism are reactions against technocratic and market-
based regimes of governance, as well as solutions that frame citizen agency in 
individualistic terms. For the relocalisation movement, it is about bringing it all back 
home, and creating convivial communities of place, whilst for the CCA it is about 
speaking truth to power as communities of struggle. 
 
This three-step discursive logic – temporal urgency; rejection of the status quo; need 
for collective solidarity and a DIY approach – is present in both movements and, as 
we can see below, provided the rationale for the first CCA in 2006:  
 
1. Climate change is already happening and its effects will be 
catastrophic if we don’t act now 
 
2. New technology and market-based solutions are not enough to 
address the problem tackling climate change will require radical 
social change. 
 
3. There is a need to work together in our communities to come up 
with solutions. We cannot rely on business and government to bring 
about the radical changes that are needed. (Shift, 2010, p. 6). 
 
This three-step collective action frame, used as a rationale for mobilisation, is 






Figure 4 Dislocation from hegemonic discourse in the CCA.  
 
 
Qualitatively, the CCA typically seeks to make state-level contradiction visible to a 
broader public through targeted action against its local and concrete manifestations. 
This is exemplified below in this activist quote from a Scottish open-cast mining 
protest:  
 
You have a wind farm on one hill and a coal mine on the other. I mean, 
make your mind up. The Scottish Climate Change Bill is the strongest in 
the world, and we are very thankful of that, but how are you going to 
achieve that if you expand coal mines and airports? (McCracken, 2009, 
p. 8). 
 
Thus, the start point of the CCA’s public pedagogy was arguably the public exposure 
of state policy contradictions. Despite the fact that the CCA emerged from this 
moment and was successful in assembling a heterogeneous group of new actors, the 









Popular press coverage (N=593) Press Releases (N=49)
% of total articles in which 'dislocation' is 
explicit 





Connecting to the past: articulations of 
historical equivalence and difference  
 
Invoking a common history of civil disobedience and non-violent direct action 
(NVDA) is commonly used rhetorical device in order to win over public perception 
and mobilise bystanders. In this sense, it is a pedagogical device. 
 
We’re standing on the shoulders of giants in terms of the 90’s activism 




Table 6 Discursive linkages to a history of civil disobedience. * N=591 
Social movement ‘Movement 








 C to early 20
th
 C) and 
second (60s and early 70s) wave feminist 
movements 
5 17 22 
Reclaim the Streets (the ‘90s) 6 12 18 
The Civil Rights Movement (‘50s and 
‘60s) 
2 10 12 
The Zapatistas (1994-present) 2 9 11 
The Peasant’s Revolt (1381) 4 5 9 
The anti-nuclear movement (1960’s - 
present) 
3 3 6 
The mobilisations of 1968 2 3 5 
The Diggers and the Levellers (17
th
 C) 1 2 3 





This stretches far beyond the anti-roads protests and radical environmentalism, to 
progressive movements that have long-since captured the popular imagination (table 
6). 
 
The significance here lies in demonstrating the temporal scope of the movement’s 
identity and its ambitions to articulate many particular social justice and ecological 
concerns under one populist identity (Laclau, 2005). As history has demonstrated the 
legitimacy of these struggles – or perhaps more correctly, that struggle legitimates – 
so they hope to lend populist credibility to their own DA tactics: 
 
We who engage in non−violent direct action are not the creators of 
tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already 
alive.   
Dr Martin Luther King Jr. (Gee, 2011, p. 4) 
 
Nevertheless, a significant difference to the historical movements cited, is the notion 
of protesting for less. As this Heathrow protester put it:  
 
The suffragettes wanted more of a voice, the civil rights 
movement was asking for more equality. Climate change is 
about asking for less and that's a real psychological 
challenge. 
 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 8) 
 




1 2 3 
Anti-poll tax protests (1990) 0 1 1 
The Jarrow March (1936)  -- 1 1 
Anti-apartheid movement (late ‘50s early 
‘90s) 
2 2 4 




In order to address this narrative discontinuity, the temporal component of the 
movement’s identity must also stretch into the future. Consequently, the notion of 
intergenerational justice is invoked. Thus, in making the linkage to 1968, the notion 
of intergenerational justice is used to mark a significant difference to the public 
between climate activism and its historical antecedents:  
 
The protest pattern since 1968 has been of young people demanding an 
abandonment of limits and restraints, and a sober older generation 
lecturing them on the need for responsibility. Last week saw precisely the 
opposite. These protesters came here to protest against the disinhibited 
vandalism of their parents' generation, and to call for a massive slash in 
carbon emissions now, before the climate starts to hit tipping points 
beyond which it spirals away from habitability. 
 
(Hari, 2010, p. 2) 
The limits of a narrative of austerity became hotly debated within the movement 
itself. Regardless of this difference, historical direct action movements are invoked in 
order to highlight to the public their success and legitimacy. This normalising work 
is important, because the counter-framing in public discourse is that of a dangerous 
and exotic sub-culture.  For example, when Ed Miliband, speaking in his old role as 
Minister for Energy and Climate Change, called for a popular mobilisation on 





Ed Miliband, the energy and climate change secretary, recently 
announced a policy not to build new coal plants without burying some of 
their carbon emissions - a partial victory for Climate Camp. Miliband 
admitted to the Guardian last month that environmentalists' pressure was 
a big influence, but added: "Illegal aspects did not appeal to people. It 
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 It is significant, that Miliband has been inspired by the Transition Towns model of cultural change, 
which deliberately avoids contentious politics. In fact, the reference to the Women’s Institute in this 
context, was first articulated by Transition movement intellectual Rob Hopkins in 2008. This example 
of implicit intertextuality, combined with the fact that the Transition Handbook was a top 10 summer 





alienates them. But when you have a coalition of Greenpeace, the 
Women's Institute and others engaging in peaceful campaigning, that 




As this hegemonic encounter played out in public discourse, this activist responded: 
 
'Given the government is still planning to build new coal-fired power 
stations and expand its airports and roads, Ed Miliband's call for a public 
mobilisation on climate change is a clear attempt to co-opt this growing 
movement. But people aren't daft. They realise that the suffragettes and 
the civil rights movement didn't win by wearing rubber wrist bands - they 
won because they were broad-based and willing to take risks, if 
necessary breaking the law.’ 
 
(McVeigh, 2008, p. 29) 
 
Further up the genealogical tree, the British anti-roads movement of the ‘90s and 
radical environmentalist networks such as Earth First!, have all  inspired the CDA 
movement (Gee, 2011, p. 4). Again, activist framing attempts to refocus public 
attention on the successes of these movements, rather than focusing on the cultural 
stereotypes of the popular media.   
 
However, a difference is that the CDA movement frames itself as being part of a 
global ‘cosmopolitan’ identity, with grand narrative ambitions (climate versus 
capital) that subsume particularistic concerns.  
 
[Climate camp is] partly inspired by older movements like the anti-roads 
movement…Environmental struggles in the Nineties were characterised 
by intense struggles, either in defence of place - for instance, against road 
builders - or, for early Reclaim the Streets, over the creation of place. 




and what the economy needs. This grand narrative will hopefully 
motivate a movement equal to the task. 
 
(McVeigh, 2008, p. 29)  
 
In view of this global and systemic focus, the closest relative of the direct climate 
action movement is the alter-globalisation movement, which in turn was inspired by 
the Zapatistas, whose ‘horizontalist’ politics has directly influenced the ideology and 
organisational form of the alter-globalisation movement (Graeber, 2004, pp. 103-5), 
and has deeply influenced the CCA. This assemblage began to take shape in 2005 at 




The anti-globalization movement focused on a number of issues…with 
climate change sometimes playing second fiddle to other movement 
concerns. The turning-point for many activists came in 2005. One of the 
spaces set up during that year’s G8 mobilisation in Edinburgh was a 
purpose-built, non-hierarchical eco-village, consciously designed to 
create a space for anti-capitalists and environmentalists to meet and 
share ideas…Many of the younger activists there had become political 
during the protests against the Iraq war, and joined the area of the site 
organised by the student group People & Planet. At daily consensus-
based meetings they rubbed shoulders with direct-action old hands from 
across the world, many of whom were veterans of the summit protests, 
Earth First!, Reclaim the Streets and anarchist groups. This was quickly 
followed by the formation of the Camp for Climate Action. 
 
           Tim Gee (2011, p. 4, my emphasis) 
 
 
The highlighted text above is particularly important because the coming together of 
anti-capitalists protest, the mainstream environmental movement, the newly ‘active’ 
and protest veterans, speaks volumes about tensions that would develop within the 
nascent movement.  
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Dimensions of the CCA’s public pedagogy 
The previous section provides us with necessary insight into the discursive origins of 
the CCA, and its temporal articulation of identity. Equipped with a necessarily 
impressionistic lay of the land, it is possible to now forge ahead and critically 
explicate the various ways in which the CCA’s cultural politics act as a form of 
public pedagogy. I contend that the CCA’s public pedagogy emerges from the 
articulation of a populist identity, and that the curricular content of this identity 
centres around three analytically distinct ‘knowledge interests’ (Eyerman & Jamison, 
1991, p. 55), which are heuristic applications of Habermas’s knowledge constitutive 
interests: these are cosmological knowledge (an application of Habermas’s 
‘emancipatory’ knowledge interest, concerned with the creation of worldviews);  
technical-practical knowledge (the empirical realm of science and technology); and  
organisational knowledge, which speaks to how knowledge is organized, produced 
and disseminated through organizational form. In the present context, the technical-
practical is primarily concerned with the popularisation of climate science; the 
organisational with the public demonstration of ‘horizontal organising’; and the 
promulgation of distinctive worldviews in the form of anti-capitalism and anarchism.  
 
These dimensions are major axes around which latent tensions in the movement’s 
ambitions to create a populist identity manifest. I contend that the most generative 
moments of the CCA’s public pedagogy emerged from the tensions between these 
‘knowledge interests’. Accordingly, instead of treating each dimension separately, 
the rest of this work is organised around the tensions between organisational form 
and political worldviews that played out in the movement’s attempts to define the 
enemy, and the relationship between climate science and political worldviews. 
 
I understand the public pedagogy of the CCA to emerge from a struggle to articulate 






'simplifies' the political space, replacing a complex set of differences and 
determinations by a stark dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily 
imprecise… [T]here is in these dichotomies, as in those which constitute 
any politico-ideological frontier, a simplification of the political space. 
 
As an “equivalential chain”  joining the claims of particular collective actors 
through their opposition to a ‘constitutive outside’ grows, they become united 
under “empty signifiers”, so-called because particularistic claims, demands and 
interests are linked increasingly only in terms of that which they oppose on the 
other side of the “dichotomic frontier” (p. 131). In this case, the call for Climate 
Action becomes an empty signifier. 
 
Argued above, equivalential chains do not have to be articulated between 
heterogeneous actors in the same historical moment, but can be forged across time. 
In this instance, the DCA movement was articulated in an equivalential chain with a 
variety of historical actors under something like an identity of “Left Civil 
Disobedience”, in opposition to something equally vague which would be defined as 
“Oppressive Social Structures”. In the present (that is 2005-2011), a variety of 
contemporary actors are united in opposition to particular manifestations of an 
oppressive Other, which is articulated as the “root causes of climate change”.  
Therefore, I think it is fair to treat the naming of this Other as the first substantive 
dimension of the DCA movement’s public pedagogy, which will be explored. This 
kind of public pedagogy, is what radical adult educator Michael Newman (1994) 
calls “defining the enemy”.  
 
Defining the enemy 
When we ask who the enemies are we should try to prevent our learners 
retreating into abstractions…[C]alling the reorganisation of capitalism 
what it is can be a starting point to resistance. Yes, but it is only a starting 
point. We and our learners need to find out more. Wherever possible we 




Who are the people, what are the organisations promoting the 
reorganisation of capitalism? Where do they operate? Can we name them 
and do they have an address? (Newman, 1994, p. 120). 
 
The DCA movement enacts a fundamentally different public pedagogy from the TT 
movement, oriented around an agonistic politics, which seeks to make particular 
nodal points of power, and the networked connections between them, visible to the 
public. What radical adult educator Michael Newman argues above is, I think, related 
to a qualitative shift in global political economy to what Graham and Luke (2011) 
have called the “new corporatism”. We now see a widely diffused public ownership 
of corporate assets: through investment strategies such as pension funds and direct 
shareholdings, a powerful “custodial class” (p. 108), who sit on corporate boards, 
typically are the ones who invest public money, making it “practically impossible for 
any individual to know exactly what their money owns” (p. 108).  
 
Related to this, this business class – increasingly separated from actual human 
industry – has enjoyed increasingly close relationships with the political class, which 
has led to what David Harvey (2010) calls the state-finance, or state-corporate nexus. 
Following from this, accountability, that is the “literal duty of care in the 
administration and expenditure of budgeted monies” (Graham & Luke, 2011, p. 110), 
has become increasingly cleaved from any sense of embodied ethical responsibility. 
Finally then, “sustainable business practices” are consistently subjugated by what 
Graham and Luke call “overriding concerns”, dictated by the short-term corporate 
profit motive. This is an important point, because the communication of these 
overriding concerns can be considered a “mass mediated public pedagogy” (Graham 
& Luke, 2011, p. 117) of the state-finance nexus, where an equivalence is made 
between general national interest and corporate profit. 
 
In the case of climate change protest, so-called “overriding concerns” are almost 




and militant particularism, the public pedagogy of the CCA is counterpoised against 
the public pedagogical efforts of vested interests in public discourse. Table 7 below 
exemplifies counterpoised frames in coal protest and aviation protest. 
 
















A spokesperson for 
E.on said: " As a 
Group, we remain 
committed to the 
development of cleaner 
coal and carbon capture 
and storage, which we 
believe have a key role 
to play alongside 
renewables, gas and 
nuclear, in tackling 
climate change while 
ensuring affordability 
and security of energy 
supplies” 











The arguments centre 
around "the energy gap", 
spreading the fear that 
"the lights will go out". 
..[T]he government is 
driven by its concern over 
"energy security". Whilst 
the company is driven by 
the need to generate a 
profitable return for its 
institutional 
shareholders…the 
Climate Camp people are 
demanding that "climate 
security" should be put 
before shareholder return, 
and that "energy security" 
can be achieved by other 
means than by burning 
coal 





Ian Pearson, minister of 
state for Climate 
Change and 





[Activist explains]: “the 
airline industry will make 
a big play of saying it's 









aviation isn't included 
in the Climate Change 
Bill because there is no 
agreement on how to 
allocate emissions to 
various national 
inventories. He denies 
that his role and the 
Department for 
Transport's plans for 
expansion are at odds. 
'The government's 
principle of sustainable 
development for 
aviation is that a proper 




considerations,' he says. 
'In 2002, aviation added 
£ 10bn to the UK 
economy.' He agrees, 
however, that aviation 
is making a growing 
contribution to climate 
change and that, 'like 
all sectors of the 
economy, the polluter 
should pay the price'. 
The best way to do this, 
he says, is for the 
government to ensure 
that aviation is included 






it is - in the UK, it's more 
like 6.5 per cent. But it's 
not the amount, it's the 
rate of growth that's so 
worrying.' The rub of 
Plane Stupid's argument, 
then, is the apparent 
contradiction between the 
Department for 
Transport's plans for hefty 
airport expansion, 
outlined in a 2003 White 
Paper, and the Department 
for Environment's pledge 
to cut carbon emissions by 
60 per cent by 2050. 
'They're incompatible,' 
says Thompson. 'The only 
way the government can 
set those carbon-cutting 
goals and not look like it 
failed its GCSE maths is 
not to include aviation in 
the figures.' 





Trading Scheme 'as 
soon as possible'. 
(Davis, 2007, p. 14) 
 
Given this situation, the public pedagogy of the CDA movement is a counter-
pedagogy aimed at ‘de-black boxing’ the state-finance nexus, in the context of 
climate change. This involves re-establishing connections between control and 
ownership, accountability and responsibility, human industry and business interest, 
calculated out of existence by technocratic and market-based governance networks.  
 
The quote below, taken from a piece of CCA propaganda coinciding with the 2010 
RBS protest, argues for the use of finance as a “leverage point”. It shows how the 
CCA seek to contest the separation of accountability from responsibility, ownership 
from control, and going concerns and overriding concerns, discussed above:  
 
All lending and acquisition of debt carries with it risk. If the project or 
company goes bust, the bank loses money. So banks palm off the risk on 
to other bodies as much as possible, until the banker is ‘comfortable with 
the risk’. The risk is passed on to the governments and companies 
involved in the lending agreements. Environmental and social risks are 
valued only in financial terms. This process of assigning costs to 
environmental and human impacts is relevant only as far as taking into 
account the costs of legal cases arising from health and safety or 
environmental breeches or the impacts of trade unions. And it’s these 
risks that banks pass on to the government of the country of the project, 
risks that normal people usually end up paying for…And that’s where we 
come in...Looking at the finance sector as a leverage point takes this 
same logic and applies it to the wider web of communities of interest 




destruction of ecosystems, landscapes, homes and livelihoods (Camp for 
Climate Action, 2010a, p. 8).  
 
Of course, identifying “this wider web of communities of interest” is an empirical 
matter, only made possible by research emerging from intellectuals and organisations 
that coalesce to form critical communities, opposed to hegemonic epistemic 
communities. Such grey literature often provides the epistemological basis for social 
movement agenda setting, and the critical communities that produce CSR, in turn, 
rely on activist communities to promulgate their work through generating public 
attention. Table 8 gives examples of key pieces of CSR, which have, at various 
times, undergirded the public pedagogy of the DCA movement, through addressing 
issues of political economy, and critically interrogating the practices of, and 
connections between, specific corporate and political actors. Behind all of these 
reports lies a deeper concern with democratic deficit at the heart of the state-
corporate nexus.  
 











































to the Catholic 
church selling 
indulgences 
because of their 











Climate Care in 
Oxford was invaded 
by people dressed as 
red herrings and the 
CarbonNeutral 
Company in London 
was leafleted. Both 
offer to "neutralise" 




Sins” allows business 








bear the local 
costs of offset 
projects foisted 


















investing in projects 
which lower 
emissions elsewhere. 
"Carbon offsets are 
ineffective, based on 
dubious science and 
lead people to 
believe they are 
helping when they 
are not," said Sophie 
Nathan, who took 
part in the 
CarbonNeutral 
Company action. 































































In detailed estimates 
published in a report 
by a coalition of 
environmental 
groups, RBS is 
accused of helping 
to provide an 
estimated $16bn 
(£8bn) to E.ON and 
other companies 
utilising coal over 
the past two years, 
with HSBC 
providing $10bn and 







2001 and 2006 
locked in future 
emissions of 
655 million 
tonnes over the 
next 15 years, 
more than 
equivalent to 









are coming from all 
over the country to 
protest against the 
proposed new coal-
fired power station 
at Kingsnorth. If 
RBS and the other 
banks don't stop 
financing such 
climate-trashing 
projects they risk a 
similar public 
backlash."…Environ
mental groups are 
looking to target 
banks that fund coal 
projects while 
trumpeting their own 
green credentials.. 
They point out that 
the Co-op Bank, by 
contrast, has 
introduced an ethical 
investment policy 
prohibiting it from 
financing any coal, 
oil or gas projects. 
























To take a step back and analyse the overall picture, between 2005-2008, the CCA 
was almost exclusively preoccupied with opposing coal and aviation expansion, 
targeting local sites that were considered to be manifestations of corporate-state 
collusion and government hypocrisy. Although it is almost impossible to adduce any 
cause and effect relationship between such protest actions and changes in policy, 
plans for a third runway at Heathrow were shelved and plans for new coal-fired 
power stations were prevented by the introduction of statutory stipulations about the 









markets has the 
potential to 
create a carbon 










that carry a 
relatively high 





of the Earth US, 










of creating a market 
to solve a problem - 
climate change - 
caused by the 
relentless pillage of 
our planet by the 
marketers. It is 
immoral and it 
doesn't work. It's the 
next sub-prime.” 
(Taylor, et al., 2009, 
p. 29) 
(CCA spokesperson 
Mark Smith, in 





highlighted major contradictions to the broader public by bringing aviation and coal 
expansion into the same conversation as climate change policy.  
 
Post-2008  
The global financial crisis provided opportunities for climate protesters to articulate 
linkages between climate politics and anti-austerity politics. This happened in three 
ways: 
1.  The crisis of finance capital caused by ‘toxic assets’, and the attendant 
populist suspicion of unaccountable and esoteric financial innovations, 
provided a discursive opportunity to frame carbon markets as the next ‘sub-
prime’ waiting to happen.  
2. The frame of a ‘Just Transition’ away from fossil fuels gained prominence as 
climate protesters sought to articulate linkages with worker’s struggles and 
trade unions.  
3. CSR organisations, particularly Platform4, had already been building capacity 
by researching the financing of environmentally destructive fossil-fuel 
projects. Banking bailouts prompted questions around public ownership and 
accountability. RBS was identified as being the biggest investor in climate 
change exacerbating projects. 
 
Of course, in the post-2008 environment, the public market-place of ideas and 
political claims was crowded, and particularly in 2009, the resources of the CDA 
movement were pulled in many directions: anti-coal protest, legal challenges over 
policing, articulating links with anti-austerity movements, preparing for the COP 15 
negotiations in Copenhagen by forging transnational coalitions organising around the 
Climate Justice frame.  
                                                          
4
 Platform is a London-based activist organisation that produces critical empirical research and 
educational resources on the oil industry. Their report “The Oil and Gas Bank” (Minio-Paluello, 2007) 




Figure 5 Major narrative trends in the CCA (2005-2011). 
  
 
Figure 5 shows the general pattern of popular press coverage of the four major 
thematic groupings of my press corpus: coal, aviation, carbon markets and finance. 
Overall, the critique of carbon markets garners the least attention. This is not 
surprising, as the critique of carbon markets is a complex and abstract issue which is 
hard to squeeze into the sound bites and norms of journalistic prose covering protest 
events. The spike in coverage of anti-aviation protest is represented by the Heathrow 
protests in 2007. Coal protest has the most consistent coverage across time and, 
coinciding with anti-austerity protest, we see the rise in the focus on finance capital 
2009-2010. By far the most commonly identified corporations in this news coverage 
are BAA, E.ON, and RBS. 
From climate change to meta-protest  
Having looked at intended issue frames, it is pertinent to note that the second 
metanarrative of the CCA is dominated by state suppression of the right to protest, 




























Major narrative trends in the CCA 












CCA enacted an incidental public pedagogy. In public discourse, this was played out 
as a ‘top trumps’ of freedoms and rights: the right to protest versus the freedom of 
individuals to fly; the freedom of individuals to fly versus people’s right to life and a 
healthy environment because of climate change; the right to break the law to prevent 
greater injustices caused by anthropogenic climate change. In this game of top 
trumps, climate science was always used as a legitimating factor.  
 
The large volume of press that the 2007 Heathrow protest attracted can be partially 
explained by the injunction that BAA attempted to take out against the CCA and all 
affiliated with it from protesting, under the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act. In 
the end only certain members of Plane Stupid and anti-aviation group HACAN were 
formally issued with the injunction. The court case backfired for BAA, adding fuel to 
the media fire, and mobilising more than it otherwise would have, much to the ire of 
HAL’s prosecuting lawyers. Thus began a narrative, whereupon the CCA 
inadvertently became a “protest for democracy”, exemplified below: 
 
The Harassment Act has been used many times against peaceful 
campaigners…If the climate camp protesters were not threatening 
disruption at Heathrow, would the Guardian have written a leader about 
the environmental impacts of flying? I think not…By joining the climate 
camp at Heathrow next week, you will be making a stand not only 
against climate change, but also against the attempt by BAA to stop 
people from agitating for a better world. What began as an 
environmental demonstration has now also become a protest for 
democracy (Monbiot, 2007, p. 25).  
 
From this point in time, this narrative only gathered momentum, as the role of the 
NPOIU (of which undercover police spy Mark Kennedy was a member), the 
NECTU, and FITs (see appendix 5) in systematically gathering intelligence on 





This meta-protest narrative came to a crescendo in 2009 for a number of reasons, the 
main one being that 2009 was the busiest year for the movement. The Kingsnorth 
protest of 2008 was subjected to a very heavy-handed and expensive policing 
operation. Liberal Democrat justice spokesman MP David Howarth became a 
political ally of the movement, pushing for an inquiry into the policing of 
Kingsnorth. There was a media lag effect as the legal repercussions of its policing 
tactics – including blanket stop and searches, police violence, detention without 
charge, sleep deprivation tactics –  played out. For example, in the Guardian (the 
single broadsheet title with the most overall coverage), there were 28 articles 
covering Kingsnorth, with another 27 in 2009. Also, 2009 saw the mass kettling of 
protesters and use of excessive force by police in the April G20 protests (infamously 
leading to the Ian Tomlinson tragedy). 
 
In the most general terms, it was the policing of the CCA that consumed the highest 
proportion of its overall press coverage. Thus, to the extent that the public were 
learning anything from reportage on the DCA movement, much of it was to do with 
protesting for the right to protest itself.  From 2007 onwards, press focus on 
controversial policing tactics consumed proportionally between around a quarter and 
over a half of annual coverage (figure 6). In the overall press corpus (N=593), 
‘police’ and ‘policing’ are the second most frequently occurring words, and in the 
CCA’s own press releases (N=49), ‘police’ and ‘policing’  were the fourth most 
frequently occurring words behind the words, ‘climate’, ‘camp’, and ‘action’! This 
indicates that even the CCA’s own unfiltered outwards facing communications 










Figure 6. General focus on relationship between the CCA and police from 2006-2011.  
 
 
It is well known that  hegemonic discourse is capable of incorporating particular 
interests and identities articulated under impossibly vague concepts such as being 
‘green’ or ‘sustainable’. Nevertheless, the CCA movement is a collective emblem of 
what happens when the contradictions within these over-determined subject positions 
create nascent social identities that cannot be discursively co-opted. In other words, 
where discourse fails, there is always brute force.  On this point, David Graeber 
(2004, pp. 72-3) – a leading anarchist thinker and CCA ‘movement intellectual’ – is 
excellent: 
 
[T]he threat of that man with the stick permeates our world at every 
moment; most of us have given up even thinking of crossing the 
innumerable lines and barriers he creates, just so we don’t have to remind 
ourselves of his existence…Contrary to popular belief, bureaucracies do 
not create stupidity. They are ways of managing situations that are 
already inherently stupid because they are, ultimately, based on the 
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In this sense the incidental public pedagogy of the CCA became oriented around the 
constant reminder of the “man with the stick”. Of course, climate protesters 
themselves are acutely aware of this problem, as evidenced by the on-going praxis on 
the matter in activist fora: 
 
Its struggling with language and its learning as we go along…We had a 
clear message that we wanted to say about the system of economic 
growth and how that’s related to climate change,… [b]ut then we also got 
caught up in talking a lot of rubbish about police…We really have to 
avoid that the story doesn’t become the police [because] it narrows even 
more the space to have the systemic critique (Lewis, 2009) 
 
In truth, this was more than merely a narrative distraction: much of the movement’s 
resources appeared to be increasingly mobilised around tackling ‘political policing’, 
on the streets, and through the courts (domestic and European). With the media 
narrative consumed by this, the categorisation of climate protesters by the police as 
“domestic extremists”, under anti-terror legislation, was itself a public pedagogical 
trope, against which the movement was forced to rally.    
 
Metamorphosis 
After the last large-scale camp, at RBS HQ in 2010, the CCA ‘metamorphosed’. The 
statement released in early 2011, after the decision not to organise any longer under 
the CCA model was reached, is interesting to note here. The concern that “using the 
same tactic – mass squatted action camps in antagonistic locations – would become 
ineffectual” (CCA 2011, Metamorphosis) reflects activist understanding that 
repeating the same form of action over and over leads to stagnation and a 
diminishing law of returns, both in terms of mobilisation and public attention. Figure 
7 gives an impressionistic account of media attention: looking at broadsheet titles, we 
can see that media attention peaks in 2009 and falls off dramatically, with the 2010 
RBS protest receiving relatively little coverage. The Guardian – a liberal supporter of 




Finally, there was no camp in 2011. However, these articles almost exclusively 
focused on on-going legal proceedings against political policing allegations. 
 




Activists met in late 2011and decided to discontinue the large-scale ‘squatted camps’ 
model in order to engage in a wider war of position with anti-austerity struggle and 
to use the capacity and material resources of the CCA more efficiently (see appendix 
1). This itself signalled important activist learning and marked a desire to link social 
justice more directly with climate change.   
 
 
In 2011 the climate science is as strong as ever – and the need for action 
on climate change never greater – but the political landscape is radically 
different. As a movement, to be relevant, we need to move with the 
time…With the skills, networks and trust we have built we will launch 





















CCA coverage in broadsheet  press 




directly targeting the root cause of airport expansion and coal-fired 
power stations: our economic system…We discussed how other 
movements and groups have responded to changing circumstances in the 
past to learn from those experience?... How do we best grow a climate 
justice social movement that is relevant, vibrant and successful over the 
next few years? What organisational structures, consistent with our desire 
to tackle hierarchy, will take us to a new level of participation and 
action? 
(CCA 2011, ‘Metamorphosis’ statement, n-p) 
 
The CCA assemblage was being deterritorialised and was involved in a larger 
process of becoming. Interestingly, the use of the word “metamorphosis” as the title 
for the collectively penned statement of the CCA’s dissolution, is exactly the term 
used by Alberto Melucci (1995) to describe the management of activist "identity 
work”. This draws attention to what has proven to be a rather contentious point in the 
praxis of the CCA: metamorphosis is about “how activists construct their identities 
over time as activists, rather than in relation to a particular collective identity” (King, 
2004, p. 74).  
 
Activist Mel Evans is looking forward to what happens next: "Climate 
Camp was always about more than just climate change, it's also about the 
political and economic context for climate change, and people from 
Climate Camp are now addressing those issues through UK Uncut and 
dozens of other campaigns. It may not be called Climate Camp any more, 
but the methods and the values will carry on.” (van der Zee 2011, The 
Guardian) 
 
Thus, whist this metamorphosis is about mobilising resources efficiently, it also 
reveals something about the maintenance of an activist ‘habitus’. This self-
identification with an activist vocation has been debated within the movement, and is 






Politics and organisational form  
Shifting frames, shifting scales 
Above, I described how “defining the enemy” is a key part of the CCA’s public 
pedagogy as it sought to define a populist identity in opposition to the “root causes” 
of climate change. I outlined the role of critical communities in “defining the 
enemy”, and the role of social movement activists in publicising these analyses. This 
may be partly an objective exercise, but building alliances around the geographical 
contingencies and unexpected geographical connections that are brought to light by 
movement research, is a task of cultural politics. Such a cultural politics is itself 
never voluntaristic, but rather emerges from the contingencies/opportunities of 
particular moments.  
 
What this means is that the movement’s organisational form as a loose assemblage is 
mechanistically important, as shifting local, translocal, national and transnational 
coalitions assemble and then disassemble depending on the most politically 
expedient, and strategically and tactically intelligent, scale of action at any given 
time. Thus, in a Deleuzian sense, the CCA was in a constant state of metamorphosis, 
or ‘becoming’. As I have argued, the expressive components of an assemblage in this 
case work to “territorialise” it, or indeed to “deterritorialise” assemblages such as 
“the nation state”. What this means is that discursive work is needed to reinforce the 
scale of any given alliance of interest and identity, which is not anterior to the 
movement’s politics, but requires discursive reinforcement. 
 
Activists respond to scalar ambiguity inherent in their direct action politics. In this 
circumstance scale is not ontologically given, awaiting discovery; it is a way of 
knowing the world, which emerges through discursive struggle (Kurtz, 2003, p. 893; 




the learning process can be considered an education of attention. This concept 
resonates with Freirian pedagogy, and his notion of dialectical movement between 
one’s immediate socio-spatial positionality, and more abstract thematic universes in 
increasing nested scales, as we read and write the world (Freire, 1972).  
 
There are two primary interrelated processes occurring here, then: 
 
1. Activists “force struggles to the geographical scale at which political 
opportunity structures seemed most favourable at the time” (Kurtz, 2003, p. 
895). 
2. Activists (re)shape the scale of an activist community discursively for the 
sake of claims-making. 
 
This of course means that an immanent activist assemblage at any given scale is not 
necessarily politically coherent, leading to antagonisms, which may or may not be 
generative of useful learning. Accordingly, how the ‘public’ is framed in the CCA’s 
‘public pedagogy’, is intrinsically keyed to this dynamic socio-spatial dialectic.  
 
 
Table 9 Shifting frames, shifting scales in the CCA’s public pedagogy mediated through the 
mainstream press. 
Protest site Emergent 
scale 




Local  Local militant 
particularism 
Perhaps 83-year-old Ethel Bull is The Militant. Leaning on her 
walking stick, she says to me, "I'm going to be made homeless [if 
they build a third runway] and I want to know why. Where do you 
go when you're 83?" 
She is one of the legion of locals from the surrounding villages of 
Sipson, Harlington and Harmondsworth who have embraced the 




mechanic, enthuses: "It's fantastic. I've never seen anything so 
wonderful [as the climate camp] in my life. The only thing I'm 
worried about is the police….Linda McCutcheon, in her 60s, looks 
out across the village and says, "If this runway goes ahead, 41 
years of my life will be under concrete. My children were born in 
that house there. I live there. My first family home is just beyond 
there. All gone." 
 




of Wight, July 
2009 
National  Just Transition to 
‘green jobs’ frame 
We are writing in solidarity with the Vestas wind turbine workers 
who have occupied their factory in Newport, on the Isle of Wight, 
to prevent 600 job losses…[T]this is an inspiring example of 
workers taking action to defend themselves against the bosses' 
attempts to make the working class pay for their economic crisis. It 
is also a crucial struggle in relation to the fight against climate 
change, for democratic social control which meets the needs of 
people and planet, not the "needs" of profit and the market. 
The government says it wants to create 400,000 green jobs. It 
should begin by saving these 600, and by taking the factory into 
public ownership as the workers are demanding. 
The Vestas workers are showing how to fight back. The labour and 
climate-change movements must mobilise the maximum possible 
solidarity with their struggle. (Vestas solidarity working group, 











Local  Environmental 
justice frame 
“Protesters from a variety of backgrounds and from across the UK 
and the world have trickled into Douglas this week, including 
scientists, teachers, engineers, artists and students. One is Kirstie 
Stramler, a climate scientist who used to work for the US 
government." These people have found a location that has a 
legitimate beef," she says…She draws a graph on a notepad 
showing the local rate of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease - 
when small particles enter the lungs but can't be coughed them out, 
forming scar tissue and causing shortness of breath." It is one of 
the things that is pretty much an indicator of opencast mining," she 
says. 
All the protesters are impressively well drilled on the issues. And 
when asked why they are there, they all direct their answers in one 




on the local community." There is a community that has been 
badly hurt by mining projects around here," says Ross Jones, 26, 
from Edinburgh." Their wishes aren't listened to. Every week they 
are going to funerals because of the dust and crap that is spewed 
into the air by the coal mines. And if there are more mines, that 
will impact the area's health even more." Kirsten Williamson, 24, 
from Glasgow says:" I'm here mostly to show support for the local 
Douglas community. 







justice to climate 
justice  
Open-cast mining is responsible for a spike in the number of lung-
related deaths in this small area. 
"It is time that the likes of Scottish Coal and the planning 
authorities are held directly responsible for their role in these 
deaths. 
"Climate change is a killer, both at home and in the 'Global South', 
where those who have benefited the least from industrialisation are 







Transnational  Climate Justice 
“false solutions” 
frame  
[D]espite the fact that the European Union's Emissions Trading 
Scheme has resulted in no net reductions in carbon emissions to 
date. No coincidence, then, that the same people who have no 
desire to move beyond fossil fuels are also the biggest fans of 
carbon trading…[C]limate activists plan to expose and blockade 
corporate lobbyists at the Copenhagen summit in December. These 
are the kind of practical skills they will learn at Climate Camp 
over this week. In confronting the lobbyists, they hope to open 
political space for indigenous people, those affected by fossil fuel 
extraction and processing, representatives of small island states 
threatened by rising sea levels, and others whose voices are being 




National  Public 
accountability 
“Owned by the 
taxpayer” frame 
You own this bank [RBS]: 84 per cent of it belongs to the taxpayer 
after the bailouts. Yet it is using your money to endanger you, by 
financing the most environmentally destructive behaviour on earth, 
like burning the tar sands. The protesters chose to come here 
…because they have a better idea. Why not turn it into a Green 
Investment Bank? 






This draws our attention to learning as a transversal process of ‘translation’ (Santos, 
et al., 2007; McFarlane, 2011), between different socio-spatial epistemologies where 
‘learning’ an emergent scale of action can be considered an “education of attention” 
(McFarlane, 2011, p. 363). As argued in chapter 3, this requires us to develop a much 
more careful vocabulary than the pop culture slogan, ‘think globally, act locally’, 
would lead us to believe. Antagonistic struggles often involve thinking locally and 
acting globally, as when particularistic struggles “jump scales” in order to mobilise 
material and cognitive resources in the face of unresponsive local structures (Smith, 
2001; Kinchy, 2010). Indeed, increasingly, the DCA movement thinks locally and 
globally whilst acting translocally and transnationally all at once. Mobile DA 
activists play a brokerage role in this context, which should be critically examined. 
 
Such contingent and shifting scales, of course, created tensions between the 
repertoires of action of ‘rooted’ local protesters, nomadic anarchists, mobile 
‘moderates’, First Nations activists, trade unionists and so on.  The academic 
commentators Saunders and Price (2009), thus characterised  CCA protest sites as 
“heterotopic” spaces, meaning spaces “of alternative social ordering” located 
 Transnational  Indigenous rights 
“First Nations 
solidarity” frame 
Activists  claim RBS  is the UK bank most heavily involved with 
financing fossil fuel companies around the world and  is the UK 
bank most involved in investing in "tar sands", a particularly  
carbon-intensive form of oil  extraction  in Canada…The RBS 
AGM will be attended by    Canadian  Eriel Deranger, from the 
Indigenous Environment Network, who aims to question 
executives about the impact of their investment in projects  
affecting her home and community. 
She said: "I feel it's important to come to Scotland to be a part of 
the RBS AGM  to inform people about how their money is being 
spent.  UK taxpayers' money is being used to destroy my people, 
my community and my traditional lands.  RBS is financing the 
largest and most destructive industrial project on the planet using 
your dollars." 





somewhere between a non-hierarchical space of utopian imaginary, and the social 
constraints and power relations of reality. It is within these ‘heterotopic’ spaces 
where the dialectic between a necessary simplification of political space and 
particularistic tensions play out.  
 
Tensions between the cosmological and the 
organisational: anarchism, anti-capitalism, 
liberalism, and the valorisation of direct action 
in the CCA  
 
The above section explicated how geographical contingency, political expediency, 
and cultural politics interact in a shifting politics of scale made possible by the loose 
networked structure of the movement. I argued that this may result in antagonisms 
and contradictions, as the nascent movement struggles to assert a populist identity. In 
my view, the most generative tensions occurred within the space where horizontal 
organising and DA had become the accepted modus operandi of the growing 
movement. Expanding numbers in public occupations is not equivalent to an 
expanding space for radical anarchist politics: as one participant wrote, “the camp 
has been hijacked by a hardcore of liberals” (Charsley, 2007). The original 
‘submerged network’ of the CCA gradually felt more alienated from the space that 
they had created through their own labour, although, part of the reason d’être of a 
non-hierarchical movement is, of course, that no one can claim ownership of it.  
 
Genealogically, if there is one principal political ideology which informed the 
‘cosmology’ of the movement, it was anarchism. This movement emerged from the 
alter-globalisation movement and, more directly, from the G8 mobilisations in 2005. 
Activist-anthropologist David Graeber can be considered one movement intellectual 




Anarchist Anthropology” (2004) is listed on the CCA websites ‘Get Educated’ 
section as useful political reading (CCA, no-date).It is, therefore, perhaps useful to 
turn to him in order to understand how anarchy is understood and enacted in the 
alter-globalisation movement. Graeber (Graeber, 2002, pp. 70-1) writes:  
 
A constant complaint about the globalization movement in the 
progressive press is that, while tactically brilliant, it lacks any central 
theme or coherent ideology… [T]his is a movement about reinventing 
democracy. It is not opposed to organization. It is about creating new 
forms of organization. It is not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of 
organization are its ideology. It is about creating and enacting horizontal 
networks. 
 
This notion that the enactment of organisational form is ideology, to paraphrase 
Graeber, has created difficulties for the CCA. These problems manifest around what 
David Harvey has described as “an all-consuming fetishism of organisational form” 
centred around “horizontality” and “non-hierarchy” (Harvey, 2012, pp. 125-126). 
The pertinent question is, how the fetish is reproduced and maintained. In order to 
explain this, I give an account of how an anarchist base mutated into what Laclau 
(2005) would understand as a distinctly ‘populist’ political logic in which 
‘horizontalism’ became emptied of its political content. 
A privileging of form over content opened up the political space to actors such as 
NGO participants and so-called ‘liberal’ protesters, who were happy to abide 
superficially by the espoused organisational form and tactical repertories, which 
were consequently valorised, whilst the substantive politics moved in other 
directions (or was, as our activist put it, ‘hijacked’). As a result, particular activist-
intellectuals argued that the particular ‘green’ concerns of certain campers were 
assimilated back into the hegemonic discourse because of a misidentification of 
“root causes”.  
 
The following excerpt, co-authored by climate camp participants writing in radical 




national camp in 2009. It is revealing because it speaks to the aestheticisation of 
protest. Although DA is an intrinsic part of anarchist organizing, in and of itself it is 
not ‘horizontal’. Indeed, dramatic actions are often undertaken by a vanguard of 
activists, whose aims of ‘shutting down’ particular sites (whether airfields or power 
stations) come to seem rhetorical – a front for what is, indeed, a “dramatic lobbying 
technique”: 
 
When we first got involved with the Climate Camp, a few months before 
the Drax camp in 2006, it had a very distinct radical feel to it. In its stated 
principles, government and markets were regarded as the problem that 
we needed to tackle, and the camp was to be a festival of grassroots 
resistance…In discussions with friends and other campers, it seemed that 
many felt that we had made a crucial mistake: we had opened up an 
exciting political space from where to challenge the status quo, but it was 
being filled with a message that was no longer our own. We were 
becoming a hip, media-savvy campaign of flash mobs and publicity 
stunts, lobbying for tighter government control of our lifestyles. “Friends 
of the Earth with D-locks” as one of our contributors wrote in the first 
issue of Shift. (Archer, 2007). 
 
The populist logic of this is well expressed by this reflection from the Anarchist 
Federation (2009): 
 
The direct action climate change movement has moved over the years 
from being fairly politically homogeneous, to being quite wide and 
diverse…The result is that it is action against climate change (whatever 
that may be), not any sense of shared aims and values as a community of 
activists, that is holding our movement together…[T]he real 
contradictions inside the movement are starting to show. 
 
 
Symbolic mediatised direct actions have been credited as a pedagogical marker of 
success for the CDA movement (alongside more vanguard groups like Plane Stupid), 
acting as a source of public pedagogy by influencing public discourse. Nevertheless, 
DA as radical lobbying for state reform and corporate responsibility is, from the 




other hand, other protesters argued that temporal urgency of the climate change issue 
requires political pragmatism: 
 
 [C]onsidering the timescale we don’t have the luxury of arguing over 
whose strategy is the best one. At the moment we’re in a quickly 
descending aircraft, and it’s “press every fucking button on the 
dashboard” time (Anonymous, 2009). 
 
The use of the descending aircraft metaphor captures well the sense of urgency, 
which more committed horizontalists see as a Trojan horse for what is alternately 
termed ‘green authoritarianism’ or ‘eco-fascism’. Implicated in this process, activists 
became frustrated as, what they saw as protest aesthetics appealing to the state, were 
substituted for building lasting alliances with communities peripheral to protest sites, 
through the unglamorous graft of sustained dialogue. The activists taking this 
position seemed to be more aware of the alienating effect of particular activist 
subcultures, and called for more honesty and less “bravado and bluster” surrounding 
the potential of horizontally organised camps, and direct action beyond symbolic acts 
of dramatic lobbying (e.g. Ford, 2008; Basset, 2009).   
    
Two interesting analyses were generated from this activist praxis: first, an analysis of 
the valorisation of the ‘activist’ role; second, the misidentification of “root causes”. 
Activist-intellectuals inspired by the CCA’s anarchist principles and the French 
Situationists (Do or Die, 1999), questioned what happens to the movement as a force 
of public pedagogy from the grassroots, when protesters position themselves as 
“activist experts”: they paint a picture of an unappealing climate martyrdom, the 
propaganda of which promulgates a hopelessly woolly message. They seem 
ultimately to suggest a limit to mass -mediated public pedagogy:  
 
Anti-capitalist politics do not translate easily into ‘action’ but they do 
make sense and we do not need to water down the messaging to appeal to 




anti-capitalist politics to direct action over simplistic lifestyle politics 
loses us friends both inside and outside of the anti-capitalist movement. 
Instead of trying to ‘win people over’ by rose tinting our anger and rage 
we should speak honestly about the frustration that we all feel and 
recognise it in the less valorised forms of action that people take every 
day (Shifter, 2011). 
 
Ultimately, the “political vacuum” identified by particular activist-intellectuals in the 
CCA, was a result of the fetishization of organisational form, such that the notion of 
“open space”, run by consensus meetings, and so on, became an “open political 
space of environmental solutions” to the extent that anarchist anti-capitalists could 
not “articulate [their] own political structure in anarchist terms because of the 
misconception that [they had] no politics at all!” (a.g.r.o.a.t., 2010, p. 10). 
Pragmatists, on the other hand, argued that, to the extent that capitalism and the state-
corporate nexus could be identified as the “root causes”, the temporal urgency of the 
situation, as dictated by climate scientists, necessitates, in the short to medium term, 
a struggle to reform these root causes. This line of inquiry leads us directly on to an 
analysis of the way in which climate science legitimates political argument in the 
movement’s public pedagogy. In this sense, we move from one central fetishism 
(horizontalism) towards an analysis of another, that of carbon.  
 
Climate science and politics 
 
‘Historically, greens have had it tough,' says Garman. 'So many of these 
environmental battles are conveyed as an "Industry versus Greenies" 
thing. We're lucky, all our stuff is based on science. 
 






How climate science is used as legitimation for 
contentious politics  
A major orienting theme for the CCA is its relationship to climate science. One of 
the key tropes of the CCA is, as we know, addressing the ‘root causes’ of climate 
change. The argument was developed in the previous section that out of a tension 
between the desire to mobilise new activists through popular appeal, and anarchism 
as a guiding philosophy, arose an analysis of the valorisation of organisational form 
and protest tactics, at the cost of political coherence.  This section continues to 
examine the struggle to mobilise around a populist identity by analysing the 
relationship between the politics of climate change and its science. We begin with 
the insight from above that temporal urgency is itself a public pedagogical tool, 
which draws its power from climate science:  
 
Winning a big argument in a democracy is a longer haul than any flights 
BA has to offer, but...the long grind does not work for environmental 
activists. Put simply, the greens believe - and most scientific evidence 
backs them up - that inaction now will cost lives later. That time limit, 
and the enormous possible consequences of failure, applies to few other 
causes (Guardian Leader, 2007, p. 28).  
 
One of the most interesting ways in which activists have tried to use climate change 
to legitimate a political imperative is through court cases following from direct 
action. In this sense, the actions are high stakes, undertaken by few but with the 
intention of using a legalistic setting as a wider source of public pedagogy. The basic 
argument is that (illegal) action taken is justified in light of the urgent need to tackle 
climate change. The basic premise – of taking action outside the letter of the law in 
order to prevent a greater evil – is not new, and flags up a process of learning 
through protest cycles. The extract below, from the Guardian, usefully summarises a 






· 2000 Norwich jury found Greenpeace director Lord Melchett and 27 
activists not guilty of causing criminal damage to field of GM crops 
· 2000 Five Greenpeace volunteers found not guilty of criminal damage 
after occupying incinerator  
· 1999 Three women cleared of causing £80,000 damage to Trident 
nuclear submarine computer equipment 
· 1996 Liverpool jury acquitted four women who caused £1.5m damage 
to Hawk fighter jet at British Aerospace factory 
 
(Vidal, 2008).  
 
 
In October 2007, six Greenpeace activists known as the ‘Kingsnorth Six’, inspired by 
the burgeoning CCA movement, occupied a smoke stack and painted ‘Gordon’ down 
the chimney to highlight the contradictions of New Labour policy on climate change 
and its support of new coal-fired power stations. The Kingsnorth Six’s tactics 
worked, and they were cleared of criminal damage. Publicity of the case provided the 
opportunity to build a ‘broad church’ of alliances, and used expert witnesses to turn 
the court room, in a sense, into a pedagogical space.  The Kingsnorth Six 
successfully used the defence of ‘lawful excuse’ to damage property at Kingsnorth 
power station in Kent to prevent even greater damage caused by climate change. 
Although the decision was not made by a high court, and therefore cannot set 
precedent, it subsequently sent shockwaves throughout sympathetic media, the 
activist community, as well as the wider corporate and political world:  
 
[A climate activist commented] "It's just a fantastic result. It shows that 
the public can distinguish between what the government says and what it 
does on climate change…And that's because here we have the public 




politics, and it makes me very optimistic that we can actually turn this 
around” 
(van der Zee, 2008, p. 7) 
 
The court room became a public lecture theatre in which NASA climate scientist Jim 
Hansen, the Tory environment advisor, and an Inuit leader from Greenland, argued 
the case in climate change terms. The ‘dots are joined’ between the local actions and 
the wider global repercussions already occurring as a result of emissions: 
 
Professor Jim Hansen, one of the world's leading climate scientists, 
argued that the 20,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted daily by 
Kingsnorth could be responsible for the extinction of up to 400 
species…The court was told that some of the property in immediate need 
of protection included parts of Kent at risk from rising sea levels, the 
Pacific island state of Tuvalu and areas of Greenland. The defendants 
also cited the Arctic ice sheet, China's Yellow River region, the Larsen B 
ice shelf in Antarctica, coastal areas of Bangladesh and the city of New 
Orleans (Vidal, 2008). 
 
This reveals how particular activists consider such actions to be productive of public 
pedagogy in a Habermasian sense. By Habermas’s (1979) account, modernity is 
characterised by testing the validity claims inherent in social arrangements through 
rational discourse. Public pedagogy arises from the fact that actors engaged in 
rational discourse with a normative perspective on society, are forced to learn when 
confronted with contradiction. Although the courts are a good example, this use of 
climate science as public pedagogy is far more general.  
 
Armed only with peer-reviewed science? 
The use of climate science to flag up democratic deficit in the face of objective 
urgency is heavily used throughout the CCA’s history. Perhaps one of the most 
famous memes of the CCA – emerging from the 2007 Heathrow protest – was “We 
are armed only with peer reviewed science”. What is at stake is the potential of such 




There are several entangled issues. However, to simplify, the use of esoteric science 
as a conscientizing force asks certain obvious questions such as, does the notion of 
scientifically literate, educated, mobile protesters shore up binaries such as good 
protester/bad protester, or so-called fluffy versus spiky activism, that mass mediated 
popular culture perpetuates? It is not even that we can rely on press accounts that 
such a protester is indeed ‘typical’. More to the point is the power of such a public 
narrative in creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
What is the “peer-reviewed science” that attendees were referring to at Heathrow? 
Primarily, three items were cited through media reporting: a paper co-authored by 
NASA professor James Hansen, et al (2007) entitled “Climate change and trace 
gases”; secondly, a working paper from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research entitled “Growth Scenarios for EU & UK aviation: contradictions with 
climate policy” (Anderson, et al., 2006); thirdly, the “World Health Report 2002: 
Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life” (World Health Organisation, 2002). 
Firstly, it is important to state that the DA movement have acted as popularisers and 
promulgators of science to the wider public, as seen above. This is educative in itself. 
Taken together, such protest actions help the public to join the dots between climate 
change policy, aviation policy, global climate science, and the human cost of climate 
change. The use of the popular media has been crucial in this respect. In many cases, 
DA provides the catalyst resulting in the popular press referencing the claims made 












Table 10 The CCA as populariser of contemporary climate science 
Source Topic Example of promulgation through media 
Anderson, et 
al (2006)  
The contradictions between 
government climate change 
policy and aviation expansion 
policy. 
This year, the [climate camp] have chosen 
Heathrow…for a simple reason. The current 
expansion in flying is, on its own, a guarantee that 
Britain will fail to meet even the most modest of its 
environmental targets…Flying…is growing rapidly. 
The Tyndall Centre for Global Warming, one of the 
world's most distinguished scientific bodies, has 
calculated that air travel alone will take up 134 
percent of the Government's greenhouse gas targets 
by 2050. 
(Hari, 2007, p. 13). 
 
Hansen, et al 
(Hansen, et 
al., 2007) 
Global climate change, arctic ice 
melt, and ‘positive feedbacks’. 
“SIR - Camping at the "Camp for Climate Action'' 
over the past six days has been surreal but 
exhilarating…We know from the latest science 
(Hansen et al, "Climate Change and Trace Gases'', 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 
May 18) that "recent greenhouse gas emissions 
place the Earth perilously close to dramatic climate 
change that could run out of control''…By 
permitting a third runway at Heathrow - and the 
dramatic rise in carbon dioxide emissions that will 
inevitably accompany it - the Government is 
effectively committing itself to the destruction of 
the world as we know it” 






Estimates of the effects of 
climate change on human health 
and mortality. 
Next month's Camp for Climate Action will put 
Heathrow airport at the frontline of direct action on 
climate change…As individuals, we are not off the 




150,000 people will die this year from climate 
change. Their right to life beats our right to the 
break of our choice. 
(Fauset, 2007, p. 8) 
 
Nevertheless, a movement that is to generate grassroots support must be inclusive 
and, despite the general journalistic sense of novelty at the esoteric discussions 
taking place at climate camps, there is something more insidious at work. Note below 
the equivalence of educated middle class with ‘good protester’. That right-leaning 
press accept the movement’s legitimacy, may be seductive to particular activists: 
 
These "unemployed layabouts" and "stupid hippies" (copyright Talksport 
Radio) must be the most scientifically qualified protesters in history, with 
every other person seemingly a science graduate. I recognise an 
undercover journalist from a right-wing newspaper. "This is terrible!" he 
says "I've been sent to find stories about drug-addicted layabouts and 
they're all nice people with PhDs." 
(Hari, 2006, p. 27). 
 
Therefore, it is not the science, but the (inadvertent) legitimation of institutional 
‘respectability’ that is a double-edged sword. Below, in a letter to the Guardian, CCA 
activists legally banned from protesting at Kingsnorth in 2008, run the risk of 
inadvertently legitimising the hierarchical power that they oppose by strategically 
appealing to it: 
 
We may be arrested and jailed for our determination to be at the camp. 
The thought of going to prison even for a short period is daunting, but we 
cannot accept the logic of bail conditions that stop us attending a legal 
event at which Royal Society professors mix with families. Scientists tell 
us that from this week we have just 100 months to solve climate change. 
That's not long; from this moment on every week counts. 
 





The problematical nature of this approach is recognised by movement participants 
and climate scientists alike. First, the understanding of the ‘upstream’ construction of 
climate change is suppressed; second, it obfuscates ethical debates over cultural 
values, norms and political worldviews. Reflecting on the 2007 Heathrow protest in 
the wake of ‘Climategate’, Professor of Climate Change at University of East Anglia 
2009, recognised these dangers:  
 
The protesters claimed they were "armed only with peer-reviewed 
science". They were in fact armed with much more: a powerful vision of 
a future Britain, a strong belief in the value of natural ecosystems, 
compelling ethical principles about the rights of the poor. None of this 
armoury was to be found in the peer-reviewed science they quoted... 
Producing the "trump card" of science to settle debate is not healthy for a 
democracy 
(Hulme, 2009, p. 33) 
 
Indeed, this emerged as a key internal debate within the movement, that obfuscating 
political issues will take us down the path of ‘green authoritarianism’ as the problem 
becomes more urgent. From this debate, a critique emerged that the symbolic 
defining of the enemy as particular corporations is a misidentification of “root 
causes”. This excerpt from Shift magazine stands out as an excellent analysis of what 
is at stake. It is therefore worth quoting at length:  
 
[C]apitalism and the state apparatus supporting it could survive climate 
change, though in uglier forms. Barring a clean energy revolution, this 
would entail cutting energy consumption by ensuring only a minority 
carry on consuming. Deepening inequality coupled with exclusion 
through green taxation; the poor being forced to sell energy quotas to 
survive; prevention of infrastructure development in nations hit hardest 
by climate-change under the ruse of sustainability, whilst rich nations 
aided by stolen majority world resources - including land to grow bio-
fuels and organic vegetables - create fortress-like border controls. ‘Cut 
the carbon by any means necessary’ campaigners seem asleep to 
this...The root causes of this crisis are not particular buildings, 
particular corporations, or particular politicians, but the wider social, 




priorities, and the dominant ideologies of our time. It is a ‘battle of 
ideas’, and this movement needs to wade in with more courage. 
(Archer, 2007) 
 
The notion that this is indeed a ‘battle of ideas’ has, in a sense, taken us full-circle, 
from the need to name names and back to ‘abstractions’: the tensions between 
politics and climate, as played out between the CCA’s ‘outward facing’ persona in 
public discourse, and fora of movement praxis, have been generative of an analysis 
of ‘carbon fetishism’, drawing on Marx’s notion of ‘commodity fetishisation’. I 
conclude this chapter by first of all explaining this analysis. Finally, I consider the 
implications for public pedagogy by delineating the kinds of questions opened up by 
an analysis, which takes account of a fetishisation of both organisational form, and 
carbon. 
 
Conclusion: towards a more dialectical public 
pedagogy? Beyond the two fetishisms  
I have explicated the various ways in which the CCA has acted as source of public 
pedagogy. I argued that the movement’s public pedagogy emerged from the 
articulation of a populist identity, from which – as a simplification of political space 
– tensions arose.  I went on to illustrate how it became increasingly unclear who the 
enemy is, and what “root causes” are, as the movement expanded to incorporate new 
actors.  
 
The analysis of carbon fetishism has been very important to the evolving cognitive 
praxis of this movement. Larry Lohmann, and his research colleagues at the ‘Corner 
House’ – a critical community, which produces research aimed at facilitating 
discussion and strategic thought in movements for environmental and social justice – 
have been key in developing these ideas, which have been debated and promulgated 
by the CCA. The focus on CO2e emissions, as well as the valorisation of actions that 




hypocrisy by the right-leaning press, such that the movement has been dragged into 
counterproductive conversations about the morality of activists flying to alternative 
people’s summits and so on:  
 
CLIMATE change activists opposed to air travel are travelling to a 
conference in South America ... by plane…The 12,000-mile round trip to 
the Climate Change and Mother Earth's Rights conference next month 
involves changing planes at least twice. The flights will generate about 
eight tons of carbon dioxide greenhouse gases (Lewis, 2010).  
 
The activist-intellectuals in Shift magazine argue that “the central tenet of the notion 
of fetishism is to create equivalence; the idea that you compare different gases, 
different places and locality through an idea of carbon equivalence” (Shift Magazine, 
2010). The key insight that an analysis of carbon fetishism can bring to the DCA 
movement’s public pedagogy is that “[i]t’s not a question of teaching people in 
power about science… the fetish distracts your attention from the central relations 
that you need to talk about when talking about the climate issue; instead you focus 
on numbers and on things which begin to have dominion over you” (Shift Magazine, 
2010). The online vote for the 2009 camp, by which protesters were encouraged to 
pick a target for DA based on annual emissions was offered in an article of Shift, as a 
good example of the fetishistic approach (ibid.). 
 
In this analysis, technocratic and market-based regimes of governance exercise their 
own public pedagogy through framing such regimes in such a way as to ‘black-box’ 
the boundaries of their construction (Lohmann, 2005, p. 210). These obfuscatory 
practices ride roughshod over socio-material and geographical contingencies and 
inequalities, through the desire of expert epistemic networks, who – in a process akin 
to self-fulfilling prophecy – are forced to make questionable equivalences between 
very different places and practices in order to ‘hem in’ CO2e, so as to give it a 





Yet, it seems that a counter-public pedagogy aimed at ‘de-black boxing’ such 
processes, requires something more than the empirical identification of connections 
and collusion between the financial class, state actors and fossil fuel industries 
involved in producing emissions. Yes, anti-capitalism is an abstraction (an empty 
signifier in discourse theoretical terms) but despite Newman’s call for names and 
addresses, as Paula Allman (2001, p. 127) has argued, “[t]o blame individual 
capitalists, or corporations, or even institutions set up to facilitate and orchestrate the 
system and the cut-throat competition that abounds, particularly when capital is in 
crisis, gets us nowhere in terms of creating a more just society”.  
 
Finance may strategically be used as a leverage point, as argued by the CCA: 
nevertheless, it is essential to keep in mind that class is a role and relation, not a fixed 
subject position, or a set of cultural preferences; something which populist outrage at 
corporations misses (Allman, 2001; Harvey, 2010, p. 232). Given that individuals 
routinely struggle to act and reconcile multiple structurally-constrained roles in their 
daily lives; given that a large proportion of the UK is dependent on the labour 
infrastructure targeted by DA; given that the technocratic and calculative rationalities 
necessary for the fetishistic disavowal of the socio-spatial relations underlying CO2e 
emissions are routinized, and performed locally by the employees in these industries 
every day; a counter-pedagogy would surely have to be dialogical and begin 
with/emerge from people’s situated biographical experience. After all, as activist-
intellectual AK Thompson (2010, p. 283) reminds us, Marx’s entire analysis of the 
economic logic of Capital was explicated from a description of the quotidian and 
mundane experience of encountering particular commodities in the real world. 
 
In this context, as particular climate activists came to recognise, such a public 
pedagogy should be dialectical and dialogical, centred around the notion of Just 
Transition away from fossil fuels, and cognisant of what fossil fuels represent (good 




labour, institutional arrangements, cultural norms and the rhythms of everyday life 
that people are ‘locked into’ (Harvey, 2010, p. 251).  
 
Indeed, as argued through the praxis of the CCA, such a public pedagogy should also 
involve a commitment to less valorised forms of action. It is no doubt true that direct 
action is educative to those who partake, as well as to bystanders.  In fact, as 
Thompson  (2010, p. 62) would argue about DA in general, much direct action taken 
by the CCA was arguably educative in a Freirian sense because it involved going 
beyond the realm of the ‘meaning’ of an action, and being “informed about issues”, 
towards “exploring the social organisation of power as it was revealed through 
moments of confrontation”. This was certainly the case as CCA participants (and, 
indirectly, bystander publics through the mass media) challenged undercover police 
infiltration, kettling and violence, blanket stop and searches, the work of Forward 
Intelligence Teams, and applications of the 1997 Harassment Act by corporations, 
through the mass media, the courts, and by making political alliances and having 
dialogue with police.  
 
As I have shown, activists did important public pedagogical work by striving to 
normalise such action to potential supporters through efforts to articulate historical 
and genealogical links to other civil disobedience movements. However, fetishizing a 
commitment to autonomous, horizontal, direct action can be both alienating, and can 
lead to political incoherence (Freeman, 1972; Harvey, 2010, p. 125).  Yes, the camp 
attempted to embed democratic and open structures in its organisation, but the ability 
to attend a camp in the first place (and to participate in the submerged activist 
networks that organise between camps) is differentiated according to available time 
and mobility, which is raced, classed and gendered. Secondly, the impetus to attend 
the camp in the first place is differentiated according to educational level, and the 
nature of such education, which again, is raced, classed and gendered. Once inside 
the camp, the commitment to maintenance of a horizontal culture of consensus and 




logic, or a regulative ideal, anterior to its material enactment (Juris, 2005). How does 
it reproduce hidden, arcane and distributed forms of power? What organisational and 
educational possibilities do horizontal forms of organising obfuscate? It is precisely 
the agonistic view of democracy, deployed in this chapter, which would argue that 
power/knowledge can never be separated, that spaces of resistance are always 
simultaneously spaces of domination. As some activists argued happened in the 
CCA, ‘open spaces’ allowed reformists, liberals, moderates, pragmatists to a 
platform to argue a role for state reform, and as such DA became a symbolic 
lobbying technique, where non-activist bystanders see ‘activist’ experts protesting 
their ‘cause’. 
 
As a result, a key dilemma in the movement has been how to “diversify, without 
diluting” the structural critique (CCA, 2010b, p. 42). This is one of the key issues 
which the Transition Towns movement seeks to address through its cultural politics: 
this is a movement which recognises the need for less valorised forms of action, 
rooted in daily life; however, its approach has been to eschew contentious politics 
altogether (at least in its public discourse) to the extent that its broad church 
approach has been critiqued as being apolitical. With this we can move on to the next 












Community responses to climate change as 
public pedagogy: the cultural politics of the 
Transition Towns movement (2005-2011) 
 
In principle, the notion of political community could operate (let us be 
hugely optimistic here) at the level of the human species, defined 
precisely by participation in a democratic political community, with the 
us then unfortunately depending upon the mobilisation of those old, old 
dualisms of Humanity versus The Rest, Culture versus Nature, and so on 
(Massey, 1995, p. 287).   
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter gave an interpretive account of the cultural politics of the CCA 
as public pedagogy. I analysed the movement’s discourse as public curriculum, 
which emerged from the articulation of a populist identity (Laclau, 2005), united 
against the ‘root causes’ of climate change. In this context, the CCA’s public 
pedagogy was fundamentally about “defining the enemy” (Newman, 1994). 
Alongside this political curriculum, the CCA popularised climate science, and sought 
to demonstrate the viability of non-hierarchical modes of social organisation.   
 
As a “necessary simplification of the political space” (Laclau, 2005) , I argued that 
emergent antagonisms in the movement’s cognitive praxis could be understood as 
occurring at the intersections between cosmological, organisational and technical-
practical knowledge interests: tensions between climate science and political 
worldviews, and between organisational forms and repertoires and political 
worldviews, generated movement analyses arguing for less valorised forms of action, 




A key dilemma which emerged in this respect was how to diversify without diluting 
the politics. This dilemma is explored in this chapter through an analysis of the 
cultural politics of the TT movement as public pedagogy.  Emerging from the same 
moment as the CCA in 2005, the TT movement has taken a fundamentally different 
approach from the outset, indeed based around less valorised, and more rooted, forms 
of community action. However, the TT movement has eschewed agonistic politics 
altogether (at least in its public discourse), in favour of a broad church approach 
based around creating a sense of ‘engaged optimism’ through prefigurative practices 
(Hopkins, 2008a). 
 
In this chapter, I argue – as I did in the case of the CCA – that the public curriculum 
produced by the TT movement can  be understood as emerging from hegemonic 
struggle to  articulate diverse struggles and demands under a populist identity 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 350; Mouffe & Lalcau, 1985, p. 87; Giroux, 2000, p. 354), 
structured around cosmological, organisational and technological knowledge 
interests (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). On the face of it, the Laclauian theory of 
hegemony might seem of little utility to an analysis of the TT movement’s discourse, 
because it purposely avoids contentious politics and the articulation of an identity 
around that to which it is opposed. Nevertheless, I aim to show that the process of 
articulating a Self through relations of exteriority, cannot avoid constructing Others, 
even where issues of power and politics are strategically suppressed. In other words, 
to be for something is always to be against something else, whether this remains 








Understanding the origins and evolution of the 
TT movement 
Overview and antecedents  
The origins of the TT movement and its subsequent ‘viral spread’, is by now well-
documented not just in the academic commentary (Connors, 2010; Bailey, et al., 
2010; Aiken, 2012; Barry & Quilley, 2009; Smith, 2011), but in its own literature 
(Hopkins, 2008a; Hopkins, 2011), and in media representations
vii
. The movement 
grew between 2005-February 2009 to 134 ‘official’ Transition Town communities 
worldwide in February 2009 (Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010), growing again to 159 in 
May 2009 (Connors, 2010)and growing to 186 by July 2009, with another 802 
worldwide communities reportedly mulling the process over (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 
600). As a loosely networked assemblage, this self-mythologising about humble 
origins and ‘viral spread’, plays an important expressive role in “making the 
movement appear larger than it is”, thus helping  “to inspire people that they are part 
of something ‘big’”, in order to “generate momentum for further expansion” (Bailey, 
et al., 2010, p. 603). These representations can thus be considered to be public 
pedagogical devices.  
 
Nevertheless, as an activist-intellectual engaged in both Transition and direct action 
put it: 
 
[W]hat does being a transition town mean; how many people are 
involved? In Aberystwyth, we have signed up some 100 people to an 
email list and have a bare handful of proactive members. This from a 
town with around 25,000 residents (Mason, 2008).  
 
Because the movement’s origins are well documented, I will be brief in my 
overview. The TT movement is a multi-scalar, translocal and transnational network 




practices that have been built up over time though experimentation and observation 
of communities as they drive forward to build local resilience” (Brangwyn & 
Hopkins, 2008, p. 8), faced with the intertwined issues – the “hydrocarbon twins 
(Hopkins, 2008a, p. 18) – of climate change and peak oil
viii
. Resilience in the context 
can broadly be defined in the following way:  
 
 [T]he ability of a system to absorb change while retaining essential 
function; to have the ability for self-organisation; and to have the 
capacity to adapt and learn. Resilience can apply to people, places and 
ecosystem (Adger, et al., 2011, p. 696). 
 
The movement’s co-founder, movement intellectual  Rob Hopkins, dates the 
emergence of the idea of Transition to the production of an  energy descent action 
plan (EDAP) for Kinsale, Ireland, by students on a permaculture course he taught at 
Kinsale Further Education College (Hopkins, 2011, p. 20). Genealogically, if there is 
one principal philosophy informing the ‘cosmology’ of the movement, which 
transcends its locally contingent character, it is permaculture (Connors & McDonald, 
2010, p. 568; Aiken, 2012, p. 92). Indeed, the principal concepts of the movement – 
transition, resilience, community – are derived from permaculture (Aiken, 2012, p. 
92). The movement has strong genealogical connections (Hopkins, 2008a, pp. 138-
139) to the works of permaculturist, David Holmgren (2004). As Holmgren (2013) 
describes, permaculture principles were co-developed with the other founding father 
of permaculture Bill Mollison (1988), through cross-pollinisation of their work at the 
University of Tasmania in the 1970’s, which combined interests in landscape 
architecture, agricultre and psychology. This all was developed through what 
Holmgren himself descibes as the first wave of environmentalism, concerned with 
“Limits to Growth”, and living through two oil crises between 1973 and 1979 .  
 
Permaculture, originally a contraction of ‘permanent agriculture’, started as the 
principle of modelling agricultural practices on the self-organisation and regulation 




understood as a contraction of ‘permanent culture’, applying the concept of 
permanence to one’s cultural world (p. 98). In this sense, design-led permaculture 
has strong genealogical links to older traditions of social ecology, social anarchism 
and municipal bioregionalism espoused by green movement intellectuals such as 
Peter Kropotkin, Lewis Mumford, and Murray Bookchin (Heywood, 2007, pp. 275-
276; Harvey, 2012, pp. 137-138).  
 
Nevertheless, the idea of TT as an evolving assemblage of actors, ideas, and 
practices is important, because it allows us to conceptualise its cognitive praxis as a 
process of intellectual bricolage: Hopkins references the cut and paste culture of Hip 
Hop in this context, arguing that “many great inventions in music happen when 
someone thinks ‘What happens if I put this with that?’” (Hopkins, 2011, p. 77).   For 
this reason, as in the previous chapter, latent tensions emerge from this heterogeneity 
through the movement’s attempts to articulate a populist identity.  
 
After moving to Totnes, Hopkins describes the ideational mix that led to the creation 
of the first Transition Town, in Totnes:  
 
I met…a fellow peak oil educator…We began showing films together 
and giving talks, and they generated a great deal of interest. Other people 
started getting involved and bringing pieces from systems thinking, 
psychology, business development and the power of the internet to 
spread ideas (Hopkins, 2011, p. 21).  
 
In short, what Hopkins describes as “the emergence of an idea”, is fundamentally 
premised on an eclectic recombination of different bodies of knowledge “built 
around the stories and experience of…[p]eople who are learning by doing—and 
learning all the time” (Hopkins, 2011, p. 17). Transition, it appears, is a 




Dislocation and the formation of new 
subjectivities 
 
To understand the origins of the TT movement we must understand that, although it 
has very different genealogy to the CCA, it is a manifestation of the same discursive 
logic. Like the CCA, the TT movement constructs a three-step rationale – based on 
temporal urgency, rejection of the status quo, and a need for collective solidarity and 
a DIY approach – aimed at mobilising potential adherents: 
 
If we wait for governments, it’ll be too little, too late. If we act as 
individuals, it’ll be too little. But if we act as communities, it might be 
just enough, just in time (Hopkins, 2011, p. 17). 
 
As in the CCA, this rationale for action is front and centre in the TT literature. 
Although the TT movement has never courted the media, and has only ever “done 
one press release”, it has nevertheless garnered its fair share of media attention 
(Hopkins, 2011, p. 25). In my popular press analysis, this rationale was present in 
4.9% of the press sample of TT coverage (N=206), as opposed to 9.9% for the CCA 
(N=593). Below is fairly typical example of this rationale in popular press coverage, 
which was consistent across the ideological spectrum:  
 
Maggie Johns, a Hervey Bay Transitioner, signed off her e-mail to me 
thus: "Before, it all seemed so futile. What was the good in changing a 
few light bulbs? There are ice-shelves breaking off, for goodness sake! 
But when you know that more and more towns are coming online with 
Transition, and each has an army of dedicated volunteers, it seems much 
more do-able." (TT participant, in Leitch 2008, Times). 
 
Both cultures of activism advocate the need for grassroots cultural change, whilst 
offering conflicting understandings of how this might best be achieved. As argued in 
the previous chapter, whilst the starting point of the CCA’s public curriculum was 




manifestations, the TT movement uses temporal urgency, and policy contradiction as 
rhetorical devices to justify a community-of-place based on ‘micro-politics’, opposed 
to the framing of citizen agency in individualistic terms. In this sense, we can see that 
what the cognitive praxis of direct action and community activism have in common 
is a desire to render agency and learning in collective terms, as opposed to the 
cognitive praxis of behaviour change technologies, which though applying insights 
from social marketing, and nudge politics, render citizen agency in individualistic 
terms, thus arguably maintaining the disjuncture between the micro (individual and 
family behaviours) and the macro (climate change and the monolithic forces of 
neoliberal politics). 
 
The spatial tropes of place and community are central to the cultural discourse of TT: 
the TT movement is concerned with relocalisation through community capacity-
building in the face of the “hydrocarbon twins” of climate change and peak oil 
(Hopkins, 2008a, p. 18). However, part of the success of Transition is that it is about 
more than the ‘hydrocarbon twins’: Transition culture aims to create a sense of 
“engaged optimism” so that participation would “feel like the most appropriate thing 
to be doing,…connecting us more with place, with each other and with ourselves”, 
even if climate change and peak oil were no longer issues (Hopkins, 2011, pp. 29-
37).  
 
TT’s rationale for relocalisation is therefore not merely ‘immanent’, but is an 
‘intentional’ normative political project “based on inclusion, local distinctiveness, 
equality and freedom” (North, 2010, p. 591). As a cultural project, the notion of a 
sense of place takes on a cosmological role rather than merely an organisational one 
(Eyerman & Jamsion, 1991), as means/ends distinctions are blurred. This rationale is 






Part of [TT’s] growing success is how it meets several needs 
simultaneously. It tackles social recession – the sense of disconnection 
and fragmentation of community – at the same time as it collaborates on 
the huge behavioural change that will be required for a low-carbon 
society. The latter is far more likely to come about in the context of 
personal relationships than as a result of discredited politicians dictating 
change. (Bunting, 2009, pp. 31, my italics). 
 
We can see then, how ‘Transition’ acts as the movement’s key empty signifier, 
around which a plethora of other democratic demands – a sense of place, meaningful 
relationships, meaningful work, climate change –cluster. In fact, community is 
arguably “the key conceptual motif” of the movement, used not just to describe an 
appropriate scale of local organisation, but as a ‘buy-in’ tactic reflecting a grassroots 
approach (Aiken, 2012, p. 93).  As a crude empirical indicator in support of this 
claim, I found that the word ‘community’ occurred more frequently than the word 
‘resilience’, in the movement’s two key texts (Hopkins, 2008a; Hopkins, 2011) taken 
together, and that it was used in 33.3% of news articles in my press analysis 
(N=207).  Community can be regarded as the appropriate ‘meso-scale’ of agency, 
which emerged from the process of dislocation from hegemonic discourse. The 
critique of a more confrontational approach is implicit. As Aiken (2012, p. 93) 
summarises:  
 
Talk of carbon footprints, appeals to saving money, or ‘do a little, save a 
lot’ styles of approach; these target the individual as the unit of analysis. 
The alternative to this, projecting blame onto corporations and 
governments, is seen as equivalent to hiding one’s head in the sand. 
Community here is the meso-layer that is effective. 
 
Arising from the same dislocation from hegemonic discourse, the TT movement 
seeks to catalyse the dialectic between the cultural politics of communities and the 
political culture of the state, rather than engaging in direct action, against ‘the state’ 
as an abstraction: 
 




community and which offers a positive vision of a lower energy future, 
communities have set out where they want to go, then a very dynamic 
interface is created between communities, local and national government. 
Communities could set the agenda, saying to government, "Here is our 
plan: it addresses all of the issues raised by the coming challenges of 
climate change and energy security, and it also will revitalise our local 
economy and our agricultural hinterland, but it will work far better if 
carbon rationing is in place, and if the true costs of fossil fuels are 
reflected in goods and services." The fear of change is removed for 
government, and they become swept along in a huge movement for 
change. Previously non-vote-winning policies become the norm 
(Hopkins, 2008, p. 76). 
 
Above, we can see how Transition acts as an empty signifier linking democratic 
renewal, community, local economy, climate change, energy security and 
agriculture. As argued in the previous chapter, the political implications of this are 
not necessarily progressive.  Carbon rationing and a ‘true reflection’ of fuel costs, at 
the extreme end of the spectrum, hints at the kind of green-authoritarianism opposed 
so strongly by anarchists in the CCA. However, the ostensible idea is precisely that 
this would not be the case, because resilience in the face of climate change and fossil 
fuel decline will be achieved from the ‘grassroots’, by emphasising the ‘upside of 
down’; that is, relocalisation fulfilling social needs and shifting cultural values and 
norms through the creation of convivial community. 
 
Yet, as  critiques of the TT movement have argued, the woolly conception of 
‘community’ in its discourse, coupled to the reactionary notion of resilience – often 
popularly described as ‘bouncebackability’ – leave little room for an analysis of 
power asymmetries and political economy (Scott-Cato, 2008; Chatterton & Cutler, 
2008; Greer, 2009; Connors, 2010, p. 567; Aiken, 2012, pp. 94-96). As a result, 
critics of the movement have expressed scepticism regarding the movement’s ability 
to avoid insipid compromise and state cooption.  
 
Therefore, in dialogue with the previous chapter, one underlying question in what 




with an intentional suppression of a more agonistic approach to ‘community as 
politics’ (Shaw, 2007), has the potential to skew the ways in which ‘community’ in 
public discourse is used as a  pedagogical trope to manufacture consent for on the 
one hand, a neoconservative discourse  of green authoritarianism, and on the other, a 
neoliberal discourse of self-help and state roll-back. 
 
As a result of this DIY attitude and the recognition of the need to build support for 
government policy from the ‘grassroots’, local TT initiatives have been able to 
mobilise populist support across the political spectrum. Taken as a whole, my 
popular press analysis (N=207) found that 24.2% of news articles directly reported 
some kind of rhetorical party political endorsement, whilst only 2.9% featured any 
kind of explicit criticism.  It has been argued by activist-intellectuals aligned with a 
more radical politics that the TT movement has made negligible direct policy impact 
(Towers, 2012). Although this is an empirically suspect claim in itself, the point 
worth making at this juncture, is that Transition has undoubtedly had an indirect 
influence as politicians have learned from the movement.  
 
Connecting to the past: articulations of 
historical equivalence and difference  
 
As touched upon in the last chapter, the most well-documented instances of 
politicians learning from TT are the support of Ed Miliband, and the huge popularity 
of the Transition Handbook (Hopkins, 2008a) amongst MPs upon its release:  
 
If you want to catch a glimpse of the kinds of places outside the political 
mainstream where that new politics might be incubated, take a look at the 
Transition movement. Ed Miliband, the energy and climate change 
secretary, was one of the first to spot its potential when he described this 
young and fast-growing movement as "absolutely essential". Other 
politicians have been similarly intrigued, and last year The Transition 




why politicians are so interested. The Transition movement is engaging 
people in a way that conventional politics is failing to do… Hopkins is 
emphatic that transition groups refuse all political affiliation…But it is 
intriguing to see how the movement is experimenting with the sorts of 
ideas those in conventional politics are talking about – localism, 
decentralisation of power to communities, and an environmental politics 
that is utopian and hopeful rather than gloomy. 
(Bunting, 2009). 
 
As argued in the previous chapter, particular CCA activists argued that the 
articulation of historical links between climate change activism and the suffragettes, 
and the anti-apartheid movement by Ed Miliband (Adam & Jowit, 2008, p. 1), was 
an attempt to co-opt the climate movement more generally. In this sense, such 
historical linkages can be considered to be floating signifiers, vague enough to be 
articulated in different chains of equivalence, thus beginning to shift the ‘frontier 
lines’ of the wider movement (Laclau, 2005). Clearly inspired by the TT movement, 
Miliband subsequently attended the 2009 Transition Conference as a “keynote 
listener”: 
 
This story symbolises the approach Transition takes to politics, of leading 
by example and of trying to get politicians to experience the buzz being 
created by Transition initiatives, rather than just protesting. Reflecting 
later on the experience, Miliband wrote: “Thank you to all the people I 
met for taking the time to talk to me, and thank you for continuing to be 
the vanguard of that persuasion.” (Hopkins, 2011, p. 27). 
 
Significantly, the discourse of the TT movement articulates no historical linkages to  
past or present social movements, to the extent that one sympathetic activist wrote “It 
is as if a nascent idea had been cut out from its social and historical context, planted 
in a vacuum and expected to grow” (Nicolson, 2009, pp. n-p). Yet, as part of the 
Transition culture’s pedagogical strategy of creating a sense of ‘engaged optimism’, 
“rather than just protesting” (Hopkins, 2011, p. 27), the movement has articulated its 




undifferentiated ‘we’.  In doing so, it has differentiated itself from previous historical 
incarnations of the environmental movement. 
 
In the TT discourse, two recurring themes stand out: national memory of wartime 
resilience during trying times in World War II (WWII); and the Cuban Oil crisis of 
the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The WWII memory of 
‘digging for victory’ has been cleverly deployed in TT’s self-produced discourse and 
widely in the popular press, as a story from our collective past that can articulate 
many other concerns in the way that Transition hopes to: namely, import substitution 
in the face of resource scarcity; leading to a concomitant inward substitution of 
skills, democratisation and sharing of useful knowledge, social solidarity, health and 
wellbeing, and so on.  
 
Hopkins (2008a, p. 65), in asking “can any lessons be learned from Britain’s most 
recent national ‘Powerdown’, WWII?”, highlighted that food production rose by 
91% (p. 66); that “local authorities set up horticultural committees…teaching 
practical skills”  (p. 66); and that “rationing rebalanced [class-based] inequalities in 
diet” (p. 67).  
 
As feature pieces on Transition began to appear, this meme was reported on 
positively in the Right-leaning, Left-leaning, and tabloid popular press, exemplified 
respectively: 
 
Between 1939 and 1944, food imports to Britain halved - and the nation 
responded, nearly doubling domestic food production. Peak oil does not 
concentrate the popular imagination in quite the same way as Hitler did, 
but at least the Transitioners will be prepared when, as they predict, an 
energy crisis occurs (Leitch, 2008, p. 2). 
 
Some of the inspiration for Transition Towns comes from the Second 




However, people were more self-sufficient then, with good local food 
networks, less energy consumption per head and strong practical skills, 
and so were better equipped to deal with the change (Ferry, 2007, p. 18). 
 
When our food supplies were threatened in the last war the government 
urged us to dig for victory…and we did. Never in our history have we 
had a more healthy diet. And the fact is that people are responding to 
Transition schemes (Humphrys, 2007). 
 
As a pedagogical tool, it is recognised that this historical linkage feeds into a process 
of intergenerational learning through the sharing of oral histories.  As well as being 
oriented around climate change and peak oil, this also began to incorporate themes of 
self-help in austere times, ensuring that the empty signifier of Transition was 
capacious enough to seem relevant after the economic crisis of 2008. This was 
particularly clever since evidence suggests that concern over climate change in the 
UK and Europe more widely, decreases in times of economic crisis regardless of its 
objective urgency (see appendix 4).: 
 
[I]t seems that the combination of credit crunch and environmental 
concern is driving us to seek out the wisdom of other ages…that for too 
many years has been brushed off shamefully as the chuntering of old 
codgers too eager to talk about the privations of war and rationing 
(Flintoff, 2008, p. 8). 
 
In a similar vein, a documentary film on the Cuban response to their geopolitically-
caused oil crisis called “The Power of Community”, has been widely used across the 
UK to raise local awareness by TT initiatives. This more recent historical connection 
has also made it into wider public discourse:  
 
Looking for inspiration I travel to south London for a screening of the 
latest consciousness-raising film promoted by Transition Town 
Brixton…The Power of Community is about what happened to Cuba 
after Soviet oil supplies dried up and the US embargo curtailed other 




intensive agriculture: urban spaces were cultivated, from window boxes 
to wasteland. The transition took years…but, by the end, even people in 
cities were producing half their annual fruit and vegetable needs. 
(Flintoff, 2007). 
 
Generally speaking, it is the spatial articulation of the TT movement’s identity, 
through re-embedding our values in a sense of place, which is often emphasised as 
the primary public pedagogical tool of the movement in its own literature and in 
secondary commentary. However, these historical articulations of the movement’s 
identity as public pedagogical tools, are arguably equally important as symbols of 
what can and must be achieved in the context of what the peak oil experts call the 
“petroleum interval”:  
 
 
The notion of the petroleum interval (figure 8) is very clever pedagogical device, 
because of its simplicity.  
 




It is in this wider temporal context of thousands of years of human history, that we 
are invited to visualise ourselves as standing at the peak of this brief 200 year blip 
staring at the downslope, whereupon “further expansion of oil becomes impossible 
because new production flows are fully offset by decline” (Skrebowski, in Hopkins, 
2008, p. 21). Hopkins (p. 70) argues that “[t]he Oil Age can be seen as a 200 year 




it again”. He argues that  our species ‘addiction’ to oil (more on this later) has 
enabled “our society to do 70 and 100 times more work than would have been 
possible without it” (p. 19). Nevertheless, there is no luddic lapse into a globalisation 
bad/localisation good dualism in TT discourse: rather it is argued that we must find 
ways of “unleashing” the “collective genius”that carried us to the peak, in order to 
help us Transition away from living arrangements which have been designed in such 
away that we are hopelessly vulnerable to disruptions in energy supply.   
 
In this sense, it is useful to remind ourselves of geographer Doreen Massey’s (2005) 
argument against the cleavage of space/time in relation to ‘the political’: if we 
interpret them as irreducible (rather than as space as an apolitical  totality  and 
dislocation as temporal) then we are better equipped to understand the primary 
pedagogical device for the movement’s cultural politics, which is the articulation of 
place-based ‘cultural stories’, as another of the movement’s intellectuals Shaun 
Chamberlain (2009). Since the production of space is relational, and in a constant 
state of becoming, the temporally sequenced ‘cultural stories’ so essential to the 
movement, address both these dimensions.  
 
Given the movement’s desire to articulate these historical connections to instances of 
rapid large-scale change in the face of resource scarcity, and make them seem 
attractive to the broadest audience possible, it is understandable that an intentionally 
fuzzy optimism pervades TT discourse: it is designed to inspire, and it has always 
been explicit that the movement is a translocal social experiment. As a result, TT 
discourse has shifted over time through praxis. I now turn to outline these shifts. 
 
The discursive evolution of the TT 
movement 
As the TT movement has expanded and matured since 2005, it has responded to 




the same way that the CCA did. The very indeterminacy of the notion of Transition 
Culture as the movement’s principle empty signifier, under which a diverse 
ensemble of practices, ideas and actors – “the heads, hearts and hands of energy 
descent” (Hopkins, 2008, contents) – are connected, as well as the indeterminacy of 
its two key floating signifiers ‘community’ and ‘resilience’, imbues the movement’s 
discourse with an inherent adaptability (and, by implication, ambivalence and 
ambiguity). This lack of a clear vision of “where we are in Transition to”, has been 
identified by the movement’s intellectuals in fora for praxis as being the movement’s 
most appealing feature and its main weakness (e.g. Scott-Cato, 2008, p. 96). 
 
If there was any doubt that Transition operates as an empty signifier, as the following 
quotation in a chapter in the “Transition Companion” entitled “Framing Transition” 
aptly puts it, “It’s a good thing to avoid definitions, they only confuse things” 
(Hopkins, 2011, p. 73). The premise of the approach is to make belonging to the idea 
as simple as it can be. As argued above, Transition is a temporal concept, evoking 
the notion of a collective journey in which a community moves from a state of fossil 
fuel dependence to a state of resilience: 
 
[Transition] imagines transforming the place you live…as a journey…[I]t 
doesn’t tell you which way to go, or what your journey will look like but 
it suggests some of the especially good views along the way, and 
provides a rough sense of the different types of terrain you will find 
yourself travelling across. (Hopkins, 2011, p. 14) 
 
Accordingly, in the post-2008 context, the TT movement has had little difficulty in 
connecting the ideas of community and resilience to the dual contexts of economic 
recession and state-imposed austerity. My content analysis of the popular press 
corpus, shows the emergence of a connection between coverage of Transition and 







Figure 9 popular press articles linking Transition to recession 
 
 
The focus on achieving economic resilience through relocalisation has 
understandably conferred a certain salience on TT initiatives that they might 
otherwise have lacked (table 11). In fact, as a practical orientation present in press 
coverage, this dimension stands just below a focus on carbon reduction (40.6% of 
news articles), sustainable energy initiatives (46.9%), and local food production 
(49.8%).  
 


























of total  
Year  
Press articles linking Transition to recession 
Number of articles not linking
Transition to recession
Number of articles linking
Transition to recession
 Number of articles Percentage of articles  
Focus on local currency 
(N=207) 
66 31.9% 






Post-2008, we begin to see local economic resilience being linked directly to 
recession. For example, one largely positive Times article reporting on Transition 
Totnes’s local currency scheme was entitled “Town's pound note bucks the 
downturn” (Malvern, 2008). Or alternatively, in another account of the Lewes 
currency scheme in the Daily Telegraph:  
 
“It would be misleading to say that the Lewes pound was implemented as 
a safeguard against the downturn,'' says the mayor [of Lewes]…"But 
now? Maybe it's one small town's response to the recession” (Walden, 
2009). 
 
In the next exemplar, a local news piece on Portobello, Edinburgh’s TT initiative, a 
historical link is manufactured to the depression era ‘30s by a local movement 
intellectual, in order to link local currency initiatives with wider economic instability 
in press coverage: 
 
Justin Kenrick, a director of Portobello group Pedal, said: "There are a 
range of reasons that it could work and the most obvious one is that, if it 
is based on a five per cent discount, you get things five per cent cheaper 
and that builds up loyalty to the local high street. “The community 
council here is doing a campaign to support the High Street and it is 
likely to tie in with that. "Economic conditions seem to be going to get a 
lot worse and it seems we've only seen the edge of that.” In the 1930s, 
local currencies really took off when there was a bit of an economic 
meltdown and they did really well during that, so it might be the right 
time to do it."  (Blackley, 2011, p. 3). 
 
Some significant learning has occurred in this regard, which I have evidenced by 
examining the discursive shift over time between the publication of the movement’s 
key texts published in 2008 (Hopkins, 2008a) and 2011 (Hopkins, 2011). What is 
apparent is the deft shift in language in response to the ambivalence of the contrived 
community rhetoric of the Big Society agenda. In the exemplar below, Transition is 
connected to social justice in the wider context of austerity, through the concept of 





Many people are motivated to engage in Transition because a more local 
economy, in which assets and key enterprises are owned and managed by 
and on behalf of the local community, offers a far better route to social 
justice, as well as local economic resilience, than business-as-usual does. 
This is particularly pertinent in the current economic climate of austerity, 
with deep cuts and closure of services leading increasingly to a sense of 
injustice and unfairness (Hopkins, 2011, p. 26) 
 
Transition discourse during this time has been inevitably dragged in to a process of 
hegemonic struggle, as it is forced to confront the ambivalence of neoliberal 
localism. Playing a precarious game, the potentially dislocatory effects of recession 
on Transition discourse become apparent, and in response ‘Transition’, linking 
‘community’, ‘resilience’ and so on, now adds ‘social justice’ to its growing chain of 
equivalence. As Transition has evolved in this context, social entrepreneurship, as a 
model of funding Transition-related activity has emerged:  
 
It has been fascinating to see the emergence of social enterprises in the 
area of Transition – businesses designed to address a social need and to 
create employment as well as revenue for the wider Transition process. 
The art of identifying business opportunities and starting local enterprises 
in response has now begun in earnest and, as this book sets out, is seen as 
the next key stage in the evolution of the Transition 
movement…[P]rojects need to be economically viable, and one vehicle 
for this is social enterprise. This is gaining a lot of traction and interest, 
often in the context of the government’s ‘Big Society’ agenda. (Hopkins, 
2011, pp. 24-25) 
 
Whilst the words ‘enterprise’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ are virtually absent in the 2008 
text, they appear a combined 116 times in the later book. Enterprise was most 
frequently prefixed with the word ‘social’ in its usage and most frequently suffixed 
with the words ‘and entrepreneurship’, so we can infer that this comparison makes 
sense.  Now Transition as an empty signifier comes to represent an increasingly 
improbable chain of equivalence incorporating energy security, climate change, 
community, democratic renewal, economic resilience, enterprise and 




the same time, this shift in discourse is reflected in the popular press. The Big 
Society agenda was notionally linked to Transition post-2008 in five articles in 2011. 
As political frontiers look increasingly ill defined, movement intellectual Rob 
Hopkins is forced to flag up the difference between localism – a synonym of an 
ideological programme of state rollback – and localisation: 
 
When the first Transition town was established five years ago [it was 
about] creating a more sustainable community to reduce their 
dependency on oil…Now,..[o]ut goes the focus on abstract notions of 
"peak oil" and in comes an emphasis on "social enterprises", economic 
development and growth…Mr Hopkins stresses that Transition's 
particular form of "localisation" is different from the Government's talk 
of local control. "Localism is about devolving political power to local 
councils ... Localisation is an economic process that shortens the distance 
between consumer and producer 
 (Morrison, 2011, p. 22) 
 
The aim of Transition is to try to relocalise the economy where it's 
happening, and be a catalyst for that process of intentional relocalisation. 
Hopkins is keen to stress that this is very different to David Cameron's 
interpretation of localism, devolving power from central government. "It 
doesn't mean putting a big fence up around Totnes and not letting 
anything in or out. It doesn't mean Totnes will be making its own laptops 
and frying pans. But it means in terms of food, building materials, a lot 
more of that can be done locally. Which in turn makes the place much 
more resilient to shocks from the outside." But what of David Cameron's 
coalition government? "I think Transition could be part of a genuine Big 
Society," says Hopkins, "but only where initiatives really give power and 
assets to the community." 
(Siegle, 2011) 
 
Thus, it seems that whilst TT discourse has come to recognise the currency of 
‘community’, evidenced by the significant increase in its use (table 12), it has also 
become more cognisant of its ambivalence as a floating signifier as it has been forced 





Table 12 Comparison of key word usage in key Transition texts. Key: word count, (weighted 
percentage of total word count), ranking in terms of frequency of occurrence 
Key words (from 1000 
most frequently 
occurring words)  
Total 
occurrence in 













































Ultimately,  recent TT discourse makes more explicit linkages between relocalisation 
as a path to social justice in the face of austerity. These linkages are certainly more 
explicit in the Transition Companion (Hopkins, 2011) than they were in the 
Transition Handbook (Hopkins, 2008a).  The exemplar below references the 
immensely popular ‘Spirit Level’ (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010) argument: 
 
[T]he more equal a  society becomes, almost all desirable social 
indicators, such as literacy and life expectancy, rise, while undesirable 
ones, such as teenage pregnancies and mental illness, fall. The gulf 
between rich and poor continues to rise, with many damaging impacts on 
global society. Many people are motivated to engage in Transition 
because a more local economy, in which assets and key enterprises are 




far better route to social justice, as well as local economic resilience, 
than business-as-usual does. This is particularly pertinent in the current 
economic climate of austerity, with deep cuts and closure of services 
leading increasingly to a sense of injustice and unfairness (Hopkins, 
2011, p. 28). 
 
As the movement has grown in visibility, it has become increasingly obvious that it 
is unable to avoid the contingency and antagonism, which accompanies being 
positioned ‘in and against’ the state. Having adumbrated the origins and antecedents 
of the TT movement, and provided the reader with necessary insight into the 
movement’s temporal articulation of identity, I now turn to the task of critically 
explicating the various dimensions of the TT movement’s public pedagogy. 
 
Dimensions of the TT movement’s public 
pedagogy 
As in the previous chapter, I have thus far demonstrated how TT’s public pedagogy 
emerges from the on-going articulation of a populist identity, and that the curricular 
content of this identity revolves around three analytically distinct ‘knowledge 
interests’ (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 55), which are the cosmological, the 
technical-practical, and the organizational. In TT, the technical-practical is primarily 
concerned with the popularisation of not just climate science, but also the concept of 
peak oil. TT discourse argues that these issues should be treated as inextricable. The 
reason for this is that the movement’s cosmology is guided by permaculture, 
underpinned by the need for holistic thinking. The technical-practical knowledge 
interest is also engaged in TT through the idea of “reskilling”, meaning what urbanist 
Jane Jacobs called an inward substitution of skills, related to appropriate 
technologies for living, in all manner of domains as our economies and daily lives 
localise. The organisational knowledge interest in TT is complex – seeking to 
reinvigorate place-based knowledge, whilst sharing with the CCA an ostensible 




‘rhizomatic networking’. I contend, as I did in the previous chapter, that these 
dimensions provide axes around which latent tensions in the movement’s ambitions 
to create a populist identity manifest. Moreover, as in the previous chapter, I contend 
that these tensions have (to an extent) been, and have the potential to be, generative 
of learning. 
 
Yet, there is one glaring issue with framing the public pedagogy of the TT movement 
in Laclauian terms, and that is that although Transition acts as the empty signifier for 
the movement, which articulates many particularistic concerns through chains of 
equivalence, this is one of two fundamental conditions. The other is that these 
particularistic concerns and claims are articulated in an overdetermined totality held 
together by the creation of a dichotomic frontier between it and the status quo. 
Transition ‘away from’ the status quo vaguely defined, surely necessitates the 
presence of an anti-status quo discourse. As I argued in the conclusion of the 
previous chapter, the TT movement recognises the need for less valorised forms of 
action, rooted in daily life; however, its discursive approach has been to eschew 
contentious politics altogether by being publically for things, and not against 
anything. To this extent, the TT movement’s discourse exhibits schizophrenic 
qualities whose public pedagogical implications deserve close attention. In this 
sense, it is fair to say that the primary substantive dimension of the TT movement’s 










Sleeping with the enemy as public pedagogy: 
the strategic suppression of the ‘constitutive 
outside’ in the TT movement  
 
What is the TT movement against? 
The TT movement “stands against neoliberal visions of a deregulated, neoliberal 
economy based on free trade underpinned by cheap fossil fuels and externalised 
emissions” (North & Longhurst, 2013, p. 1425). It stands against implausible 
‘technofixes’. In being for relocalised convivial economies based on non-alienated 
labour and use-value, it is de facto against the logic of capital’s spatial 
fixes/speeding up of time where it rubs up against constraints to its expansion 
(Harvey, 2006). Thus, sharing a genealogy with movements for Slow Food (van 
Bommel & Spicer, 2011) and Slow Scholarship (Hartman & Darab, 2012), slowness 
is understood as counter-hegemonic. In other words, TT’s pedagogy, based as it is on 
the (re)production of space, contains an implicit/latent political economy, which for 
reasons of impression management is suppressed.  For example, in the movement’s 
key texts (Hopkins, 2008a; Hopkins, 2011), the word ‘capitalism’ is only mentioned 
in the reference section, nevertheless, in the Transition Companion (Hopkins, 2011, 
pp. 34-35), it is made crystal clear that on the current trajectory of population growth, 
the achievement of 3% compound annual growth that of the reproduction capitalism 
is estimated to require (Harvey, 2012), would increase resource consumption by 
1,600% - clearly a fantastical and unachievable figure. Although, rather than using 
the loaded term anti-capitalism, more affirmative terms such as ‘steady state 
economics’, and “Prosperity Without Growth” (Jackson, 2009) are employed.  
 
Thus, although space is brought back into the fold in TT’s pedagogy, through the 
failure to situate their public pedagogy within an ideological framework attending to 




unpacking. TT’s approach seems to be that, since resource constraints mark the limit 
points of capital accumulation, there is no point in protesting against that which has 
no future. Rather, as these movement intellectuals argue, the movement aims to 
“engage in knowledge production about how to deal with energy crisis and climate 
change… in the positive sense of a method of thinking in creative ways that make 
alternative futures possible (North & Longhurst, 2013, p. 1426). We can, in this 
cognitive praxis, detect a lack of understanding about the constitutive nature of 
hegemony. 
 
The question is, whether the bracketing of such functions in the cognitive praxis of 
the green movement is possible or desirable. Although TT advocate relocalised 
agglomeration economies based on an inward substitution of skills, how can the 
movement overlook the macro processes euphemistically termed “structural 
adjustment” which began in the mid-80s, which through hard forms of money power 
(particularly the IMF), rewarded states rearranging economies of scale and therefore 
disciplining bio-power through proletarianisation of massive swaths of the world 
population who already operated in agglomeration economies? Can so-called 
‘microcosms of hope’ ever be scalable if their pedagogical strategies intentionally 
skirt the issue of power? 
 
‘Them and Us’: Transition and the 
environmental movement  
 
Given the above, the strategic imperative to reach out beyond the usual suspects by 
avoiding contentious politics, means setting out a positive vision rather than 
campaigning against things, and constructing Self-Other relations: 
 




than on campaigning against current problems. Successful Transition 
Initiatives will need an unprecedented coming together of society. They 
dedicate themselves to openness and inclusion. This principle is based on 
the need to involve local business communities, community groups and 
local authorities. It stresses that, in the challenge of energy descent, there 
is no room for ‘them and us’ thinking (Hopkins, 2011, p. 78). 
 
Yet, in order to maintain this stance, TT discourse has continually been forced to 
create an Us-Them relationship between historical incarnations of the green 
movement, as well as the contemporary direct climate action movement. Treating the 
‘old’ environmental movement as ‘constitutive outside’, TT discourse picks up from 
the “Death of Environmentalism” arguments made by Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
(2009), that environmentalism as a special interest, where activists “shock or depress 
people into action”, has been “discredited by history” (Hopkins, 2011, p. 36): 
 
[Rob Hopkins] is determinedly upbeat in the face of Armageddon and 
scathing about those who are not. "The environmental movement has 
been enormously naive for 40 years in assuming that the way you make 
people change is to give them depressing, distressing information," he 
says. "Take that approach and all it does is to breed apathy, or it feeds a 
sense of powerlessness. At this time in history the last thing you need is 
people feeling powerless." (Leitch, 2008, p. 2). 
 
As the critique of the information deficit model (the idea that action follows 
improved knowledge about issues) gained currency, popular memes reinforcing this 
dualism began to spread through public discourse and could be detected in the mass 
media:  
 
The whole thing has been described as "a party rather than a protest 
march", and it is to this concept that Hopkins attributes the movement's 
success. [Hopkins] says: "It is positive and doesn't start out by trying to 
identify whose fault it is. It looks at what the opportunities are around 
peak oil and climate change, not the problems." (Lewis, 2008, p. 8). 
 
Myra Carus, convener of the Highland Green Party…said: " I was struck 
by the insistence that whatever a transition initiative does must be fun - 




movement is about people taking control and doing something positive in 
their own community." (Chetwynd, 2009, p. 3).  
 
The peak oil focus  
Another significant way in which TT discourse actively distances itself from the 
environmental movement is its focus on peak oil. Oil scarcity is thought to be 
something less abstract and, therefore, more relatable than climate change. This 
requires careful unpacking because there are a number of nuances to consider. 
Firstly, peak oil as a mobilising concept is a floating signifier, which is to say, it is a 
signifier “subject to the pressure of [various] antagonistic equivalential chains” 
(Laclau, 2005, p. 132). As a floating signifier, it can by definition, be associated with 
a number of different political responses: these range from cosmopolitan ‘think 
global, act local’ forms of relocalisation, to right-wing nationalism, to survivalist 
‘run to the hills’ responses, to justification for further environmentally destructive 
projects, particularly Tar Sands extraction. Appeals to peak oil as a natural limit can 
be easily incorporated into the logic of capital, whereby they are invoked as a reason 
for high oil prices, thus making shale oil extraction financially viable (Harvey, 2010). 
Thus, ‘neutral’ appeals to peak oil - meaning those that do not understand it to be 
something amenable to articulation through hegemonic struggle risk tacit complicity 
with precisely the kinds of environmentally and socially unjust projects that the CCA 
protests against.  
 
This quote from Nick Griffin on the British National Party website exemplifies the 
way in which peak oil is invoked as an argument for xenophobic right-wing public 
pedagogies:  
 
We're not just at Peak Oil. We're at Peak Grain, Peak Copper, Peak 
Uranium, Peak Fish, Peak Rare Earth Metals. All of which mean we're 
also inevitably at the Peak of the Milk of Human Kindness. From now 




they like; tribalism and Nationalism will be the main currencies of human 
exchange (Griffin, n.d.). 
 
As Barry and Quilley (2009, p. 17) recognise, “[t]he tension between overt 
survivalism and a more reasonable public face suggests the need for a continual 
process of impression management on the part of both ordinary TT participants and 
more prominent leaders”.  The question then is, how does the TT movement distance 
itself from apocalyptic survivalist undertones, individual self-interest and 
xenophobia?  In the media, TT discourse differentiates itself from the survivalist 
fringes of environmentalism by comedically representing it as a North American 
fringe culture, radically different from our more ‘British’ sense of pulling together 
and community spirit, by invoking the historical memories of wartime solidarity 
discussed earlier. This is based on an analysis of TT’s self-produced discourse, and 
of 47 press articles where Transition is directly discussed in the context of peak oil 
(table 13).  
 
Table 13 Balance of climate change and peak oil as foci in press coverage of Transition  
 
Nevertheless, appeals to self-interest in TT discourse do appear. Most commonly, 
these are appeals to people’s pockets. Social marketing strategies such as audience 
segmentation and linguistic nudging through careful ‘framing’, have birthed 
approaches to environmental governance where problems are sold to people in an 
attractive way that distances pro-environmental behaviours from the domain of 
‘green issues’ and ‘environmental activists’. Here the cognitive praxis of community 
activism and the cognitive praxis of professional activism become hybridised. TT 
initiatives in particular instances seem not to have been immune to this, despite the 
The ‘hydrocarbon twins’ Number of articles (N=207) Percentage of articles  
Climate change 92 44.4 




rhetoric of collective learning through participatory democracy and community 
building: 
 
Williams claims that householders need to start thinking about energy 
saving not as something confined to the domain of environmental 
activists - but as a way to selfishly save some extra cash for themselves. 
"Not everyone cares about green issues, but everyone does care about 
saving themselves money," he says.  (Bradley, 2011, p. 22).   
 
Here is another excellent example from the Sunday Mirror: 
 
[O]ne part of the answer [to rising fuel costs] may be something called 
"transition towns"…they're not just saving the planet, they're saving a 
fortune in cash as well. It makes good economic sense (Humphrys, 2007) 
 
The most famous initiative (the one that started it all), TT Totnes, received funds 
from the Government to participate in the Low Carbon Communities Challenge 
between 2010/2011. In feeding back their lessons learnt from their engagement work, 
a similar story again emerges. What this also evidences is a process of mutual 
learning between the state and Transition, which places in question the claims of 
some commentators who distinguish Transition from ‘nudge politics’ (Aiken, 2012). 
In fact, it seems that a part of what Transitioners may be learning to do is nudge and 
frame: 
 
Particularly for the hard-to-reach we have focused entirely on messages 
like ‘Fancy some free electricity?’ and ‘We can give you money towards 
a solar-PV system… and if you’ve less than £250 in your pocket after 
you’ve paid your household bills each month you could get it virtually 
for free’. It’s all about the money and we don’t get into environmental 
impacts, CO2 emissions etc. This worked really well (Department for 
Energy and Climate Change, 2011, p. 40) 
 






We looked at the kind of people in our community and categorised them 
into 4 groups, and then designed our strategy and materials accordingly. 
Our aim is recruit at least 30-50% low income households which we 
think we have now met. Categories include: settlers interested in 
neighbourliness/technical DIY/home improvements; prospectors 
interested in income/ property value; pioneers active or interested in 
sustainability, social justice, community building (Department for Energy 
and Climate Change, 2011, p. 40). 
 
This social marketing technique is known as “segmenting” and has been advocated 
by DEFRA and as an approach to encouraging pro-environmental behaviours in the 
government Strategy Unit’s paper “Achieving Culture Change: A Policy 
Framework” (Knott, et al., 2008). Appealing to people’s self-interest on the basis of 
financial gain and fossil fuel insecurity is a path strewn with difficulties. However, in 
principle, the Transition approach is clear that these issues arise when climate change 
and peak oil are not addressed together, that is, through a holistic permaculture 
approach. In the passage below, Hopkins disagrees with prominent 
environmentalists Tony Juniper (Friends of the Earth), and George Monbiot, that 
these issues require separate treatment, and that the relocalisation agenda can be 
pursued through invoking climate change alone, because invoking peak oil may 
“legitimise the case for biofuels, increased coal use, tar sands extraction”: 
 
One of the more absurd phenomena to emerge in recent years is that there 
are climate change activists who dismiss the peak oil argument, and peak 
oil activists who downplay climate change. It is as if people have 
discovered terrain which is somehow 'theirs'… [T]o borrow from Al 
Gore, peak oil is as much an Inconvenient Truth for climate change 
campaigners as climate change is for everyone else. Both, of course, are 
symptoms of a society hopelessly addicted to fossil fuels and the 
lifestyles they make possible…We do have a choice about how we 
respond to peak oil. We can use it as an argument for developing 
solutions that actually put in place infrastructure that will support us 
beyond the Oil Age, or we can use it to justify clinging to fossil fuels at 
all costs…Climate change says we should change, whereas peak oil says 
we will be forced to change. Both categorically state that fossil fuels have 




better. It is key that both climate change and peak oil are given an equal 
degree of importance in any decision-making processes (Hopkins, 2008a, 
pp. 36-37, my emphasis). 
 
So, rather than on the one hand (peak oil) legitimating more extreme practices of 
fossil fuel extraction “resource nationalism”, and on the other hand (climate change) 
legitimating techno-fixes and carbon commodification, treating them as intertwined 
apparently logically leads to community building and relocalisation.  The key insight 
of discourse theory here is to point out that there is no internal logical coherence to 
Transition in this context: such articulations are contingent and require radical 
investment in the identity of Transition. 
 
This section has looked at the discursive strategies employed by TT to distance 
themselves from received wisdom in the environmental movement. At the heart of 
the approach is the notion that climate change and peak oil serve as motivators for 
imagining how more localised lives might be better. In this context, it is easy to 
understand the logic of a non-confrontational approach to shifting socio-cultural 
norms and values. Nevertheless, the now famous critique of Transition by the 
popular education and direct action group Trapese Collective, recognises the 
ambivalence of a strategy of intentionally refusing to “define the enemy” (Newman, 
1994): 
 
The Transition Town model is…a model about positive responses and 
not something that takes positions ‘against’ institutions or projects. While 
it may seem obvious to try and limit political wrangling in a burgeoning 
movement, this position raised some serious questions about the 
effectiveness of a depoliticised movement…[T]here are many reasons 
why it is important to be more confident and defiant when calling for 
transition and actually take a stance against the exploitative and polluting 
corporate practices that are happening all around us. How can we talk 
about climate change and peak oil and not deal with politics or side with 
communities struggling against the expansion of fossil fuel 





This seminal critique has provided the springboard for subsequent debate and praxis 
between these two cultures of activism, which will provide the focus for the 
remainder of the chapter. From such debates important tensions and dilemmas can be 
identified. In essence, there are those activists who feel it is counterproductive and 
ultimately problematic for the TT movement to distance itself from DA protest and 
advocacy work, whilst Transition positions itself as being stronger for being separate 
from (but not in opposition to) the protest movement.  
 
Reading across the debates occurring in various fora for praxis, one protagonist, 
representing the former perspective, cleverly drew on the foundational principles of 
permaculture, invoking the notion of “edgework”: that is, the most fertile spaces and 
productive spaces for work are often those liminal ones between two or more 
ecosystems. This ‘work’ in our case is dialogical work, indeed pedagogical work.  
 
Identifying (productive) tensions in the 
cognitive praxis of TT through ‘edge work’  
 
One of the observations used a lot in permaculture is the idea of ‘edge’, 
that is the point where two ecosystems meet is often more productive 
than either of those systems on their own. This principle reminds us of 
the need to overlap systems where possible so as to maximise their 
potential (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 139). 
 
The Trapese Collective’s critique acted as a catalyst for edgework and has been 
widely commented on since. As I perceive it, the kernel of this dialogue is a debate 
over how political and socio-cultural change happens. As a result, there are several 
entangled issues revealed through this intellectual praxis between two activist 
cultures, which I will try to unpack. Nevertheless, at the heart of them all lies the 
issue of power – its forms, the extent to which it can be bracketed, and the 
consequences of its obfuscation. The Trapese Collective come to the table with a 





The idea of TT is to create a model that everyone could agree to. But if 
everyone can agree with an idea then what exactly is going to change, 
and how is it different to what went before? Change comes through 
argument and debate (Chatterton & Cutler, 2008, p. 24). 
 
Trapese exemplify the argument that non-confrontational work at community level 
does nothing to challenge the status quo:  
 
[P]roblems will occur along the way if big political debates are brushed 
aside because we only talk about what we already have in common. 
Communities must face up to issues such as nuclear expansion, market 
based solutions to climate change such as carbon trading and offsetting, 
agrofuels and food scarcity, developments such as airport expansion and 
resource extraction. These things all occur through active government 
policies, which try to maintain the economic and political, “business as 
usual” scenarios. Unfortunately, left unchallenged they could also 
wipeout the best efforts at local sustainability, like a tsunami in front of a 
sand castle (ibid.) 
 
In what follows, I will attempt to distil the substrate of this argument by interpreting 
Hopkins’s position, followed by two main counter-points, leading to a chapter 
conclusion. These points are (and the ordering of the counter-points is, to a degree, 
arbitrary): 
 
 Point: Being against ‘being against’ is not naïve, it is a skilful 
pedagogical/ communicative device. 
 
 Counter-point 1: A discourse of engaged optimism is intrinsically 
unstable, because to be for things is to be against others, such that, 
even the quotidian practices of Transition will sooner or later rub-up 
against power. 
 





I will address each argument in turn: 
 
Being against ‘being against’ is not naïve, it is a 
skilful pedagogical/ communicative device 
 
TT aims to break out of the activist ghetto. Its discourse reflects and reinforces this 
approach, and there is evidence to suggest that it has been successful in building 
alliances and influencing policy at local authority level in both suburban and urban 
settings,  in ways that s(h)ow the seeds of radical potential, through doing so (Scott-
Cato & Hillier, 2010; North & Longhurst, 2013). In this sense, TT reworks the ‘in 
and against’ the state argument that refuses to see the state as representational 
abstraction and a descending form of power (North & Longhurst, 2013, p. 1435).  
 
The radical Left would like to expand the notion of what Transition is, to include 
repertoires of contentious politics. Hopkins sees this as “missing the point”. 
Transition for him is, first and foremost, a cultural Transition. This is a very 
important concept and will be explicated in the next chapter. It draws on positive 
psychology, the psychology of change, the power of narrative, reconnecting to 
‘place’ through positive ‘visions’ and, as such, is skilled at deploying ‘frame 
alignment’ strategies (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
 
Time and again [the Trapese Collective] re-state their belief in a them-
and-us perspective…Yet these extraordinary times into which we are 
moving extraordinarily fast demand new tools, both practical and 
thinking tools. It has always struck me that as we stand on the verge of 
the monumental changes that peak oil and climate change will impose, to 
have confrontational activism as the principal tool in our toolbox is 





Again, as in the previous chapter, we see the return of temporal urgency as a 
justification for pragmatism. Hopkins believes that cultural change requires a more 
sophisticated palette of tools and self-awareness than he perceives exists in the direct 
action community. Drawing upon my discussion of the ‘relational turn’ in social 
movement theory (see chapter 3), differences in TT’s strategy can be explained as 
the strategic and provisional suppression of situationally potent identities and 
projects in order to communicate across differences (Mische, 2003; Mische, 2008). 
As Mische argues, this is “a learnt skill” (see italicised in quote below) – a kind of 
identity juggling – that activists gain through participation in socially heterogeneous 
networks. Below Hopkins replies to another social movement intellectual involved in 
both the CCA and Transition, who has argued for solidarity between the two 
cultures: 
Mason writes “surely a strong environmental movement requires 
solidarity not isolation?” Absolutely, but two friends can be close friends 
without sharing a flat or going everywhere together… and indeed they 
are stronger and more effective as people as a result. My point is that 
both approaches are more skilful for standing on their own distinctive 
ground, being skilful about what they make implicit and what they make 
explicit, as well as reaching out far, far beyond the usual suspects… I 
would argue that those of us who are happy at a Climate Camp (which I 
wholeheartedly support by the way), and who assume it offers a 
replicable model for the rest of society, are being very naive in assuming 
that this model, because it is “right”, will convince everyone else that 
there is a better way to do things…In the protest movements, we take up 
a position outside of mainstream culture, use language, dress codes, 
behaviour and forms of protest which at best bewilder and at worst 
enrage mainstream society, yet we expect them to see the error of their 
ways and the validity of ours and embark on a radical decarbonisation 
(Hopkins, 2008c) 
 
This is a subtle but important point: Hopkins contends that critics misinterpret what 
he is arguing for: not factionalism or “sectarian solidarity” (see Saunders, 2008), but 
rather, the development of what Mische understands as communicative skill. This is 
seen by some as a kind of ‘closeting’ (see italicised in quote) of activist identity that 





We live our lives in separate stories. In our meetings we are Transitioners 
and in the “outside world” we are someone else…In Transition Norwich 
there are people who are activists for Greenpeace, for CND, who go on 
climate actions and marches, who sign petitions, who organise flash 
mobs, who fight for the NHS, for higher education, for the forests, for the 
libraries, who protest against Tescos, against the Northern Distributor 
road, who lobby politicians and councillors ….We have to see that 
without talking about our actions, without coming out about our radical 
nature,…Transition does not have the strength or wit or daring to 
challenge the dominant worldview. It runs the risk of becoming stifled by 
the tyranny of what Blake called "the polite society", by conventional 
good behaviours and small talk, and fragmenting as has happened in 
some initiatives. We are in danger of living in a never-never land of 
allotments and spiritual clichés.  (DuCann, 2011,n-p). 
 
Yet, between the TT approach – a strategic unconditional discursive suppression of 
one’s other commitments – and the ‘sing it loud and proud’ approach, lies what 
Mische (2008, p. 359), in the context of Brazilian activist networks, calls the “jogo 
de cintura – translating from Porteugese roughly as the swing of the hips – in the 
dance of democratic politics”. As she notes (2003, pp. 269-273), and as we have 
observed in this and the last chapter, this involves playing off the ambiguity of 
categories (“generality shifting”), and “temporal cuing”, that is “the temporal 
formatting of the stories actors tell each other about their histories, purposes and 
capacities to intervene”. It also involves “identity qualifying”, which is the reflexive 
ability to switch between identities by speaking ‘as’ someone. This skill, that Mische 
observed during interviews with Brazilian activists, is something which I have 
recognised in my own interviewing of climate activists. For example, speaking on 
the role of capacity building versus activism in a social movement, this respondent 
used identity qualifying in the following way:  
 
I suppose it depends what hat I’m wearing. If I was wearing the [popular 
educator] hat you could say the process is very important in terms of, if 
you want to build a sustainable, empowering movement …seeing the 
connections between things. Whereas with [direct action group] Plane 




the political agenda …I don’t like calling myself an activist because…it’s 
almost like your putting yourself on a pedestal. ‘I’m an activist, I’ve got 
these skills, I’ve acquired these things and I’m going to teach you how to 
live your life…It’s fine, Plane Stupid is a vanguard group, they don’t 
claim to be movement building, which is good  (organiser, 2010) 
 
I would contend that this nuanced and reflexive jogo de cintura, is much more 
necessary than TT discourse recognises. Mische’s (2008) general argument is that 
partisanship does not, in fact, destroy civic dialogue, which in practice requires deft 
manoeuvring between more agonistic and more deliberative communication. Mische 
(table 14) situates her understanding of activist dialogue around four ideal types of 
communicative performance, and argues that publics may be prone to breakdown as 
a result of the weaknesses inherent in any one ideal type if it is overemphasised. 
Whilst more agonistic forms of communicative performance are prone to the kind of 
ideological entrenchment that TT seeks to avoid, the combination of Deweyan 
pragmatism and Habermasian dialogue is prone to bland appeasement, through 
avoidance of conflict and dispute and a “tendency towards idealism detached from 
practical and political consequences (Mische, 2008, p. 291). This is what DuCann 
(2011) is getting at when she asserts that “[w]e are in danger of living in a never-

















Table 14 Communicative performance in activist publics. Adapted from Mische (2008, p. 29). 
 Focus on ideas Focus on action 




Social outcome Open-ended exchange of ideas Pragmatic institutional 
relations 




Social outcome Counter-hegemonic proposals 
for reform 
Distributions of power and 
resources 
 
This being said, analysing the contents of the Transition Companion (Hopkins, 
2011), it is clear that the focus on “dealing with conflict” (Du Cann et al, in Hopkins, 
2011, pp. 188-191), and “respectful communication” (Hopkins, 2011, p. 101),  which 
begins to address these issues, has emerged from this activist praxis over time. For 
example, contra the usual differentiation from contentious politics, in the following 
passage linkages are made to a common history of civil disobedience in relation to 
women’s rights, much like the CCA: 
 
Unhealthy civility…can uphold established power 
relationships…Virginia Sapiro has argued, about the historical 
advancement of women’s rights, that ‘There was simply no way for 
women to advance their interests through politics in a civil manner’ 
(Neal, Pickering and Cohen, in Hopkins, 2011, p. 100). 
 
Yet, more than this, DuCann speaks of the need for a public pedagogy that includes 
political resources for systemic critique – for reading the world (Freire, 1972) – that 




“everyone has the right to understand the world they live in”. To this Hopkins (2011) 
responds:  
 
I think that Transition has been quite skilful over the last 5 years 
in creating an approach and a vision that appeals beyond the usual 
suspects…We talk of people being ‘hard to reach’, but often the language 
activists use, the way they communicate, dress, speak, and present their 
arguments means, ironically, that they make themselves ‘hard to reach’ 
for most ordinary people. Likewise, “sharing … all our self-education 
that includes Marxist theory, Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, the history 
of Levellers and Diggers” is almost certain to relegate Transition to being 
seen as yet another deep green, left wing campaign group. If Transition 
groups are expected now to make space for the sharing of such insights, 
are we also prepared to create space for sharing for those who come from 
very different cultural backgrounds, as well as those who enjoy ‘Top 
Gear’, who work in industry, or who drive trucks for a living?   
 
This, to me, is a very confused comment because, although moving beyond the 
activist ghetto is of prime importance, the works of Chomsky, Klein and Marx 
cannot be considered as merely the cultural currency of such an activist ghetto: 
starting where people are at does not mean this is where one stops. Hopkins’s 
response seems to imply ‘Top Gear’ over here, ‘Marxist theory’ over there, and 
never the twain shall meet. Moreover, existing scholarship noting that the TT 
movement remains over-represented by the ‘civic core’; that is middle aged, well-
educated and prosperous (Cohen, 2010; Connors & McDonald, 2010; Aiken, 2012), 
reveals a lack of self-awareness regarding the movement’s own cultural biases. 
Below, I engage with the two strands of criticism of this TT approach. 
 
Counter-point 1: power can’t be avoided 
Operating at the level of  quotidian interventions that everyone can get behind, TT 
initiatives often encounter power in the form of the “administrative structuring of 




for the public good, is nevertheless inflexible and prone to manipulation by vested 
interests (Mason & Whitehead, 2012, p. 510). This is illustrated in activist reflection:  
 
Some of us find that saying yes inevitably means saying no…[B]eing 
involved in local business and local food production means you will be 
against supermarkets by default and no matter how far you go to speak 
with those in power and civic office. You get to a point where you are 
pulling in different directions in subtle and sometimes in subliminal 
ways, where the business-as-usual model is directly conflicting with 
Transition (DuCann, 2011). 
 
In reality then, the ‘enemy’ is often obvious at local level, where TTs are clearly not 
immune to the necessities of familiar NIMBY politics, exemplified below in this 
newspaper interview with participants in Paisley Transition Town:  
 
Protest group Paisley Transition Town (PTT) believe the key to reviving 
the decline in Paisley's central shopping area lies in local independent 
shops, not superstores. And they say the proposed 24-hour Tesco on 
Renfrew Road would scuttle any recovery. Maggie Kennedy, from PTT, 
said: "If the council grants planning permission for the giant 
supermarket, it would be failing in its duty to safeguard the viability of 
the town centre and throwing away all the money it has spent on it. 
"Tesco will turn Paisley into a ghost town by taking trade away from 
local shops." PTT say the once-bustling town centre has suffered serious 
decline in the past year, with the number of empty units in the high street 
rising from one in eight to one in four - totalling 50 empty shop units. 
The group say the council should be offering a cash boost to independent 
shops to help revamp the town centre. Maggie added: "Rates, rents and 
lease lengths need to come down to realistic level. But Buddies also need 
to support these businesses and do less of their shopping outside the 
town." Maggie said: “It is not too late to influence the council's decision. 
We are urging people to write to the Planning Department objecting to 
the Tesco proposal." (Stewart, 2009, p. 21). 
 
Although these encounters of power are not as dramatic as those in the previous 
chapter, they are still forces for learning through “exploring the social organisation of 
power as it was revealed through moments of confrontation” (Thompson, 2010, p. 





The more we look closely at this wide range of agricultural projects, the 
more we begin to understand the complexity of the socio-environmental 
injustice issues they bring to the surface. From the rules you have to 
comply with in order to use publicly owned land to the extortionate price 
of land, particularly in urban and periurban areas; from the regulation of 
land zoning and allotment leasing, which prevents people from 
establishing agricultural projects beyond self-consumption; to 
discriminatory neighbourhood design which makes it common to have 
densely populated neighbourhoods without decent green space 
(Tornaghi, 2011). 
 
Or alternatively, in the context of TT Abersytwyth, this activist-intellectual 
wrote: 
 
Transition Aberystwyth has already come up against obstacles, such as 
bureaucratic inertia, that current ‘transition culture’ will be hard pressed 
to shift. Frustrated in our attempt to contribute to the Local Authority’s 
‘Masterplan’ implementation process for the town, one of our steering 
group wrote: ‘We are beginning to see where the nice transition process 
meets its concrete boundaries.’ (Mason, 2008). 
 
These are all things that have to be confronted at some stage. 
 
Counter-point 2: ‘choosing’ confrontation is a 
misrepresentation 
 
In a second version of the Trapese Collective’s critique, Chatterton and Cutler (2009) 
argue this point forcefully. They read critique and creativity as a dialectical process, 
and opine that the privileging of engaged optimism perpetuates that unhelpful 
dualism between good activist/bad activist that I discussed in the previous chapter. 
Although Chatterton and Cutler (2009) speak of activist resistance, and of potential 
Majority World allies, I would contend that this also applies domestically where, in 




violence. What I mean by this is that one’s situated biography and social networks – 
which are classed, gendered, and raced – must be taken into account, if such an 
approach is not to become inadvertently pathologising: 
 
One thing that Rob also perhaps misrepresents in his critique is that we 
do not feel that anyone chooses confrontational politics – it is a response 
to the often brutal forces people find themselves up against…We need to 
break out of the bubble we live in. 
 
Despite the fact that there is a clear cultural element to particular repertoires of 
action, and organizational forms, which may become valorized, this is an important 
point. As previous research has highlighted (e.g. Griggs & Howarth, 2002, pp. 48-56; 
(Scandrett, et al., 2012, p. 301), locally rooted communities-in-resistance, with a 
critical respect for legal and state processes (and perhaps having more to lose in 
some instances than the more nomadic activist class), may take up DA tactics when 
all other avenues have been exhausted. As I move on to argue in the conclusion, this 
requires surely a more dialectical approach to cultural politics as public pedagogy. 
What is a language of possibility that denies critique? Of conviviality without 
conflict? Of resilience without resistance?  It is, to put it crudely (but then the matter 
is not all that complex), a language of all agency and no structure, of possibility 
without constraint: the ideological hallmarks of the creation of a deficit discourse. 
 
Conclusion: towards a more dialectical public 
pedagogy of (Just) Transition?     
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea of a more dialectical public pedagogy, 
oriented around the concept of Just Transition, and committed to less valorised forms 
of engagement which emerges from daily life in all its messiness and 




prosaic, forms of collective action seriously, has moved towards the opposite 
extreme, engaging in a public pedagogy, which is overtly anti “defining the enemy”. 
From this extreme, the TT movement’s public pedagogy, I would contend, is limited 
by the lack of dialectical movement between a language of critique, and language of 
possibility, that many radical adult educators (Giroux, 1992, p. 10; Allman, 2001, p. 
224) have always argued is essential. A public (or popular) curriculum might begin 
at either antipode, but the key is the dialectical movement. In this context, the 
permaculture idea of edge work applied to cultures of activism might be seen as a 
kind of border pedagogy, understood as the recognition, challenge and 
reterritorialisation of material, geographical, cultural, epistemological, political and 
social borders (Giroux, 1992, pp. 28-29). 
 
As I have argued in this chapter, such edge work,  thought of as border pedagogy, 
requires the development of a ‘jogo de cintura’ (Mische, 2008), which may require 
the “strategic suppression of situationally potent identities”, but not their complete 
banishment in all circumstances. Theorists of democratic communication, in the 
same manner as TT discourse advocates, have often spoken of supressing self-
interest in favour of  the common good, but what Mische (2008, p. 355) calls 
attention to is the development of heterogeneous publics “negotiating among many 
different ways of pursuing…the ‘common good’, including, in their understanding, 
partisan pursuits”.  
 
This will always be necessary, as it reflects people’s multiple and ambivalent 
positioning as ‘at risk from, but economically dependent upon’, where the public 
pedagogy of TT rubs up against more powerful “neoliberal public pedagogies”, 
meaning “the powerful ensemble of ideological and institutional forces whose aim is 
to produce competitive, self-interested individuals vying for their own material and 
ideological gain” (Giroux, 2010, p. 486). This, as it was argued in the previous 
chapter, aligns with the Just Transition approach, which seems equipped to transcend 




across interests and identities, where people might otherwise feel as though they 
cannot bite the hand that feeds. Indeed, the incorporation of the adjective ‘Just’ into 
Transition is something that has recently begun to emerge from activist praxis 
(Chatterton & Cutler, 2009; Irving, 2009; Reyes, 2009). 
 
What the relocalisation movements and direct action movements share, is a wider 
belief in open space, a horizontal cultural logic if you will, in relation to 
organisational form. In this sense, a similar danger that they share is an elision of 
politics with these emergent organisational forms. The very notion of open space is a 
contradiction in that it must be opened by someone and with some purpose in mind 
(Nunes, 2005).  
 
Where TT differs is in its simultaneous focus on roots, through a pedagogy of place, 
as opposed to routes, associated with nomadic forms of existence, whether a 
transnational capitalist class (globalisation from below), or a transnational ‘activist’ 
class (globalism). Whilst there is an analysis of privilege, related to the capacity of 
mobility and available time and resources that has developed in the praxis of the 
direct action movement, it does not seem as though this reflexive questioning has 
emerged as strongly in the TT discourse. In fact, the perceived success of the 
rhizomatic spread of the TT movement relies on a number of unacknowledged 
mobilities, that when combined with the “subtle elision of the social with the local” 
(Amin, 2005, p. 615) may obscure the political economy of participation, and serious 
questions about power and representation.  
 
As Aiken (2012, p. 95) recognises, the TT movement’s view of community is an 
active one, where communities are “assemblages of enunciation”, and therefore fully 
emergent processes, always unfinished. Indeed the TT movement makes heavy use 
of “Open Space Technology” (Owen, 1993) as an organisational tool. The first rule 
of Open Space meetings is “whoever comes are the right people” (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 




many ethnographic studies of ‘horizontal’ organising in social movements 
(Anderson, 2004; Juris, 2008; Nunes, 2005; Juris, 2005), that domination/resistance 
are inextricable from one another, and intrinsic to any spatial practice.  
 
If the TT movement seeks to enact an optimistic pedagogy of place, it should, on the 
other hand, be dialectically open to a critical pedagogy of place and community, 
sceptical of any ascriptions of naturalness to places, and the ‘openness’ of Transition 
practices taking place within them. “The point to emphasize here”, as Shaw (2007, p. 
31) argues in relation to the politics of community, “is that place structures social 
relations just as, conversely, social (and economic) relations structure the parameters 
of choice in relation to place”. The very success of relocalisation initiatives is 
facilitated through networked learning based on exteriority and connectivity. On the 
other hand, container geographies of local community have been, and continue to be, 
a policy prescription for the poor (Amin, 2005; Shaw, 2007), whose lack of 
engagement, lack of resilience, may be spuriously interpreted in terms of having 
chosen to reject community when, in fact, they “are least equipped and least 
motivated to play at such lofty community expectations, stripped as they are of the 
material, institutional, experiential, and possibly also the psychological means” 
(Amin, 2005, pp. 620-621). 
 
For the TT movement’s public pedagogy to become border pedagogy, it must 
contend with these issues, which are fundamentally about the political economy and 
structural relations that shape uneven geographical development in the first place. 
This points us towards a relational ethics of place (Massey, 2005), which is 
something that academics involved in the TT movement have argued for (Mason & 
Whitehead, 2012), alongside recent accounts of urban Transition initiatives, which 
argue that “urban cosmopolitanism” provides “institutional thickness”, which may be 
more conducive to systemic change than  “local resilience” (North, 2010, p. 1435). 




ask who has the resources, possibly the ‘capabilities’ (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000) 
to produce what spaces and where.  
 
Yet, such efforts may be hampered by particular aspects of the TT movement’s 
public pedagogy, which rely heavily on insights from psychology for the following 
reasons: to understand our reliance on fossil fuels through the psychology of 
addiction; to understand optimism as a learnable skill (psychological resilience); and 
ultimately, to justify an appeal to universal values and the creation of an 
undifferentiated ‘we’: 
 
[P]erhaps the route to real change, long-lasting and deep change, isn’t 
through deepening polarity, but through a re-weaving of what has been 
torn apart, a seeking of common ground, an appeal to universal 
values…For me, the idea that “activism as a dynamic force within the 
whole pattern of Transition strengthens it” is deeply flawed, and risks 
undoing much of the good work of the last 5 years (Hopkins, 2011). 
 
The following chapter situates these psychological dimensions of the TT 
movement’s culture change theory in the context of a wider shift in the cognitive 
praxis of the environmental movement towards a questioning of the very  ‘cognitive’ 
in the cognitive praxis. This shift itself, is the product of a wider shift in all kinds of 
policy contexts towards what is known as libertarian paternalism, which takes as its 
starting point a rejection of rational actor theory, of Homo economicus, of the 
Cartesian rationality of the enlightenment subject, and so on.  
 
Consequently, embodied rather than consciously held dispositions, tacit cultural 
values and norms, and emotion and affect are brought back to the fore. In this 
context, insights from psychology, cognitive science, and behavioural economics are 
being deployed through public pedagogies that aim to engage ‘bigger-than-self’ 
values as opposed to cultural values that promote material self-interest and individual 
competition. In one sense, this can be understood as a wider movement towards 




neoliberalism (Giroux, 2010). However, it is necessary to critically interrogate this 
shift, because the seemingly teleological shift towards a common transcultural value 
base, justified by positivistic appeals to a coalescing epistemic community of culture 
change experts, could be regarded as totalising, leaving no room for agonistic 





















Professional activism as public pedagogy: the 
cultural politics of Common Cause 
 
Introduction  
In chapter 5, I explored the cultural politics of the CCA, which was oriented around 
an agonistic politics of “defining the enemy”. I developed the argument that as the 
empty signifier of ‘Climate Action’ grew, it became increasingly unclear who the 
enemy was. However, such tensions were generative of intellectual praxis from 
which several conclusions were drawn. Significantly: (1) horizontalism itself acted as 
an empty signifier from which internal antagonisms emerged. A key stake was not 
just the production of space, but the issue of temporality. As a CCA organiser 
intimated to me during an interview “as the shit hits the fan, we’ve got to be very 
brash with our tactics and our organisational abilities because we don’t have time to 
waste” (organiser, 2010); (2) whilst ‘defining the enemy’ was recognised as being a 
vital component of a cultural politics of bringing the abstract ‘down to earth’, 
scapegoating particular sites and corporations based on their actual and potential 
climate impacts risked miseducating people about ‘true’ causes: as radical educator 
Paula Allman (2001, p. 131) has argued, the ‘race to the bottom’  to see who can get 
away with the lowest standards of social, economic and environmental justice, is not 
due to the fact that: 
 
 governments, people and corporations are necessarily greedy, 
unscrupulous, mean, or uncaring…[I]t is due to the fact that they are 
locked into historically specific social relations,…and if they are to 




to compete in the global market, or for that matter, regional and national 
markets. 
 
Consequently, an analysis of the “fetishisation” of both symbolic targets and of 
carbon emissions emerged. This led to the third insight that the public pedagogy of 
climate activism should be less valorised, and be prepared to engage with people’s 
multiple and contradictory positioning in the micro-politics of everyday life. In 
chapter 6, I developed this analysis by arguing that such an approach could be 
discerned in the cultural politics of the Transition movement. Nevertheless, through 
examining ‘edge work’ occurring between cultures of direct action and community 
action, I argued that Transition had moved from one extreme to another through the 
strategic suppression of a ‘confrontational activist’ identity. I argued from an 
educational standpoint that what is important is the movement between the quotidian 
and the abstract; between a language of critique and a language of possibility; 
between the “hot cognitions” of injustice (Gamson, 1992), and an optimism of the 
will. This dialectical approach to social movement learning, common in diverse 
literatures on critical pedagogy and popular education (Freire, 1972; Giroux, 1992; 
Allman, 2001) is, in my view, a necessary remedial to unenlightening binary debates. 
As environmental critical theorist Brulle (2010, p. 93) argues, “it is this combination 
of threats and opportunities, nightmares and dreams – that fuels social movement 
mobilisation and social change”. 
 
In this chapter, I develop my argument by critically examining what cultures of 
professional activism have contributed to this debate in recent years, and in doing so, 
how they challenged the assumptions and intellectual praxis of the environmental 
movement as a whole. The discourses of ‘engaged optimism’ that prevail in 
Transition Culture owe to this culture of activism; in fact, there is significant overlap 
between knowledge workers in ENGOs and intellectuals in the Transition movement. 
I therefore engage in a little more ‘edge work’ in this chapter, albeit now moving on 





An orienting idea up to this point has been that the environmental movement can 
partially be understood in terms of the production of knowledge and its uptake in 
wider society, through a process dubbed “cognitive praxis” through which a 
movement is distinguished from others by the “cognitive territory” it opens up for the 
“creation, articulation [and] formulation of new thoughts and ideas” (Eyerman & 
Jamison, 1991, p. 55). Nevertheless, in the UK, societal consensus on the objective 
urgency of tackling climate change sits alongside something akin to collective denial 
when confronted with the fossil fuel – and particularly oil – rich energy base that 
ensures our social infrastructures and lifestyles. Thus, climate activism has been 
likened to building a social movement against ourselves (Monbiot, 2006, p. 215). 
Thus, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the TT movement, through praxis, 
developed an analysis that  this state of affairs signals a shift away from the 
conventional view of traditional green democracy founded on Enlightenment notions 
of the reasoning subject – collective action and societal change founded on behaviour 
guided by environmental ethics, shared cognitive rules, and a calculating 
appreciation of ‘the facts’ – towards a more nuanced understanding regarding the 
role of “embodied rather than consciously held dispositions” (Haluza-DeLay, 2008, 
p. 217). Haluza-DeLay (p. 210) thus contends that “Eyerman and Jamison’s 
conceptualization might need correction, primarily about the role of the “cognitive” 
in the “praxis”. This ‘correction’, is primarily what I examine in this chapter, through 
continuing to examine the discourse of Transition Culture, but in dialogue with the 
cultural work of ENGO working group Common Cause (CC hereafter).   
 
We know now that Transition and CC differ in that they each reflect a cognitive 
praxis of what Jamison (2001, pp. 151-164) has termed “community” and 
“professional” environmentalism, respectively. We have seen that the cognitive 
praxis of community environmentalism is characterised by the mobilization of local 
knowledge in relation to environmental issues, and the development of technical-




towards techniques of communication, translation and synthesis of knowledge 
concerned with making local governance and deliberative democracy work. On the 
other hand, this chapter shows how professional environmentalism is the culture of 
activism which most blurs the lines most between the knowledge making of critical 
communities and of epistemic communities with institutional access.  Knowledge 
workers within ENGOs are the experts of green activism: they produce ‘civil society 
research’, which is often a particular mix of genres of empirical research, educational 
materials as well as investigative journalism, and polemic designed to influence 
policy, practice and the wider public (Jamison, 2001; Hess, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, to the extent that Transition emerges from the cognitive praxis of 
community environmentalism, and CC from professional environmentalism, there 
are significant overlaps in the purpose of both milieus. Namely, both claim to 
question the Enlightenment myth of rational economic man, through engagement 
with insights from psychology, cognitive science, behavioural economics, and 
sociological theories of practice. Intertextuality between their respective literatures 
evidences mutual learning and the brokerage of ideas by key intellectuals. Moreover, 
because these milieus have an ambivalent history of engaging with structures of 
governance – and indeed enacting environmental governance – I conceptualise the 
knowledge produced in these two milieus as being ‘in and against’ the pedagogical 
state. In this chapter, I use discourse theory to critique the notion of a universal 
progressive value base, implemented through the framing work of idea specialists. 
 
Understanding the origins and evolution of 
Common Cause 
 
Overview and antecedents  




other civil society organizations (CSOs)
ix
. The working group produces civil society 
research oriented towards explicating and promulgating culture change strategies for 
“campaigners, community organisers, civil servants, fundraisers, educators, social 
entrepreneurs, activists, funders, politicians, and everyone inbetween” (Holmes, et 
al., 2011).   
 
CC has emerged from collaboration between idea specialists in ENGOs and 
psychologists, cognitive scientists, and behavioural economists (Lakoff, 2004; 
Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Crompton & Kasser, 2009; 
Cahan, 2010; Maio, 2011). The initial seeds were brought about through ENGO 
dialogue with these academics (particularly Tim Kasser and George Lakoff) in 2009. 
Through such collaboration, the foundations of ‘enlightenment reason’ and rational 
actor theory are questioned: they cite from a large body of empirical studies which 
show that, in order to avoid the ‘cognitive dissonance’ that occurs when objective 
imperatives to action and values informing social identity collide, ‘the facts’ are 
routinely discarded (Crompton, 2010, p. 10). Accordingly, the tacit dimensions of 
culture are opened up. As I will show in this chapter, what we actually have with CC 
is a quasi-questioning of enlightenment reason, which, rather than arguing for the 
development of an agonistic public sphere, favours a consensus model which 
supposes that “the defects of the enlightenment can only be made good by further 
enlightenment” (Giroux, 1992, p. 49). 
 
Interestingly, archetypal ‘public intellectual’ Michael Sandel is an influence 
(Common Cause, 2011). CC is partially underpinned by his Aristotlean (virtue) 
ethical critique of how “market norms” “crowd out” other forms of moral reasoning 
(Sandel, 2012). In this sense, CC is antagonistic in that it is directly opposed to 
neoliberal public pedagogy. Taken at face value, the basic point is to reassert a 
holistic sense of the ‘moral’ in public discourse going beyond the ‘hot button’ 
approach of ‘social marketing’ (Gamson, 1992, p. 185), which as Brulle (2010, p. 91) 




potential of society by reinforcing individual self-interest (Brulle, 2010; Webb, 
2012).  This reinforcing of self-interest and market norms that occurs when 
campaigners try to use them as a hook for pro-environmental behaviours is what CC 
calls “collateral damage” (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 43).  
 
A well-known weakness of ‘green culture’ continues to be the lack of perspicuity 
regarding the term ‘sustainability’ to the point where it has been co-opted as an 
almost empty corporate trope. An effort is therefore made by CC to redefine 
‘sustainability’ in seemingly more holistic terms (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 43). As the 
CC working group argues in relation to climate change, the ‘Stern Review’ created 
political traction, but by framing the argument for climate change in the economists 
discourse of cost-benefit reasoning (spending on mitigation and adaptation now 
rather than in the future), the review arguably reinforced the primacy of cost-benefit 
reasoning to the detriment of wider moral imperatives, “because of the tight 
association between national interest and economic interest” (Crompton, 2010, p. 
50). I will go on to unpack this a little in the section below.  
 
By all accounts, this is a step forward for the cultural politics of ENGOs in the 
context of climate change: this approach has been typologised as ‘social marketing’, 
meaning finding the optimum conditions for communication in order to affect 
behaviours, by drawing on psychological insights. Yet, the term ‘social marketing’ is 
perhaps uncharitable in this context, as it implies a kind of insidious expert intent to 
‘spin’ issues, and ‘nudge’ people in particular directions. It would therefore be more 
accurate to argue that the cultural politics of CC are partially borne of, but attempt to 
move beyond, a wider political rationality known alternately as soft paternalism, or 
libertarian paternalism. The term soft paternalism captures an assemblage of 
academic insights applied to policy interventions aimed at: 
 
… governing the irrational brain, governing through people’s inevitable 




cultivating the rational and reflexive aspects of the mind. (Pykett, 2012, 
p. 219) 
 
Thus, CC (first quotation) and TT (second quotation) mark a departure from the 
combination of confrontation and rational persuasion embodied in the CCA: 
 
Unfortunately, the grey matter cannot be ruled off-limits…We can bury 
our heads in the sand, and insist on the sanctity of Enlightenment reason. 
Or we can respond to the new understanding of how decision-making 
processes work (Crompton, 2010, p. 24). 
 
The idea that people change by encountering distressing information, 
digesting it intellectually, and deciding based on evidence…is not how 
things happen. Transition also acknowledges that we are emotional 
creatures (Hopkins, 2011, p. 73). 
 
Formally, soft paternalism is characterised by interventions that guide the citizen 
subject in the direction that represents the paternalist’s interpretation of the subject’s 
‘true wishes’ that have been (in the paternalist’s eyes) clouded by either an error in 
reason or an emotional override of reason (Buckley, 2009, p. 15). Jones et al (2010, 
p. 486) through studying the political geography of “actually existing soft 
paternalism”, identify its “epistemological drivers” as “behavioural economics, 
psychology and the neurosciences”, and its “mechanisms” as “spatial design and 
(choice) architecture; temporal ordering; measures to rationalize the brain; and 
prompting social norms via culture change strategies, social motivation and 
segmentation, and the development of peer-to-peer pressure”.  
 
In an UK environmental policy context, DEFRA (2007) has recommended the use of 
“‘wedge behaviours’ which take advantage of windows of opportunity in order to 
promote demand-side lifestyle changes at opportune moments” (Jones, et al., 2010, 
p. 487). As I discussed in the previous chapter, DEFRA also draw upon the 
marketing concept of “segmenting” audiences in order to tailor interventions. In 




Cultural Change” (Knott, et al., 2008) builds upon work done by DEFRA but 
includes a more sociological perspective alongside the deployment of social 
psychological concepts, drawing on Putnam’s work on bridging and bonding social 
capital, identifying the importance of developing deliberative fora and, crucially, 
acknowledging the role of structural constraints in identifying “the capacity to 
change” as a key caveat in the consideration of cultural drivers for sustainable and 
low-carbon living. 
 
 In a Scottish environmental policy context, Greener Scotland campaigns heavily 
utilise social marketing approaches targeted at their “ten key low-carbon behaviours” 
(The Scottish Government, 2013). However, the Environment Social Research team 
have recently sought to go beyond individualistic social marketing approaches, 
drawing on a wider, more nuanced and more sophisticated palette of tools, including 
the work of CC, in the process (Darnton & Evans, 2013, p. 31). They have developed 
a something called the “ISM tool” (Darnton & Horne, 2013; Darnton & Evans, 2013) 
as a guide to influencing behaviours through understanding not just the individual (I), 
but the “social (S) and material (M)” contexts influencing people’s behaviours. The 
guide has been the basis of educational workshops run through the Scottish 
Government with policy makers as well as professional and community 
environmental groups. It draws primarily on the epistemological drivers of soft-
paternalism as well, namely “social psychology, behavioural economics, and 
sociological theories of practice” (Darnton & Horne, 2013). It is in this sense that 
CC, and also TT can be said to be located ‘in and against’ the pedagogical state, as 
behavior change experts producing knowledge aimed at re-educating the habitus, 
broadly meaning sets internalized and durable dispositions held by particular social 
actors in particular social settings (Haluza-DeLay, 2008). What is of concern  in this 
penultimate chapter is the potential democratic deficit that may occur when expert 
epistemic communities deploy culture change technologies in the governance of an 




unproblematically identified a priori, rather than emerging through hegemonic 
struggle.  
 
Critical theorist Robert Brulle (2010) has already critiqued US-based environmental 
campaigning efforts influenced by cognitive scientist George Lakoff for similar 
reasons. He challenges the hegemony of expert advocacy, seeing it as inherently 
democratically compromised, and in the long-term reducing the “mobilization 
capacity” of civil society; he challenges the unidirectional ‘short-termist’ social 
marketing approach; he questions some of the intellectual and empirical claims made 
of core values; and he questions the ability of such efforts to move beyond the 
discursive status quo of ecological modernization. In what follows, I ask similar 
questions of CC, asking how the approach differs from ‘nudge politics’ and ‘social 
marketing’ crudely described, whilst exploring dialogue, where it exists, with our 
previous two cultures of activism, but particularly with Transition. 
 
Dislocation and the formation of new 
subjectivities 
CC emerged from a collective perception that “current approaches” to environmental 
campaigning “are failing”. For example, “real UK [carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e)] emissions have actually increased by 17% since 1990” (Crompton, 2010, p. 
17). Thus, the impetus from CC emerged from the same dislocatory experiences 
caused by climate change that prompted the emergence of the CCA and the TT 
movement.  
 
Like the CCA and the TT movement, the purpose of CC is crystal clear: to place 
climate change in a wider battle for hearts and minds, against the entrenched cultural 
values and norms of neoliberalism. One of the drivers for CC is an awareness of the 
pernicious fragmentation of civil society organisations into issue specialists, as 




marketplace of ideas. The very name Common Cause signals a statement of intent to 
articulate new chains of equivalence around progressive cultural values that a body 
of social psychology claims that we all share (but prioritise differently).  
 
Yet, the work of CC emerges from a double-dislocatory experience, in a similar 
fashion to that of TT discussed in the previous chapter: the dislocatory experience of 
climate change under the neoliberal status-quo, and the dislocatory experience from 
hegemonic approaches to campaigning, namely “flood[ing] the public with as much 
sound data as possible, on the assumption that the truth is bound, finally, to drown 
out its competitors” (Crompton, 2010, p. 19). As described above, this places CC in 
and against the pedagogical state and, more specifically, the interventions of soft-
paternalism. Regarding the former dislocatory experience, CC seeks to use 
psychological insights to argue that Ecological Modernization discourse, in the 
context of climate change  contains fundamental contradictions, or as they put it 
“incompatible frames” (Crompton, 2010, p. 50). They draw on Michael Sandel’s 
argument that market mechanisms, and (quasi) cost-benefit analyses, when applied to 
intractable problems such as climate change, are not merely instruments, but come 
ready-packaged with implicit value assumptions, which become norms:  
 
[I]n discussing the costs of responding to the challenge, the Review 
inevitably lapses into debating the competitiveness impacts for individual 
countries: “All economies undergo continuous structural change through 
time. Indeed, the most successful economies are those that have the 
flexibility and dynamism to cope with and embrace change” (p.282)… 
These two frames are incompatible. It is extremely difficult to 
simultaneously pursue national economic competitiveness concerns and 
international cooperation, especially when this is based on principles of 
equity… Directly raising concerns about national competitiveness is one 
problem. But these concerns are also inherent to economic cost-benefit 
analysis, which provides the primary motivation for the Review’s 
recommendations. Concepts of self-interest (here national economic 
interest) are activated through use of economic cost benefit analysis, 
because of the tight association between national interest and economic 
interest. The one invokes the other; both are elements of the self-interest 





CC uses insights from soft paternalism to respond to this dislocation, since, as they 
put it, “community feeling” and “financial success” are in “psychological 
opposition”. Thus, responding to climate change as a tragedy of the commons 
requires the nurturing of “bigger-than-self values”. Reflecting the situated actor-
networks of ENGOs, the literature produced by CC can be described as ‘evidence-
based’ culture change strategy. This reflects a peculiar paradox: whilst it is 
recognised that technocratic governance is facing a ‘legitimacy crisis’, “public 
demand for change is important”, and that “feelings are more important than facts” 
(p. 19),   CC is based upon a technocratic approach to culture change, embodied in 
Lakoff’s call for “cognitive policy”. For CC, then, unlike for the CCA or TT, the 
forging of historical chains of equivalence is not a part of its public pedagogical 
strategy. If anything, CC, like TT, are convinced that the environmental movement 
must articulate a historic break with itself.  
Yet, there is a further dislocatory experience, from which CC has emerged: this is the 
difference between the ‘hot button’ approach of social marketing, or what they call 
the “value modes” approach, which seeks to influence behaviour through appealing 
to three broad segments of the population characterised as ‘Settlers’ who value 
tradition, ‘Prospectors’ who are extrinsically orientated and need the approval of 
others through being ahead of the curve, and ‘Pioneers’ – the traditional 
‘environmentalist’ or ‘activist’ constituency, who are more interested in ideas than 
things, are attracted to ‘issues’ and are interested in the big picture (Juniper, 2012). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, even Transition initiatives have used this 
‘Value Modes’ strategy for grassroots community engagement.  
Thus, a schism has emerged in the ENGO sector between movement intellectuals 
who advocate the  CC approach, and those who advocate for the ‘Value Modes’ 
approach, with both sides looking to marshal the empirical evidence from 




for the public good. My scepticism over these debates notwithstanding, this is 
generating rich intellectual praxis within the ENGO sector and beyond. For example, 
career campaigner Tony Juniper (2012,  n-p) argues: 
Having spent 30 years as a campaigner and among other things seeking 
to change behaviour, I am very clear as to where I think we are most 
likely to get positive change, and it is in the second approach, whereby 
campaigns are designed to work with the grain of the fundamental 
psychological needs that people have, rather than trying to persuade 
people who are not environmentalists to adopt the values that would 
cause them to become so… Green groups need to be careful that they 
don’t waste their precious resources in backing the wrong strategy. Time 
is now short 
 
Note again how the sense of temporal urgency sets the tone when arguing over 
strategies of cultural politics. Essentially, Juniper’s argument is that we neither have 
time, nor will it be successful to effect culture shift towards the values that sustain an 
activist habitus, because such values are determined by life circumstances beyond the 
scope of campaign communications. Thus, insights from psychology should be used 
more shrewdly. In the context of climate change, Carvalho (2010, p. 173), writing 
from an American perspective, draws on the results of a survey of over 2000 people, 
which asked what might prevent them from taking actions. The most popular (33%) 
of the response options chosen was “I am not an activist”. Thus, the following 
excerpt from the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) (a centre-left leaning 
public policy think tank) commissioned research into climate change 
communications seems to be eminently sensible strategising:  
 
We need to work in different and more sophisticated ways, 
harnessing tools and concepts used by brand 
advertisers…Desired climate friendly behaviours need to be 
made to feel simply like ‘the kinds of things that people like 
us do’ to large groupings of people…We should not present 
‘messages’ with the implication of rational argument and top-
down persuasion. Instead we need to work in a more shrewd 




engagement…The answer is not to try and change their radar, 
but to change the issue (Segnit and Ereaut, 2006, pp. 27-28) 
 
This approach, and other similar ones emerging from communication think tanks 
(FUTERRA, 2005; 2010; Segnit and Ereaut, 2006, 2007), has been interpreted by 
critical geographers as a process of “subconscious subterfuge”, designed to ‘short-
circuit’ democratic debate through careful ‘lexical nudges’ (Jones, et al., 2009). This, 
so the argument goes, is ethically questionable as it unabashedly promotes the 
“lexical closing off of response options” as opposed to “winning the argument” 
(ibid.). Yet, the same commentators point out the difference between the approaches, 
marking the difference between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ paternalism, through linking 
CC to the latter, in an attempt to engender a wholesale ideological shift away from 
consumerist values (Whitehead, 2011). The question, to reiterate, is whether the 
means (forms of expert ENGO governmentality) justify the ends. With this, I move 
on to explore the public pedagogy of CC, by exploring its conception of values and 
frames, through dialogue with discourse theory.  
 
The public pedagogy of Common Cause: 
values and frames 
 
Values in CC 
CC’s understanding of the cultural values draws on academic expertise from the 
domain of psychology. From this domain comes the first postulate of CC; that there 
exists a universal, trans-cultural ‘circumplex’ of values. Secondly, CC recognises 
that values and behaviour are intimately connected. Third, it is proposed that 
“[f]rames offer a vehicle for promoting values” (Crompton, 2010, p. 11). Cultural 
values, it is written, “represent our guiding principles: our broadest motivations, 




particular conception of values articulated is derived, in large part, from the 
foundational work of social psychologist Shalom Schwartz (Crompton, 2010, p. 28). 
In his seminal paper “Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of 
Human Values, Schwartz (1994, p. 21) defines values as “desirable transinstitutional 
goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or 
other social entity”, learned through socialization.  
 
Values, he argued, are quantifiable, categorisable, interrelated in consistent ways and 
trans-cultural. CC emphasises that “[h]undreds of [worldwide] papers—amounting to 
literally 100,000s of participants—have also tested the relationships between the 
values the vast majority of these papers confirming the relationships Schwartz 
outlines” (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 58). By their own positivistic epistemic standards, 
this is “a well-founded model of how human values relate to each other, with 
measurable impacts on our attitudes and behaviours” (p. 58). Values can be collapsed 
into ten groups: universalism; benevolence; tradition; conformity; security; power; 
achievement; hedonism; stimulation; and self-direction. These ten groups and their 





    




This mapping is a visual representation of a technique known as “smallest space 
analysis (SSA)” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 27), in which “the distances between the points 
reflect the empirical relations among the values. The more similar two values are 
conceptually, the higher the intercorrelation between their importance ratings, and 
the more similar their pattern of correlations with all other values” (p. 27). These 
values can be broadly divided into two axes—self-enhancement (at the opposite of 
which is self-transcendence), and openness to change (at the other end of which is 
conservation)—represented in Schwartz’ circumplex (Homes, et al, 2011, p, 16), 
below. We can detect an implicit Western deference to a “cybernetic” view of 
culture, as a closed but complex system of inputs and outputs, reducible to 
information, and therefore manipulable (Santos, 2008).  Certainly, a reduction of 




mathematically derived proximities between signifiers, correlates to the first two 
postulates of cybernetics: first, everything can be modelled as an “informational 
process”; second, informational processes are subject to control and manipulation 
(Robillard, 2005, p. 247).  
 
Schwartz’s theory of values is simplified by CC as being divided into two categories: 
those deemed intrinsic and those deemed extrinsic. Intrinsic values are those such as 
“affiliation to friends and family, connection with nature, concern for others, self-
acceptance, social justice and creativity”, which are “intrinsically rewarding to 
pursue” (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 21). Extrinsic values are deemed to be those 
“centred on external approval or rewards”, such as “wealth, material success, 
concern about image, social status, prestige, social power and authority” (p. 21).  
 




The extent to which this represents an implicit desire to reduce culture to ‘Western’ 
binary logic is up for debate. From a discourse theory perspective, the intrinsic | 
extrinsic binary is subject to a Western metaphysics of hierarchy, whereby the 




“outside” (Howarth, 2000, p. 37). In fact, participating in a CC workshop with 
environmental activists at the Friends of the Earth 40
th
 Anniversary conference, I 
noted that delegates from local groups struggled to reconcile their views on 
traditional campaigning for the environment – “FoE cannot abdicate its responsibility 
to educate the public” as one participant argued – with new strategies from the 
centre. Another participant was quick to draw on her Feminist knowledge, and 
astutely flagged up the dangers of such reductive binary thinking in creating a deficit 
discourse where people structurally positioned in ways that prevent them from acting 
are ‘Othered’ as being ‘extrinsically’ motivated. CC, though, do recognise this, 
arguing that we all possess such values, which express different needs at different 
times and are reinforced through experience (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 62).  
 
Thus, from a discourse theoretical perspective, CC’s intellectuals can sidestep this 
critique because they rely on a structuralist (as opposed to a ‘post’-structuralist) 
epistemology through which cultural values are mapped through the organismic 
metaphor of the ‘values circumplex’, as the individual components of a closed 
totality. Thus – and this is an important point – the relationships between values are 
viewed as the logically necessary internal relations between the components 
comprising a whole. Since this approach denies the constitutive nature of 
antagonism, and the externality of relations, CC points towards a kind of teleological 
progression of the human spirit towards a universal value base.  
 
CC, to be fair, do respond directly respond to the ‘Othering’ criticism in the 
following way: 
 
Doesn’t this analysis divide values and people into good and bad? Or 
even left-wing and right-wing? Values are not ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in and of 
themselves. They are each thought to express different needs, and are 
therefore each necessary for different purposes….All of us will hold all 
of the values on the circumplex to some extent. Which of them come to 




be in (and this effect will be strengthened over time) (Holmes, et al, 
2011, p. 62). 
  
Furthermore, CC does recognise that that “meeting people where they are” involves 
recognising socio-material constraints, and “creating spaces for change” (p. 41). 
Rhetorically at least, there seems to be desire to ‘walk the talk’:  
 
A low-involvement experience—reading a leaflet, for instance—is likely 
to engage with values fairly superficially; while top-down 
communications may stifle the expression and development of self-
direction values. First-hand experience and deeper involvement are likely 
to have a much greater impact, and self-direction values are more likely 
to be engaged where self-expression and critical thought are facilitated 
and encouraged 
 
CC seems to understand that this requires organisational and spatial arrangements 
congruent with espoused values and an ostensible questioning of the “churchly piety” 
model of citizen environmental engagement through “paying one’s dues” 
(Szerszynski, in Jamison, 2001, p. 150). The “organisational” knowledge interest 
(Eyerman and Jamsion, 1991) is engaged here, and the seeds of a dialogical agenda 
are visible, as the movement cites both Transition Culture and the Camp for Climate 
Action, as exemplary models of what they are trying to achieve. For example: 
 
Our relationship with the people we work with can therefore be 
important. Holding a participatory meeting in a community space 
embodies very different values from a formal meeting encouraging 
deference to hierarchical structures. Similarly, financially successful 
models or techniques often allow limited scope for engagement…An 
example is the civil society model of professionalised ‘protest 
businesses’ with direct debits as the deepest level of engagement. What 
organisational models best embody the values we wish to promote? 
Example: The Camp for Climate Action..in principle…was open to all, 
and encouraged direct participation on a horizontal, democratic basis 






In fact, going further, CC’s view of values hints at an understanding of what 
geographers Doreen Massey (1995) and Ed Soja (1996) term the “socio-spatial 
dialectic” (see chapter 3).   
 
Our experience of various aspects of our society will help strengthen 
particular values. Community centres and churches, trade unions, 
libraries, local sports clubs—institutions that we share and recognise as 
promoting the common good—may increase the importance we place on 
equality, social justice, or friendship. Forests and parks may promote 
appreciation for nature and other intrinsic values. Extrinsic and security 
motivations may be strengthened through competitive work 
environments; advertising appealing to status (Holmes, et al, 2011p. 68). 
 
Now that we have a sufficient idea of how values are conceived by CC, we need to 
look further towards the epistemic implications and analytical utility of their 
understanding of framing as a controllable cultural process. 
 
Frames in CC 
In chapter three, I engaged in a reasonable amount of depth, the pros and cons of 
framing in a climate change activism context. Rather than repeat the critical points, I 
would signpost the reader to revisit those arguments. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
reiterate the discourse theory interpretation (Howarth, 2000, p. 3):   
 
Positivists and empiricists argue that discourses are best visualised as 
‘frames’ or ‘cognitive schemata’, by which they mean the conscious 
strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of 
the world and of themselves that legitimate or motivate collective action. 
 
This is the sense in which framing has been taken up by CC. Frames in context are 
understood as “vehicles for engaging and strengthening values” (Holmes, et al., 
2011, p. 39). Therefore, “the way we incorporate them in our language” is said to be 
“crucially important” (p. 39). Frames are understood after cognitive scientist George 





[M]ental structures that allow human beings to understand reality—and 
sometimes to create what we take to be reality…[T]hey structure our 
ideas and concepts, they shape how we reason, and they even impact how 
we perceive and how we act. 
 
After Lakoff, CC makes the distinction between “conceptual frames” and “deep 
frames” (Crompton, 2010, p. 41).  Conceptual framing entails: 
 
…careful use of wording and phrasing such that an audience can be 
encouraged to focus on and communicate about (or obscure!) different 
aspects of an event, situation or policy…Particular word choices serve to 
activate frames that may be more (or sometimes less) helpful in terms of 
motivating behaviour associated with addressing bigger-than-self 
problems (p. 41). 
 
Lakoff’s description of ‘deep frames’ – likened to ideologies – seems to be rather 
more provisional (Crompton, 2010, p. 42):  
 
[Deep frames] are the most basic frames that constitute a moral world 
view or a political philosophy. Deep frames define one’s overall 
‘common sense’. Without deep frames there is nothing for surface frames 
to hang onto. Slogans do not make sense without the appropriate deep 
frames in place. 
 
Deep frames, we are told, “embed values in the question ‘how do I understand the 
world?’” (Crompton, 2010, p. 46).  Values are said to be connected to deep frames 
through the use of conceptual metaphor. It is therefore possible to connect certain 
clusters of related values through ‘mapping’ an easily understood “source domain” 
frame (they use the example of ‘family’ and its associations) onto a “less intuitively 
understood…target domain” that the ‘framer’ is interested in, such as climate 
change:  
 
‘[H]umans are a family and must face climate change together’, ‘poor 






The three binary pairs of deep frames worked up by CC are ‘self-interest | common 
interest’, ‘elite governance | participatory democracy’, and ‘strict father | nurturant 
parent’. If the saliency of a discourse based on the ‘commons’ and participatory 
democracy are self-evident to anyone interested in environmental and social justice, 
perhaps the strict father | nurturant parent is more abstract and needs unpacking.  
 
This pairing was developed from Lakoff’s work on constructions of the nation as a 
family (although primarily in a US context). In such constructions, we can envisage a 
strict father (state) whose role is to compete, provide for and protect the family in a 
paternalistic way. ‘Mapped’ onto the ‘source domain’ of environmental politics this 
means “the exercise of authority and control” (Crompton, 2010, p. 53). Conversely, 
the nurturant parent teaches empathy and respect for others which, mapped onto 
environmental politics, aligns with “social justice and empathy” (p. 53), and 
“intrinsic values”.  
 
The following passage creates the impression of a coalescing epistemic community, 
oriented more around normative belief in the applicability of a body of knowledge 
(cognitive science and psychology) to a particular area, than to an approach based 
entirely on empirical ‘rigour’:   
 
The development of these examples has been informed through extensive 
consultation with two experts in frame analysis and cognitive 
linguistics,… and an expert in values and behaviour…There is a high 
degree of subjectivity to the approach taken in the development of these 
examples, and future work should shift this frame analysis on to a more 
empirical basis (Crompton, 2010, p. 47). 
 
Turning to address the pedagogical implications of all this, one might ask, is the 
development of a ‘participatory democracy’ frame, not oxymoronic? If participatory 
democracy connotes transparency and social learning though dialogue, does this not 




communicators? It is to these issues I now turn. Brulle has already critiqued the 
democratic deficit in recognising the importance of cultural values, yet choosing 
framing, and essentially leaving the making-up of normative deep frames 
(ideologies) to cognitive scientists: 
 
[W]e need to move from relying on either of our parents, whether they 
are strict or nurturant. Rather, we need to leave home and learn to rely on 
ourselves as competent adults (Brulle, 2010, p. 94) 
 
Although  Brulle’s critique in many respects pre-empted mine, I think the issue is 
that his Habermasian understanding of civil society doesn’t go far enough. It is not a 
matter of either reaching rational consensus through participation, or moving frame 
analysis on to a more empirical basis. Rather, political articulation is a contingent 
power game, a “war of position”. Although it may be understandable for an 
assemblage of reformist organisations to avoid the loaded term ideology given its 
pejorative connotations (instead using ‘deep frame’ as an uncontentious proxy), 
frame theory has little to say about how such change efforts involve “a long process 
of self-conscious discussion, debate, and political education”, which necessarily 
grapples with “the relation between people’s material conditions or material 
experiences” and their cultural worlds (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, pp. 196-200).  
 
However, since discourse is inherently multi-vocal, recursive, and contingent, the 
agonistic approach gives a more coherent account of the relationship between 
structure and agency. Rather than making the space for antagonism and 
heterogeneity, what we get is a brand of scientism, which seeks to promulgate a 
woolly notion of the common good. On the one hand, CC legitimises their approach 
to values through emphasising the evidence base (Holmes, Blackmore, Hawkins, & 
Wakeford, 2011, p. 58). Yet, on the other hand, CC’s approach to framing rests on 
contested ideas about ‘core progressive values’,  the empirical credibility  of which, 
Brulle (2010, p.87) has already questioned. Moreover, CC acknowledges the 




47). Thus, CC gives the impression of a coalescing epistemic community, oriented 
around a belief in the applicability of expert knowledge (cognitive science and 
psychology) to cultural politics. Contested scientific insights cannot be simply 
superimposed onto communicative practices, as though they are free of latent and 
potentially contradictory political assumptions and beyond lay critique: the 
supplanting of matters of concern by supposed matters of fact is never a healthy sign 
for democratic politics (Pykett, 2012, p. 237). 
 
CC view the ethical implications as being solvable through co-production of such 
interventions, and democratising such knowledge of how to pull ourselves up by our 
species and overcome our bounded rationality. In effect, citizens may become ‘co-
producers’ of soft paternalist interventions (Jones, et al., 2011, p. 498): 
 
How can values-based communications and campaigns be delivered in 
compelling ways, inviting – and achieving – widespread participation, 
and exhibiting (in their design and execution) those values that they serve 
to champion? (Crompton, 2010, p. 25). 
 
How indeed: the analysis of values hints at awareness of spatial, historical and 
material contingency. Nevertheless, Lakoff’s framing theory, conjoined with a desire 
to map a universal progressive value base, and nurturing state metaphor onto 
environmental politics, reveals ultimately an epistemic community seeking to justify 
a normative orientation towards a reductionist cognitivism, when in fact (and as 
Brulle (2010, p. 87) has already noted in his analysis of Lakoff’s work), the empirical 
and theoretical basis of these claims is far from uncontested.  
 
The overcoming of the we/they distinction in matters of politics (and this is very 
much a matter of politics), is anathema to the political: power can never be bracketed 
out. I agree with Mouffe (2005, p. 121) when she argues that the drawing of a 
frontier between the legitimate and illegitimate is always a political decision. 




are not “the expression of universal morality” (p. 121). The consequence of thinking 
that they are is incompatible with the irreducible conflict of values, and as long as 
values remain universal, I agree with Mouffe (2005) that they remain an instrument 
of globalisation from above. Thus, we are at an odd juncture, where ENGOs are 
attempting to engage in adversarial politics through post-political means. 
 
A hybrid cognitive praxis combining the advocacy of participatory democracy with 
the behaviour and culture change technologies of soft paternalism has been 
developed at the overlap of the edges between CC and the TT movement. The more 
dialogical nature of cultural change hinted at in aspects of the CC literature are more 
fully developed in the literature of the TT movement, and the work of Rob Hopkins, 
who is identified by CC as being a key exegete of the ‘participatory democracy 
frame’. Accordingly, the cultural change theory of TT and its convergences and 
divergences in relation to CC are explored below.  
 
 
More edge work: Common Cause and 
Transition   
 
Psychological insight between Transition 
and Common Cause  
Like CC, “psychological insight” is also one of the main epistemological drivers of 
TT (Hopkins, 2008a, pp. 141-142). Unlike CC, narrative rather than frame is the 
primary cultural tool. In the earlier TT literature (Hopkins, 2008a), the primary 
‘psychological insight’ is a catachrestical application of the psychology of addiction 
to oil consumption. This idea is based on the ‘transtheoretical’ model of change 




in the TT literature by contributing author and popular psychologist Dr Chris 
Johnstone, who plausibly argues that it is possible to say we are addicted to fossil 
fuels if we define addiction as “stuck patterns of behaviour that can be difficult to 
change even when we know they’re causing harm” (p. 86).  
 
The value of this approach is that “recognising dependence allows you to anticipate, 
and deal with, the additional obstacles to change this brings…while pointing us 
towards proven strategies from the addictions field” (p. 86). Thus, at the early stages 
of transition initiatives, before any of the hands-on practical “reskilling” related to 
sustainable ways of working, there are a number of different stages of awareness 
raising, including pre-contemplation, contemplation and preparation in relation to 
climate change and peak oil (p. 85). There is also recognition that people may 
“relapse”. As a result, the empty signifier of Transition is now able to be articulated 
as a “twelve step plan” leading to the creation of an “energy descent action plan”. As 
Connors and McDonald (2012, p.567) observe, these 12 steps are now referred to as 
“ingredients” (Hopkins, 2011) in order to dampen the prescriptive connotations, yet 
those with “the mandate for issuing such directives” are those with experience and 
involvement in permaculture. Thus, those trained up in health psychology are 
charged with “making the addict aware of the degree of personal responsibility that 
breaking the addiction will require” (Miller & Sanchez, in Hopkins, 2008, p. 92). 
Also emphasised is a style of “therapeutic empathy”, seeking to “engage as well as 
educate” with the goal of enhancing “client self-efficacy or optimism” (p. 92).  
 
It was clear to me through key informant interviewing that this discourse was in fact 
being used enthusiastically ‘on the ground’, so to speak. The quotation below is from 
a Transition activist in urban Scotland, who referred to his initiative as a “grassroots 
community group” (activist, 2010):  
 
We started by doing a pilot project…and that went really well… [W]e 




then about twenty volunteers who were trained-up in energy efficiency 
and motivational interviewing, which is a behavioural change technique 
from health psychology, which is used to work with people who maybe 
want to stop smoking, have alcohol addictions or drug addictions and it’s 
a kind of person-centred approach. We’ve taken that and applied it to 
energy in a way and just a way of communicating with people that’s non-
directive and supportive.  
 
The questions I would therefore ask at this stage are: who wields the insights of the 
psychologist, and who is the patient? Are we all therapists, as well as addicts? To 
what extent does the psychologisation of change detract from, or stand in 
contradiction to, the notion of “Transition as an approach rooted in place and 
circumstance” (Hopkins, 2011, p. 73)? There is a construction of undifferentiated 
responsibility in such discourse that could have the potential to stigmatise people 
with less capacity to act. 
 
 
More recently, the psychological insights of CC have found their way into Transition 
discourse:  
 
Transition works because it cultivates intrinsic values. It is already 
showing that a cultural shift towards more intrinsic values is a shift that 
can inspire sustained change (Hopkins, 2011, pp. 75-76).  
 
The issue is that Transition as an intellectual idea comes from those who are already 
‘intrinsically motivated’ by virtue of their socio-spatial positionality and class 
position. More attention needs to be paid to this. In the same book, Tim Kasser 
(academic psychologist and CC collaborator), in dialogue with Hopkins (2011, p. 
46), speculates that localisation would provide people with more opportunities to 
enact intrinsic values, and by linking resilience to happiness, they develop a 
connection to the positive psychology literature, where resilience is understood as an 




resilience is seen as an important part of “optimism as a learnable skill” (Seligman, 
in Hopkins, 2011, p. 77).  
 
Again, this is where insights from discourse theory can be productively applied. 
These concepts deployed by CC and TT, we can position as being ‘in and against’ 
the “pedagogical state” (Newman, 2010) (see chapter two). One of the faces of the 
concept of a pedagogical state is ‘moral regulation’ (Newman, 2010), which can be 
read as a neoconservative response to the “crisis of cultural security” of the 
neoliberal polity (Green, 2007, p. 559). Another face of the pedagogical state is the 
‘repsonsibilisation’ of citizen subjects; meaning encouraging learning as a route to 
self-provision and self-management (Newman, 2010). 
 
Resilience, as a floating signifier emphasising the “bouncebackability” of individuals 
and communities, has, in the post-2008 context of austerity, become a key policy 
trope. Increasingly, insights from psychology are being deployed as state actors aim 
to teach citizens and families psychological dispositions to cope in tough times, to 
the exclusion of structural considerations (Harrison, 2013). ‘Resilience’ is therefore 
often used to justify maintenance of the economic status-quo, and as a justification 
for a shrinking public sector.  
Furthermore, in policy discourse, resilience is also articulated in the context of post-
9/11 “disaster pedagogies” woven into the fabric of everyday lives through security 
alerts, routines of securitisation, and media promulgation (Preston, Avery, 
Chakrabarty, & Casey, 2011). Combined with ‘community’ - another key signifier of 
TT – the so-called “absent-presence of race” becomes apparent (p.759): 
 
Community resilience is associated with ‘Dunkirk Spirit’ and ‘Britishness’. In 
interviews with policy makers…community resilience invoked themes of 
“localism and romanticised communities as sharing a collective (British) spirit 
of survival and counterpoised the metropolitan as anonymised and unsafe. 
“Race is therefore ‘absent’ in not being directly made, but always ‘present’ in 
terms of the racial associations which fetishized Britishness and stereotypically 





This is interesting because as we saw in the last chapter, the TT literature invokes 
precisely this kind of imagery in asking “can we learn anything from Britain’s last 
‘wartime mobilisation’ (Hopkins, 2008, p. 65) in order to link resilience for 
sustainability with relatable cultural mores. As climate change moves into the realm 
of ‘the political’, it is necessarily imbricated in a wider politics of economy, 
development, immigration, energy security and so on. Thus, the utility of ‘resilience 
thinking’ will rely on its ability to resist incorporation into hegemonic policy 
discourse. More generally, ‘community’ and ‘resilience’ – as well as being floating 
signifiers deployed with good intentions by – are policy prescriptions for the 
marginalised (Robinson, 2007; Levitas, 2005; Worley, 2005).  
 
This signals a key point in my argument. Psychological and therapeutic discourse on 
its own misses these nuances. Having personally discussed particularly the 
ambivalence of resilience with people involved in Transition, I have been careful not 
to misrepresent the particular way in which it is articulated by them. As I have 
conceded in conversation with activists obviously do not see their idea of resilience 
as part of a discourse of either austerity or cultural conservatism. Yet, this is to miss 
the point completely: the radical investment in ‘consensus’ and ‘open space’ – 
“whoever comes are the right people” (Hopkins, 2008, p. 168) – alongside the 
valorisation of ‘grassroots community’ as a representational strategy, leaves the 
movement vulnerable to co-option whilst obscuring actually existing power relations. 
Another consequence of the penchant for insights from psychology alongside a 
politics of consensus, is that such a position at its worst, tacitly colludes with 
neoconservative public pedagogies, which position confrontational activists as 






Can CC learn from TT’s use of narrative? 
Unlike the concept of framing in CC, “cultural stories “are the primary cultural tool 
in TT:   
 
The telling of stories is central to this book…Our culture is underpinned 
by various stories, cultural myths that we all take for granted…We need 
new stories that paint new possibilities, that reposition where we see 
ourselves in relation to the world around us (Hopkins, 2008a, pp. 14-15). 
 
The collective creation of place-based cultural narratives of the future underpins the 
creation of the strategic twenty-year action plans, from which participants “back 
cast” in order to achieve their goals (Hopkins, 2008, pp. 104-121). Haluza-DeLay 
articulates the pedagogical rationale of this clearly:  
 
[Ecological habitus] would be described backwards from the practices of 
living socially and ecologically well in place. [W]e can understand an 
ecological habitus as an expertise developed from a “sense of place” 
(2008, pp. 213-4). 
 
It has been demonstrated in environmental communication literature that narrative 
learning as a form of “border pedagogy” (Giroux, 1992) provides the scope for 
individuals to connect collective ‘matters of concern’ to their own situated and 
emergent sense of values (Vandenabeele, Vanassche, & Wildemeersch, 2011, p. 
183). As I have argued, border pedagogy is underpinned by a concern to render 
visible the shifting borders that “undermine and reterritorialize different 
configurations of culture, power and knowledge” (Giroux, 1992, p. 51). Ironically, 
this resonates with Transition’s adoption of the permaculture concept of the 
productiveness of the ‘edge’. However, Giroux’s (1992) idea of “border pedagogy” 
is connected to a form of politics, in which “agonistic confrontation is the very 
condition of the existence of democracy” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 29). Working at or on the 





Part of this risk involves addressing confrontation, not pathologically avoiding it. 
Thus, although telling cultural stories might add something to the cogntive praxis of 
climate activism that  framing doesn’t, the pertinent question is, who is telling the 
story, and who has been framed out? Given that the CC and TT literature lacks any 
sense of agonistic politics, I move on to offer some concluding thoughts about the 
obfuscation of power in both CC and TT.  
 
Conclusion: hidden politics, hidden power? 
In this chapter, I have interpreted the environmental movement as undergoing a 
process of meta-learning, through which various milieus are coming to question the 
‘cognitive’ in the cognitive praxis (Haluza-DeLay, 2008). Through applying this 
insight to the discourse of CC (and exploring overlap and dialogue with TT), I have 
also made the argument that this questioning of the Enlightenment subject positions 
each milieu ‘in and against’ the pedagogical state, as they seek to enact 
environmental governance through cultural interventions.  
 
Two significant differences between CC and TT are organisational form, and the use 
of framing and narrative as cultural tools, respectively. Regarding the first difference, 
it ostensibly appears as though TT has more democratic potential than CC, which 
despite its rhetoric, is inherently limited by the organisational structures of its core of 
professional campaigning organisations, depending on the mandate of donors. 
Therefore, the CC literature reads at times as though the organisations are making an 
argument for their own planned obsolescence. Regarding the second difference, the 
dialogical notion of cultural stories is pedagogically interesting, but limited without 
addressing power more directly.  
 
The main points of commonality between CC and TT are a sharing of insights from 
psychology and cognitive science, and their intentional avoidance of agonistic 




that their culture change theories attempt to provide empirical justifications for 
woolly political messages, which construct an undifferentiated ‘we’. Thus, the 
singular virtue of a discourse approach to the cultural politics of climate activism, is 
to argue that “agonistic confrontation is the very condition of the existence of 
democracy” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 29). Contested scientific insights cannot be simply 
superimposed onto processes of cultural politics.  
 
As a discourse theorist, my position is that there is no objectively accessible, 
transcultural, singular notion of the ‘Common Cause’; it is articulated through 
hegemonic struggle. This involves linking together struggles by making contingent 
and non-necessary radical investments, not striving to prove through science that the 
values of the political Left are all somehow intrinsically connected to one another 
through an incremental building of the evidence-base. It is perhaps important to 
reassert that there is a strategic component to this approach: for example, having the 
opportunity to speak to Tom Crompton at a roundtable at the Conference on 
Communication and Environment (2013), I asked if there wasn’t a contradiction 
between their approach to framing (Lakoff, 2010), which is admittedly subjective 
(Crompton, 2010), and their invocation of the size and reliability of the evidence-
base for their approach to values (Schwartz, 1994). His reply insofar as I could 
interpret it was that one must ‘play the game’ to be taken seriously in a wider 
landscape of evidence-based policy making, but that Common Cause is, in fact, 
about moving beyond issue specialism in the NGO landscape, connecting 
environmentalism with other social justice issues in a wholesale battle for hearts and 
minds, and opposing neoliberal values. He argued to participants that Thatcherism 
was first and foremost a cultural project, and that the Left needs tools to develop a 
cultural project of equal ambition (Personal field notes, Saturday 8
th
 June, 2013).  
 
From a discourse theoretical perspective, the crucial insight in this regard is that 
political identities are non-necessary, historically specific formations; refining the 




seems to either miss or disregard this point. Common Causes’s programme of 
‘framing’ brings in normativity in all kinds of ways, and necessarily so! It is not a 
mere issue of moving the analysis of frames onto “a more empirical basis” 
(Crompton, 2010, p.47). As Stuart Hall (1988) demonstrated, Thatcherism was 
successful because it articulated a number of disparate claims, interests and identities 
into a hegemonic project. The connections of the parts to the whole were not 
‘logically necessary’, but were ‘contingently obligatory’ (DeLanda, 2006). Thus, 
from a discourse theory perspective, the problem with the idea of the ‘Values 
Circumplex’ (Schwartz, 1994) as used by Common Cause, is that it re-enforces the 
‘organismic metaphor’ whereby intrinsic and extrinsic values are all somehow 
related and positioned in reliable and consistent ways as the logically necessary 
components of a whole.  
 
The intellectuals of Common Cause have generated a curriculum about culture 
change, producing educational materials such as the “Values and Frames 
Guidebook” (Holmes, et al., 2011), for anyone who is interested. In this way they are 
seeking to democratise the insights of behaviour change technologies, thus moving 
beyond the hegemony of expert advocacy so that citizen subjects become ‘co-
producers’ of such interventions (Jones, et al., 2010). My concern is that this 
approach to addressing democratic implications reduces cultural politics to 
promoting framing techniques and mindfulness skills. It is not that there is anything 
inherently problematic with this, but in the final instance, the notion of framing 
always assumes a passive end recipient. As a thought experiment, what would 
happen all people could be taught to ‘know their values and frame the debate’, as 
Lakoff (2004) prescribes? Would we not have an aggregate of individuals, all 
artificially sure of themselves, unwilling to be reflexive, unwilling to try to engage 
with ‘Otherness’ in its own terms? There is an odd combination of things going on 
here. First, I agree with critical theorist Robert Brulle (2010) that I’m not at all sure 
that this instrumental approach to communication can ever be compatible with the 




action were not incompatible, I disagree with Brulle and Common Cause’s 
assumption that consensus on the common good can ever be reached through the so-
called unforced force of the better argument.  
 
As an alternative, I have posited that Henry Giroux’s (1992) notion of ‘border 
pedagogy’ is useful. This position, amongst other things, recognises that since the 
representational practices of cultural politics never fully represent ‘the real’ - since 
they are marked by a constitutive lack – our ‘values’ are never self-evident to those 
with whom we engage, or ourselves. Thus, a border pedagogy would: (1) allow for a 
questioning of the political assumptions behind the territorial expansion of particular 
disciplines (psychology, cognitive science, behavioural economics, and even 
sociological theories of practice) themselves; (2) refuse to take an a priori stance on 
what the ‘Common Cause’ is to begin with; (3) recognise that the idea of ‘open’ or 
‘horizontal’ space is a non-starter, and ensure that representational strategies do not 
cloud our analysis of real power relations. The task for the cultural politics of climate 
change, as it is for all variants of cultural politics, is “[n]ot to overcome the we/they 
relation but how to envisage forms of construction of we/they relation compatible 
with a pluralistic order” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 115).  
 
Related to all of this this is the political economy of the formation of movement 
intellectuals engaging in such debates (Holst, 2002, p. 84). Such individuals are often 
academics, activists, and consultants at different times. Although they may be called 
‘movement intellectuals’ (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991), forming ‘critical 
communities’ (Rochon, 1998), their cultural work reflects a tacit class positioning, 
very different to the formation of organic intellectuals envisioned by Antonio 
Gramsci (Holst, 2002, p. 84). This is not to give a deterministic reading of class, but 
to flag up that the cleavage of the ‘political’ from the ‘cultural’ is concerning in such 
a context. For example, it is written that the “Transition Companion” is the product 





Although CC is aware of the need to address its organisational limitations, I would 
suggest that one possible answer would be a rebalancing of such organisations 
towards popular education and away from just advocacy. These tendencies in the 
case of Transition strike me as particularly concerning because of its representational 
strategy of asserting its ‘grassrootness’ using adjectives such as ‘open’, ‘leaderless’, 
‘non-hierarchical’, ‘rhizomatic’, and ‘learning network’ (Hopkins, 2011, p. 286; 
Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; Bailey, et al., 2010, p. 603). Thought of as expressive 
components of discursive-material assemblages, such discourse does not describe an 
anterior material reality. This calls to our attention the potential for such 
representations to become abstractions that obfuscate more arcane and distributed 
types of power Attention needs to be paid to how the capacity to contribute to the 
‘open network’ is dependent on intersecting factors such as available time, class, 
gender, race, education, versatility, cultural and social capital, relative mobility, 
financial resources, and so on (Nunes, 2005, p. 315; McFarlane, 2009, p. 567; Aiken, 















In chapter one I made the case that, in the context of climate change, the most 
significant educational interventions have often not occurred in formal educational 
settings, but can arguably be attributed to the activity of social movements.  Clover 
and Hall (2010, p.165) go so far as to contend that “[a]ll of us, no matter whether we 
are formally informed of the intricacies of climate change or not, have been learning 
about climate change because of the nearly thirty years of work done by activists and 
movements”.  
 
Be that as it may, a serious knowledge-action gap persists alongside a serious value-
action gap (Hulme, 2006). The reasons for this, as I explained, are complex; but as an 
education scholar, I began by addressing mental conceptions: climate change as a 
chronic problem – as a complex, emergent, autonomously functioning system – has 
exposed our species-level cognitive blind-spots (Marshall, 2007).  As an 
environmental-ecological issue, I argued, following David Harvey (1996; 2010), that 
arguments made about climate change “are complex refractions of struggles being 
waged in other realms” – including institutional arrangements, labour processes, 
social relations, technologies and organisational forms – which play out in our 
situated experience of everyday life. I have argued that important consequences 
follow from this, in asking what role education has to play in climate change, and 





One consequence, I argued, is that, in the context of climate change, social 
movement milieus challenge society’s lopsided ‘learning capacity’, through the 
promulgation of insurgent discourses. Thus, I argued, the dominant discourse of 
Ecological Modernization (EM) frames the issue of climate change in such a way as 
to make the issue seem tractable through processes of “innovation and policy 
learning” where “rational and responsive institutions learn, adapt, and produce 
meaningful change” through technological advances, advances in organisational 
form, administrative arrangements, and market mechanisms (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 
685). Insurgent discourses critique such processes as components of a technocratic 
project with three problematic dimensions:  
 
[T]hey focus on efficiency and efficacy but have little to say about issues 
of social justice; they seem to be spatially contingent and to generate 
patterns of uneven geographical development; and they appear to recreate 
a neoliberal hegemony (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 699). 
 
The second consequence follows from this one: effective education about the causes 
of, and solutions to, climate change (conceived in terms of our relation to nature) 
must engage with issues of culture, space, and political economy. This means an 
emergent curriculum able to move lithely between the abstract (the agglomeration of 
codified and translated empirically- based knowledge that is global climate change) 
and the concrete, spatially situated, cultural politics of daily life. This involves the 
development of a relational imagination capable of connecting localised 
epiphenomena to systemic phenomena. As a cultural issue, I am reminded of 
Raymond Williams’s (1989 [1958]) maxim that ‘culture is ordinary’. And thus, the 
task is to make the abstract as ‘ordinary’ as possible. In fact, in opening the thesis, I 
explicated ‘culture’, arguing, after Williams, for a view of culture that encompasses 
the “social psychological” (“the sets of values, beliefs, and meanings that individuals 
carry” (Earl, 2004)), the symbolic/semiotic, and the material, where culture is 
particular ways of life, situated in time and space (Earl, 2004, p. 510), without being 




politics as a process of public pedagogy is about reading and writing the word and 
the world.  
 
To put it simply, I argued that activist milieus are increasingly coming to the explicit 
realisation that, whilst climate activism must make a difference, its cultural 
consequences are equally important. Thus, I argued that climate activism has sought 
to catalyse the dialectic between the cultural politics of everyday life and the political 
culture of governance institutions. Through engaging in cultural politics (DA, 
community, and professional) activists have generated a kind of public curriculum 
for both activists and the wider public. This ‘curriculum’, I argued, itself reflected 
different the cognitive regimes of these three milieus of activism (Jamison, 2001). In 
fact, through movement praxis, as the dynamics of cultural change have become a 
substantive knowledge interest, these different milieus begin to explicitly reflect their 
different understandings of this process. Different ideal typical ‘modes’ of climate 
change communication – agonistic pluralism, public participation, and social 
marketing (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012)  – can be mapped as crude types onto the 
cultural politics of these milieus.  
 
In chapter two, I situated all of this ideational-cultural work in the wider frame of 
public pedagogy; the reason being that climate change as a complex emergent system 
is deeply intertwined with another complex emergent
x
 system: capitalism. Our 
current system of production, consumption and exchange, is driven by the largely 
autonomous logic of capital, which, as new social movement theorists have long 
argued, increasingly encroaches into our daily ‘lifeworlds’, and reproduces itself 
through our ‘mental conceptions’ of the world (meaning worldviews, ideologies, 
cultural values and norms). Thus, I argued that the public pedagogies generated 
through climate activism are necessarily polemical; positioned ‘in and against’ the 
“pedagogies of everyday life” (Luke, 1996), the ‘state’, and against ‘neoliberal’ and 





I argued in this chapter that people are not merely ‘interpellated’ by ideology in the 
sense that they can be described as being in a state of false consciousness. Rather, 
both climate change and capitalism are complex, emergent, autonomously 
functioning systems, governed by discursive-material processes, and ‘logics’ that do 
not only surpass the intentions of persons and networks, institutions and 
organisations, cities and states, but human agency in its entirety, even if these 
phenomena can be causally attributed to humanity.
xi
 Often, we misidentify causes as 
a result (greedy bankers and CEOs), or become frustrated when even experts can 
only speculate about the links between observable tangible weather effects and 
climate change: the victims of our own ‘bounded rationality’, as behavioural 
economists would say. Additionally, I would suggest that as a species, we also are far 
more aware of the contradictions between our so-called ‘objective’ beliefs – that 
climate change is an immediate and urgent threat, and that an economic system based 
on the imperative of infinite 3% compound growth annually is patently unsustainable 
in the long term – and our everyday behaviours than Marxist theories of false 
consciousness would suggest. The implications of all of this, I think, are very 
important, and I will go on to unpack them in the next section, but for now, I move 
on with the recapitulation. Ultimately, the purpose of chapter two was to submit that 
the public pedagogy of climate activism is entangled in hegemonic politics, whether 
this explicitly acknowledged by climate activists or not.  
 
In chapter three, I suggested that understanding the public pedagogy of climate 
activism in the context of movement learning, required two co-implicated theoretical 
strands: a coherent theory of social movements, and a coherent theory of learning. 
Thus, in this chapter, I explored the contributions of three significant cultural 
perspectives–new social movement theory, framing theory and discourse theory– 
thinking through their consequences specifically in the context of climate activism 
and the character of the learning it may generate. This was important because the 
tensions between each theoretical approach reflect tensions within and between the 




valuable insights which could be drawn from these various strands, but that, for my 
purposes, the agonistic approach to cultural politics found in discourse theory was 
the most promising approach, both analytically and normatively.  
Once I had set up the problems and research questions motivating the thesis, couched 
my investigation in the wider body of work concerned with public pedagogy, and 
justified my use of discourse theory through an exploration of relevant theoretical 
understandings of social movements in relation to climate change and social 
movement learning,  I moved on to outline my research methods, which involved an 
operationalisation of discourse theory. Working with a dialogical and recursive 
understanding of discourse, my approach has been to construct a research model 
capable of exploring the intertextual links between activist milieus (Hansen, 2006), 
and the process of diffusion of such movement knowledge into polysemic arenas of 
public discourse from 2005-2011. As such, my corpus consists of ‘self-produced’ 
movement texts, including books, pamphlets, website material, blogs, alternative 
periodicals, civil society research (or ‘grey literature’ as it is sometimes called), press 
releases, as well as popular press articles. Through operationalizing the theoretical 
postulates of discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987), I have explored how 
cultural milieus have attempted to link particularistic ‘claims’ in chains of 
equivalence, whilst distancing themselves from others, in order to legitimate their 
cultural projects. Working with textual reifications, and understanding them as 
curricular artefacts conferred certain advantages, but also imposed limitations. One 
obvious major limitation of my approach was that I could, in fact, say very little 
about the power relations behind the production of such texts, and therefore, one 
could be in danger of reading such texts as though they somehow represented the 
‘voice’ of particular milieus. I will expand on the strengths and limitations of this 
study later in this concluding chapter. 
Chapters five, six and seven were the substantive examinations of the cultural 




pedagogical artefacts. In writing these chapters, I have tried to maintain a narrative 
thread, whereby the dynamic tensions not just within but between such cultures of 
activism would be made evident. In stepping back to think about what can be learned 
from these chapters, I will now move on to revisit the research questions delineated 
in chapter one. First, I address each culture of activism in turn, and then I seek to 
synthesise these insights by making clear the unique theoretical contribution made by 
applying discourse theory to an analysis of the cognitive praxis of climate activism 
more generally. In moving on to address my initial research questions below, I 
should reiterate that the theoretical utility of discourse theory can be analytically 
divided into two strands: first, as a resource for analysing the unfolding political 
articulations of particular identities in particular moments; and second, as a 
theoretical resource with normative implications for an adequate conception of the 
political, which begins with the insight that the justification and assertion of values 
are the result of articulatory practices suffused with power.  
 
What are the cultural politics of direct action in 
relation to climate change? What curriculum is 
generated through this cultural politics? 
 
Out of all three imbricate but distinct cultures of activism explored, direct action 
against climate change most overtly retains an agonistic conception of cultural 
politics, and its spatial interventions reveal the obvious materiality of cultural 
struggle. Firstly, in order to move from the mere dislocatory moment (by definition a 
moment of indeterminacy, where contingent events cannot be represented by existing 
structures) towards ‘antagonisms’, which represent germinal discursive responses, 
new chains of equivalence had to be sutured together around the notion of ‘Climate 
Action’. Firstly, this involved the articulation of acts of resistance against polluters, 




the repertoires of contentious politics, which sought to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
common struggle. This was at once a mobilisation strategy and a pedagogical move, 
which sought to disrupt the articulation of Climate Action through Ecological 
Modernization, by contesting neoliberal and corporate public pedagogies, 
highlighting spatial contingency, and articulating the concept of climate action into a 
broader identity based around tackling interlocking systems of oppression. 
 
Climate Camps represented attempts to highlight the absurdities of concrete 
geographical developments in their emergent particularity, set against abstract 
institutional rhetoric of climate protection. Attempted expressions of worthiness, 
unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly, 2004), through the assembling of bodies, and 
of heterogeneous interests and identities, demonstrated the practical and political 
obstacles in the way of creating spaces for an oppositional cultural politics. This was 
cultural politics in a material sense, not merely in the social psychological sense of 
‘behaviour change’ experts. To speak with Lefebvre, these interventions sought to 
directly challenge the production of space. Thus, the distinctly agonistic strategy of 
‘defining the enemy’, was an integral part of the public pedagogy of DA. To speak 
with Giroux (1992), the CCA also enacted a ‘border pedagogy’ in the way that it 
sought to ‘de- and re-territorialise the accepted geographical boundaries of political 
discourse, moving lithely in scale between the local, national and global, not to 
mention moving translocally and transnationally. Through a public pedagogy of 
defining the enemy, the CCA sought to uncover the messy connections and 
complicities, which had been disentangled by neoliberal public pedagogies invoking 
the reified generalities of ‘nation-state’ and ‘market’. 
 
Nevertheless, all of this activity generated pressures, both internal and external, 
which took their toll on the movement. I made the distinction between ‘intended’ and 
‘collateral curriculum’. ‘Collateral curriculum’ occurred through the reactive 
articulation of a narrative of meta-protest, as the ‘coercive’ political power of the 




structures to confer identity on social actors through articulating a coherent discourse 
on climate change eventually revealed the ugliness and arbitrariness of state-
corporate power through the use of systematic surveillance, violence and legal action 
(c.f. Gramsci, 1971).  
 
However, even at this point, the coercive component of state power in the repression 
of protest, required hegemonic practice to legitimise its arbitrariness (Gramsci, 
1971): to this end, it is clear that post-911 disaster pedagogy constituted part of the 
hegemonic cultural politics as the identity of climate activists was articulated into a 
chain of equivalence with ‘terrorists’ and racialised Others, though the murky legal 
legitimacy lent to a discourse of ‘domestic extremism’.  
 
This signifier of ‘domestic extremist’ itself is the product of a ‘unipolar world’ 
(Mouffe, 2005); of a political system in which there is no room for ‘adversarial’ 
politics, thus instead making ‘enemies’ of those who find themselves excluded from 
post-political or ‘Third Way’ (Fukuyama, 1992; Giddens, 2009) institutional 
arrangements operating as though ‘we/they’ relations have been surmounted. This 
reaction to the attempt to foment a populist collective response to climate change, is 
the product of a quasi-Enlightenment rationalism endemic to our political and 
academic institutions, fixated on the relationship between the normal and the 
pathological (Laclau, 2005). Here, once again, it is worth pointing out the difference 
between ‘social logics’, operating according to procedural logics and rules 
circumscribed by what Foucault called ‘discursive orders’ operating at the ‘ontic’ 
level, and the contingent logic of ‘the political’, operating at the ‘ontological’ level. 
It is because hegemonic totalities cannot be derived logically at the conceptual level 
that they require a radical investment in a lack that has more to do with affect than 
rationality. Once climate change enters into the realm of ‘the political’, this is 
unavoidable. Given the history of the pathologisation of protest (see chapter 3), this 




because there are such strong grounds for exposing the irrationality of the status quo 
compared with the rationality of their position.  
 
Thus, as far as internal pressures were concerned, as the empty signifier of Climate 
Action grew to include more actors and articulate links between more claims, the 
tensions between the Habermasian ideal and an agonistic conception of the political 
became obvious. This was because the  goal of testing the ‘validity claims’ of 
modernity through direct action, and being on the side of science and reason was 
incredibly alluring to the movement, particularly as this attempted to combine the 
epistemic legitimacy of climate science discourse with the institutional legitimacy of 
legal discourse, in order to justify the moral necessity of direct action.    
 
The agonistic deficit manifested itself internally in the CCA in another fashion. The 
internal organisational knowledge of the camp was predominantly articulated around 
a discourse of ‘horizontalism’ and deliberative democracy, such that the space to 
express substantive political antagonisms was systematically reduced. If was felt by 
some more ostensibly radical activists, that direct action was morphing into dramatic 
lobbying, as horizontalist consensus decision making structures became conflated 
with an absence of substantive political positions. ‘Horizontalism’ and its sister ideal 
‘spontaneism’ are themselves nodal points around which diverse struggles in the 
global justice movement have articulated themselves, and since the CCA forms part 
of the same genealogy of dissent, such concepts were assumed in climate camps. 
Since, the cultural politics of Transition also share this in common with the CCA, I 
will address the implications of horizontalism from a discourse theoretical 
perspective separately. For now, it will suffice to say that such tensions, were 
generative of praxis, from which movement intellectuals produced an analysis of the 
fetishiziation of carbon. Thus, the valorised role of the activist and direct action was 
brought into question, through an engagement with situationist thought. This was 
educative to activists to the extent that it forced reflection upon the need to act, their 




Secondly, the analysis of a fetishisation of carbon, drawing on Marx’s analysis of 
commodity fetishism, sought to critique the way in which spatial contingencies are 
eradicated through throwing all emissions (regardless of where these are on the 
sliding scale of survival or luxury emissions) into relations of equivalence with one 
another through market mechanisms. Although the mediatisation of direct action was 
an important channel of public pedagogy, this analysis questioned the wisdom in the 
view that simply working activities such as flying into a wider narrative with climate 
change constitutes success. It showed that attempting to block supply-side emissions 
at source, may be necessary, but it was by no means sufficient. This actually 
suggested a need to pay closer attention to the intricacies of culture as a social 
psychological phenomenon in the context of climate change. It also suggested a need 
to address not just institutional arrangements, but the practices of daily life as the 
locus for cultural politics. With this, I move onto the cultural politics of 
relocalisation.  
 
What are the cultural politics of relocalisation in 
relation to climate change? What curriculum is 
generated through this cultural politics? 
 
To simplify the above, the CCA was externally agonistic, but internally preoccupied 
with consensus. To express this in cognitive praxis terms, whilst the ‘cosmology’ 
was anti-capitalist and anarchistic, the ‘organisational’ knowledge interest was 
Habermasian. However, what has become clear is that these foundational means/ends 
distinctions do not withstand much scrutiny.  
 
The cultural politics of Transition also obviously seeks to enact elements of a 
Habermasian cultural politics, albeit eschewing an externally agonistic dimension. 




open space decision making, as well as promulgating practical skills related to the 
development of appropriate technologies for living, reflects the wider cognitive 
praxis  of ‘community environmentalism’ (Jamison, 2001). To understand Transition 
as a response to a dislocatory moment, I have shown that one must first understand 
Transition as part of an attempt of the environmental movement as a whole to 
articulate a historic break with itself.  
 
Transition as an empty signifier, has always been promising as well as problematic 
from the outset, as it has been able to articulate a vast array of floating signifiers in 
chains of equivalence able to appeal to a very wide range of interest and identities, 
thus adapting quickly to change. I argued that it is primarily problematic when its 
very identity relies on direct action as its ‘constitutive outside’; that is as its Other 
which both ensures its identity in the first place and denies its final suture. Movement 
intellectuals have argued that the Transition approach is not actually against direct 
action, but rather argues for the functional separation of both approaches. My 
argument, drawing on discourse theory, is that this assumed seperability is premised 
on the fantasy of power-free social relations (whether at the micro, meso, or macro 
scales as a wealth of feminist scholarship has long since argued). Moreover, I argued, 
such reasoning leads the Transition approach down a path of tacit complicity with  
neoconservative public pedagogy which  attempts to articulate direct climate action 
into a chain of equivalence with other forms of ‘domestic extremism’.  
 
Transition as a fundamentally open-ended idea, sought to move beyond just ‘Climate 
Action’ by linking it with concerns about ‘peak oil’, the importance of a sense of 
‘place’ and ‘community’ and perhaps most significantly the concept of ‘resilience’. 
As an alternative empty signifier to ‘Climate Action’, ‘Transition’ was able, through 
its ‘theory of anyway’ (i.e. these are the things we would do and values we would 
espouse even if climate change were no longer an issue), to maintain relevance post-






A key part of my argument was that resilience is an important “floating signifier”. 
And as Laclau (2005, p. 132) argues, “the 'floating' dimension becomes most visible 
in periods of organic crisis, when the symbolic system needs to be radically recast”. 
As I argued, the fact that this is resolved through hegemonic struggle seems to have 
eluded most of the Transition movement’s intellectuals to-date. In other words, 
intended use of concepts becomes irrelevant if one is not willing to engage in a wider 
terrain of struggle for those concepts. This, I would contend is its key weakness. 
 
 As a flexible concept, resilience refers to the capacity of a self-organising system 
(whether person, community, city, ecosystem and so on) to adapt and learn in the 
face of change, whilst retaining its core functions and identity. As I explained in 
chapter six, one of the most important contributions of Transition was to shift the 
cognitive praxis of environmentalism by displacing the notion of sustainability with 
that of resilience (Hopkins, 2009). At community level this means diversification and 
modularisation at where it makes sense and is viable (predominantly in relation to 
energy production, economy, food production) in order that feedbacks are tightened 
and communities are thus not so susceptible to sudden macro-structural shocks 
(whether economic or to do with energy supply and the availability of imported 
commodities.  This approach resonates with urbanist Jane Jacob’s (1985) concepts of 
import replacement and inward substitution of skills.  
 
Thus, rather than engaging in overt systemic critique, Transition is more concerned 
with enacting an affirmative translocal micro-politics. Its holistic and optimistic 
approach to cultural politics is thus partly borne of its genealogical origins in the 
‘cosmology’ of permaculture, and its catachrestical application of organismic 
metaphors onto the realm of politics and cultural change. However, some approach 
Transition in a different way, abandoning the organismic metaphors for an approach 





In this context, some movement intellectuals (Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; Aiken, 
2012) have posited that the non-essentialist philosophy of Deleuze is a productive 
intellectual base for the movement. This very much suits the movement’s 
philosophically pragmatic suspicion of theoretical purism, instead favouring a 
process of ‘what works’ and social experimentation.  If something works, it spreads 
locally, and throughout larger national, regional and global networks connected 
through the internet. In this way, the Transition movement can be considered an 
overarching emergent assemblage of other learning assemblages. Moreover, in this 
sense learning is then conceived of as a process of ‘translation’ between  imbricate 
domains, forcing us to think relationally about how the spaces through which 
knowledge moves hinders, facilitates, amplifies, distorts, contests or repackages it  
(McFarlane, 2011, p. 365).  
 
As I argued in chapter 6, ‘community’ is also one of the key nodal points around 
which the notion of Transition is articulated. The cultural politics of Transition is 
emergent, multiple and changing, but one where the reconnecting with a sense of 
place, and therefore “learning to dwell” is considered vital (McFarlane, 2011). 
(Re)connecting with place finds Transition’s cultural politics at the intersection of 
culture as social psychological, and as material – as a complete way of life 
(Williams, 1989 [1958]). In this sense cultural politics draws attention to how 
Transition’s pedagogical dimensions are to do with the “education of attention” 
(McFarlane, 2011). Yet, Transition culture aims to go beyond this by fostering a 
relational sense of place – as an unfinished product (Massey, 2005), always in a state 
of becoming (Aiken, 2012). Nevertheless, as I argued, questions remain around 
mobility and uneven geographical development, which overly simplistic 
prescriptions for affective ties with one’s ‘place’ do not get at. In this context, 
Transition Culture would do well to engage with a wider community development 





However, in  cognitive praxis terms, this is where the ‘technical knowledge’ interest 
emerges as appropriate technologies or living, in terms of sustainable scale, can only 
be generated through the en masse ‘re-skilling’ of local communities. This is not 
purely ‘technical’, but rather is socio-technical because it is seen as involving the 
unlearning of tacit cultural values and norms that reproduce themselves through our 
habitual everyday practices.  
 
Hence the perceived importance of local communities envisioning cultural 
narratives, in which ‘resilient’ communities are “described backwards from the 
practices of living socially and ecologically well in place” (Haluza-DeLay, 2008, p. 
213). The Transition identity is forged through constructing cultural narratives, 
which “indicate a possible future” and “bring life to the past” by articulating a 
coherent cognitive praxis exemplifying sustainable technologies, skills, and forms of 
social interaction (Hopkins, 2001, p. 230). If this is one cultural tool, another is to 
apply “insights from psychology” to the question of what motivates change. 
However, there has been a question mark over what ‘insights’ are the right ones? 
Thus tensions opened up between social marketing and intrinsic motivation.  
 
The logic has been that if a cultural movement as significant as Transition is not to 
be doomed to marginality, it must be something that people want to do. This is why 
Transition draws upon the psychology of addiction, segmenting, positive 
psychology, and the social psychology of Common Cause (see next section).  None 
of this on its own is pernicious. What is more troubling is when all of these elements 
are keyed to a wider project of Transition, into which one makes a radical 
investment. Transition is borne of a frustration of the rate-of-change being too slow. 
This seemingly has driven the opinion that radical negativity and critique do not 
move us forward in that respect. Yet, what I am arguing is that the movement’s 
failure to see that there is no ‘beyond hegemony’ is what may in the end either 
confine it to marginality, or see it co-opted back into hegemonic discourse. This is 




particularly when understood psychologically as a component of “optimism as a 
learnable skill” (Seligman, in Hopkins, 2011, p. 77). Moreover community resilience 
can be part of a discourse of shoring up boundaries and cultural insidership. In this 
respect, it is important for Transition Culture to realise that it does not exist in a 
cultural vacuum. Community, resilience and even peak oil can all be articulated into 
neoliberal discourse as well as neoconservative discourse, and this floating 
indeterminacy is only resolved through struggle.  
 
This, as I argued, is particularly concerning when articulated alongside what is in 
cognitive praxis terms, an ‘organisational’ knowledge interest preoccupied with 
‘openness’ and ‘consensus’,  because it obscures more insidious, arcane and 
distributed forms of power. There is a recognition of conflict as natural, but it seems 
to be regarded as something to be anticipated and micro-managed through processes 
of respectful communication and emotional awareness, rather than something which 
structures the fabric of social relations in a productive way.  
 
In Transition, some have advocated using social marketing techniques and crude 
framing techniques. At times it has drawn on the ‘Value Modes’ approach (see 
previous chapter), which actively advocates pressing ‘hot buttons’ that is, drawing 
people in though appealing to ‘extrinsic values’. This has existed alongside a wider 
‘cosmological’ instinct to change people’s worldviews completely. The desire to 
make Transition something that is intrinsically motivating has been developed 
substantially by professional movement intellectuals from Common Cause. With 







What are the cultural politics of professional 
activism in relation to climate change? What 
curriculum is generated through this cultural 
politics? 
 
Common Cause, as a professional culture of activism, is most directly located ‘in and 
against’ social marketing and behaviour change technologies. It is ‘against’ because 
it seeks to directly contest the values and norms of the ‘market society’ (Sandel, 
2012), which some commentators have accused behaviour change technologies of 
merely reproducing by addressing people as individual consumers (Webb, 2012). In 
cognitive praxis terms, its ‘cosmology’ is ostensibly anti-neoliberal, with influences 
from communitiarian virtue ethics (drawing upon Michael Sandel’s critiques of the 
market society). It is ‘in’ because it seeks to apply, in cognitive praxis terms, 
technical-practical knowledge from psychology, cognitive science, and behavioural 
economics to the domain of culture change. In essence, CC has bought into the idea 
that one can ‘do’ cultural politics like science.  
 
As a discourse theorist, my position was that there is no objectively accessible, 
transcultural, singular notion of the ‘Common Cause’; it is articulated through 
hegemonic struggle. political identities are non-necessary, historically specific 
formations; refining the evidence-base in order to provide a rational route map to 
cultural change simply seems to either miss or disregard this point. I move on below, 
to briefly address the issue of dialogue across these cultures of activism, before 






What dialogue can be observed across these 
activist cultures, and where it exists, has it 
been generative of praxis, and thus social 
movement learning? 
 
Let us begin with common ground: what the cognitive praxis of Common Cause, 
Transition, and the Camp for Climate Action have in common is an internal 
‘organisational’ knowledge interest informed by Habermasian notions of ‘open 
space’, ‘horizontality’ and ‘consensus’. Transition initiatives use ‘Open Space 
Technology’, Climate Camps are premised on consensus-decision making, and 
Common Cause clearly believe that Transition (Crompton, 2010, p.57), and the CCA 
(Holmes, et al, p. 47) are models of participatory democracy to aspire to. Indeed, an 
ethnographer of, and participant in, the global justice movement (from which the 
Climate Camp emerged) has argued that horizontalism enjoys the status of a 
“Kantian regulative idea” hovering over actual networks and open spaces which are 
“only partial actualisations of the idea they make possible” (Nunes, 2005, p. 297). 
This is illustrated clearly in the expert below from Common Cause:  
 
While in practice participation [in the CCA] was inevitably limited by 
factors such as available time, mobility and experience, in principle the 
decision-making process was open to all, and encouraged direct 
participation on a horizontal democratic basis (Holmes, et al, 2011, p. 
48).  
 
Yet, issues of available time, mobility and experience go to the heart of the matter. 
They should not be casually inserted as caveats. So, how do we understand the logic 
of such statements? Understood in the Kantian sense as an infinite approach towards 
the ideal, one could argue that the only political option is a vacillation between a 




distance” (Butler, et al., 2000, p. 233). Neither of these seem like good options. 
However, this vacillation disappears if we understand ‘horizontalism’ as a partial 
object in which a radical investment is made (Laclau, 2005, p. 235). This radical 
investment in horizontal/open spaces allows for mutual learning and translation to an 
extent. However, time will tell whether or not actually existing structural exclusions 
occurring within cultures of activism will create dislocations which question the 
ability of horizontalism to define the horizon of collective struggle.  
 
Despite a dialogue between these cultures of activism, which suggests a unanimous 
agreement regarding the principle of applying consensus approaches to 
communication to internal practices, each culture of activism interprets these 
differently, and the tension between agonism and rational consensus plays out in 
different ways. The CCA sought to demonstrate the incoherence of a neoliberal 
approach to climate governance through targeted interventions aimed at establishing 
networks of complicity and identifying specific actors as responsible parties.  As 
such, the movement intentionally and inadvertently built up quite a list of adversaries 
(see appendix 5). A difference between the CCA and both Transition and Common 
Cause, is a tacit faith in the rationality of an adversarial approach. I have suggested 
that this dimension was overemphasised as a reaction to the pathologisation of direct 
action protest historically. Common Cause maintain an antagonistic dimension but it 
is expressed rather abstractly as opposition to the tacit values and norms of a market 
society. Transition meanwhile are de facto against neoliberalism, but choose 
strategically to eschew antagonism altogether.  
 
A difference between both Transition and Common Cause compared against the 
CCA’s approach is a quasi-refutation of the Western Enlightenment subject. It is 
‘quasi’ in both instances because in spite of what is stated, there is a tacit belief in the 
efficacy of expert behaviour change technologies, only used to ‘fight the good fight’. 
As I have argued, it is obvious that many people operate in more than one, or all of 




culture might be most effective by remaining functionally separate to a degree. Yet, 
this has generated considerable debate and intellectual praxis. The big mistake to 
make, as some activists have pointed out, is the failure to see that antagonism and 
power are both productive and also intractable. Direct action activists have helped to 
make this point, through dialogue with Transition activists whilst the cognitive praxis 
of Transition and Common Cause have devoted more intellectual resources to 
understanding the psychological drivers of culture change. Dialogue between 
Transition and Common Cause has led to a degree of epistemic drift between both 
cultures: activist-intellectuals from ENGOs with better institutional access than direct 
action networks are able to establish contacts with sympathetic academics. 
Knowledge produced in this milieu is often ‘used on the ground’ in community 
initiatives. I now move on to consider what I have learned about the concept of 
cognitive praxis in general.  
What can be learnt about the cognitive praxis of 
climate activism? 
 
Beyond cognitive praxis? 
Discourse theory has provided me with a powerful theoretical and philosophical 
resource for critically examining how cultures of activism have, in their own ways, 
attempted to reassert a relationship between structure and agency through their 
cultural politics. I have demonstrated this through explaining how the time period 
under examination has produced dislocatory moments arising from attempts to 
articulate the concept of climate protection into hegemonic discourse, based on a 
mixture of technocratic managerialism and faith in markets. Although these 
dislocatory moments have been constitutive of new activist cultures, they 
nevertheless “remain conditioned by existing ideological traditions and 




what is available and credible (Howarth, 2000, pp. 121-2). More than this, I contend 
that the very application of central tenets from discourse theory – particularly, an 
agonistic concept of the political based particularly on Laclau and Mouffe’s radical 
reworking of hegemony – to the cultural politics of climate activism, represents a 
unique theoretical contribution both in its application to the empirical material at 
hand and through the way it challenges the new common sense of consensus.  
Through analysing the evolving cognitive praxis of environmentalism, what I have 
found surprising is the sheer extent to which an agonistic conception of cultural 
politics approach has been marginalised by the hegemony of consensus.  
Although it is true to say that the ‘cognitive’ in the cognitive praxis has been 
reflexively challenged by movement intellectuals, a false novelty has been attached 
to the disruption of the Eurocentric enlightenment ideal that this entails. Indeed, it 
seems that as particular movement intellectuals discovered the ‘bounded’ nature of 
our rationality, they projected this discovery onto others as though it was a 
consequence of the theorising and evidence base generated through  psychology, 
behavioural economics, and cognitive science, thus ignoring the profound 
contributions to epistemology  made by at least a generation of feminist, 
poststructuralist and critical theorists.  
 
This is why, to grasp what is really at stake within the current cultural politics of 
environmentalism, it is useful to revisit the debates between non-essentialist, 
contingent agonistic theories of democracy and the rationalistic Habermasian belief 
in universal values as necessary to humanist metanarratives of emancipation. The 
new cultural politics of environmentalism, after Habermas, “believes that the defects 
of the Enlightenment can only be made good by further enlightenment” (Giroux, 
1992, p. 49). It is, to borrow a turn of phrase from theorist Levi Bryant, about 
“‘bootstrapping’ ourselves out of the limitations of our cognitive architecture” 




‘meta-learning’, which clutches to a belief in the humanist narratives of adult 
education (Mezirow, 1995) as applicable in the domain of climate change. 
 
The problem arises when culture becomes cleaved from politics, as a positivistic 
scientism comes to serve the quest for a cosmopolitan, post-political and universal 
value core adequate to the scale of the ‘wicked problems’ we face. As I have argued, 
the single most important argument from discourse theory, which can be applied 
here, is that because there is no foundational ‘people’ or ‘identity’ that can be 
constructed through essentialist presuppositions, the precarious stability of the social 
is non-necessary and shot through with power. Therefore, the commitment to ideals 
of social justice and radical democracy require that we acknowledge that antagonism 
is constitutive of the political, and abandon “the dream of a reconciled world that 
would have overcome power, sovereignty and hegemony” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 130). 
 
It has become apparent to me that an agonistic approach is increasingly anathema to 
the new common sense of environmentalism, yet this is precisely why it is so 
important a contribution to knowledge. The non-necessary nature of the social entails 
a hegemonic politics of articulation, through which power can never be bracketed, as 
it is necessary to the temporary stability of any socio-political order. As I have 
sought to demonstrate, cultures of direct action, relocalisation and professional 
environmentalism all enact public pedagogies through articulating chains of 
equivalence. Each culture of activism has achieved this in two ways: in each case, 
the mobilisation of actors with diverse interests and identities, through a pragmatic 
multiplication of tactics and strategies, required the construction of empty signifiers. 
These are necessary but impossible representations needed in order to bring together 
such heterogeneous ensembles. Here they were calls for ‘Climate Action’, 
‘Transition’, or appeals to a ‘Common Cause’ of ‘Intrinsic Values’.  As argued in 
chapter three, the pedagogical element involves the work of filling such empty 





What about political economy? 
Adult educator John Holst (2002, p. 84) has argued from another, more explicitly 
Marxist perspective, that the notion of cognitive praxis is flawed because “Eyerman 
and Jamison “virtually ignore the political for the cognitive, thus leaving themselves 
open to an overemphasis on the ideal and not the material…[T]heir dependence on 
Habermas…taints their perspective” (Holst, 2002, p. 84). This would be a fair point 
were it not based on such a careless reading: Eyerman and Jamison (1991, p. 62) 
explicitly state that they use Habermas heuristically to represent tensions between 
different kinds of knowledge making, and not transcendentally. In fact, in a manner 
remarkably consonant with the position of discourse theory, one of the theory’s 
originators Andrew Jamison (2001, p.41-2) clearly states that cognitive praxis 
understands “ecological culture as an ongoing set of both social and cultural 
processes that contain both elements of both thought and action, and which are both 
ideational and material”.  
 
However, I think that Holst does have a point when he argues that “Eyerman and 
Jamison’s lack of political economy is evident in their conceptualisation of 
movement intellectuals” in their analysis of environmental and civil rights 
movements (Holst, 2002, p. 84). As a discourse theorist, I obviously take issue with 
the notion that the proletariat is an organic category (derived from a dialectical 
reading of capitalism) and that this category is the a priori privileged agent of 
historical change.  
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, such individuals in the world of 
climate activism are often academics, activists, and consultants at different times. 
Although they may legitimately be called ‘social movement intellectuals’ (Eyerman 
& Jamison, 1991), their cultural work reflects a tacit class positioning. As I argued, 
the severing of the ‘political’ from the ‘cultural’ is concerning particularly when 
ideas of grassrootsness are constantly invoked as a representational strategy. 




“means that virtue, knowledge, wisdom and everything else reside with the 
grassroots. And those who are not in sight of the grassroots are classified as elites 
and academics” (Holst, 2002, p.94). This despite the fact that almost all of the 
intellectuals in the climate movement are university educated, and many of them 
move lithely between activism and the academy. Second, to think that a ‘Common 
Cause’ can be brought about through cognitive re-framing, ignores that “the 
particular political economic context of NGOs forces them into fragmented, 
politically limited projects” (Holst, 2002, p. 94). Instrumental representational 
strategies are OK, so long as we do not end up deceiving ourselves. For movements 
to truly engage and mobilise, educational efforts are needed which don’t wilfully 
neglect how “power relations between participants rooted on [sic] structural 
inequalities” shape cognitive praxis, and engage with how power dynamics and 
structural, spatial, temporal constraints “intersect in setting up the boundaries of 
‘insidership’ and ‘outsidership’ (Estevez, 2008, p. 1934). Finally, I would like to 
finish by re-examining temporal urgency, which seemed to be a strong theme 
throughout.  
Implications for climate change education: the 
temporal dynamics of meta-learning 
 
From the outset, I have been at pains to emphasise that the public pedagogies of 
climate activism are positioned against neoliberal public pedagogies (Giroux, 2010). 
As such, activist-intellectuals have sought to advance cultural strategies, which 
suppress self-interest frames in favour of a discourse of the Commons. That activist 
milieus have actively recognised that this places culture in a position of strategic 
importance is a progressive and necessary step. I have recently heard this referred to 
in environmental communication circles as ‘re-commonsing’ our discourse. The 




‘recommonsing’. As sociologist Ann Mische (2008) has forcefully argued, 
democratic discourse requires, not unconstrained communication, but the “strategic 
suppression of situationally potent identities”. In a sense, as I argued, the Transition 
movement has recognised this, as it has sought to create a discourse, which 
strategically suppresses partisan discourse in favour of creating ostensibly ‘open 
spaces’ for Habermasian ‘bridging’ rhetoric and Dewian problem solving rhetoric, as 
opposed to Gramscian positioning (Mische, 2008). Yet, as Ann Mische also 
recognises, and as I argued, successful democratic communication relies on activists 
who have, by virtue of their overlapping membership of several groups in networks, 
learned the tacit skill of how to alternate between more agonistic, more problem 
solving and more deliberative modes of communication in a reflexive manner. 
Antagonism is constitutive of the political and the exercise of civility and reason in 
the public sphere is a utopian vision. The ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 1979) 
must be recognised as just that – an ideal – lest its emancipatory claims become 
oppressive. This requires reflexivity and being able to differentiate between strategic 
attributions of ‘openness’ and ‘horizontality’, and believing one’s own hype, so to 
speak. Thus, I feel that the following statement on climate change communication 
sums up my position well:  
 
Though not simple, the answers have to involve increased pluralism in 
addressing climate change at all stages of political life. But rather than 
expecting consensual deliberation, one should expect agonistic 
pluralism…[A]ntagonism…is in fact a condition of democracy, not an 
obstacle to it…What are the means for and the implications of applying 
agonistic pluralism to climate change? Designing spaces and mechanisms 
of expression for a wide range of views on the problem, including those 
in disagreement with hegemonic discourses, would be required (Peterson 
& Carvalho, 2012, p. 318). 
Designing spaces and mechanisms is indeed a central problematic. Whether through 
creating such spaces in local communities, or through the spatial interventions (the 
‘invented’ spaces) of direct action, and through consensus-based decision making, 




I see it, is time. If democratic politics can be understood metaphorically as a ‘jogo de 
cintura’ (Mische, 2008, p. 355) – a reflexive swing of the hips - then it dances to its 
own beat; a different, and slower beat than the drum of capital accumulation, and 
certainly, a different beat than the drum of the global climatic change.  
In exploring the cultural politics of climate change, I have sought to tell a story: the 
degree to which it convinces, and perhaps more modestly, is compelling (regardless 
of its veracity) is for the reader to judge. As a piece of written research, there is no 
master’s view from nowhere: my own hermeneutical reading of events and texts is 
necessarily partial, situated, and a simplification of a messy reality. Nevertheless, I 
will simplify and abstract from the messy entangled events even more here, for the 
sake of perspicuity.  
Direct action, community and professional cultures of activism have their own 
genealogies, histories and their ‘cognitive praxis’, or ‘identity’, is constituted through 
their own distinctive actor-networks. As cultures of direct action have sought to 
‘speak truth to power’, their agonistic approach has been derided by other cultures of 
activism for alienating the wider public, valorising the ‘activist’ role (the kind of 
social justice version of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’) at the expense of ‘everyday life’, 
being unhelpfully focused on problems and conflict rather than solutions and 
opportunities, and preventing action through ideological retrenchment in a context 
where we are constantly reminded that we have no time. 
A time-limited situation, as we all are aware, requires pragmatism. So what works? 
Well, relocalisation movements have argued that we must make engaging with 
systemic issues as quotidian as possible. This must mean a cultural politics 
embedded in communities of place. So far, so good. We must also make the 
argument that engaging collectively in creating a sustainable future is more 
rewarding, beneficial and fun than not engaging (thus, tackling the free-rider problem 
discussed in chapter 3). This has resulted in a strategy of suppressing “situationally 




my opinion, is a pernicious elision between ‘starting where people are at’, and an 
evacuation of power and politics from the discourse. 
Lest we forget that the personal is political, and that power manifests itself in 
seemingly mundane situations, I argued, drawing on such diverse resources such as 
the empirical sociology of Ann Mische, the education scholarship of Paula Allman, 
Henry Giroux, and Paulo Freire, and of course, the work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, that antagonism must be a part of our educational discourse: a 
language of possibility (an optimistic pedagogy of place) must presuppose a 
language of critique (a critical pedagogy of place). I fear that if such approaches do 
not address the unexamined effects of their own rhetoric, then they are doomed to 
marginality at worst and bland compromise at best, again in a context in which we 
are repeatedly reminded that we have no time.  
Considering all of this, the Transition movement, and the ENGO sector, has not been 
beyond applying ‘social marketing’ approaches to their work either. Thus, audiences 
have been ‘segmented’ in identity campaigns, through which activists have sought to 
appeal to people’s image, or their pocket, as incentives for adopting ‘green’ 
behaviours. This tactic, it was thought, may play a part in gaining buy-in in the short 
term. As people adopt particular green behaviours, these may be seen as the thin end 
of the wedge for opening people up to climate-friendly policies. Yet, pushing the 
debate forward yet again, the Common Cause coalition (and the TT movement) have 
drawn on social psychology (Schwartz, 1994) literature to suggest that social 
marketing appeals to self-interest  are indeed counter-productive in the long-term 
because they only inadvertently serve to reinforce the hegemonic self-interest values 
that we are rallying against. Meanwhile, those who advocate the ‘Value Modes’ 
approach, argue that we have no time to reorient the values of society at large.  
As a result, we are in a tricky situation, with no obvious answers. We have a complex 





Table 15 Competing temporal dynamics in the climate change debate. 




The slow time of 
democratic dialogue 
(whether consensus-
based or ‘agonistic’). 
The ‘fast-time’ of 
digitally networked 
movements 
Social movements exist in hybrid public spaces between 
network time and in physical spaces, which seek to 
escape the time/spaces of capital accumulation.  
We may be able to seek technological solutions through 
crowd sourcing, but can there be a rapprochement 
between network time and the slow-time of democracy? 
The global 
climate  
The scientific language, 
and reality, of feedback 
loops and tipping points 
speak to a time limited 
situation in which to act. 
Actual changes in 
climate do not occur on 
a time frame consonant 
with the risk perception 
parts of our cognitive 
architecture. 
 
Disjunction between objective threat and our perception. 
Climate change is not concerned with the slow 
temporalities of democratic politics, or the temporal 
filters through which we perceive ‘reality’. 
Capitalism  ‘Fast-time’, ‘network 
time’: the ‘annihilation 
of space through time’.  
The temporal dynamics of capital accumulation have 
changed the way we work, and socialise, and have 
indeed blurred the line between the two. Network time 
overstimulates our evolved attentional capacities, and 
thus physically disciplines and exhausts us, so that we 
have time for political thinking, deliberation and debate. 
Network time has trapped us within a recursive loop in 






It is the third row in the above table that I would like to draw attention to.  As stated 
in chapter two, the pedagogies of neoliberalism operate in a particular disembodied 
temporality: the preoccupations of network time affect our subjectivities and drain 
our cognitive energies. In my opinion, activist public pedagogies need to contest this, 
but also to acknowledge it explicitly. This, I would contend, is part of the learning 
that needs to take place. I do not claim to have any easy answers here, but I have 
recognised that there is another temporality that must be added to the mix, and of 
which we must be aware as we continue to learn.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, we can say that we have embodied and disembodied 
temporalities. We already know, and it is already well-documented in the climate 
change communications literature, that the disembodied temporality of climate 
change tests our evolved, embodied, temporal perceptions. In one sense, we have to 
act quickly and collectively as a species to forge global agreements that would be 
effective. Yet, the disembodied temporality of climate change does not square with 
our embodied temporal perceptions of risk. Whilst top-down interventions will not 
be effective in the absence of democratic participation, deliberation and agonistic 
democratic encounters operate according to embodied temporalities. Thus, we are 
faced with the question of whether or not we have time for such lofty democratic 
ideals (Giddens, 2009).  
 
Yet, on the other hand, simply ‘slowing down’ can be considered counter-hegemonic 
(Bommel & Spicer, 2011; Hartman & Darab, 2012). Prefigurative movements can be 
understood as an attempt to operate outside of these temporalities. This prefigurative 
‘slow time’ is important in the autonomous spaces of the CCA, as well as in 
Transition initiatives. Indeed, it is a arguably a defining feature of contemporary 





Occupied spaces created a new form of time, which some in the camps 
characterized as a feeling of ‘forever’. The routine of their daily lives was 
interrupted; a parenthesis was opened with an undefined time horizon  
 
I think that it is important to recognise explicitly that this is the case. It is not the 
case, I would argue, that people are blinded by an ideological veil: our agency is 
structured to an extent by the temporalities of capital accumulation. Driven by 
technological and thus organisational change, this has important consequences for 
daily life, labour processes, institutional arrangements, but ultimately, our embodied 
cognitive and affective processes. Increasingly, this will force the development of 
meta-cognitive capacities. This also requires that we recognise the differential 
endowment of these capacities. Thinking of our relation to nature, the relocalisation 
movement is right to say that such temporalities are dependent on our ability to 
consume the energy of fossilised sunlight in every aspect of our daily life. Thus, one 
way or another, our worlds will get smaller.  
 
Yet, retreat to the local in absence of scaled-up action is not enough. In the so-called 
“information age” it seems that climate activists don’t just seek to produce 
alternative hybrid spaces between place and flow, but that intellectual praxis for 
collective action relies on both the fast time of digital learning networks, and the time 
outside the “tyranny of the moment” (Erikson, 2001). To my final point. Agonistic 
pluralism arguably would help us to move beyond the impasse of consensus 
approaches to climate politics. Yet more than this, agonistic pluralism expressed as 
border pedagogy may be not useful, but necessary, since any climate policy ignoring 
the poor and marginalised is bound to be ineffective. Climate activists could learn 
from those least equipped to act that, who already know most about the “tyranny of 
the moment” in day to day life, as Paulo Freire observed. Yet, this itself must 
become a “generative theme”, from which the duelling temporalities of climate and 
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Appendix 1 Timeline of the Camp for Climate Action. 
Date Event Targets Reason Example 
July 2005 G8 Protests, Gleneagles. 
The camp emerges from 






Symbol of democratically 
unaccountable neoliberal 
project. The focus on 
climate change emerges 
partially from political 
opportunity. Tony Blair 
champions communique 
on climate change backed 
by the Royal Society.  
“When we first got 
involved with the Climate 
Camp, a few months before 
the Drax camp in 2006, it 
had a very distinct radical 
feel to it. In its stated 
principles, government and 
markets were regarded as 
the problem that we needed 
to tackle, and the camp was 
to be a festival of grassroots 
resistance – much alike the 
Horizon eco-village that 
was the base for hundreds 
of British anarchists and 
their international allies 
during the Gleneagles G8 
summit a year earlier”  
 
(‘Open Letter’ written by 
climate camp participants, 
reproduced in 








CCA Drax, Yorkshire 
 
 
(Plane Stupid East 
Midlands Airport) 
 













The UK’s single-biggest 
emitter of CO2 and a 
symbol of the 
unsustainability of coal as 





“Last summer's Camp for 
Climate Action saw 
hundreds of people take 
direct action against Drax, 
the country's largest coal-
fired power 
station…Within weeks, 
Greenpeace had staged a 
similar action at Didcot 
power station, the country's 
second largest source of 




    
dozen people were arrested 
after blockading a runway 
at Nottingham East 
Midlands Airport, and 
Plane Stupid, the country's 
first anti-aviation direct 
action group, took off”. 

















6’ occupy smokestack and 









proposed building of a 
third runway at Heathrow, 
and therefore the 
expansion of aviation, 
serving short-term 
economic interests. 
Capacity built from Plane 




Camp for Climate Action, 
an annual gathering of 
hundreds of environmental 
campaigners from disparate 
groups, will take Plane 
Stupid's lead and spend 
eight days campaigning at 
Heathrow, somewhere they 
say is responsible for 31m 
tonnes of     carbon 
emissions a year - more 
than many countries, 
including Peru, Cuba and 
Croatia. 'People can't now 
contemplate flying without 
contemplating their impact 
on the climate,'  
(Interview with CCA 



















EOn proposed the 
building of a replacement 
coal-fired station. The 
current station is to cease 
generation in 2013 due to 
EU pollution laws.  
[The proposed station] will 
emit between six and eight 
million tons of CO2 every 
year. More than the 
projected emissions from 
Heath-row's planned third 
runway. 
To undertake such a project 




contentious, and both the 
company and the 
government have been 
striving to make the case 
for Kingsnorth. The 
arguments centre around 
"the energy gap", spreading 
the fear that "the lights will 
go out". As with 60 years 
ago, the government is 
driven by it's concern over 
"energy security". Whilst 
the company is driven by 
the need to generate a 
profitable return for its 
institutional shareholders. 
But this time the situation is 
different. The negotiations 
have been made public, and 
at the Climate Camp people 
are demanding that "climate 
security" should be put 
before shareholder return, 
and that "energy security" 
can be achieved by other 
means than by burning coal. 
And to demand that the 
proposed new power station 
at Kingsnorth should not be 
built. 
(Platform activist James 









Proposed expansion of 
Aberdeen Airport 
supported. The expansion 
is supported by Donald 
Trump because of his golf 
course project. 
One  protester, Jonny 
Agnew, 22, from 
Edinburgh, said: "The 
reality is that our 
generation's future is 
vanishing so that people 
like Donald Trump and his 




into Aberdeen for a round 
of golf. The expansion of 
this airport just cannot go 
ahead." 
(Churchill 2009, The 
Herald) 






This is a symbolic centre 
where the trade in carbon 
markets is facilitated. The 
crisis of finance capital 
caused by ‘toxic assets’ 
provides a discursive and 
political opportunity to 
highlight carbon markets 
as a false solution.  
The CCA protest 
dovetailed with a larger 
‘Financial Fools day’ on 
April 1st, organised in the 
wake of the financial 
crisis and set against the 
background of the G20 
meeting. 
This signals a subtle 
narrative shift for the 
CCA as it widens to join 
with emerging anti-
austerity coalitions. 
Climate Camp in the City 
on 1 April is all about 
reclaiming power from 
politicians. It's about people 
taking their future into their 
own hands, not leaving it 
up to those who continue to 
be enchanted by the 
"magic" of the markets. 
Carbon trading is the 
embodiment of this. It is 
nothing more than the 
proposition of creating a 
market to solve a problem - 
climate change - caused by 
the relentless pillage of our 
planet by the marketers. It 
is immoral and it doesn't 
work. It's the next sub-
prime. 
So if the G20 want to avoid 
the entire world giving up 
on government, they will 
need to produce a solution 
to climate change that is not 
just another business 
opportunity but a moral 
imperative. 
 
(CCA organiser Kevin 
Smith, in Taylor et al 2009, 
Observer) 
 




August  Vestas wind turbine 




workers made redundant 
through lack of demand. 
The notion of Just 
Transition enters the 
narrative. 
locals, environmentalists 
and labour campaigners 
are all working together 
reflects how important 
this occupation is. It's 
vital to the factory 
workers and their 
families, it's vital to the 
local economy, and it's 
vital in the fight to avert 
climate disaster. The 
Vestas wind turbine 
factory must be saved. 
(CCA press release 
2009) 
 








Camp was set up in June 
2010. In August the camp 
was opened as an 
educational space for a 
week following the CCA 
model.  
The camp opposes the 
development of the open 
cast mine because of the 
unsustainability of coal 
and also because of the 
effects of local 
environmental injustices. 
"We've heard so much talk 
from the Scottish 
Government. On the one 
hand it's great that they 
want to have the strongest 
climate bill in the world, 
but it's all just talk if, on the 
other side, they're 
expanding the coal 
industry. 
"It's a complete 
contradiction." 
(CCA organiser, in Watt 
2009, The Herald) 
 










The camp continues to act 
as an edcautional space in 
which the links between 
financial crisis and 
climate change can be 
thought through. Also, the 
camp acts as a training 
ground for Ratclife-on-
“This year we are camping 
in London because we want 
to demonstrate and talk 
about the links between the 
crisis happening to our 
climate and the financial 
crisis and capitalism. We 















Soar and activists 
intending to travel to 
Copenhagen.  
are decisions and practices 
that are made and enacted 
in centres like the city of 
London, and that we cannot 
divorce the problems of 
environmental damage 
from the economics of 
endless growth that is 
pushed by the City” 
(CCA letter to residents, 
2009) 
 
October CCA Ratcliffe-on-Soar Eon’s coal-
fired plant in 
Ratcliffe-on-
Soar  
In an online vote, Eon’s 
Ratcliffe-on-Soar plant is 
chosen as the site. It is 
chosen because it is one 
of the largest CO2 
emitters in Britain.  
If we don’t turn around our 
emissions now – so that 
they start to get smaller - 
climate change will spiral 
out of control well within 
our lifetimes. 
Small personal steps and 
letters to MPs are 
worthwhile, but they’re 
obviously not enough, 
because things aren’t 
changing – the government 
is still planning new coal 
power stations, which is a 
total no-brainer bad idea 
when it comes to the 
climate 
Our politicians and the 
political systems we have 
are failing us. There’s too 
much big-industry money, 
too much fear of change, 
too much political capital 
tied up in the carbon 
economy to make lobbying 
MP’s enough to meet a 
challenge of this 
magnitude. 









The COP15 counter- 
mobilisations were are 
thoroughly transnational 
affair with ENGOs and 
anti-capitalists all 
claiming Climate Justice 
and North South 
coalitions forming 
amongst both the 
reformists and radicals. 
Climate Campers formed 
alliances in wider Climate 
Justice networks to stress 
the democratic deficit 
inherent in  the talks and 
highlight alternatives. 
“Copenhagen offers a 
unique opportunity to meet 
like-minded activists from 
across the globe…"Amidst 
all the depression as we 
start to doubt whether 
politicians are really going 
to come up with anything," 
says Kevin Smith of 
Climate Camp, "it's really 
inspiring to look at what the 
activists are getting on 
with." 
The most confrontational 
demonstrations look likely 
to kick off with two major 
actions by Climate Justice 
Action, a global network of 
activists and groups that 
aims to shut down 
Copenhagen Harbour on 13 
December. Three days later, 
once the world leaders have 
finally arrived, it wants to 
take over the UN 
conference itself and turn it 
into a "people's summit". 
"Because the talks are 
collapsing, people are 
thinking they might listen 
to us," says Ed Thompson, 
a British activist travelling 
to Copenhagen. "There will 
be thousands of activists 
there, and a lot will be 
willing to commit acts of 
civil disobedience “ 
(van der Zee and Barkham 









Owners N-Power, plan to 
build four new coal-fired 
power stations in the UK, 
as EOn drop out.  
The single greatest threat to 
the climate comes from 
burning coal…Ed Miliband 
recently announced plans to 
allow the construction of 
four new coal plants... N-
Power is behind 2 possible 
plants..As we close old 
coal-fired and nuclear 
power stations in the next 
decade we will lose 
capacity currently 
providing around a quarter 
of our electricity 
output…According to 
Europe’s leading 
independent energy experts, 
Poyry, if the UK was to hit 
these existing renewables 
and efficiency targets, there 
will be no ‘energy 
gap.’..Labour came to 
power, carbon dioxide 
emissions have actually 
increased and this can be 
attributed in large part due 
to ‘the roll to coal’ as well 
as increased aviation 
emissions. 
(CCA press release 2009) 
2010 
August  
CCA Royal Bank of 
Scotland HQ, Edinburgh 
RBS HQ, 
Edinburgh 
RBS is targeted in order 
to make the link between 
its investment practices in 
environmentally 
destructive projects, - 
particularly Tar Sands 
extraction in Alberta, 
Canada -  climate change, 
and the effects on First 
Nation communities and 
the devastation of local 
ecosystems.  
We were told the banks 
were too big to fail. Now 
the very same people 
demand austerity from us 
while lending cash to 
climate change criminals... 
In the past year the Camp 
for Climate Action, along 
with the UK Tar Sands 
Network, has been 
organising with First 
Nations communities from 




The public ‘bail out’ of 
RBS is used as an 
opportunity to resonate 
with ordinary people, and 
highlight the democratic 
deficit. 
involvement in what is 
being called ‘the world’s 
most destructive 
project’…RBS..underwrote 
loans to companies 
operating in the tar sands, 
to the tune of more than 
$7.5 billion. Since the 
initial government bailout 
of UK banks in October 
2008, RBS has 
underwritten corporate debt 
and equity worth nearly 
$2.5 billion to tar sands 
related companies. This is 
an enormous investment of 
taxpayers’ money in an 
energy pathway that is 
taking us to the cusp of 




‘Metamorphosis’ of the 
CCA into new forms 
n/a Activists meet and decide 
to discontinue the large-
scale ‘squatted camps’ 
model  in order to build 
alliances with the shifting 
politics of austerity and to 
use the capacity and 
material resources more 
efficiently. 
In 2011 the climate science 
is as strong as ever – and 
the need for action on 
climate change never 
greater – but the political 
landscape is radically 
different. As a movement, 
to be relevant, we need to 
move with the 
times….  With the skills, 
networks and trust we have 
built we will launch new 
radical experiments  
As the financial crisis 
unfolded we moved to 
directly targeting the root 
cause of airport expansion 
and coal-fired power 
stations: our economic 
system. 
 But many worried that 




mass squatted action camps 
in antagonistic locations – 
would become ineffectual. 
. We therefore held a week-
long ‘retreat’ type event at 
Monkton Wyld in Dorset to 
figure out what to do.  
Over six days, about 70 
people shared their 
experiences and critical 
reflection. We should not 
pretend that these 
discussions were easy. We 
talked about the limitations 
of an organisational model 
built to plan one camp a 
year, when we now have 
both the will and capacity 
to do much more. We 
discussed how other 
movements and groups 
have responded to changing 
circumstances in the past to 
learn from those 
experience?... How do we 
best grow a climate justice 
social movement that is 
relevant, vibrant and 
successful over the next 
few years? What 
organisational structures, 
consistent with our desire to 
tackle hierarchy, will take 
us to a new level of 
participation and action? 
(CCA 2011: n-p) 
“Activist Mel Evans is 
looking forward to what 
happens next: "Climate 
Camp was always about 
more than just climate 




















political and economic 
context for climate change, 
and people from Climate 
Camp are now addressing 
those issues through UK 
Uncut and dozens of other 
campaigns. It may not be 
called Climate Camp any 
more, but the methods and 
the values will carry on." 






Appendix 2 List of pilot interviews undertaken. 
Position 
 
Organisation Date of interview 
 




 May 2010 
 
Community development worker Community development 
organisation working with 




 May 2010 




 May 2010 
Direct action practitioner and 
popular educator 
CCA; Plane Stupid;  So We 
Stand; Workers Climate Action 
29
th
 May 2010 
Full-time researcher and 
development officer for 
Transition 
Local Edinburgh Transition 
Towns initiative  
1
st
 June 2010 
Communication and New Media 
Officer (part of Common Cause) 
Friends of the Earth Scotland 2
nd
 June 2010 
Head campaigner for climate 
change (Part of Common Cause) 
Oxfam Scotland 7
th
 June 2010 
Popular educator; Project Officer Scottish Education for Action and 
Development; Community 
Recycling Network Scotland 
8
th
 June 2010 
Director  Take One Film (film organisation 
that links filmgoers with activist 
communities and organisations 
tackling climate change issues) 
8
th
 June 2010 
Prominent activist, campaigner, 
speaker and author on peak oil 
and climate change 
Independent by affiliated with 








Appendix 3 Newspaper sources consulted 
 
Transition Towns newspaper coverage (2005-2011) 
Newspaper Title  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total  
The Aberdeen Evening Express       1 1 
The Aberdeen Press & Journal   1 5 15 22 10 53 
The Berwickshire News    1 1 3  5 
The Carluke & Lanark Gazette   1  1   2 
The Daily Mail     1    1 
The East Lothian News     2 2  4 
The Edinburgh Evening News  1 5 3 4 12 6 31 
The Express      1  1 
The Glasgow Evening Times    1  2 2 1 6 
The Guardian   4 7 6 3 1 21 
Hawick News    1 3 4  8 
The Herald 2  2  1 1 1 7 
The Independent     3 1 2 6 
The Mirror   2   1  3 
The Observer   4 2 1  2 9 
The Paisley Daily Express    1    1 
The Scotsman   2 4 1 3 2 12 
The Southern Reporter    1 3 3  7 
The Telegraph   1 2 1 2  6 
The Times   3 6 4 6 2 21 
Combined annual total 2 1 26 34 48 66 28 205 
 
Camp for Climate Action newspaper coverage (2005-2011) 
Newspaper Title  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total  
The Aberdeen Press & Journal   7  1   8  
 
The Carluke & Lanark Gazette     2 1  3 




The Daily Record     3 4 2 9 
The Edinburgh Evening News     2 12 1 15 
The Express     8 5 3 16 
The Glasgow Evening Times      2 4  6 
The Guardian  1 34 40 118 15 22 230  
Hawick News         
The Herald   2 1 8 15 1 27 
 
The Independent  5 28 16 29 6 7 91 
 
The Mirror  1 9  12  3 25 
The Observer  1 5 10 16 1 1 34 
 
The Scotsman   5  14 20 3 42 
 
The Star      2  1 3 
The Sun      7 1 8 
The Telegraph   16 6 15 5 1 43 
 
The Times       2 2 
 


























Appendix 4 Attitudes towards climate change in the UK  
 
Overview 
This appendix draws on survey and polling data and supplements it with relevant research evidence, in 
order to provide an up-to-date overall picture of climate change attitudes and beliefs. It should be 
noted that specifically Scottish data was scarce and that the data predominantly refers to Britain or the 
UK as a whole. This appendix is slightly adapted from a briefing note I produced working in 

























Belief in climate change 
 In 2008, around one in ten people in Scotland were not convinced that climate is changing 2013 data suggests 
that scepticism has increased with around one in five people not believing that the climate is changing. 
 
Concern about climate change 
 Concern about climate change has decreased from 2008 to present. However, around 6 in 10 people in the UK are 
concerned.  
 In comparison, British people are roughly twice as concerned about energy security as they are about climate 
change. 
 
Immediacy of climate change 
 Since 2008, the proportion of people regarding climate change as a problem  for the future has remained around a 
fifth. In 2013, around 6 out of 10 people think that climate change poses an immediate threat to the UK. Close to 
a half think it will have a big impact on them personally (43%) and their local areas (47%).  
 Flooding generates the most concern in the UK and is linked to increased certainty about climate change and 
belief that something can be done. 
 
Responsibility for tackling climate change  
 Around 7 out of 10 people think they have some kind of responsibility to tackle climate change, but national 
government remain overwhelmingly regarded by the public as having the most responsibility to act.  
 
Attitudes towards sources of information 
 Outside internet searches, government publications and websites were cited as the most popular source of 
information on climate change. This is not matched by trust in such sources.  
 Trust in friends and family is relatively high.  
 Distrust outweighs trust across media sources but tabloids are the least trusted and the BBC and ‘quality’ 
newspapers are the most trusted sources. Scientists remain the most trusted sources. 
 
Drivers of attitudes and beliefs 
 Increased scientific certainty has not led to a long-term increase in the public’s certainty and concern about 
climate change.  
 There is evidence to suggest that the single biggest driver for concern and belief about climate change is the 
economy. 
  Economic conditions notwithstanding, media attention, coupled with issue advocacy by political elites are the 




This appendix covers four main areas related to climate change attitudes and beliefs.  
 
 Section 1 examines different aspects of climate change scepticism.  
 Section 2 looks at concern about climate change.  
 Section 3 looks at how immediate, or otherwise, people perceive climate change to be.  
 Section 4 examines attitudes around responsibility.  
 Section 5 examines sources of information and trust in them.  
 Section 6 concludes by drawing on research evidence seeking to understand what drives 
changes in concern and belief.  
 








     
 Despite the increasing scientific certainty of anthropogenic climate change5, the 
most reliable evidence suggests that climate scepticism is on the rise. 
 
 In terms of general trend scepticism in climate change, in 2002 only 5% of Scots 
were of the opinion that the climate was probably or definitely not changing
6
. In 
2008 SEABS found that only 9% of Scots were “not convinced that climate change 
was happening”. Although there is no comparable data for Scotland since this 
period, figure 1 suggests that for the UK as a whole, disbelief in climate change has 
increased and is currently at its highest level at 19%. 
 
                                                          
5
 IPCC (2013) 
6

















Source: Poortinga, et al. (2013). NB:  TS= trend scepticism:  
% responding ‘yes’ to “as far as you know, do you 
personally think that the world’s climate is changing”. 
IS=impact scepticism: % agree that “the seriousness of 
climate change is exaggerated”. AS=Attribution scepticism: 
% think that “climate change is entirely/mainly caused by 








 ‘trend scepticism’ (TS) refers to lack 
of general belief in climate change. 
 
 ‘attribution scepticism’ (AS) refers to 
lack of belief that people are causing 
climate change. 
 
 ‘impact scepticism’ (IS) refers to a 
belief that the predicted consequences 






 Evidence suggests that impact scepticism has actually decreased, with a statistically 
significant drop of 6 percentage points since 2010 of people thinking that the 
seriousness of climate change is exaggerated (figure 1). 
 
 Meanwhile, attribution scepticism has remained relatively constant with around a 
fifth of people believing that climate change is entirely/mainly caused by natural 
processes (figure 1). The proportion of people holding the opinion that it is caused 




We can either measure concern by asking direct questions about climate change or by 
assessing its importance relative to other issues: by both measures, the best available 
evidence suggests that concern over climate change has dropped since 2008 (figures 2 and 
3).  
 
Figure 2 Proportion concerned (asked directly)
 7
            
 
 Between 2010 and 2013, the 
proportion either ‘fairly 
concerned/concerned’ about climate change 
dropped significantly by 8 percentage 















                                                          
7 Sources: Poortinga, et al. (2013), DECC (2013), Ipsos Mori (2013). NB: Proportions for each year based on annual means of 
data taken from the UK/ERC tracker (Poortinga, et al., 2013), the DECC (2013) public attitudes tracker and 2013 attitudinal 
research by DEFRA (Ipsos Mori, 2013). All sources based on nationally representative samples of the British population. All 
















Figure 3 Relative importance of climate change
8 
 An alternative measure is to ask 
people what issues are the most important 
to them
9
, unprompted, and without the 
research being couched as 
‘environmental’ to participants.   
 
 On this measure, relative concern 
for climate change has also dropped 
(figure 3). The percentage difference 
between Scotland and Britain over this 
period is statistically significant, i.e. scots 
have tended to rate environmental 
concerns/climate change of slightly 



















                                                          
8 Available from: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2440&view=wide;  
Ipsos Mori Scottish public opinion monitor. Available from: 
http://www.ipsosmori.com/contactus/offices/scotland/scottishpublicopinionmonitor.aspx. NB: The question asks what people 
think are ‘the most important issues facing Britain/Scotland today’ 
9 However, the wording of these issue importance questions potentially generates artificially low responses for climate change 
because of the way the questions are worded. For example, the questions generally ask what are the most important issues 
facing Scotland/ Britain today. However, a question asking what important issues we should be addressing today, or facing 
Scotland/Britain in the future, might generate very different responses. Thus, we should focus not on the figures themselves, but 





































































Figure 4 ‘What are the 3 most important 
Environmental issues facing your country today?’
 10
 
 Finally, it is interesting to note the relative 
importance of climate change in relation to a basket of 
other ‘environmental’ issues: British concern over 
climate change was 8 percentage points lower than the 
global average in 2011.  
 
 Moreover, concern over energy security, waste, 
and overpopulation topped concern for climate change 
in Britain (figure 4).  
 
 One reason why concern over climate change is 
not commensurate with the risk it poses, is that it is 
often perceived as a distant issue. This is addressed in 













3. The perceived immediacy of climate change 
People ‘psychologically distance’ themselves from climate change because they perceive it 
to be a future problem as well as geographically distant
11
. Temporal immediacy refers to the 
extent to which climate change is regarded as a problem for the present. Spatial immediacy 
refers to the extent to which climate change is perceived as a problem which will impact 
one’s locality, country, one’s region and so on. 
 
 
                                                          
10 Source: Ipsos Mori Global Advisor Available from: 
http://www.ipsosmori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive.aspx?page=3&keyword=Global+Advisor. 
























Implications for communication campaigns… 
The finding that energy security is a greater environmental concern amongst the British population than climate 
change. This has led some environmentalists to comment that concern about energy security can be used as a “hook 
by which campaigners can nudge the public towards many, if not all, pro-environmental behaviours” (McLennan, 
2011) 
However, in lieu of more research, there a good reasons to be circumspect about this: a recent study based on a 
nationally representative sample of the British population has marshalled evidence that “while concern about energy 
security appears to be steeped into a traditional worldview, concerns about climate change emerge from a more 
altruistic self-transcending worldview”.  They “did not find evidence for the assertion” that energy security concerns 
“may strengthen public support for the development of  new  low-carbon technologies and increase the willingness to 









 The extent to which climate change has been regarded as ‘a problem for the future’ 
has remained relatively stable over time with around a fifth of people holding this 
view from 200712.   
 
 However, between 2009 and 2013 the proportion of people disagreeing that climate 
change dropped significantly from 64% to 47%, because people became less certain 
that it is a problem for the present. This based on comparing figures from DEFRA’s 
2009 Public attitudes tracker and DEFRA’s 2013 ‘Climate risk’ survey.  
 
 
 Research undertaken by DEFRA13 in 2013 found that close to a half (45%) of people 
in the UK thought that “we are already feeling the effects of climate change”.  
 
 The same research found that relative concern for climate change doubles14 if asked 
what are the most important issues facing the UK in the future as opposed to the 




 A minority of people think that climate change is a problem for other countries 
rather than the UK. In 2008, SEABS found that 6% agreed that “climate change will 
only have an impact on other countries, so there is no need to…worry”
15
. Although 
there are no comparable figures for Scotland, in 2013, around a fifth of people in the 
UK agreed that climate change would “mostly affect areas that are far away from 
here”.   
 





 Less people (47%) think that their local area is likely to be affected by climate 
change, rather than their country more generally. This represents a statistically 




                                                          
12 Sources: SEABS (Davidson, et al., 2008), DEFRA public attitudes and behaviours tracker (Thornton, 2009), 
Climate risk acceptability (Ipsos Mori, 2013). NB: All listed sources asked respondents the extent to which they 
agree/disagree with the statement “the effects of climate change are too far in the future to really worry me”. 2008 
is Scottish data, whilst the other data points represent Britain/ the UK. There are no significant differences 
between the UK and Scotland. There was no Scottish data available other than SEABS. 
13 Ipsos Mori (2013). 
14
 5% identified climate change as one of the “three most important issues facing the UK today”, whilst 11% 
identified it as one of the “three most important issues facing the UK in the future”. 
15 Davidson, et al. (2008, p. 10) 
16
 Ipsos Mori (2013) 
17




 Over the same period, the proportion of people agreeing that “climate change is 
likely to have a big impact on people like me” remained relatively constant (45% 
and 43% in 2010 and 2013, respectively)
18
. This suggests that climate change is 
viewed as a threat to one’s self, locality and country by a sizable proportion of the 
UK population.  
 
 It has been suggested that extreme weather events influence people’s sense of the 
spatial immediacy of climate change. In 2013, three quarters of people in the UK 
who think that extreme weather events have become more frequent in the past 




 Moreover, when asked about specific climate impacts, flooding generates the most 
concern. Whilst only a third of people in the UK think that heat waves will become 
more common by 2050, around 8 in 10 think that flooding has become more 





4. Responsibility  
If people see climate change as an immediate issue, then it is likely that they will favour 
action. But who is deemed responsible for taking such action? Figure 6 shows who people in 
the UK see as most responsible for tackling climate change. People were asked to identify 
the most responsible entity, as well as the three most responsible entities.  
 
Figure 6 Responsibility for tackling climate change 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Poortinga, et al. (2013) 
19 Poortinga, et al. (2013) 
20
 Ipsos Mori (2013) 
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 In 2013, nearly 7 in 10 people in the UK identified ‘national government’ as one of 




 This backs up other research which has repeatedly shown that people think that the 
greatest responsibility to tackle climate change lies with ‘national government’
22
: 







 In 2013, 13% of people in the UK think that individuals/households are one of the 
three groups most responsible for tackling climate change
24
 (figure 6).  
 However, other surveys show that 7 in 10 people do feel as though they have some 
“responsibility to help do something about climate change”
 25
. This has remained 
steady between 2010 and 2013.  
 
 2013 research has found that nearly 8 in 10 people in the UK agree that “individuals 
and organisations who contribute towards climate change should take on the 




 However, with this figure it is worth bearing in mind that SEABS found that around 
a third of people living in Scotland didn’t believe that their “behaviour and lifestyle 
contribute towards climate change” 
  
Industry/Business 
 Similarly, 13% of people in the UK think industry/business is most responsible for 
tackling climate change, with 11% putting industry/ business as one of the three 
entities most responsible for tackling the issue (figure 6).  
 
 
The governance trap 
 These statistics lend credence to the idea that the so-called ‘governance trap’ - where 
“both the government and the governed seek to attribute primary responsibility to 
the other, and thus neither party acts in a decisive way”
 27
 – is one of the main 
barriers to effective action in the UK.  
 
 One oft proposed solution to the ‘governance trap’ is ‘local community’ as the 
‘meso’ scale of action between the individual (micro) and the state (macro), where 
people can make the most collective difference.  
                                                          
21 Ipsos Mori (2013) 
22 Ipsos Mori (2010; 2013) 
23 Eurobarometer (2011).  
24Ipsos Mori (2013) 
25 Poortinga, et al (2013) 
26 Ipsos Mori (2013) 





 In this context, it is interesting that still only 1% of people in the UK identify ‘local 




5. Trust and significance in sources of information 
Finally, in order to form coherent beliefs and attitudes about climate change, the public at 
large needs easy access to reliable and trustworthy information. However, the most trusted 
sources may not be regarded as the most accessible or significant. 
 
 
Figure 7 Percentage of people in the UK who  
use particular sources but do but not trust them, 2013. 




that in the UK, the 
most popular first 
stop for finding 
information about 
climate change is 
internet search 
engines such as 
Google, with just 
over half of people 
in the UK saying 




about a third of 
people use but don’t 




 “Government and Government agencies including their websites and their 
publications” were the second most popular source of information on climate 
change, with 37% of UK respondents saying that they would use such sources
29
. 
However, almost a quarter use but don’t trust this source (figure 7). 
 
 Nearly 2 in 5 use but don’t trust ‘media in general’ and ‘newspapers’, whilst 15% 
use but don’t trust TV as sources of information on climate change. 
 
 
                                                          
28 Ipsos Mori (2013) 















Figure 8 Percentage of people in the UK who trust particular sources but don’t use them. Source: 
Ipsos MORI (2013) 
 
 Scientists remain the most ‘trusted but not used’ sources (figure 8): 14% would trust 
but don’t use information from scientists working in universities, whilst 11% trust 














































 Turning to focus on media 
sources, 2013 polling suggests 
that mistrust outweighs trust for 
all media sources on climate 
change, although levels of trust 
in different media sources vary 
substantially (figure 9).  
 
 
 Around 1 in 2 trust the BBC, 
which perhaps unsurprisingly is 
the most trusted media source. 
In comparison, just over 1 in 10 
trust tabloid newspapers, which 
remain the least trusted media 
source. 
 






 Finally, the role of social networks and family institutions should not be 
underestimated as trusted sources: in a 2012 poll, 1 in 4 British people identified 
friends and family as the source they would “trust the most if they were giving their 




 2013 research of the US population found that “Americans are most likely to 
identify their own friends and family, such as a significant other (27%), son or 
daughter (21%), or close friend (17%), as the people who could motivate them to 





6. Conclusion: What drives changes in concern and belief?  
The pattern of decline in concern about climate change since 2008 in the UK is similar 
across the Western world
32
. One thing that is clear is that increasing scientific certainty has 





It’s the economy, stupid 
                                                          
30
 Ipsos Mori  (2012) 
31 Leiserowitz, et al. (2013) 
32 Ratter & von Storch (2012) 
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 Research drawing on aggregate public opinion trends from the 27 EU countries 
(including the UK), as well as the US has found that both concern and beliefs about 
climate change are most strongly determined by economic conditions. This research 
found that labour market conditions explain opinion trends better than weather 
extremes, media cycles and partisan politics: “a shift in the national unemployment 
rate from 5 to 9% in Europe…reduces the percentage of people reporting that global 




 This change in concern might be explained as a simple public goods dilemma in 
trying economic circumstances between now and the future.  
 
 However, a change in belief is harder to explain: one explanation is that if the 
perceived steps taken required to ameliorate climate change conflict with those 
perceived to be necessary to improving the economy, climate change beliefs are 
altered to overcome what psychologists call ‘cognitive dissonance’
35
. This may be 
one factor explaining the apparent rise in scepticism.  
 
It’s ideology, stupid 
 Controlling for the economy, research into US public opinion between 2002-2010 
found that “information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on 
public concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical 




 This reinforces the argument that concern and thus action does not necessarily 
follow knowledge. As the authors of this study conclude, efforts to address climate 
change must account for the fact that “political conflicts are ultimately resolved 




 Similarly, a recent study based on a nationally representative sample of the British 
population found that “the strong association with political preferences shows that 
the willingness to engage in environmental behaviours is rooted in ideology and 






The effect of extreme weather: does this matter? 
 Three quarters of people in the UK who think that extreme weather events have 




                                                          
34Scruggs & Benegal (2012, p. 513) 
35Scruggs & Benegal (2012, p. 508) 
36
 This research found that media attention was itself largely a function of elite cues (Brulle, et al., 2012, p. 169). 
37
 Brulle (2012, pp. 185-6) 
38Poortinga, et al. (2012, p. 818) 




 Moreover, whilst only a third think that heat waves will become more common by 
2050, around 8 in 10 think that flooding has become more frequent and will become 




 Importantly, recent research suggests that “those [UK citizens] who report 
experience of flooding express more concern over climate change, see it as less 
uncertain and feel more confident that their actions will have an effect on climate 
change”
41
. Although more research needs to be done, these results support the 
claims of commentators who suggest that there is a communicative challenge to be 
met in developing “a narrative that seeks to localize climate impact”. It also suggests 
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Appendix 5 Defining the enemy in the CCA 
Meta-
narrative 
General target Specific target(s) 
Climate 
change 
Aviation expansion BAA (Ferrovial) 
  Easy Jet 
 Carbon 
commodification 
Carbon Offset markets (Voluntary offset markets and the 
Clean Development Mechanism) 
  Carbon markets (The EU Emissions Trading Scheme) 
 Biofuel industry  Ensus 
 Biomass energy Forth Energy 
 Coal power Arch Coal 
  BHP Billiton 
  Drax Group Plc 
  Edelman PR (PR for E.On) 
  E.On 
  Hargreaves Services, Maltby Coal Mine South Yorkshire 
  N-Power 
  Scottish Coal and South Lanarkshire Council 
 Oil BP 
  Cairn Energy  
  Canadian Government 




  OptiCanada 
  Shell 
  Sonangol (Angolan State Oil Company) 
  Tullow Oil (Ireland) 
  Premiere Oil (UK) 
 Finance capital RBS 
  Barclays,   BNP Paribas, Citigroup Inc,  Deutsche Bank, 
HSBC,   JP Morgan Plc 
 General mining  BHP Billiton  
  Vedanta Resources  
  Orissa Mining Corporation  
Democracy The police  National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) (of which 
undercover police spy Mark Kennedy was a member)  the, and 
the use of Forward Intelligance Teams (FITs) 
  National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NECTU) 
  Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs) 
 Corporate-state 
collusion 
The Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR)  
 
  The Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
 Press 
misrepresentation  
The Daily Mail 
  The London Evening Standard 







                                                          
i
 As far as the evidential basis for this is concerned, in a Scottish national survey, Davidson et al (2008, p. 31) 
found in the Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours Survey (SEABS), that that educational attainment 
and socio-economic class and deprivation are the variables with the highest effect on level of environmental 
engagement. Using the SEABS dataset, I cross-tabulated aggregated dichotomous social class indicators (socio-
economic brackets A through C1, against C2 through E) with the response to the question “do you discuss the 
environment and climate change with people you know?” I found that 54.4% of respondents in class brackets A 
through C1 did discuss the environment and climate change, compared with 34.2% of those in class brackets C2 
through E. This relationship was statistically significant (Gamma (γ)= 0.24, (χ ²=92.97 (5 d.f.), p<0.05). 
 
ii For excellent histories/genealogies of neoliberalism, see the following works of David Harvey (2007), 
Stephanie Lee Mudge (2008), and Stuart Hall (2011). 
 
iii This will be elaborated in depth in chapter three. 
 
iv
 With regard to the alleged ‘newness’ of such movements, critics have, in my view, demonstrated 
through historical comparison that in every respect these simplistic dualities between old labour movements and 
new cultural movements are untenable, and say more about the normative convictions of their theoretical 
proponents than they do about actually existing social movements from the 1960s onwards. A new academic 
focus is hypostasised as a ‘new’ material reality. Calhoun, for example, (1995, pp. 391-392) shows that 
movements of the 19th century “constantly overflowed the bounds of the label ‘labour’”, and that the “beginning 
years of industrialization were particularly fertile for the proliferation of non-materialist movements” concerned 
with “identity, autonomy and self-realization”, a “politicization of everyday life”, “non-class or middle-class 
mobilisation”, “self-exemplification”, “unconventional means”, and “partial and overlapping commitments” 
(1995, pp. 393-410). Thus, debates over historical newness are in Edwards’s (2004, p. 128) opinion a “red 
herring”: what NSMT brought to the fore was a more holistic focus on social movements per se, where collective 
actors struggled against the dominance of ‘system world’ (read state and economy as irreducible) logics in 
determining how and why we live and work as we do, which could be read back in time to the labour movement 
and beyond. 
 
vi  Indeed, to take a Scottish snapshot through analysing the Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours 
Survey (SEABS) 2008 dataset (Davidson et al 2008), I found that only 0.8% of all respondents cited 
environmental non-governmental organisations’ (ENGO) information as being the most significant source on 
climate change. The most significant combined source of information overall unsurprisingly is tv and radio news 
and documentary at 65.5%, and newspapers (tabloids and broadsheets combined) are cited as the most significant 
source in 10.3% of cases. However, there is a large gap between perceptions of trust and significance in relation 
to ENGOs as informational sources on climate change: The original analysis tells us that ENGOs were cited as 
the second most trusted source of information on climate change amongst respondents at 25%, behind 
independent scientists at 45% (Davidson et al 2008). The least trusted sources were the UK government (34%), 
tabloids (34%), business and industry (22%), and the Scottish Government (17%) (ibid.). This dissonance 
between trust and significance taken into account, the intersection of green movements and media is made even 
more interesting. Please see appendix 4 for a fuller up-to date picture of trust in information sources.  
 
vii For a succinct and accessible “potted history of Transition” see Hopkins (2011, pp. 20-26). 
 
viii Peak oil can be understood as the point at which petroleum extraction reaches its maximum rate, after which 
production will gradually decline to the point where the energy input/output ratio of extraction is no longer 
viable. This can apply at varying scales—for example, to a particular field, or globally. See Bentley (2002) for a 
detailed explanation of the depletion of oil supplies. 




                                                                                                                                                                    
 
ix At the time of publishing the former document, the working group was convened by chief executives from the 
Climate Outreach and Information Network (COIN), Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), Friends of the 
Earth (FoE), Oxfam, and WWF. The working group itself consisted of senior campaign directors and heads of 
communication from each NGO. By the time the latter document was published, the coalition had expanded to 
include “Action for Children, Cambridge Carbon Footprint, the New Economics Foundation and Think Global” 
(Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 4). The latter document was also written in collaboration with independent think tank 
The Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC), whose primary interests are in strategic communications in climate 
change, energy, and economics.  
x It is important to note the distinction here between emergent and emerging: I use emergent in the philosophical 
sense, where it describes a system arising as an effect of complex causes and not simply as a sum of its parts (as 
in relations of internality in a totality). As I have argued, my understanding of emergence arises from non-
essentialist process ontologies, and is therefore wholly consonant with the ‘materialist’ Deleuzians such as Rosi 
Braidotti and Manuel DeLanda and the materialist poststructuralism of Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe, whose 
work I try to read tranversally.  
 
xi This, incidentally, is where I depart with Latour and his ANT thinking, or perhaps more accurately, rub up 
against the limits of its utility. Being ‘ants’ parochially following trails, and refusing the existence of the macro; 
or asking, ‘what is capitalism?’, ‘where can it be found?’, is all a rather futile process if we come to realise that 
our cognitive capacities to perceive reality and therefore complex causality are evolutionarily shaped, and 
therefore are not unproblematic windows to the world. Something like Manuel Delanda’s assemblage theory is 
far more useful in explicating a non-essentialist and materialist ontology capable of theorising part to whole 
relations and therefore emergent macro causality. The same could be said also of David Harvey’s dialectical 
imagination, shaped by Whiteheadian thought, and some more recently emerging work in what has been called 
































                                                                                                                                                                    
 
